M. J. Petry

G. W. F. Hegel The Berlin Phenomenology



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HERAUSGEGEBEN UND ÜBERSETZT

MIT EINER EINLEITUNG

UND ERLÄUTERUNGEN

von

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EDITED AND TRANSLATED

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

by

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


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To Oriel

INHALTS-ANZEIGE

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PREFACE

Since the three volume edition of Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* (1978, 1979[2]) has been so well received, I have been encouraged to select that part of it most suitable for teaching purposes, and to publish it here as a separate work.

As a teaching text, the *Berlin Phenomenology* has several important advantages. Unlike so many of Hegel's writings, most notably the *Jena Phenomenology* of 1807, it is concise and to the point, and concerned with issues already familiar to most students of philosophy. Since it consists for the most part of a searching and radical analysis of Kant's epistemology, Fichte's ethics and Schelling's system-building, it provides first-rate insight into Hegel's assessment of his immediate predecessors. When considered in context, as part of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, it enables us to distinguish clearly between the systematic, the logical and the psychological aspects of Hegelianism, and is therefore also relevant to some of the central issues in modern phenomenology.

It is to be hoped that the introduction and notes prepared for the present edition will prove helpful to both teachers and students. Every effort has been made to produce a thoroughly reliable basic text and an accurate translation. The text published in 1978 was prepared at the Hegel Archive in Bochum from photocopies, and I am most grateful to the Central Interfaculty of the Erasmus University, Rotterdam, for having made it possible for me to check the printed version against the original manuscripts.

I should like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Frau Dr. I. Stolzenberg of the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, and Prof. Dr. L. Bohmüller of the University Library, Jena, for allowing me access to the manuscripts in their care. Without the help of my wife in transcribing and checking the text and in typing out the finished manuscript, the preparation of this edition would not have been possible.

M. J. P.

Rotterdam
December 1980

INTRODUCTION

a. CONSCIOUSNESS

> Our sciences, *taken merely as such*, are games, which the human spirit invents to pass its time. In playing them, *it organizes only its ignorance*, gets not a hair's breadth nearer to any cognition of what is *true*. — JACOBI.

It is useful to begin any enquiry into Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, by reminding ourselves that the great majority of its expositions are based almost exclusively upon the ordinary non-philosophical knowledge of the time. Recent research, particularly the discovery of his library list and the analysis of the sources referred to in his lectures, has shown how much of his basic information was drawn from standard text-books, professional journals or first-hand accounts of investigations and experiences. He evidently had little or no interest in professedly philosophical interpretations of this material. As he was never tired of emphasizing, it was the empirical sciences of his day which provided him with the subject-matter of his philosophy,[1] and from the very beginning of his public career he showed that he was fully aware of what this implied with regard to the contingency of his expositions. In his first acknowledged publication for example, the essay on the *Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, he observes that since, "all knowledge has one foot in the sphere of finitude", it is essential that philosophy should, "give the division into subject and object its due" and "admit the claims of separation just as much as those of identity."[2] It was, indeed, one of his fundamental tenets, that the knowledge provided by the empirical sciences constitutes an essential part of the very foundations of systematic thinking. Unlike Kant and Fichte therefore, he did not regard philosophy as simply the tribunal of pure reason, committed by its very nature to the rejection or justification of each and every claim to knowledge.

Nor did he regard the philosophy he was propounding as merely a matter of empirical contingency, for he was fully persuaded that the systematic

[1] *Enc.* §§ 26–39; *Phil. Nat.* I.201; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.ix–xix; *Phil. Right* pp. 10–12.
[2] *Ges. Werke* 4.63; Eng. ed. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf (Albany, 1977), p. 156.

exposition of the various sciences carried out in the *Encyclopaedia* had its own validity, and whatever we may think of this distinction between contingent content and general principle, empirical material and philosophic form, it is essential that we should not overlook it. As he conceived of the interrelationship it involves, it is systematic exposition which endows empiricism with philosophical significance. When commenting upon Jacobi's assertion that our sciences are nothing but organized ignorance, he therefore made no attempt to deny it, but simply observed that one should not forget that, "ignorance is cognition of singularities, and that by being organized it becomes a kind of knowledge."[3]

When getting to grips with the actual content and pervading system of the *Encyclopaedia*, – with its reconstruction of the judgement and syllogism for example, with its analysis of Newtonian mechanics and Goethean optics, with its interpretation of the chemistry of Berthollet and Berzelius, the zoological systems of Lamarck and Cuvier, even with its systematic expositions of world history, art and religion,[4] – we find, therefore, that we are working not only with empirical material accessible to the ordinary processes of historical investigation, but also with a framework or structure of general principles. Since there was usually a well-defined consensus of informed opinion concerning the topics being dealt with, it is nearly always possible to reach a fairly satisfactory assessment of the significance and effectiveness of the work's general principles by analyzing Hegel's reasons for accepting, rejecting, reformulating or criticizing the basic empirical material he had at his disposal.

Unfortunately, this approach can not be very readily adopted when attempting to assess his phenomenology or doctrine of consciousness, the reason being that during the opening decades of the nineteenth century there was as little general agreement on the nature of the subject-matter of this discipline as there is today. The principles of its systematic exposition are the same as those employed throughout the *Encyclopaedia*, but the cultural and historical origins of its basic material are difficult to locate. Phenomenology had first been brought into discussion as a distinct discipline by the mathematician and logician J. H. Lambert, who had conceived of it as the theory of the appearances constituting the bases of all cognition deriving from experience. Lambert defined its main task as the detection of the illusions arising from these appearances. He maintained that just as an optician can employ the principles of perspective in order to distinguish between real and apparent relationships in space, so a philosopher can make use of the principles of phenomenology in order to distinguish between true and illusory know-

[3] *Ges. Werke* 4.71; Eng. ed. p. 166: *Jacobi an Fichte* (Hamburg, 1799); F. H. Jacobi *Werke* (ed. F. Roth, 6 vols. Leipzig, 1812–1825) vol. 3. 29.

[4] *Enc.* §§ 166–193; *Phil. Nat.* I.221–283; II.135–160; 178–193; *Enc.* §§ 548–571.

ledge.[5] Kant on the other hand, who was well acquainted with Lambert's writings and made good use of them in working out his own critical philosophy, confined the scope of phenomenology to consideration of the epistemological problems involved in distinguishing between relative and absolute space and motion.[6] Fichte, like Lambert, treated it as a general doctrine of appearance and illusion, distinct from that of truly scientific knowledge, but his conception of it was not widely accepted, and among the minor philosophers and psychologists of the time we find a bewildering diversity of opinion concerning both the subject-matter and the principles of the discipline.[7]

The treatment of consciousness in the attempts Hegel made at working out a systematic philosophy while teaching at the University of Jena (1801/7) reflect this general situation, and give evidence of deep-rooted uncertainty concerning its precise nature. In the lectures of 1803/4 for example, he treats it as including not only sub-conscious states such as animal magnetism and mental derangement, but also the psychological factors involved in language and social relationships, topics he was later to have good reasons for classifying rather differently.[8] He evidently found it difficult to clarify his ideas on the matter, for his treatment of it in the lectures of 1805/6 shows a similar lack of systematic precision.[9] His fundamental difficulty evidently lay in his being unable to decide whether consciousness was to be regarded as a limited sphere of specialized enquiry, closely related to that of empirical psychology, or as a matter of central philosophical importance. This is particularly apparent in the system sketched in 1804/5, the logic of which is rounded off with a "metaphysics" or doctrine of consciousness, sub-divided into its theoretical, practical and absolute aspects. Although the text contains no explicit reference to Kant's three critiques or to the way in which Kant, Fichte and Schelling had opened up the theoretical, practical and teleological potential of the new critical philosophy, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that in ascribing such a central philosophical significance to consciousness, Hegel must have had these developments in mind. The manuscript remained unpublished until long after his death, and he never again put forward such a metaphysics as the culmination of his logic. Nevertheless, the text is of the utmost importance for understanding his philosophical development, since it provides such an excellent illustration of the main difficulty he then faced in attempting to formulate a satisfactory doctrine of consciousness. Had he destroyed it, we should have known only of his first confused attempts at

[5] J. H. Lambert (1728–1777) *Neues Organon* (2 vols. Leipzig, 1764) II.217 ff.

[6] I. Kant *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (Riga, 1786) sect. 4.

[7] J. G. Fichte *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Vorgetragen im Jahre 1804* (*Nachgelassene Werke* ed. I. H. Fichte, vol. 2, p. 195, Bonn, 1834); *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.360–361.

[8] *Jen. Syst.* I.273–326: *Phil. Sub. Sp.* II.243–323; 327–387; III.171–199; 231–269.

[9] *Jen. Syst.* III.185–222.

working out the relationship between consciousness, the sub-conscious and psychology.[10]

It was evidently during the spring of 1805 that he finally decided to treat consciousness as a matter of major philosophical significance, and not simply as the immediate presupposition of psychology. It was a rash decision, for even at this time he was well aware of its close affinity with mental derangement,[11]and what he had in mind was no longer a metaphysics based on a logic, but a "scientific" exposition of the "experience of consciousness",[12] that is to say, something not so very far removed from a psychology. It was, however, a "psychology" which would, he hoped, provide a satisfactory introduction to both logic and systematic philosophy.

The outcome of this new conception of consciousness was the *Jena Phenomenology*, published in 1807. In an advertisement which appeared at the time in several periodicals and which was almost certainly written by Hegel himself, the significance of the work was summarized as follows: "This book demonstrates how *knowledge arises*. Psychological explanation, as well as the more abstract expositions of what is basic to knowledge, should be replaced by the phenomenology of spirit. In phenomenology the *preparation* for science is considered from a point of view which makes it in itself a new and interesting science, as well as the initial science of philosophy. It includes the various *shapes of spirit* within itself as stages in the progress through which spirit becomes pure knowledge or absolute spirit. Thus, the main divisions of this science, which fall into further sub-divisions, include a consideration of consciousness, self-consciousness, observational and active reason, as well as spirit itself, – in its ethical, cultural and moral, and finally in its religious forms. The apparent chaos of the wealth of appearances in which spirit presents itself when first considered, is brought into a scientific order, exhibited in its necessity, in which imperfect appearances resolve themselves and pass over into the higher ones constituting their proximate truth. They

[10] *Jen. Syst.* II.154–178.

[11] *Jen. Syst.* I.285: "This *formal being* of consciousness has no true *reality, it is something subjective*, has no external existence . . . As this empirical imagination, consciousness is *an empty* waking or sleeping dream, *devoid of truth*, or a permanent derangement." In the mature philosophical system he returns to this analysis of consciousness and classifies it as only one remove from mental derangement: "When someone speaks in a deranged manner, one should always begin by reminding him of *his overall situation*, his *concrete actuality*. If, when he is brought to consider and to be aware of this objective context, he still fails to relinquish his false presentation, there can be no doubt that he is in a state of derangement. – It follows from this exposition that a presentation may be said to be *deranged* when the deranged person regards an *empty abstraction* and a *mere possibility* as something *concrete* and *actual*, for we have established that the precise nature of such a presentation lies in the deranged person's *abstracting* from his concrete actuality." (*Phil. Sub. Sp.* II.343).

[12] *Ges. Werke* 9.444.

find their final truth first in religion and then in science, as the result of the whole. – In the *foreword* the author expresses his view of what appears to him to be the requirement of philosophy at its present standpoint, of the degrading of present-day philosophy through the pretentiousness and harmfulness of philosophical formulae, and of what the general study and significance of philosophy involves. – A *second* volume will contain the system of *logic* as speculative philosophy, and the two further divisions of philosophy, the *sciences* of *nature* and of *spirit*."[13]

In his earlier systematic writings, as we have seen, Hegel had attempted, rather unsuccessfully, to indicate the precise relationship between consciousness and its immediate foundations in the sub-conscious and physiology. In the professedly "scientific" *Jena Phenomenology* however, he simply kicked off with sense-certainty, making no reference at all to its presuppostions. Although he had decided to treat consciousness as a matter of central philosophical significance, the 1804/5 conception of it reappears not in the elevated role of a metaphysics rounding off a logic, but as the initial and quite evidently basic exposition of consciousness, self-consciousness and reason.[14] In fact the main body of the work, as is indicated in the advertisement, is not a treatment of consciousness at all, but an exposition of "the various shapes of spirit", – ethical, cultural, historical, political and religious.[15] It might, perhaps, be conceded that by exhibiting the limitations of such extremely complex spiritual phenomena, even if it does so only in very general terms, the work does manage to provide a fairly satisfactory introduction to the comprehensive consideration of logical categories. The way in which these spiritual "shapes" are treated is vague and impressionistic in the extreme however, and it can hardly be maintained that the work makes it self-evident that they have been brought into any sort of "scientific order".

After the publication of the *Jena Phenomenology*, Hegel never again had recourse to such a teleological exposition of the "experience of consciousness" as an introduction to his philosophical system. He never completely rejected the work, since for all its imperfections it could not be regarded as entirely at odds with systematic thinking, but nor did he ever encourage anyone to take it very seriously.[16] He concentrated instead upon integrating

[13] *Ges. Werke* 9.446–447.

[14] *Ges. Werke* 9.53–237; *Jena Phen.* §§ 90–437.

[15] *Ges. Werke* 9.238–434; *Jena Phen.* §§ 438–808.

[16] It would, in any case, not have been policy to do so, since the early reviews, without exception, were either obtusely adulatory or uncomprehendingly critical. Not one of Hegel's contemporaries showed any real appreciation of the book's true significance. Goethe, after reading part of it, admitted that he was lost for words, and thought it impossible "to say anything more monstrous". Daub took it to be a "history of spirit", Michelet thought that no part of it should have been included in the later system, Gabler tried to scholasticize it etc. See *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.lxvi–lxxx; III.359–362; *Berlin Phen.* introd. ch. g; *L. Logic* 28–29; *Enc.* § 36 (1817), § 25 (1830); *Phil. Right* §§ 8, 35.

his doctrine of consciousness into his systematic philosophy, a procedure involving the extensive exploration of the sub-conscious which eventually gave rise to the *Anthropology*, a more rigorous and analytical examination of consciousness, self-consciousness and reason, the formulation of a sharper distinction between consciousness and psychology, and the development of the mature philosophy of spirit, especially the history of philosophy, as the proper introduction to the *Logic*.[17] He must have decided upon this revised programme very soon after the publication of the *Jena Phenomenology*, for as early as 1808 he drew up a syllabus for his pupils at Nuremberg in which the main features of his mature doctrine of consciousness are already clearly apparent. The stages by which the *Berlin Phenomenology* developed out of the Jena and pre-Jena writings are well documented, and will be considered in detail in the next chapter. Here we have only to note that as the *Jena Phenomenology* was dismantled and built into the mature system, it became increasingly irrelevant even as an introduction to systematic thinking, and that Hegel made no bones about acknowledging this.[18]

It is one of the major curiosities of the history of Hegel scholarship, that despite the general attention paid to the *Jena Phenomenology*, there has hitherto been no attempt to compare it with its Berlin counterpart, and so bring to light the crucial differences between the phenomenological and the systematic aspects of Hegel's thinking. It is to be hoped that the present publication will help to remedy this situation. If we are now to undertake the task of indicating the basic differences between the two works, it will be useful to begin by noticing what they have in common, that is to say, that Hegel always regarded consciousness as "a being-for-self in the face of its other", as involving some sort of subject-object difference. The obscurity of the Jena work often derives from the fact that the precise nature of the particular subject-object difference under discussion is not always clear. In the *Berlin Phenomenology* on the other hand, we find a consistently worked out doctrine involving four distinct kinds of consciousness.

The first of these, what Hegel calls everyday consciousness (17,21) constitutes the basic subject-matter of its expositions. Here, the subject-object difference is simply that between the conscious subject and that of which it is conscious: the subject is conscious, for example, of sensations (§ 418), of the

[17] *Enc.* §§ 387–482; *Phil. Sub. Sp.*

[18] *Bew.* (1808/9). In the preface to the first part of his *Logic* (1812), Hegel observes that it had been his intention that, "the first part of the *System of Science*, which contains the *Phenomenology*, should be followed by a second part containing logic and the two concrete sciences, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit." In a note added to this passage in the second edition of the work (1831), he observes that the *Phenomenology* is no longer to be regarded as the first part of the system, since: "In place of the projected second part, which was to contain all the other philosophical sciences, I have since brought out the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*." *L. Logic* 29.

co-ordination of appearances in natural laws (§ 422), of other living beings (§ 423), of an object of desire (§ 426), of being dominated by someone (§ 433). In such consciousness the subject is actually, existentially, unreflectively involved in a particular relationship, and in that this relationship merely constitutes part of the basic material of Hegel's expositions, it is to be regarded as differing in no essential respect from a planet's involvement in the solar system, or an element's involvement in a chemical compound etc. The fact that the subject-matter is consciousness and not the mechanical movement of material bodies or chemical bonding, has no bearing at all upon its intrinsic significance as a field of enquiry. If we want to grasp the wider historical importance of the epistemological status ascribed to this everyday consciousness within the *Berlin Phenomenology*, we might, therefore, compare it with Galilei's postulation of the primary, objective and mechanical properties of bodies, Kant's doctrine of the thing in itself, or Mill's definition of matter as a permanent possibility of sensation. Unlike these thinkers however, Hegel is concerned here not with distinguishing knowing from being, but simply with what is. He is, however, ready to admit that although use has to be made of such uncompromising realism, it is essential not to overlook its limitations: "The initial attitude of thought to objectivity is the *naive* procedure which is still not conscious of thought's involving its own opposition. It entertains the *belief* that *truth* is *ascertained* through *thinking things over*, that objects are brought before consciousness as they really are. It is in this belief that thought advances straight upon general objects, reproduces the content of sensations and intuitions from out of itself as a content of thought, and is satisfied with such as with truth. All rudimentary philosophy, all the sciences, even the daily doings and activities of consciousness, live in this faith."[19]

Everyday consciousness therefore gives rise naturally and immediately to what Hegel calls *empirical consciousness*,[20] which treats the subject's being conscious of sensations, natural laws etc., as *objects* of enquiry, and by specifying the factors which distinguish these relationships and the characteristics they have in common, works out an analytical survey of consciousness in general. A subject existentially involved in its object of desire, in dominating or being dominated etc., is not conscious of the limitations of the subject-object relationship in which it stands. It is the specification, analysis and classification of this relationship by means of empirical enquiry which first brings to light its limitations: "It is only for that which is beyond the limit, in which it is implicitly sublated, that there is a limit. It is not for the stone itself that its finitude is a limit: the limit is present only for that which is beyond it."[21] Empirical consciousness analyzes everyday consciousness into

[19] *Enc.* § 26.
[20] *Berlin Phen.* 17, 30; cf. note 17, 21.
[21] *Enc.* §§ 37–38; *Berlin Phen.* 65, 36.

various fields of enquiry in precisely the same way as it analyzes the solar system into motion, matter, planets, satellites, Kepler's laws etc., or chemistry into atomic structures, bonding, acids, salts etc. In the *Berlin Phenomenology*, for example, it analyzes sensuous consciousness (§§ 418–423) into sensing objectivity, perceiving connections between the various determinations of sense-data, understanding the laws inherent within these connections etc.; self-consciousness (§§ 424–437) into the desire to exploit and enjoy, the struggle to dominate and command, the rationality of mutual recognition etc.[22] Throughout the work, the delineation or classification of such fields of enquiry by empirical consciousness is simply accepted. Hegel is not concerned, at this juncture, with tracing, reconstructing, analyzing or justifying the complexity of inspired, intuitive, paradigmatic, inductive or deductive procedures by means of which empiricism derives its subject-matter from everyday consciousness.

To empirical consciousness, there is nothing absolutely fundamental about the ego, and in his early writings Hegel made several attempts to bring out the relationship in which it stands to both the sub-conscious and psychology. It is therefore the implications of his doctrine of consciousness in respect of the ego which distinguish it most markedly from what he calls the *ordinary consciousness* of Kant and Fichte.[23] In the *Berlin Phenomenology* he treats the ego as accessible to empirical analysis. Curiously enough he is therefore in substantial agreement with Hume, who after finding that he was unable to distinguish himself from his sense impressions, concluded that mankind in general, "are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."[24] He is not in complete agreement, since he does postulate a natural ego as the basis of consciousness[25], but he was not prepared to follow Kant and Fichte in also ascribing a transcendental significance to the conscious ego. Kant, like Descartes before him, and Husserl after him, conceived of this transcendental ego as the absolute presupposition of both consciousness and logical categories: "All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the *I think*, in the subject in which this diversity is found. But this presentation, *I think*, is an act of *spontaneity*; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it *pure apperception*, in order to distinguish it from empirical; or *primitive apperception*, because it is a self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the presentation *I think*, must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our presentations. It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no presentation can exist *for me*. The unity of

[22] *Berlin Phen.* notes 21, 36; 29, 35 and 59, 6.
[23] § 415, see especially *Berlin Phen.* 17, 32.
[24] *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739/40; ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1909) p. 534.
[25] § 413.

this apperception I call the *transcendental* unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of *a priori* cognition arising from it."[26] In the following chapter we shall examine Hegel's reasons for thinking that Kant had not grasped the full implication of the distinction between "pure and empirical apperception", and the reasoning behind his treating the logical considerations which gave rise to Kant's postulation of a *transcendental* ego as essentially irrelevant to the subject-matter of the *Berlin Phenomenology*. Here we have only to note that it was the subject-object relationships implicit in Kantian theories of knowledge and ethical activity which he took to be phenomenological in the strict sense of the term, and that his mature conception of phenomenology was therefore the direct outcome of his assessment of the philosophical significance of Kantianism.

Ordinary consciousness, as typified by Kant, was an advance upon empiricism in that it attempted to relate both the thing in itself of everyday consciousness and the analyses and classifications of empirical consciousness, to what it regarded as the absolutely basic factor of the transcendental ego. At the same time, however, it drew a sharp distinction between the subjective unity of apperception and the thing in itself. In respect of the rational understanding of what is objective to the ego, it therefore committed itself to developing a dialectic of consciousness, to formulating the "antinomies of pure reason", contradictory conceptions of objectivity, each of which might be entertained with equal plausibility.[27] It failed to attain to the spiritual standpoint which accepts the complementarity and the constantly diversifying emergence of such antinomies as a matter of course, recognizing them as the natural outcome of the analytical and synthetic procedures employed in the systematic exposition of "*all* general objects or species, all presentations, notions and ideas."[28]

In the *Berlin Phenomenology* not only the ego, but also the various aspects of consciousness related to it by Kant, Fichte and Schelling, are submitted to systematic assessment by *comprehending consciousness*, that is to say, by the consciousness basic to the exposition of the entire *Encyclopaedia*. In the light of this systematic assessment, the antinomies or mutually contradictory propositions of ordinary consciousness are seen to be complementary aspects of consciousness as a whole. Ordinary consciousness, for example, might maintain that it could be argued with equal plausibility that to be conscious of natural laws is to have perceptions (§ 420) or that it is to have an under-

[26] *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787) B132. Cf. Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* (tr. D. Cairns, The Hague, 1960); D. Carr *Kant, Husserl, and the Nonempirical Ego* ('Journal of Philosophy' vol. LXXIV pp. 682–690, 1977).
[27] The examples given by Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787) B454–489, are the limitation or unlimitedness of the world in space and time, the atomism or infinite divisibility of matter, universal freedom or causality, and the existence or non-existence of a necessary being.
[28] *Enc.* § 48, see *Berlin Phen.* note 11, 33. On the "spiritual standpoint", see *Berlin Phen.* 101–105.

standing of necessity (§ 422), and that since such consciousness cannot have both, a rational understanding of it necessarily involves the acceptance of this antinomy. Comprehending consciousness, by indicating the systematic interrelationship subsisting between perceptions, an understanding of necessity and laws, resolves the apparent contradiction into complementarity.

If we are to learn to make use of the methodology that gave rise to the treatment accorded to consciousness in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, it is therefore essential that we should see precisely what is involved in calling attention to such systematic interrelationships. Hegel gives the following account of the way in which comprehending consciousness draws upon the findings of its empirical counterpart: "*Simple sensuous* consciousness merely *knows* things, simply indicates them in their immediacy. *Perception* grasps their connection however, and by showing that the presence of certain conditions has a certain consequence, begins to *demonstrate* the *truth* of things. This *demonstration* is not final however, but still deficient. Since that by means of which something is here supposed to be demonstrated is *presupposed*, it is itself in *need of demonstration*. In this field one therefore enters into the *infinite* progression of moving from *presuppositions* to *presuppositions*. – This is the standpoint of *experience*. Everything has to be *experienced*. If this is to be a matter of *philosophy* however, one has to raise oneself above the demonstrations of empiricism, which remain bound to presuppositions, into proof of the *absolute necessity* of things."[29] It is, therefore, empirical consciousness which carries out the preliminary analytical work, and comprehending consciousness which synthesizes it, not simply by relating it to the ego, but by expounding the presuppositions brought to light by analysis as a necessary progression in degree of complexity, a series or hierarchy of asymmetrical relationships.

As has just been observed, this progression or hierarchy constitutes the central principle of both the *Berlin Phenomenology* and the entire *Encyclopaedia*. Hegel refers to its completely universal significance as the Idea, and to its involvement with empiricism and with the basic subject-matter of the *Encyclopaedia* as the Notion[30], and distinguishes as follows between comprehending and empirical consciousness: "We comprehend consciousness, we know of it, have the Notion of it before us, and it is thus that we speak of it with its determinations before us. Consciousness as such, as what is empirical, does not have these determinations before it, does not know of them. That which lies in the Notion of consciousness does not pertain to consciousness as such, to empirical or everyday consciousness."[31] Consequently, since we necessarily constitute part of everyday or empirical con-

[29] Note 43, 8.
[30] § 437; note 93, 21.
[31] See *Berlin Phen*. 17, 16; note 17, 21. Cf. the way in which this distinction determined Hegel's assessment of the ego as merely "formal identity" (§ 415; note 11, 23).

sciousness, and since the Idea can only be realized through the working out of the Notion of whatever field of enquiry we are occupied with: "Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an illustration of what is dialectical. We know that instead of being stable and ultimate, everything is finite, changeable and transient: and this is nothing other than the dialectic of finitude, whereby that which is finite, being implicitly the other of its own self, is also forced beyond its own immediate being, and switches into its opposite."[32]

The task of comprehending consciousness in the *Berlin Phenomenology* is therefore to expound the intrinsically antinomical or dialectical findings of empirical consciousness within the sphere of everyday consciousness, as a hierarchy of complementary levels or asymmetrical relationships. Since this has never been very widely recognized, and there is such diversity of opinion concerning the nature of Hegel's speculative method and the way in which it involves negation and sublation, it may be worth observing that in this work, as throughout the *Encyclopaedia*, it is the progressive inclusion of levels within a sphere which is referred to as sublation or negation, and that the two terms are, to all intents and purposes synonymous.[33] When dealing with the interrelationship between two egos in self-consciousness for example, Hegel speaks of the general object's being "sublated in respect of its externality, negated, so transformed into me, that I become free" (27,20). He means in fact that he has analyzed the relative complexity of the interrelationships implicit within the one now under consideration, and can, therefore, expound them as being sublated or negated within it. This does not mean, however, that sublation and negation are simply aspects of his methodology, and therefore devoid of any ontological significance. Since the interrelationship between the two egos is a matter of everyday consciousness, not only of analysis, it really does sublate or negate that into which it has been analyzed. The ontological significance of the analytical and synthetic procedures of Hegel's expositions is based upon realism and empiricism, and it is this basis, and this basis alone, which guarantees that the method or system can really coincide with its subject-matter. System and subject-matter are not identical, however, and it is therefore quite possible that we should find ourselves accepting the necessity of Hegel's systematic exposition, but objecting to the way in which he has handled its everyday, empirical or Notional aspect.

Since the main principles of the analysis to which consciousness is submitted in the *Berlin Phenomenology* are also to be found in Hegel's earliest attempts at systematic thinking, there would appear to be little point in questioning his mature judgement in rejecting the *Jena Phenomenology* as a suitable introduction to his philosophy. The limitations of the book, even when it is regarded as no more than a treatment of consciousness, are only too

[32] *Enc.* § 81; note 67, 27.
[33] *Berlin Phen.* introd. cii, cvii; notes 19, 15, 49, 25, 91, 5.

apparent. It throws no light at all upon the vexed question of the relationship between consciousness and its subconscious and physiological foundations, and although the opening sections on consciousness (§§ 90–165), self-consciousness (§§ 166–230) and reason (§§ 231–239) correspond broadly to those so headed in the Berlin version[34], their systematic structure as well as their analyses of the philosophical accomplishments of Kant, Fichte and Schelling are much less carefully worked out. As is only too evident from the writings of those who have tried to make out a case for regarding it as a work of major philosophical importance, it confuses the essentially distinct roles of empirical and comprehending consciousness. On the central issue of the philosophy of spirit for example, although its original purpose was only to treat the subject-matter as "the experience of consciousness", it also becomes involved in assessing it from the standpoint of comprehending consciousness. Since this section therefore lacks any proper empirical foundation, it falls far short of the *Encyclopaedia* and the Berlin lectures in systematic cohesion, clarity and comprehensiveness,[35] and is, therefore, much less satisfactory than the later *Philosophy of Spirit* as an introduction to the *Logic*.

After the publication of the *Jena Phenomenology*, Hegel never again had recourse to a teleological exposition of the "experience of consciousness" as an introduction to his philosophical system. He did not abandon the methodology of the work entirely, for in the lectures on the Philosophy of Religion delivered in 1824 he sketched an approach to the comprehension of religion through the stages of immediate knowledge, feeling, reflection and thought, which was quite evidently modelled upon it. He was, however, careful to distinguish this approach from its systematic or speculative counterpart, and he made no further mention of it in his subsequent lectures on the subject.[36]

b. DEVELOPMENT

> We are to search by what steps and degrees the soul of man riseth unto perfection of knowledge. — HOOKER.

Although Kant saw the necessity of distinguishing between "pure and empirical apperception", he and his contemporaries were aware that he had

[34] *Ges. Werke* 9.63–102; 103–131; 132–137.
[35] *Jena Phen.* §§ 240–808; *Ges. Werke* 9.137–434; *Enc.* §§ 440–577. The main fields of enquiry included within the Philosophy of Spirit are psychology, law, morality, social ethics, history, art, religion, philosophy.
[36] R. Heede *Die göttliche Idee und ihre Erscheinung in der Religion* (Diss. Münster, 1972) pp. 125–140. An English translation of this work, to be published by Nijhoff of The Hague, is in preparation.

been unable to provide a satisfactory analysis of the relationship between the logical and psychological aspects of his "transcendental deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding". The account he gave of it in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was based upon a heterogeneous assemblage of notes, and still contained some of his pre-critical postulates, most notably that of the transcendental object, "which alone can confer objective reality upon all our empirical concepts".[1] For the second edition of the work he prepared a completely new version of the deduction in which he attempted to bring out its logical as opposed to its psychological aspects. Since he realized that he had not managed to demonstrate conclusively that the unity necessary to knowledge was anything other than empirical, in the revised version he tried to show that the logical form of the judgement is, "nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception", that is to say, providing them with a validity independent of the subjective or psychological processes through which it is apprehended. In the final version of the *Critique of Pure Reason* it is therefore the categories cognized through judgements which are presented as constituting the logical unity which makes apperception and experience possible.[2] The basic uncertainty remained however, and many passages in the revised version left Kant's critics wondering where the line between what is logical and what is psychological was to be drawn, if, indeed, it was to be drawn at all.[3]

Some of the problems Kant raised seemed to make it essential that psychological should not be confused with logical subjectivity, and yet gave rise to further problems once the distinction had been drawn. For example, when faced with the apparent necessity of an infinite reiteration of introspective presuppositions if he admitted the possibility of the subject's being the object of its own intuition, he distinguished between the psychological nature of intuition and the logical nature of the understanding, and pointed out that any investigation of introspection must necessarily presuppose the logical unity of the understanding: "Apperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal sense. The former, as the source of all our synthetical conjunction, applies, under the name of categories, to the manifold of *intuitions in general*, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects. The internal sense, on the contrary, contains merely the form of intuition, but without any synthetical conjunction of the manifold therein, and consequently does not contain any *determined* intuition, which is possible only through consciousness of the determination of the manifold by the transcendental act of the imagination."[4] Even if we accept this as a satis-

[1] A 109. For an analysis of the stages in its development, see N. K. Smith *A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"* (1918; reprinted. London, 1979) pp. 202–234.

[2] *Critique of Pure Reason* B 139–143 (§§ 18–20).

[3] See, for example, B 144–145 (§ 21).

[4] *Critique of Pure Reason* B 154.

factory solution of the infinite reiteration problem, we might very well ask why distinguishing between apperception and internal sense should require our denying any power of synthesis to the latter. Interpreting Kant's conception of this particular problem becomes even more difficult when we find him criticizing the rational psychology of the Cartesians for having postulated a unitary self or substance having a series of presentations as its attributes,[5] and then going on to maintain that the purely logical entity of the transcendental subject may be cognized by means of its predicates: "We can lay at the foundation of psychology nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless presentation *I*, which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this I, or He, or It, who or which thinks, nothing more is presented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception. Hence we are obliged to go round this presentation in a perpetual circle, inasmuch as we must always employ it, in order to frame any judgement respecting it."[6]

There might well appear to be no very obvious connection between this predominantly subjectivist and analytical approach to the relationship between the logical and psychological aspects of subjectivity, and Hegel's conception of phenomenology as the introduction to logic or of consciousness as the teleological termination of it. Teleological thinking is discussed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but not very extensively, and with reference to cosmological and theological matters, not logic or psychology.[7] We have, therefore, to turn to the *Critique of Judgement* if we are to relate Hegel's conception of these matters to its Kantian origins.[8] In this work, Kant brings out the importance of thinking in terms of ends by analyzing the basic difference between a mechanism and an organism. He points out that since an organism has the power to impart form to material which is inherently devoid of it, it cannot be interpreted in terms of the mere motion of a machine. He then explores the further implications of this by conceiving of the body politic in terms of the organism, and ascribing a theological significance to teleological thinking. This aspect of his critical philosophy had a great influence upon Schelling's philosophy of nature, and through the

[5] *Critique of Pure Reason* B 399–403. T. Wilkerson, *Kant on Self-Consciousness* ('Philosophical Quarterly' vol. 30 no. 118 pp. 47–60, January 1980), questions the correctness of Kant's interpretation of Descartes on this point.
[6] *Critique of Pure Reason* B 404.
[7] B 715–720. Cf. B 394: "From the cognition of self to the cognition of the world, and through these to the Supreme Being, the progression is so natural, that it seems to resemble the logical march of reason from the premisses to the conclusion."
[8] 1790; tr. J. C. Meredith, Oxford, 1961. Cf. *Berlin Phen.* notes 5, 14; 31, 8; 49, 25; 51, 28; 51, 32; 101, 10.

emphasis it laid upon the general significance of the organism, upon Hegel's philosophical system as a whole. Hegel therefore comments upon it at some length in his lectures in the history of philosophy, noting the similarity between Kant's and Aristotle's views on the purposefulness of nature, and criticizing the former for having taken up only the subjective aspect of the matter.[9]

It would be difficult to overestimate Kant's influence upon the climate of opinion within which Hegel worked out the general principles of his philosophical system. Nor should it be assumed that this influence derived solely from the critical writings, for even in a field such as anthropology, which Kant thought it necessary to treat in a non-critical manner, it has left its mark upon the corresponding section of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia.*[10] It was often an influence exercised indirectly through Kant's disciples, and when assessing Hegel's treatment of a Kantian problem it is often essential to take this mediation of ideas into consideration. For example, when he criticizes the way in which psychology was being used to develop a metaphysics, the works of such contemporary Kantians as Fries and Herbart have to be consulted if we are to grasp the main thrust of his argument. Fries attempted to interpret all philosophy, including not only logic but also things in themselves, as a psychological science of experience, a "psychic anthropology". Herbart built a whole system of neo-Kantian metaphysics around the "simplicity" of the soul and the psychology of musical sounds. Hegel reacted by pointing out the need for a diagnosis of the confusions implicit in such enterprises, a clearer definition of psychology: "Psychology, like logic, is one of those sciences which have profited least from the more general cultivation of spirit and the profounder Notion of reason distinguishing more recent times, and it is still in a highly deplorable condition. Although more importance has certainly been attached to it on account of the direction given to the Kantian philosophy, this has actually resulted in its being proferred as the basis of a metaphysics, even in its *empirical* condition, the science here consisting of nothing other than the *facts* of human *consciousness*, taken up empirically simply as facts, as they are given, and analyzed. Through being so assessed, psychology is mixed with forms from the standpoint of consciousness and with anthropology, nothing having changed in respect of its own condition. The outcome of this has simply been the abandonment of the *cognition of the necessity* of *that which* is *in and for itself*, of the Notion and *truth*, not only in respect of spirit as such, but also in respect of metaphysics and philosophy in general."[11]

Kant maintained that picking up a stone or a coin and saying that it feels

[9] *Jub.* 19. 605/6: "although he gives expression to the unity, once again he emphasizes the subjective side, the Notion." This passage is not present in the English translation.
[10] *Enc.* §§ 388–412; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.xlvii–lxvi; II.
[11] J. F. Fries (1773–1843), J. F. Herbart (1776–1841); *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.99.

heavy is fundamentally different from the judgement "all bodies are heavy". He argued that in the first instance our statement is based upon empirical intuition, and has no more than subjective validity, the relationship between the object and the weight we feel being simply the outcome of the laws of association. As has already been noted, however, he interpreted the judgement as indicating that cognitions are brought under the objective or logical unity of apperception: "This is plain from the use of the term of relation *is* in judgements, in order to distinguish the objective unity of given presentations from the subjective unity. For this term indicates the relation of these presentations to the original apperception, and also their *necessary unity*, even although the judgement is empirical and therefore contingent."[12] On account of the survival of a note by Hölderlin *On Judgement and Being*, we know that this indication of the significance of the logical category of being as the unity basic to both subject and object was taken up by Hegel's circle of friends soon after the publication of Fichte's *Doctrine of Science* in 1794. In this fragment, which was probably written on the flyleaf of Fichte's book in the spring of 1795, Hölderlin makes use of the logical necessity of presupposing being in order to criticize Fichte's postulation of consciousness as the basic principle of philosophy, even more radical than A = A, the fundamental proposition of logic.[13] Like Hegel in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, he fastens upon the literal meaning of the German word for judgement (*Ur – teil*, basic component or division) in order to analyze the self-identity of what Fichte took to be the foundation of consciousness into an even more radical logical component: "*Judgement* is, in the highest and strictest sense, the original sundering of subject and object, which are most intimately united in intellectual intuition. Judgement is the sundering which is the basic division, that which first makes object and subject possible. In the notion of division there lies already the notion of the reciprocal relation of object and subject to one another, and the necessary presupposition of a whole of which object and subject are parts. "I am I" is the most appropriate example of this notion of basic division in its *theoretical* form, for in its practical form the ego posits itself in opposition to the *non-ego, not to itself*."[14]

By criticizing Fichte in this way, Hölderlin helped to clarify the issues involved in Kant's conception of the infinite reiteration of presuppositions. As we have noticed, Kant had grasped this partly as a problem implicit in ordinary psychological introspection, and partly as the relationship between psychology and the transcendental ego. Fichte, well aware that the "trans-

[12] *Critique of Pure Reason* B 141–142.

[13] *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (Jena and Leipzig, 1794) pt. 1 § 1: "The ego, as absolute subject, *that the being of which consists solely of its positing itself as being*."

[14] J. C. F. Hölderlin (1770–1843) *Sämtliche Werke* vol. 4 pp. 216–217 (ed. F. Beissner, Stuttgart, 1961). Cf. Hegel *Briefe* no. 9 (26 January 1795); D. Henrich *Hölderlin über Urteil und Sein* ('Hölderlin-Jahrbuch' 14 pp. 73–96, 1965/6).

cendental deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding" had failed to distinguish satisfactorily between what is logical and what is psychological, naturally assumed that the remedying of this fault would enable him to improve upon Kant's account of the way in which logical categories are to be derived from judgements. He was wrong in thinking that the deduction of the categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was fundamentally empirical[15], since Kant was fully aware of the necessity of distinguishing between the empirical consciousness. The very course of our discussion has shown attempting to re-think the relationship between logic and consciousness. Hence his postulation of consciousness as the foundation of logic: "We began with the proposition A = A; not assuming that the proposition *I am* can be proved from it, but because we had to start from some sort of *certainty* in empirical consciousness. The very course of our discussion has shown however, that it is not the proposition A = A which is the justification for the proposition *I am*, but vice versa."[16] He admits, however, that the consciousness involved in the argumentation of the *Doctrine of Science* presupposes the validity of logical laws, and that his whole enterprise therefore rests upon a circularity of presuppositions.[17]

Kant refused to regard the central issue as a search for valid presuppositions, and insisted that since the synthetic unity of apperception is no more than the logical unity in judgements, it has no need of an independent and preliminary justification. He commented upon Fichte's enterprise as follows: "Mere self-consciousness, merely in the form of thought moreover, without material, and therefore without anything on which to reflect when considering it, without anything to which it could be applied, and which goes beyond even logic, makes an extraordinary impression upon the reader", and advised him to "give up the cultivation of fruitless niceties" and "cultivate his considerable powers of exposition by interpreting the *Critique of Pure Reason* in a useful manner." He observed elsewhere that, "a general doctrine of science, in which one abstracts from its material, the objects of cognition, is pure logic, and to think up yet another and even more general doctrine of science, which itself cannot contain anything but the form, the general science of cognition, is to whirl about in a futile conceptual circle."[18]

By criticizing Fichte's central conceptions and calling attention to the significance of being as the presupposition of the judgement, Hölderlin had

[15] *Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre* ('Philosophisches Journal' vol. 5 pp. 1–47, 1797).
[16] *Grundlage* (1794) pt. 1 § 1.
[17] Loc. cit.: "This is a circle; but it is an unavoidable circle." W. Janke, *Sein und Reflexion. – Grundlagen der kritischen Vernunft* (Berlin, 1970) p. 90 ff., attempts to avoid the conclusion that it is also a vicious circle.
[18] Letter to J. H. Tieftrunk, April 5th 1798; *Declaration concerning Fichte's Doctrine of Science*, August 7th 1799; *Introduction. Of the formal Concept of Natural Science*: Kant *Gesammelte Schriften* (Akademie Ausgabe, Berlin, 1910 ff.) XII.240–241, 370–371; XXI.207.

therefore made an extremely important contribution to the philosophical developments of his time. He had opened up the prospect of a systematic exposition of logical categories which, while throwing light upon the presuppositions of ordinary consciousness, would neither devalue the empirical content of the subject–object relationship, nor lapse into Fichte's infinite reiteration of a consciousness without content. He had shown, that to indicate the logical category of being as the presupposition of judgement was not to imply that the validity of our judgements depends upon our grasping their presuppositions, but simply to establish that the logical presuppositions of consciousness are a field of valid enquiry. What was opened up therefore, was the possibility of finding a suitable subject-matter for Fichte's radical consciousness in the universal abstractions of logical categories, and of using the scope of this new logic in order to demonstrate the necessity of distinguishing between the ordinary consciousness evident in Kant's objections to Fichteanism, and the comprehending consciousness later to be made explicit in the *Encyclopaedia* and the *Berlin Phenomenology*.

This insight, though of the utmost importance in its own right, was doubly important in that it helped to change the *basic approach* required for working out the implications of the critical philosophy. Instead of the initial concentration upon the subject–object antithesis, interest began to shift to the searching out of presuppositions, and since the relationships that emerge from this lend themselves so readily to teleological interpretation, the wider significance of the *Critique of Judgement* came under consideration. It was Schelling who first took up Kant's analysis of the difference between the mechanism and the organism, and developed it into a full-scale philosophy of nature. Kant, while not forgetting to remind his readers that "the supersensible substrate of nature is shut out from our view", had gone on to observe that: "It is an open question, and for our reason must always remain an open question, how much the mechanism of nature contributes as means to each final design in nature. Further, having regard to the above-mentioned intelligible principle of the possibility of a nature in general, we may even assume that nature is possible in all respects on both kinds of law, the physical laws and those of final causes, as universally consonant laws, although we are quite unable to see how this is so. Hence, we are ignorant how far the mechanical mode of explanation possible for us may penetrate. This much only is certain, that no matter what progress we may succeed in making with it, it must still always remain inadequate for things that we have once recognized to be physical ends. Therefore, by the constitution of our understanding we must subordinate such mechanical grounds, one and all, to a teleological principle."[19] Schelling, not content with the simple distinction between the mechanism and the organism, attempted to demonstrate in

[19] *Critique of Judgement* § 78 (II. § 17, p. 73).

detail how the heterogeneity of what is mechanical and physical, the multifarious aspects of the inorganic world brought to light by the physical sciences, – gravity, matter, light, electricity, magnetism, chemical processes etc., approximated to and found its teleological unity in the equally heterogeneous but more inwardly co-ordinated nature of the organism. He noticed, moreover, that the relationships brought to light by such a teleological exposition might be read backwards in order to yield a classification of reductionist interpretations of whatever level of complexity was under consideration: "The general task of *finding a dynamic gradation in nature* has therefore been accomplished. We are now acquainted with at least the first stages of nature's gradual descent from what is organic to what is inorganic, and the first thing we have to do is simply to illustrate this gradation from nature."[20] His interpretation of the organism was as detailed and as closely in touch with the empirical sciences as was his treatment of the inorganic world, and it was probably for this reason rather than any other, that his lectures and publications on the philosophy of nature aroused such widespread interest among the natural scientists of his day.[21] To those concerned primarily with *philosophical* problems however, his teleological interpretation of the natural sciences was important mainly on account of its dealing with the presuppositions of Kant's *psychological* unity of apperception, its having demonstrated that nature has its telos or point of co-ordination in human psychology in the same way that logical categories have theirs in the transcendental unity of apperception.

Schelling never grasped the significance of a systematic exposition of logical categories corresponding to his philosophy of nature. To some extent this was evidently due to his preoccupation with Spinoza. He first wrote to Hegel about this on February 4th 1795: "I have since become a Spinozist! – Don't gasp. You want to know why? – For Spinoza the world, that is to say the object as such, in opposition to the subject, was *everything*. For me the *ego* is everything. It seems to me that the essential difference between the critical and dogmatic philosophy lies in the former's starting with the absolute ego, as yet unconditioned by any object, while the latter starts from the absolute object or non-ego. Driven to their ultimate conclusions, the latter results in Spinoza's system, the former in Kant's. – For me, the supreme principle of all philosophy is the pure, absolute ego, that is to say, the ego in so far as it is simply ego, as yet completely unconditioned by objects, posited through *freedom*. The Alpha and Omega of all philosophy is freedom. – The absolute ego deals with an infinite sphere of absolute being, within which *finite* spheres form themselves, arising through the *limiting* of the absolute sphere by means

[20] *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* (Jena, 1799); *Schellings Werke* (ed. M. Schröter, 12 vols. Munich, 1927–1954) vol. 2, p. 195.
[21] *Phil. Nat.* I.81.

of an object."[22] For Schelling, therefore, the two attributes of Spinoza's substance, extension and thought, are to be dealt with by means of the philosophy of nature and the idealism which includes and transcends it, and he subsequently postulated reason as being the supreme principle of the latter: "absolute reason, or reason proper, in so far as it is thought as being the total undifferentiation of what is subjective and what is objective."[23] His interpretation of Spinoza therefore led him to maintain that from the intuited standpoint of this identity of subject and object, the absolute ego is able to employ absolute reason and aesthetic intuition in order to assess the relative extent to which such spiritual phenomena as intelligence, self-determination, ethics, morality, law, history, religion, aesthetics etc. approximate to itself in overcoming the pervasive subject-object dichotomy: "Philosophy as a whole proceeds, and must proceed, from a principle which, as the absolute principle, is also and at the same time that which is simply identical. An absolutely simple identity is not to be grasped or communicated by means of description, and certainly not by means of concepts. It can only be intuited. Such intuition is the organ of all philosophy. – This intuition however, which is not sensuous but intellectual, which has as general object neither what is objective nor what is subjective, but the absolute identity which is in itself neither subjective nor objective, is itself merely an inwardness, which cannot also be objective to itself: it can only be objective through a second intuition. This second intuition is the aesthetic."[24]

In his later lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel referred to the *System of transcendental Idealism* as "one of the most carefully thought-out of Schelling's works."[25] This almost certainly means that it had an important influence upon his own development, and there are good reasons for regarding it as standing in much the same relation to the *Jena Phenomenology* as this work does to its Berlin counterpart, for its three main divisions, concerned as they are with theoretical, practical and teleological consciousness, correspond fairly closely to the broad outlines of both *Phenomenologies*.[26] It is worth noting therefore, how Hegel's mature conception of its subject-matter differs from Schelling's. The most striking difference is that whereas Schelling conceives of the subject-object dichotomy as only being completely overcome or sublated through the aesthetic intuition and rationality of the absolute ego, Hegel deals with this sublation at the end of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, not at the final levels of the *Philosophy of Spirit*. He not only took it to be a *presupposition* of the highly complex spiritual phenomena of

[22] Hegel, *Briefe* no. 10. Cf. Schelling's *Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie* (Tübingen, 1795); J. Barion *Die Intellektuelle Anschauung bei Fichte und Schelling* (Würzburg, 1929).
[23] *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (Jena, 1801) § 1; *Werke* vol. 3. 10.
[24] *System des transcendentalen Idealismus* (Tübingen, 1800); *Werke* vol. 2. 625, note.
[25] *Hist. Phil.* III.515.
[26] *Werke* vol. 2. 388–531; 532–606; 607–634.

religion, aesthetics, history, law, etc., but also of such basic levels of psychology as recollection, intuition, intelligence etc. According to his mature assessment therefore, Schelling's supreme philosophical accomplishment, like the greater part of the *Jena Phenomenology*, was no more than a matter of everyday consciousness, accessible to empirical analysis and requiring systematic reconstruction. Consequently, in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, he presents Schelling's sublation of the subject-object dichotomy as being implicit within the subject-matter dealt with in the rest of the *Philosophy of Spirit*.[27] In his subsequent exposition of this subject-matter he went on to show that there could be no rational use of language, no ethical activity, no world history etc. without the presupposition of this sublation.

Unlike Hegel when he formulated the final telos of his *Philosophy of Spirit*, Schelling did not conceive of his intuited standpoint of the identity of subject and object as the immediate presupposition of the systematic exposition of logical categories. We might be tempted to assume, therefore, that examination of the implications of Hegel's *Logic* might enlighten us as to the essential differences between the ways in which the two thinkers conceived of consciousness and developed the philosophy of spirit. Had Schelling turned his attention to the teleological exposition of logical categories, the result would almost certainly have been different from Hegel's however, and they treated nature, consciousness and spirit differently not because one had concerned himself with logical categories and the other had not, but because they had such different conceptions of the relationship between empirical and comprehending consciousness. Both agreed that philosophy should be in close touch with the empirical sciences, but whereas Schelling thought that the findings of empiricism had to be assimilated into a philosophical system by means of intuition, Hegel's approach to empiricism, as we have seen, was essentially analytical.

It may be helpful to illustrate this basic and general difference with particular reference to the philosophy of nature. Both thinkers interpreted nature teleologically, regarding the mechanical, physical and chemical sciences as concerned with the presuppositions of the organism, and, therefore, with the presuppositions of Kant's psychological unity of apperception. Both began with the abstractions of space and time, and progressed to the consideration of such increasingly complex matters as light, magnetism, electricity, chemistry, plants, animals etc.[28] In Schelling's case, however, it was the general conception which provided the principal justification for the progression from one topic to another. He certainly thought over a great wealth of empirical material, but the details of the philosophical framework or

[27] The *Berlin Phenomenology* provides evidence that Spinoza's system was also in Hegel's mind when writing and lecturing on this part of the *Encyclopaedia*, see notes 13, 16 and 101, 18.

[28] See, especially, Schelling's *System der gesammten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere* (1804): *Werke*. Ergänzungsband vol. 2. 61–506.

structure within which he expounded it were mainly the outcome of intuitions, or fanciful and arbitrary analogies and connections. Consequently, as soon as the patterns he foisted upon the empirical content of his philosophy of nature are submitted to empirical analysis, they lose most of their apparent significance. This is not the case with the hierarchy of complementary levels or asymmetrical relationships which Hegel's comprehending consciousness elicited from its empirical counterpart in his *Philosophy of Nature*. Once one has acquainted oneself with the historical situation in the various fields of empirical enquiry dealt with in this section of the *Encyclopaedia*, its expositions nearly always turn out to be well-founded and illuminating. Any informed analysis of the differences between the various series of lectures he delivered on the philosophy of nature over a period of almost thirty years soon brings out the consistency and relevance of the general principles he employed in responding to the rapidly changing natural sciences of his day.[29] Here we need only note that he was undoubtedly justified in distinguishing sharply between the irresponsible fancifulness of the Schellingian philosophy of nature and the general principles of his own,[30] and that Schelling was mistaken in his assessment of this difference if he really believed, as he professed to in the lectures he delivered at the University of Munich in 1827, that Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* was the basic determining factor in his *Logic*.[31]

Although it might seem reasonable to counter this extraordinary thesis of Schelling's by asserting its opposite, and maintaining that the essential structure of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* is determined by his *Logic*, this too would be very far from the truth. On account of their universality and abstraction, Hegel took the categories which constitute the subject-matter of his *Logic* to be the presuppositions not only of knowledge, but also of nature. Submitting them to the same analysis as he submitted the findings of the natural sciences and spiritual phenomena, he elicited from them the same hierarchy of complementary levels or asymmetrical relationships, showing how such "subjective" categories as the judgement, the syllogism, teleology, cognition etc. presuppose, and therefore negate or sublate such "objective" categories as being, quantity, measure, actuality, causality etc.[32] There is, therefore, no infinite reiteration in his *Logic*, simply the same working out of presuppositions or complexity relationships as that undertaken by "empirical" and comprehending consciousness in the philosophies of nature and spirit. It is difficult to see how the exhibiting of such a structured logic as the presupposi-

[29] See the reviews of D. von Engelhardt *Hegel und die Chemie* (Wiesbaden, 1976), in *Hegel-Studien* vol. 14 pp. 333–340 (1979), and of Hegel's *Gesammelte Werke* vols. 6, 7, 8, in *Philosophische Rundschau* 26 Jahrgang, Heft 3/4 pp. 230–244 (1979).

[30] *Phil. Nat.* I.191–192.

[31] *Werke* vol. 5. 208.

[32] *L. Logic* 23, 573. The broad outline, though not the details of the division into objective and subjective logic, is revised in *Enc.* §§ 79–244.

tion of nature, of such a structured nature as the presupposition of spirit, of such a structured spirit as the presupposition of logic, can possibly be regarded as implying that any of these particular structures is to be interpreted in terms of the others. It is surely more reasonable to assume that one of the main purposes of the whole philosophical undertaking was the avoidance of such confusions, in both the broad outlines and the details of human knowledge.

It is worth noting in this connection that Hegel does occasionally refer to the structure or even to the *subject-matter* of the *Berlin Phenomenology* as being "logical". For example, although it is comprehending consciousness which establishes that "the progressive determination of the object is what is identical in subject and object, their absolute connectedness, that whereby the object is the subject's own", he refers to this as a logical progression.[33] It is the ego of everyday consciousness which is dealt with in the work, and yet he observes that in that it judges, "it repels itself from itself, which is a logical determination".[34] The reason dealt with is not comprehending consciousness itself, but part of the subject-matter of the work, and yet Hegel maintains that in the context under consideration it appears as the supreme logical category of the Idea.[35] If the assumption we have made concerning the fundamental intention of his work is correct, the meaning of statements such as these is not that comprehending, empirical or everyday consciousness is being predetermined by logical considerations, but that in the course of expounding them systematically, it is helpful to bear in mind the universal or logical significance of the structures or relationships to which they are giving rise.

The statement that self-consciousness constitutes reason in that it is *certain* "that its determinations are not only its own thoughts, but to the same extent generally objective, determinations of the essence of things"[36] can easily give rise to a similar misunderstanding. Although self-consciousness and reason are aspects of everyday consciousness, Hegel cannot be maintaining that the *subject-matter* of his exposition has given rise to certainty, since he has quite obviously derived it from the contingencies of the cultural and philosophical context within which he was working. The certainty to which he is referring must, therefore, derive principally from comprehending consciousness, from the validity of the exposition of the subjective and objective factors involved in the levels of consciousness antecedent to reason in the systematic progression worked out in the *Phenomenology*, from the reason he is employing in analyzing and structuring his subject-matter. Since the everyday reason under consideration also involves the rationality of its systematic derivation, the context gives rise to a certain correlation between everyday

[33] *Berlin Phen.* 11; cf. note 11, 27.
[34] ibid. 3; cf. note 3, 22.
[35] ibid. 93; cf. note 93, 21.
[36] ibid. 101; cf. note 101, 16.

and comprehending consciousness, but this should not cause us to confuse them.

Unless we are well acquainted with Hegel's *Logic*, with the way in which he has already defined the categories he is employing in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, it is often difficult to grasp the more general aspect of his expositions. He will occasionally make a conscious attempt to bring out the universal significance of the context under discussion by stating its structure in terms of logical categories. When dealing with the relationship between the soul and the ego for example, he refers to the categories of essence, reality and appearance, and the main purpose of the printed text of § 416 is quite evidently to bring out the significance of the preceding exposition in logical terms.[37] More often than not, however, he simply assumes that his audience is as familiar with the relevant sections of the *Logic* as they are with the particular subject-matter under consideration. For example, to say that sensuous consciousness, "knows of the object only that it is a being, something, an existing thing, a singular etc.", is only helpful to someone attempting to follow the argumentation of the text if he already has a grasp of the systematic treatment of the logical categories being invoked.[38] The statement that, "self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness, and since it is also its ground, within existence, all consciousness of another general object is self-consciousness" is only intelligible if the relationship between ground and existence established in the *Logic* is borne in mind.[39] It is interesting to note that when Hegel's conception of a certain subject-matter changed, or when he considered it from a different point of view, he did not hesitate to invoke different categories when dealing with it. In the *Jena Phenomenology* for example, we find sense-certainty treated as the equivalent of being, the most basic and abstract of all logical categories, and no reference to its having its immediate presupposition in what is anthropological. In the *Berlin Phenomenology* however, emphasis is laid upon the *singularity* of the sensuous general object, which cannot be thought of as separated from the *universality* of its being related to the ego and the *particularity* of its own self-relatedness.[40]

In some cases, it is not only the categories themselves, but also the systematic relationships between them which have to be borne in mind. The thing→matter→form sequence formulated in the *Logic* is used in order to categorize Kant's thing-in-itself for example, the mechanism→chemism→teleology sequence to throw light upon perceiving, the appearance→actuality→necessity sequence in order to elucidate the relationship between perception and understanding etc.[41] These logical sequences are invoked

[37] ibid. 7, 15; cf. notes 7, 15; 25, 28.
[38] ibid. 33; cf. note 33, 2.
[39] ibid. 55; cf. note 55, 4. See also notes 37, 23; 49, 1; 91, 6; 103, 25.
[40] ibid. 33; cf. notes 33, 11, 33, 24, 33, 25; *Jena Phen*. §§ 95–98.
[41] ibid. 37, 45, 47; cf. notes 37, 35; 45, 17; 47, 24. See also notes 35, 33; 45, 4; 47, 2; 59, 21.

merely in order to indicate the universal significance of the phenomenological ones however, they do not predetermine, regulate or provide the basis for their exposition. There is, indeed, abundant evidence that Hegel had no objection to the categories' being regarded as having their origin in the subject-matter of his expositions, that is to say, in the case of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, in everyday consciousness. In his treatment of perception, for example, he observes that: "Perceiving consciousness involves seizing the general object, no longer immediately, but as mediated and as self-relating in the mediation. Through this there is a mediation of what is sensuous and of thought-determinations, and the thoughts, the categories emerge in the relation."[42] In *practice* therefore, the sciences are based upon empiricism, and the seizing of the general object by means of perception precedes the emergence of the categories. *Systematically* considered however, given its placing within the whole cycle of knowledge in the *Encyclopaedia*, the exposition of logical categories precedes both the treatment of the natural sciences and the comprehension of spirit.[43]

c. CONTEXT

> The not distinguishing where things should be distinguished, and the not confounding where things should be confounded, is the cause of all the mistakes in the world. —JOHN SELDEN.

Since the ego of the *Berlin Phenomenology* is a psychological and not a logical entity, it has much more in common with Hume's "bundle or collection of different perceptions" than with Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception". The *Encyclopaedia* involves a clear distinction between what is logical and what is psychological, so that while the various factors involved in Hume's postulate are systematically analyzed in the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, those most closely associated with Kant's are treated as part of the subject-matter of the third main division of the *Logic*. One might well ask, therefore, why Hegel should classify Kant's general philosophical standpoint as closely resembling Hume's and being essentially phenomenological.[1] He admits that it constitutes a certain advance upon it in that it lays more emphasis upon the unity of consciousness and the ego's ability to determine the will and prescribe ethical laws for itself[2], but he is not prepared to regard these as matters of any fundamental significance. At first glance it is certainly difficult to see what might have given rise to such an evaluation, but despite

[42] ibid. 43, 23; cf. note 43, 29.
[43] *Enc.* §§ 84–244 (Logic); 245–376 (Nature); 377–577 (Spirit).
[1] *Berlin Phen.* 11, 30.
[2] ibid. 11, 33; 13, 28.

his acknowledging the importance of Kant's having called attention to the logical presuppositions of knowledge, the final judgement in the lectures on the history of philosophy is clear enough: "Since Kant shows that thought has synthetic judgements *a priori* which are not derived from perception, he shows that thought is so to speak concrete in itself. The idea which is present here is a great one, but, on the other hand, quite an ordinary signification is given it, for it is worked out from points of view which are inherently rude and empirical, and a scientific form is the last thing that can be claimed for it."[3]

The main point of the criticism is, therefore, that Kant had failed to bring out the full implications of his distinctions between what is logical and what is psychological, what is rational and what is ethical etc., because he had confined himself to considering only the empirical fact of their being united in subjective cognition. As the *Berlin Phenomenology* makes abundantly clear, Hegel would have been the last to deny that our everyday consciousness, our immediate or existential acquisition of knowledge, our actual experience of subject–object relationships, involve logical as well as sensuous factors, and that it is essential to grasp the basic unity of the individuality within which they come into play. He criticizes Kant not for having insisted upon the importance of this, but for not having gone on to analyze and assess the factors involved within this subjective cognition etc. from the standpoint of comprehending consciousness, – for having grasped the logical unity of apperception as the presupposition of knowledge without also bringing out the significance of logical categories as the presupposition of nature; for having recognized that categories constitute the logical component of cognition without also acknowledging the need for a systematic survey of their inter-relationships; for having treated nature as the object of consciousness without realizing that it is also its presupposition. His main point is, therefore, that if Kant had been more consequential in the searching out of presuppositions, he would have analyzed the empirical complexity of everyday consciousness into a hierarchy of distinct and complementary disciplines, within which the various antinomies which confront ordinary consciousness would have resolved themselves as a matter of course.

Within the *Encyclopaedia*, it is often the case that what might ordinarily be regarded, on account of their empirical occurrence, as closely related fields of research, are presented at widely separated levels. In order to bring out the general significance of Hegel's criticism of Kant's theory of knowledge, it may, therefore, be of value to spend a moment or two in comparing it with his criticism of Newtonian optics. – It is perfectly understandable that the empirical physicists of Hegel's day, and indeed of our own, should have treated the study of light and the study of colours as closely related disci-

[3] *Hist. Phil.* III.430.

plines. Goethe had shown, however, that the circumstances in which we *perceive* colours cannot be explained simply by means of the Newtonian theory of the composite nature of white light. He was wrong to conclude from this that the Newtonian theory was erroneous, but right to insist that it needed revision. As Heisenberg has pointed out, the Newtonian and Goethean theories of colour are in fact complementary, Newton's being concerned with its purely physical nature, and Goethe's with the more complex chemical, physiological and psychological factors involved in our actual perceptions of and reactions to chromatic phenomena. Hegel, not as careful as he should have been in distinguishing all the levels of complexity implicit in Goethe's field of empirical research, concluded from his experiments that it is the various *physical* circumstances in which light and darkness are combined which give rise to colour. Taking light itself, in its simplicity, to be the initial, the most basic, the most universal level of physics, he did not, therefore, deal with colour until he had worked out the systematic exposition of the further physical levels he considered to be involved in its production.[4] It should be noted that one might very well accept the validity of Hegel's general methodology in a case such as this, without agreeing with his interpretation of the basic empirical material, the subject-matter of his expositions.

In Hegel's *Physics* therefore, while light is presented as a more integrated motion than the various kinetic gradations constituting the subject-matter of the preceding sphere of *Mechanics*, the dimming regarded as essential to colour is taken to involve a further complexity of physical factors, – specific gravity, cohesion, shape, magnetism, crystallographic form etc., and to have its immediate presupposition in refraction.[5] Similarly, in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, while the ego basic to consciousness is presented as a more co-ordinated subjectivity than the various gradations of psychic awareness constituting the subject-matter of the preceding sphere of *Anthropology*, the self-consciousness essential to desire and recognition is taken to involve a further complexity of phenomenological relationships, – otherness, sensuousness, things, perceiving, laws etc., and to have its immediate presupposition in an understanding of animate beings. It is not surprising, therefore, that when attempting to bring out the significance of the ego as fundamental to the subject-object relationships of consciousness, Hegel should have drawn attention to the analogy of light: "Just as light is the manifestation of itself and of its other, that which is dark, and can only reveal itself by revealing that other, so too with the ego, which is only revealed to itself in so far as its other is revealed to it in the shape of something indepen-

[4] *Phil Nat.* II.12–25; 135–160; W. Heisenberg *Die Goethesche und die Newtonsche Farbenlehre im Lichte der modernen Physik* (Hamburg, 1967).
[5] *Phil. Nat.* II.25–135.

dent of it."[6] I will be remembered that he had learnt from Hölderlin that just as the unity of the judgement involves the basic division between subject and predicate, so the consciousness of the ego involves the primary components of the subjectivity and objectivity. This analogy is also referred to when discussing the significance of the ego: "Ego is now this subjectivity, this infinite self-relation. Lying within this however, namely within this subjectivity, is negative self-relation, diremption, distinction, judgement. Ego judges, and it is this that makes consciousness of it."[7] Nevertheless, since he could not follow Kant in maintaining that the *logical* aspect of the judgement brings cognitions under the objective unity of apperception, he took care to confine his *systematic* consideration of judgements solely to the categorical abstractions of the *Logic*.[8] He seems to have realized, moreover, that both analogies could easily give rise to misunderstandings, for he played them down when revising the printed version of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, and concentrated instead upon defining the subject-object relationships of the ego with reference to their sublation in spirit, and describing the structures this involved in terms of logical categories.[9]

In the *Anthropology*, the sphere which precedes the *Berlin Phenomenology* within the *Encyclopaedia*, a progression is made from the objectivity of psychic states closely dependent upon such physical factors as natural environment, to the subjectivity of the ego, which excludes from itself all such involvement with nature. During the 1820's the exploration of this sub-conscious world of sensation and feeling, of the physiological and biochemical foundations of consciousness, of what he referred to as the "soul", became one of Hegel's main interests. He lectured on it together with *Phenomenology* and *Psychology*, and by the middle of the decade had become so absorbed in the details of racial characteristics, temperament, ageing, dreams, catalepsy, drugs; hypnosis, derangement, psychiatry, physiognomy etc. etc., that he invariably skimped his treatment of these subsequent disciplines. The material evidently interested him mainly on account of its constituting the broad natural basis of consciousness, the transition from what is physical to what is spiritual. To formulate a direct transition from organic being to consciousness, as he had done in his first major sketch of a philosophical system, was to come very close to reproducing the mind-body dualism of the Cartesians and Kantians. By cultivating his *Anthropology*, he brought the main development of post Kantian philosophy into line with the progressive empirical research he found in such superabundance in the

[6] *Berlin Phen.* notes 3, 15; 7, 21.
[7] ibid. 3, 18; cf. note 3, 22.
[8] Kant, in the transcendental deduction, takes "objective" to mean both "logical" and "determinable within a spatio-temporal content." Cf. *Enc.* §§ 166–180; *L. Logic* pp. 622–663; G. R. G. Mure *A Study of Hegel's Logic* (Oxford, 1959) pp. 167–205.
[9] *Berlin Phen.* 7, 13; cf. notes 7, 15; 7, 21.

ordinary anthropological literature of the time.[10] More importantly, perhaps, he also managed to establish the systematic context of the natural ego in respect of its presuppositions, and in the opening section of the *Berlin Phenomenology* he calls attention to this: "From the very beginning, we no longer have soul at this juncture, for in that the reality of the universal is itself the universal, corporeity is done away with. Ego remains ego, infinite in its self-relatedness. Hitherto, we have posited the soul as having general qualities or determinations, as world-soul, as the soul of a nation etc. It has now also determined itself as subjectivity however, although in such a way as to remain within itself. Individuality is enclosed within a corporeity, and the feeling soul now relates itself within this closed corporeity. Although we have had sensations in somnambulism, and have certainly also spoken of consciousness in respect of derangement, we have done so by anticipation and not *ex professo* as it were, in so far as what is soul-like appears in consciousness as a state. We have dealt in general with the feeling soul, which has sensation, feeling. If we say that something is felt by someone, we already assume an object out there, and this assumption is already made from the standpoint of consciousness. The feeling soul is also confined within corporeity and shape however, and it is consciousness which first enters into objectivity, which first presents us with difference within an external world."[11]

When he says that the soul "has determined itself" as subjectivity, as the ego, he means that he has analyzed the inner co-ordination of consciousness into its sub-conscious and physical presuppositions, and then worked out a systematic synthesis of these presuppositions involving a progression from what is most basic, objective and natural to what is most developed, subjective and spiritual. The procedure here is simply that common to the *Encyclopaedia* as a whole, but in this instance it gives rise to a particularly important and original insight, for it enables Hegel to by-pass Kant's fruitless attempt to interrelate the logical and psychological aspects of everyday consciousness, and to provide a clear definition of the ego as being conscious of the objective world through its sensations and feeling, that is to say, *through the presuppositions of its own inwardness*: "Ego, the universal, the being-for-self of the soul, proceeds from nowhere but the sphere of feeling. It is by this that it is conditioned, this is the ego's other, its feeling only, and it determines itself as such, it being only through the negation of the form or mode of feeling that the ego is for itself. Ego is for itself only as negation of its feeling, the determinations of its sensation. It has being in so far as it posits them as the negative of itself. It is only in that it relates itself to an object, which is itself

[10] *Jen. Syst.* I.274, 19: "*Consciousness, as* its Notion, has raised itself immediately out of the *organization of animal being.*" Cf. *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.xlvii–lxvi; II.3–429; W. T. Stace *The Philosophy of Hegel* (Dover Publications, 1955) §§ 444–467.

[11] *Berlin Phen.* 5, 14–31.

the feeling or content. The content is the infinite judgement of the subject, whereby it posits what it is initially as the negative of itself, expels the determinations of its feeling from out of itself, and has them before itself as an object or world. What is in consciousness is in feeling, it being readily admitted that everything has to be sensed. For the subject, these determinations of sensation now have the form of an external world."[12]

It is important to note that this definition of the basic significance of the ego by means of its presuppositions or systematic context is a reiteration at the level of consciousness of what has already been established at several more radical analogous junctures, notably the transitions from the inorganic to the organic, and from the organic to the psychological sciences. At the level of consciousness, organic chemistry, and particularly the inner co-ordination of the primitive living existences it maintains, has already been exhibited as the general telos of the various levels of enquiry cultivated by the mechanical and physical sciences.[13] The "natural soul, the entirely universal, immediate substance of spirit, the simple pulsation, the mere inner stirring of the soul" has been characterized as, "raising itself above involvement in the mere life of nature" and so initiating the co-ordination of its presuppositions: "As opposed to the macrocosm of the entirety of nature, the soul may be regarded as the microcosm in which nature concentrates itself and so sublates its juxtaposition. In the soul, those determinations appearing in external nature as spheres freely let forth, as a series of independent shapes, are therefore reduced to mere qualities."[14]

It is certainly not the case that the ego, the soul and the organism are conceived of as constituting the teleological unification of their respective spheres simply because they can be analyzed into the presuppositions constituting the subject-matter of an empirical definition of their systematic contexts. Hegel notes that the ego is far from being passive in the assimilation of its objectivity: "Since the ego or consciousness is the self-relating universal, the subject in its complete universality, I relate myself to the world as universal being-for-self, that is to say, thinkingly. Thinking is the universality which is for itself, it is what is active. The ego is not a quiescent atom, but restless, active, – it is infinite negativity, activity in general. What is active has the determination of universality, and it is this that thinks."[15] Similarly, the soul or the immediate foundation of spirit is the ideality of nature in that although it has it as its natural precondition, it also has the potentiality of comprehending it: "It pertains to the nature, the very actuality of spirit, to be the ideality of nature, and its natural determination is that of the microcosm, this totality, which it is, and which dawns before it in sensation. What is made

[12] ibid. 19, 9–21.
[13] *Phil. Nat.* II.219–222; III.9–14.
[14] *Phil. Sub. Sp.* II.21, 13–15; 31, 7–8; 27, 3–8.
[15] *Berlin Phen.* 21, 10–15.

manifest to it in feeling, is the general objectivity of the world."[16] Within the macrocosm of the natural world therefore, the motions of the planets, the course of the seasons, the variability of the climate, physical geography, the constitution of the body, the stages of life etc. have a relatively free, independent and unco-ordinated existence of their own.[17] Once the microcosm or the ego has asserted itself as a distinct subjectivity however, these relatively unco-ordinated existences become part of the general objectivity of the world. One might be tempted to interpret this conception of Hegel's in terms of an evolutionary or temporal sequence, but he himself was not keen on doing so, and it should not be forgotten that it is the outcome of his basic analytical and synthetic procedures, not of some vague speculation concerning the possible significance of *our knowledge* of what has happened in time.[18] It does have its counterpart in the organic sciences, however, and at a still more basic level, the animal, by means of its formative, assimilative and generic processes, also co-ordinates and exploits inorganic nature: "The animals are not so stupid as many a realist, for whereas the realist will not admit that general objects have no actuality, the animal will eat them up."[19]

As Hegel conceived of the matter as a whole, therefore, the ego co-ordinates what is objective to it by reproducing at a conscious level the assimilation which has already been systematically analyzed and expounded at the physical and subconscious levels presupposed by consciousness. An asymmetrical relationship is apparent, for although a primitive organim will co-ordinate its physical environment without being conscious of it, a conscious being cannot assimilate its objectivity without presupposing its own sub-conscious and organic foundations. It is quite understandable, therefore, that in working out the systematic exposition of consciousness in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, Hegel should be constantly referring back to the presuppositions of the ego. For example, when dealing with the reconstruction of our being conscious not only of a manifoldness in space and time but also of things, he reminds us of the relevance of the distinction that has already been drawn between sensation and feeling: "The manifoldness is therefore related to one point, which is known as singularity, or more precisely as an object, a sensuous object in space and time, at one with its various properties and qualities, in short, with such sensuous determinations as constitute the

[16] ibid. 19, 32–35.

[17] ibid. note 19, 35; cf. *Enc.* §§ 270, 287, 288, 339, 354, 374.

[18] *Phil. Nat.* I.25; 212; III.18; 229; 366; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.lviii; II.450. It would, perhaps, be too much to expect all those who write about Hegel to spend very much time on reading him, and in any case, vested interests are bound to make it difficult to explode the myth of his historicism, but there have recently been signs of a welcome change in the general conception of this aspect of his thinking: see G. D. O'Brien *Hegel on Reason and History* (Chicago and London, 1975), D. Forbes' introduction to the *Lectures on . . . World History* (Cambridge, 1975).

[19] *Berlin Phen.* 67, 11–13; cf. notes 31, 8; 49, 25; 55, 18; 63, 38; *Phil Nat.* III.67–213.

content of sensation. Initially therefore, consciousness is active in that it brings these various sensations together in one point, and we see that with regard to feeling it is something quite different."[20] In the *Anthropology*, feeling is characterized as a level of the sub-conscious still fairly dependent upon what is physical, – as being more inwardly co-ordinated than sensation, but as falling short of the ego in this respect in that it has not yet excluded from itself all that is physical or natural.[21] In that it includes dreaming, sleep-walking, second sight, hypnotism, mental derangement, habit etc., it involves much distortion of what is objective, and Hegel calls attention to this when dealing with the objectivity of what is inter-subjective: "As consciousness, I relate myself as this particular, and at the same time as a thinking being. I differ from the others in so far as I distinguish myself from other particular beings, but they are also thinking consciousness, and in this respect we are equal. This universality is also called objectivity, and although there are certain deviations here too, they are particularly prominent only in the world of feeling. Apart from this however, objectivity also has the significance of the general object's being for me what it also is for the others."[22] Sensation, on the other hand, stands in a much more passive relationship to objectivity, and since it entails a more predominantly receptive co-ordination of sight, hearing, smell, taste and feeling, is more directly involved in our being conscious of things and their properties.

As in the case of Hegel's references to logical categories throughout the *Berlin Phenomenology*, it is not only the various levels of the sub-conscious and of nature, but also the systematic relationships between them which have to be borne in mind if we are to grasp the full significance of his references to these subordinate spheres. For example, his reconstruction of Kant's postulation of space and time as "pure forms of intuition, principles of knowledge a priori" involves reference not only to the being→quantity→essence sequence in the *Logic*, but also to the space→time→motion sequence formulated in the *Mechanics* and the sensation→sentience→feeling sequence formulated in the *Anthropology*[23]: "all that is sensuous is spatial and temporal, and both together. Feelings and sensations etc. are temporal, pertain to the feeling subject, and therefore to that which constitutes the unit in general and which is determined in its sensation as a simplicity . . . Space and time are therefore this extrinsicality, wholly within self-equality, or the form of universality. Since this universality is now continuity, space not being interrupted by a variegated content, we simply have this equality, this universal immediacy, which is what being or essence is. In that space is not thought but external, it

[20] *Berlin Phen*. 37, 23–29.

[21] *Phil. Sub. Sp*. II.147–215 (sensation); 215–409 (feeling); cf. note 215, 18.

[22] *Berlin Phen*. 25, 6–12.

[23] *Critique of Pure Reason* B 36; *Enc*. §§ 84–114; *Phil. Nat*. I 223–240; *Phil. Sub. Sp*. II.147–221; cf. note 73, 17.

is therefore the universality of thought as not thought; quantity, being etc. are thoughts as such, but in that they are not thought, as posited externally, they are initially space."[24]

It is therefore the comprehending consciousness basic to the formulation of all these sequences which constitutes the central principle of Hegel's whole philosophical enterprise. The mutual confirmation he derives from such cross references depends directly upon the truth value, the coherence, perhaps even only the pragmatic effectiveness, but in any case the ultimate philosophical significance of expounding such logical entities, such aspects of the natural sciences, such features of the sub-conscious etc. in terms of levels, hierarchies and spheres. Each "level" is expounded in *context*, in respect of its derivation from what it presupposes and the complexity relationships in which it stands to that by which it is presupposed. As has already been noticed, in that any such exposition involves the empirical content of the particular level under consideration, it constitutes the *Notion* of its subject-matter. In that it is regarded in its wholly universal or logical aspect, it constitutes the *Idea*: "The Idea is what is *true in and for itself, the absolute unity of the Notion and objectivity*. The ideal nature of its content is none other than the Notion in its determinations; the real nature of its content is merely the way in which the Notion represents itself in the form of external determinate being, and by enclosing this shape within its ideality or power, maintains itself within it."[25] Since it was almost certainly through his consideration of the significance Kant ascribed to the organism that Hegel first came to formulate this conception of the Idea, it is quite understandable that within the *Logic* it should be defined with reference to such clearly organic categories as teleology, life and will, and that within the *Philosophy of Nature* the organism should be characterized as the Notion on account of its constituting, "the totality of the inanimate existence of mechanical and physical nature."[26] Even the most complex categories are less complex than such extreme physical abstractions as space and time however, and the Idea cannot, therefore, be regarded as anything more than a logical abstraction. The organism simply assimilates its objectivity in a physical manner. Consequently, it is only the Notion of *spirit*, comprehending consciousness, which can co-ordinate or rationally expound its entire context. Spirit is therefore regarded as "rational" in so far as it comprehends its own systematic derivation, and it is the working out of the implications of this which gives rise to the final section of the *Berlin Phenomenology*. The ego considered in the first section is conscious of its presuppositions only as an objectivity. The reason which rounds it off is conscious of its presuppositions as both a

[24] *Berlin Phen.* 35, 15–18, 26–33; cf. notes 19, 9; 71, 2; 73, 17.
[25] ibid. note 93, 21; *Enc.* § 213; cf. *L. Logic* 755–760.
[26] *Berlin Phen.* note 5, 14; *Enc.* §§ 213–244, *L. Logic* 735–774; *Phil. Nat.* III.9–14.

subjectivity and an objectivity, and so constitutes the initiation of the full rationality of spirit: "The ego is the Notion, although not as the indwelling Notion of the Sun, the animal, the plant, which is inseparable from the external reality. In self-consciousness the Notion is mine, abstractly for itself, and the reality opposed to self-consciousness is consciousness, ego as relating itself to an object . . . At this juncture, reality is self-consciousness, ego in relationship with an object presented to it externally. Reason in general is the Idea, for the Idea is reason: we do not possess the Idea, it possesses us, so that reason also possesses us, being our substance . . . Reason or Idea does not only have its place where it comes forth here, for it also comes forth in Notional comprehension, which is a point at which the Idea attains to its truth, at which the other raises itself to its truth, its Idea."[27]

Although the reason assessed in the final sphere of the *Berlin Phenomenology* involves the sublation of the sort of subject-object antithesis surveyed and systematized in the course of the work, it is still part of everyday consciousness. It resembles the Notional or comprehending consciousness which is expounding it in that it is no longer confined to the subject-object disparities of its immediate presuppositions, but it is not in itself capable of assimilating or co-ordinating anything more complex than itself. In that it is conscious "of there being no abyss between the object and knowing subjectivity"[28], it constitutes an important advance upon Kantianism and Fichteanism, but it is still only the *initiation* of the full rationality of spirit, the basis or immediate presupposition of the more completely co-ordinated levels of this sphere. In the immediately succeeding sphere of *Psychology* for example, a progression is made from the abstract objectivity of intuition to the more complex and co-ordinated subjectivity of thinking and formal rationality, and from the subjective practicality of this rationality through increasing degrees or levels of objectivity, to the pursuit of happiness, which Hegel treats as the immediate presupposition of rational legislation, and of the still more complex and complete objectivity of society and the state.[29]

The fully rational procedure of Notional or comprehending consciousness only sublates subject-object disparities in a general manner. As we noticed in the opening chapter, the empirical basis of the procedure guarantees the presence of an irreducible element of contingency in Notional exposition. It is, therefore, no indication of any incongruity in Hegel's general manner of thinking, or in particular expositions of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, that the levels of everyday spirituality presented as presuppoing the reason with which he rounds off this work should provide such clear evidence of subject-object disparities. To the contingency and imperfection of the empirical

[27] *Berlin Phen.* 99.
[28] ibid. 103, 26.
[29] *Enc.* §§ 440–546; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.79–269; cf. note 269, 43.

knowledge on which the Notional exposition of this subject-matter is being based, we have to add the extent to which the everyday spirituality itself fails to assimilate its objectivity. Consequently, we may well agree that levels of spirit in which the subject-matter of the *Phenomenology* is shown to be sublated[30] presuppose a *general* absence of the subject-object antithesis, without also assuming that Hegel is putting forward the preposterous thesis that they no longer involve *any* disparity between subject and object. The difference between everyday consciousness and everyday psychology is not that one is *wholly* immersed in a subject-object dichotomy which is *wholly* absent in the other, but that psychology presupposes a *relatively* comprehensive sublation of it. If we define consciousness as involving *any* such dichotomy, we can, of course, show that it persists throughout the whole *Philosophy of Spirit*: "Consciousness is in everything, in what is ethical, legal, religious; here, however, we are only considering what consciousness and what the relationship of consciousness is, and what is necessary to its being able to progress to spirit. The relationship of consciousness is exhibited once again in what is spiritual. In the *Phenomenology* therefore, the concrete formations of spirit are also developed, in order to indicate what consciousness is within spirit, while at the same time the content too is developed. Here, however, we have to confine ourselves strictly to dealing with consciousness and its forms."[31]

The *Jena Phenomenology* was misleading in that it failed to establish any clear and consistent distinction between the exposition of consciousness and that of "the concrete formations of spirit." Within the *Encyclopaedia* however, good reasons are given for confining the treatment of consciousness as such to the *Phenomenology*, and presenting the succeeding sphere of *Psychology* as the initiation of the philosophy of spirit proper.[32] It would be difficult to overrate the importance of the difference between these two approaches, since it was as a result of it that Hegel was able to bring out the importance of the contribution which empirical consciousness had to make to the cohesion, clarity and comprehensiveness of the *Encyclopaedia* as a whole. Had the central principle of his philosophical system remained a comprehending consciousness regulated only by a final telos, and functioning very largely independently of the findings of empiricism, it would have constituted no essential advance upon Schelling's.

It is not only the main arguments of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, – the denial of logical significance to Kant's theory of knowledge, the definition of consciousness in respect of the subject-matters of *Anthropology* and *Psychology*, – which have to be borne in mind when assessing its philosophical

[30] Everyday language and social life, for example: *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.179–199; *Phil. Right* (*Enc.* §§ 483–552).
[31] *Berlin Phen.* 31, 9–16; cf. note 31, 16; *Enc.* § 25.
[32] *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.79; cf. note 79, 1.

significance. Not a few of the details of its expositions are also extremely important. As in the case of the major distinctions between logic and psychology, sensation and consciousness etc., the minor ones are most likely to be misunderstood on account of our being most familiar with what is being discussed in a context other than consciousness, and so failing to grasp the intrinsic significance of Hegel's systematic expositions. For example, most of us will probably have little difficulty in appreciating why he should treat the animal's instinctive drive to satisfy its needs as a matter of enquiry for the biological sciences. Nor are we likely to be unfamiliar with the social drive, the acquisitiveness which gives rise to property. On account of our not being in the habit of distinguishing levels of complexity, however, we may well have to think twice about the significance of treating the drive involved in practical intelligence at a particular juncture in a systematic psychology, and the exposition of desire in the *Berlin Phenomenology* will almost certainly require careful consideration if it is to be properly evaluated, even by those who are thoroughly familiar with Hegel's Jena and Nuremberg writings.[33] The treatment of our being aware of space and time will probably present most of us with a similar difficulty, although in this case we shall almost certainly be more familiar with the argumentation of the *Berlin Phenomenology* than with that of the *Psychology*. In the *Phenomenology* Hegel follows Kant and deals with the ego as only being aware of spatiality and temporality in the sequence of sensations by means of which it is conscious of an objectivity. In the *Psychology* however, he considers the far more complex case of intuition's endowing the spatiality and temporality of this objectivity with the rational determination of being the other of itself.[34]

Finally, it should not be overlooked that the language Hegel had at his disposal sometimes presented him with difficulties in defining contexts. For example, when characterizing the way in which consciousness comprehends its object, he wants to say that it "knows" of it only as "a being, something, an existing thing, a singular etc.," but he says instead that the ego "relates itself to the world thinkingly". Aware of the necessity of distinguishing between this level of sensuous consciousness and the thinking dealt with in the *Psychology*, which is closely associated with imagination, language and memory etc., he subsequently characterizes it as "formal" thinking, but this is not very helpful when we discover that its psychological equivalent also involves "formal reason".[35] Similarly, when characterizing the way in which self-consciousness comprehends itself in its counterpart, he evidently wants to say that it "*knows* of itself in the other self", but he says instead that it "intuites" the activity of the other self "as being its act, and at the same time as

[33] *Phil. Nat.* III.147; *Phil. Right* §§ 54–58; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.249; *Berlin Phen.* 65–71; cf. notes 59, 6; 61, 35; 65, 26; 71, 24.
[34] *Berlin Phen.* 33–35; cf. notes 33, 34; 35, 10; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.123–135; notes 131, 32; 135, 18.
[35] *Berlin Phen.* 33, 1–2; 21, 11–12; 31, 24; cf. note 21, 15; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.217–229.

an externality". We can only assume that in cases such as these he is either speaking by anticipation of the intuition dealt with in the *Psychology*, or that the apparent confusion of levels is due to the limitations of his vocabulary.[36]

d. COGNITION

> I call them all *my* presentations, since did I not do so, I should have a self as many-coloured and variegated as the presentations of which I am conscious. — KANT.

It is interesting to note that Kant's initial conception of the way in which consciousness might be regarded as co-ordinating knowledge bears a much closer resemblance to that of the *Berlin Phenomenology* than what is usually considered to be the most original aspect of the view he developed in his later work. In the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770 for example, he takes the self to be an ultimate and unconditioned existence, antecedent to experience and creatively generative of it, and such "pure intellectual conceptions as possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause etc." to be "acquired by attending to the actions of the mind on the occasion of experience."[1] His subsequent correspondence with his friend the physician Marcus Herz (1747–1803) concerning the central problems of the critical philosophy is particularly revealing on this point. In the well-known letter of February 21st 1772 for example, he emphasizes the importance of what appears in the first *Critique* as the doctrine of the transcendental object: "I proposed this question to myself: what is the basis of the relation of that within us which we call presentation, to the general object? If the presentation contains only the mode in which the subject is affected by the general object, it is easy to see that it accords with the latter as an effect does with its cause, and, consequently, how this determination of our mind is able to possess a general object by *presenting* something. Seen thus, the passive or sensuous presentations have a comprehensible relation to general objects, and the principles derived from the nature of our soul have a comprehensive validity for all things in so far as they are to be general objects of the senses."[2]

The conception of this "cause and effect relationship" in the first *Critique* (1781) is much the same. Like Hume, Kant maintains that experience gives evidence of no single empirical state of the self, what is constant in its consciousness being simply its awareness of its own unceasing activities: "The consciousness of the self, according to the determinations of our state

[36] *Berlin Phen.* 91, 2, cf. note 87, 5; 69, 5–6; cf. *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.117–145.

[1] *De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis* (Königsberg, 1770), Kant's *Werke* II.385–419, see esp. § 8.

[2] Kant's *Briefwechsel* I.129–135.

in inner perception, is merely empirical, constantly changeable. There can be no stationary or permanent self in this stream of inner appearances, and the consciousness is usually called the *inner sense*, or *empirical apperception*. That which has to be presented as being of *necessity* numerically identical, cannot be thought as such through empirical data. If such a transcendental presupposition is to be validated, there must be a condition which precedes all experience and renders experience itself possible . . . This purely original, unchangeable consciousness I shall call *transcendental apperception*."[3] The transcendental object, the thing in itself, the object of our presentations, that which guarantees the order, self-consistency and clarity of our awareness of objectivity, is postulated as having much the same significance as Kant was subsequently to ascribe to the logical unity of apperception: "Now these appearances are not things in themselves however, but are themselves merely presentations, which once again have their general object. It is a general object which can never be intuited by us however, and which may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e. transcendental object = x. The pure concept of this transcendental object (which throughout all our knowledge is actually and always one and the same, = x), is that alone which can confer upon all our empirical concepts relation in general to a general object, i.e. objective reality."[4]

In the first edition of the *Critique* Kant had also distinguished between the subjective or psychological and the objective or logical deduction of the categories,[5] and in attempting to bring out the cogency of the latter in the second edition, he abandoned his former postulate of the transcendental object and concentrated instead upon the importance of the logical form of the judgement as constituting the "objective" unity of apperception. This shift of emphasis may well have been necessary in order to bring out the significance of the categories, but as has already been noticed in chapter two, it subsequently gave rise to the confusion of what is logical and what is psychological, and in certain aspects of Kant's own conception, to an unwarranted downgrading of the status of empirical apperception: "It is by means of the *transcendental unity* of apperception, that all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a conception of the object. On this account it is called *objective*, and must be distinguished from the *subjective unity* of consciousness, which is a *determination of the internal sense*, by means of which the said manifold in intuition is given empirically to be so united . . . The trans-

[3] *Critique of Pure Reason* A 107.

[4] ibid. A 109.

[5] ibid. A xvi–xvii: "This enquiry, which is somewhat deeply grounded, has two sides. The one refers to the objects of pure understanding, and is intended to expound and render intelligible the objective validity of its *a priori* concepts. It is therefore essential to my purposes. The other seeks to investigate the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests."

cendental unity of apperception is alone objectively valid; the empirical. which is not under consideration here, and which is merely a unity deduced from the former under given conditions *in concreto*, possesses only subjective validity."[6]

The difficulties Kant created for himself in thus attempting to distinguish and yet interrelate the logical and psychological components of knowledge, are clearly apparent, in both editions of the *Critique*, in his treatment of the psychological paralogism. In the first edition, for example, he points out that: "It may be said of the thinking ego . . . that it knows the categories, and through them all general objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so *through itself*, but not that it also knows *itself through the categories*. For it is, indeed, perfectly evident, that I cannot know as object that which I have to presuppose in order to know any object at all."[7] In a note added to the second edition however, he shows that he would like to have it both ways, – not only to deny that any of the categories are applicable to the transcendental ego, but also to posit its existence: "The 'I think', as has already been stated, is an empirical proposition, and contains the proposition, 'I exist' . . . It expresses an undetermined empirical intuition, that is perception, (proving, consequently, that sensation, which must belong to sensibility, lies at the foundation of this existential proposition); but it precedes experience, whose province it is to determine the object of perception, through the category, in respect of time; and existence here is not a category, as it does not apply to an undetermined given object, but only to one of which one has a conception, and about which one wants to know whether or not it is posited and related apart from this conception."[8]

When the second edition of the *Critique* was being prepared, this whole issue concerning the nature of knowledge was complicated by the fact that Kant was preoccupied with the ethical enquiries which had led him to think that he had proved the concrete existence of the self-conscious ego, and that logical categories are therefore inadequate to the expression of its real and determinate nature.[9] It is important to note, therefore, that it was primarily Kant's ethics, his practical philosophy, which first attracted Hegel's attention. Unfortunately, his extensive commentary on Kant's *Metaphysics of Ethics*, which he wrote out in 1798, has since been lost, but we know from his other writings that his principal concern at this time was not so much the analysis as the interrelationship or wholeness of the various factors involved in practical subjectivity.[10] Evidently influenced by Schiller's assessment of Kantian ethics in *On Grace and Dignity*,[11] he criticized Kant for his piecemeal

[6] ibid. B 139–140.
[7] ibid. A 402.
[8] ibid. B 422.
[9] *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) preface 10.
[10] We know of the commentary through K. Rosenkranz *Hegels Leben* (Berlin, 1844) p. 87f.
[11] See footnote on next page.

approach, for having broken the moral subject down into propensity and awareness of duty, what is actual and what is possible, what is particular and what is universal, without also bringing out and laying emphasis upon its unity. It was not until the Jena period however, that he managed to provide a clear and systematic justification for the postulation of this unity.

When he wrote out the *Logic and Metaphysics* in 1804/5, he was fully aware that the comprehensiveness and systematic treatment of logical categories and of cognition demands that a distinction should be drawn between comprehending consciousness and that which it comprehends. A certain structure of presuppositional relationships had already become apparent in Kant's work, – the categories had been ranged in degree of complexity, the subject had been presented as finding greater fulfilment in practical than in theoretical reason, it had even been taken to be: "obvious, that there exists among the transcendental ideas a certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means of them, collects all its cognitions into one system. From the cognition of self to the cognition of the world, and through these to the Supreme Being, the progression is so natural, that it seems to resemble the logical march of reason from the premisses to the conclusion." It had been psychology however, the subject-object relationship of cognition, not the presuppositional relationships themselves, which Kant had taken to be the one certain reference point from which the "connection and unity" might be comprehended: "In a systematic presentation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrangement – the *synthetical* one – would be the most suitable; but in the investigation which must necessarily precede it, the *analytical*, which reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose, as in it we should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to us – psychology, to cosmology, and thence to theology."[12] In the 1804/5 text, comprehending consciousness, the analytical work of searching out presuppositions and the synthetical work of expounding them in a rational sequence or hierarchy, is brought to bear upon Kant's central point of reference. As in Kant, cognition is analyzed into the logical categories which constitute what is regarded as its immediate presupposition, and as in the case of Hölderlin's conception of the judgement, the category of being is taken to be basic.[13] Beginning with this most comprehensive and universal of categories, the whole sphere of the *Logic* is then presented synthetically as the *introduction* to cognition, as in the mature *Encyclopaedia* careful attention being paid to the subordinate presuppositional relationships subsisting between

[11] *Ueber Anmuth und Würde* (Leipzig, 1793). The work was also published in the periodical 'Die neue Thalia', but we know from Hegel's Library List (no. 82) that he possessed the Leipzig edition.

[12] *Critique of Pure Reason* A 337, B 394.

[13] It is *very* probable that this was the case, but not *certain*, the first pages of the manuscript have been lost: see *Jen. Syst.* II.356–360.

categories of simple relation such as unity and multiplicity, categories of relationship such as causality and reciprocity, the judgement, the syllogism etc.[14] The main point of the subsequent *Metaphysics* is to show how the same analysis and synthesis give rise to the conception of cognition itself as having its initiation or basis in a negative relation to its other which it comes to recognize, and eventually to know, as being identical with itself. As in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, Hegel points out that comprehending cognition is not to be confused with the cognition it is expounding: "For us, the general object of cognition is the whole of cognition; for cognition as formal cognition, cognition in the general object is what is negated, distinct. Its other being has merely the negative significance of itself; the general object is only determined as this other, cognition being merely negated within it."[15]

The further similarities between this systematic exposition of cognition under the heading of a 'metaphysics' and the *Berlin Phenomenology*, are most striking, especially in the last main section of it, the "metaphysics of subjectivity". As early as 1795, in the letter in which he wrote to Hegel about his conversion to Spinozism, Schelling had interpreted Kant's qualified reinstatement of traditional metaphysics as implying that: "There is for us no other supersensible world than that of the absolute ego. – God is nothing but the absolute ego, the ego in so far as it has annihilated all that is theoretical, – that which in *theoretical* philosophy is therefore = 0. Personality arises through the unity of consciousness. Consciousness is not possible without an object however; but for God, i.e. for the absolute ego, there is *no* object *at all*, for if there were it would cease to be absolute, – there is, therefore, no personal God, and our supreme endeavour is the destruction of our personality, a passing over into the absolute sphere of being."[16] An idea very similar to this reoccurs in the 1804/5 treatment of "absolute spirit": "The theoretical ego finds itself as the Supreme Being, as that into which for us its realization had passed over, or as that which it had posited as being absolutely beyond it . . . It therefore finds *itself*, is spirit, rational."[17] The third main section of the *Berlin Phenomenology* reproduces a similar conception of rational consciousness, without the same emphasis upon the theological overtones. What is more, the first and second main sections of the Berlin work correspond so closely to the treatment of the theoretical and the practical ego in the 1804/5 text, that it would be very difficult indeed to make out a case for regarding them as unrelated.[18]

If we are looking for the ultimate origins of the *Berlin Phenomenology* in the

[14] *Jen. Syst.* II.3–125.
[15] *Jen. Syst.* II.126, 11–14.
[16] Hegel, *Briefe* no. 10; cf. Hegel's notes on the subject in *Theologische Jugendschriften* (ed. H. Nohl, Tübingen, 1907) pp. 361–2.
[17] *Jen. Syst.* II.171, 16–22; cf. 160, 10–19; 342, 4.
[18] *Jen. Syst.* II.157–163 correspond to *Berlin Phen.* 29–53; 163–165 to 55–95; 165–178 to 97–105.

history of Hegel's development, we therefore have to take into consideration his reaction to the three Kantian Critiques, Fichte's development of the second and Schelling's development of the third, and the way in which the conception of cognition which arose out of this reaction was formulated in the *Logic and Metaphysics* of 1804/5. It is, however, the use he made of this basic and central assessment of Kantianism after 1805 which is most directly relevant to an understanding of the intrinsic significance of the Berlin text.

It looks as though he had failed to work out a satisfactory philosophy of the organic sciences and spirit in 1804/5, for the text breaks off at the end of the physics. Since the broad outlines of the philosophy of spirit of the time were much the same as those of the *Jena Phenomenology*[19], the very different use he makes of his conception of cognition in the latter work is well worth noting. In the system of 1804/5, cognition merely constitutes the transition from logic to nature. In respect of its *systematic placing and structure*, it therefore has its counterpart in the mature system in the organic categories which round off the *Logic*.[20] Although such a transformation is open to questioning, – one might ask, for example, whether what has been classified as a logical category is still to be regarded as having a cognitive function, – it is not unreasonable. To bring out the universal significance of Kantian cognition in terms of logical categories is as philosophically respectable a procedure as presenting one's assessment of it within a metaphysics arising out of a logic and constituting the introduction to a philosophy of the natural sciences. In the *Jena Phenomenology*, however, the same cognition is associated with the most primitive kinds of knowledge, the initial and sensuous foundations of the "experience of consciousness." This quite obviously involved what could easily have been regarded as a preposterous distortion of its true philosophical value, and the text therefore contains no explicit reference to Kantianism.[21]

Only when the *Jena Phenomenology* had been dismantled and integrated into the mature *Philosophy of Spirit* did Hegel begin to call attention to the significance of his treatment of consciousness as a systematic assessment of Kantian epistemology. There are, for example, concise but comprehensive statements of the mature view of perception in both the *Doctrine of Consciousness* of 1808 and that of 1809, but it is only in the corresponding section of the *Heidelberg Encyclopaedia* (1817) that explicit reference is made to Kantianism in this connection: "The precise stage of consciousness at which the *Kantian*

[19] *Jen. Syst.* III.185–287 (1805/6). The main difference lies in the clearer syllogistic structure of this work, see H. Schmitz *Hegel als Denker der Individualität* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1957) 133 ff.
[20] *Enc.* §§ 194–244.
[21] *Jen. Phen.* §§ 90–239; *Ges. Werke* 9. 63–137. The recent critical edition notes three references to Kant (§§ 146, 235, 238), three to Fichte (§§ 147, 235, 238) and two to Schelling (§§ 150, 162), none of which is explicit. Hegel was hoping for a permanent University appointment, and explicit references might not have been conducive to good public relations with the academic community of the time.

philosophy grasps spirit is perceiving, which is in general the standpoint of our *ordinary consciousness* and to a greater or lesser extent of the *sciences*. It starts with the sensuous certainties of single apperceptions or observations, which are supposed to be raised into truth by being considered in their connection, reflected upon, and at the same time, turned by means of certain categories into something necessary and universal, i.e. *experiences*."[22] This criticism of Kantianism is also put forward in the introduction to the *Berlin Phenomenology*. Both the *Doctrine of Consciousness* of 1808 and that of 1809 contain corresponding introductions[23], but it is only in the *Heidelberg Encyclopaedia* that Hegel states explicitly that: "The Kantian philosophy is most accurately assessed in that it is considered as having grasped spirit as consciousness, and as containing throughout not the philosophy of spirit, but merely determinations of its phenomenology."[24]

Although there is evidence that even as early as 1808 Hegel had a fairly comprehensive grasp of the anthropological presuppositions of the conscious ego, of the phenomenology of spirit as concerned essentially with the relationship between subject and object, and of psychology as the immediate sublation of these spheres[25], a further and even more important change in his conception of the relative significance of Kantianism and phenomenology seems to have taken place between 1808/9 and the publication of the *Heidelberg Encyclopaedia* in 1817. In the latter work it is no longer the *Jena Phenomenology*, but the historical and systematic import of Kantianism which is used as an introduction. After giving an account of the main fields of speculation in early eighteenth century metaphysics, Hegel points out that this manner of thinking had been decisively called in question, first by empiricism and then by Kantianism, and that it is awareness of the problem posed by these movements which provides the best foundation for a truly systematic and comprehensive philosophy.[26] He rounds off an extended analysis of the main aspects of this revolution by observing that: "On account of the Kantian philosophy, it has become a commonplace to demand that the *faculty of cognition* should be submitted to *critical examination* prior to cognition itself, and at first glance this would appear to be plausible enough. But this examination is itself a cognition, and there is no sense in its being undertaken without cognition." He also notes that the Logic with which he begins the systematic part of the *Encyclopaedia*, "also constitutes the examination demanded, and in a more well-founded manner than the critical procedure,

[22] *Berlin Phen.* 43–53; cf. notes 43, 16; 45, 14; 45, 29. The corresponding § in the *Heidelberg Encyclopaedia* (§ 337) is much the same as that in the *Berlin Phen.*, see *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.27.

[23] *Phil. Sub. Sp.* II.425–429; *Bew.* (1808/9) §§ 1–6; *Bew.* (1809) §§ 1–9; *Berlin Phen.* 3–27.

[24] *Heid. Enc.* §§ 332; *Berlin Phen.* 11. Cf. note 11, 33; *Phil. Sub. Sp.*III.11.

[25] *Philosophische Enzyklopädie* (1808) § 129; Hegel *Werke* (Suhrkamp, 1975) 4.42, 607. Cf. *L. Logic* (1816) 781.

[26] *Heid. Enc.* §§ 12–37.

which ought above all to have examined its own presuppositions, point blank as they are, as well as the nature of its activity", and that "*scepticism*, as a negative science applied to all forms of finite cognition" might also constitute a suitable introduction to philosophy. In thus pointing out that although a critical examination of empiricism and Kantianism constituted the best introduction to his own philosophy, various other approaches might prove to be equally satisfactory, he also explained why he had come to prefer the method of historico-criticism to that of phenomenology: "Formerly, it was the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the scientific history of *consciousness*, which I treated as the first part of philosophy, in the sense of its having to precede pure science on account of its constituting the engendering of its Notion. At the same time, however, consciousness and its history, like every other philosophical science, is not an absolute beginning, but one member within the cycle of philosophy."[27]

In the second and third editions of the *Encyclopaedia*, those which provide the framework for the *Berlin Phenomenology*, Hegel concentrated upon formulating a *systematic* assessment of Kantianism by treating consciousness "as one member within the cycle of Philosophy", and upon extending his historico-critical analysis of it in the general introduction.[28] Although he still included a somewhat perfunctory account of the introductory or didactic significance he had once ascribed to the *Jena Phenomenology*, he no longer made any attempt to relate the work to the central problems posed by empiricism and Kantianism.[29]

His assessment of Kant's epistemology is carried out in the first main section of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, the treatment of "consciousness as such".[30] As has already been noticed, he works out the systematic derivation of the natural ego from the sub-conscious in the preceding sphere of the *Anthropology*, and it is therefore Kant's *natural* ego which is presented as constituting the foundation of consciousness. The ego's most fundamental characteristic is taken to be its capacity for being conscious of something. At the most basic level, however, this something is entirely unspecified. We can say no more of this level, than that since there is an "I" there is also an "it". This is not essentially a logical relationship, for at this juncture logical subjectivity has been dealt with long since, in the sphere which even precedes that in which the physical and physiological foundations of consciousness are

[27] ibid. § 36.

[28] The analysis of Kantianism in *Heid. Enc.* §§ 27–35 has its equivalent in *Enc.* §§ 40–60. The main extension is in §§ 47–60, which correspond to *Heid. Enc.* §§ 33–35. The most important addition to the introduction in the second and third editions is the analysis of the "third attitude to objectivity" (§§ 61–78). The treatment of empiricism in the *Heid. Enc.* (§ 26) is considerably extended in *Enc.* §§ 37–39.

[29] *Enc.* § 25 Rem.

[30] *Berlin Phen.* 29–53; *Enc.* §§ 418–423.

submitted to systematic analysis.[31] The relatedness of the "I" and the "it", the ego and the non-ego, does *involve* logical categories and relationship however, and Hegel calls attention to some of the most striking and important of them.[32] Kant had maintained that: "We can lay at the foundation of psychology nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless presentation I, which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions . . . an I, or He, or It, who or which thinks."[33] Hegel is equally imprecise in respect of the exact nature of what is included under the postulate of the ego, equating "we", "I" and "ego" with evident unconcern, presumably on account of his having assumed the *universal* significance of the systematic context under consideration. In the introduction to the work, for example, we find him observing that: "This passing into *us*, by means of which the content is *mine*, is what we call knowing. I know something in that there is a certain self-determining of the *ego*, of what is *mine* and of this something."[34] He would probably have answered objections to the apparent laxity of thought here by pointing out that to have raised an "other minds" problem at this juncture would have involved entering a field of enquiry already shown to be more properly located in the *Anthropology*. The hall-mark of the ego is that it is conscious of itself as distinct from objectivity as a whole. As a matter of everyday consciousness therefore, it is by definition not involved in any confusion concerning itself or what is objective to it. If it were, it would, on Hegel's analysis, be in a state of mental derangement.[35] It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the ego of everyday consciousness is here the object of comprehending consciousness: "The certainty of my self is what is most certain, since I am a general object to myself, am certain of myself, am the general object of my consciousness."[36]

In the *Logic*, in the course of systematically analyzing such categories as *existence, thing, matter* and *form*, Kant's "thing in itself" is discussed, and treated as what is merely *implicit*, what still has to be grasped in its full complexity: "If no progression is made beyond the mere implicitness of general objects, they are conceived of not in their truth, but in the onesided form of mere abstraction."[37] The purely abstract, general and undifferentiated nature of what is objective to the ego, its non-ego to use the Fichtean terminology of the time, is "developed" in the first main section of the *Berlin*

[31] *Enc.* §§ 160–244.
[32] *Berlin Phen.* 3, 22; 19, 17; notes 11, 19; 37, 23.
[33] *Critique of Pure Reason* A 346, B 404.
[34] *Berlin Phen.* 7, 36–9, 2; cf. note 9, 2.
[35] *Berlin Phen.* note 9, 10; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* II.327–387. Cf. T. Wilkerson's "three progressively more extreme counter-examples to Kant's claim that consciousness entails self-consciousness" in his *Kant on Self-Consciousness* ('Philosophical Quarterly' vol. 30 no. 118, January 1980) pp. 56–57.
[36] *Berlin Phen.* 9, 19–21.
[37] *Enc.* § 124 Add.; *Berlin Phen.* note 37, 35.

Phenomenology into that which is the equal of the original ego, – into another ego, objective to the first. The exposition of this "development", as of the *Encyclopaedia* as a whole, is synthetic in that it involves progressing from the less to the more complex, from the ego conscious of an otherness devoid of any further determination, characteristic or feature, to the ego conscious of itself in its other, that is to say, to self-consciousness. In the first instance, however, it was almost certainly thought out analytically. As has already been observed, Hegel's original concern was with Kantian ethics, the theory of inter-subjectivity, that part of the critical philosophy which had led Kant to confound still further his original confusion of natural and logical subjectivity. There is good reason for assuming, therefore, that Hegel first entered upon a systematic analysis of Kant's theory of knowledge as the result of his attempting to sort out the presuppositions of Kantian ethics. An objective ego, he must have argued, presupposes an objective organism. An organism constitutes the co-ordination of physical laws. Such laws rest upon necessity. Consciousness of necessity arises out of experiences, the connecting of experiences and being aware of objects and their properties. There could be no experience without consciousness of things, and such consciousness presupposes awareness of space and time, sensations and feelings. When the levels of complexity brought to light by this analytical procedure were reviewed in the reverse order, the result was a systematic reconstruction, by comprehending consciousness, of what ordinary consciousness had proclaimed to be a thing in itself, objective to the ego, inaccessible to rational enquiry. It was also, however, a recapitulation of the original ego's presuppositions, which, in the mature encyclopaedic system, are provided with a full-scale exposition in the *Logic* and the *Philosophies* of *Nature* and *Spirit*.[38]

The subject-object relationship implicit within consciousness therefore resolves itself, on Hegel's analysis, into a whole series of subordinate relationships. He does not investigate them very closely, and he is even less interested in attempting to dogmatize about their details. He is concerned primarily with providing a systematic or philosophical framework for the sort of epistemological investigation stimulated by Kant's critical philosophy. To a considerable extent, therefore, he simply accepts the "many-coloured and variegated self"[39] as the necessary outcome of empirical analysis: "Since the ego only has being-for-self as formal identity, it has the *dialectical* movement of the Notion, the progressive determination of consciousness, not as its *own* activity but as *implicit*, and as an alteration of the object. Consequently, consciousness appears to be differently determined according to the variety of the general object given, and its progressive formation to be an alteration of the determinations of its object."[40]

[38] *Berlin Phen.* 29–53.
[39] *Critique of Pure Reason* B 134.
[40] *Berlin Phen.* 11, 20–26.

e. RECOGNITION

> The finite rational being cannot ascribe to itself a free causality in the sensuous world without also ascribing it to others, and so assuming the existence of other finite rational beings, external to itself. – FICHTE.

On Hegel's analysis, Kant had therefore created insuperable difficulties for himself in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, on account of the way in which he had conceived of the piecemeal use of logical categories as being integral to the acquisition of knowledge in ordinary consciousness. In that he had taken cognition to be "objective" not only through its being "logical" or capable of being formulated in accordance with the universal rules of discourse, but also through its being determinable within a spatio-temporal context, both his language and his basic standpoint had to be regarded as vitiated by a radical ambiguity. Although he had distinguished between the two factors, he had also confused them, and he had therefore been unable to decide whether the co-ordinating principle of the ego was "transcendental" or empirical. Hegel had taken his time over disentangling what was logical and what was phenomenological in Kant's conception, but by the time he was lecturing on the *Berlin Phenomenology* he had worked out his mature *Logic*, and quite evidently felt sure enough of his own standpoint to criticize the Kantian position publicly. Within the *Encyclopaedia*, Kant's "transcendental" ego reappears as the "subjective" or "organic" categories constituting the teleological unity of the systematic exposition of the entities employed in the "universal rules of discourse", and Kant's "empirical" ego as the telos of the sub-conscious, and the foundation of the various levels of spatio-temporal knowledge analyzed and systematized in the first sphere of the *Berlin Phenomenology*.

Despite this convincing solution to the central problem of Kantianism, it has to be admitted that Hegel is not very illuminating on the precise nature of the relationships subsisting between the subjective unity of the ego and the various levels of complexity at which it is conscious of objectivity. By and large he simply accepts the way in which they had been defined by the empirical consciousness of the time, and is content to classify and interrelate, rather than submit them to further analysis. It is often the case, therefore, that it is only the context in which a particular kind of knowledge is placed, that which it is presented as presupposing and that of which it is the presupposition, which provides us with any real insight into his conception of it. We know from the *Anthropology*, for example, that he saw the basic co-ordination of the ego as having its foundations in the organism, sensations, feeling, habit etc., and as a critical and comprehensive survey of the sub-conscious,

there is nothing in the literature of the time which might be compared with the work. It is certainly disappointing therefore, that when Hegel is faced with the task of characterizing the ego's initial assimilation of its objectivity, he can do no better than concoct a confused and incongruous analogy: "Knowing is nothing other than an object's being posited in its ideality in that it is posited in me. If anything is to pass into the point of the ego it has to be crushed so to speak, posited as being wholly devoid of actuality, so that it retains no trace of its independence."[1] Since he makes very little of the way in which the ego, even when distinguished from the sensations and feelings of the *Anthropology* and the intuitions and imaginings of the *Psychology*, can colour its non-ego, there is nothing particularly original about his characterization of the way in which it *senses* objectivity (§§ 418–419), *perceives* connections between the various determinations of this sense-data (§§ 420–421), and is capable of *understanding* the laws inherent within these connections (§§ 422–423). What is important and enlightening about his exposition is not so much the actual material he draws from empirical consciousness, as the use to which it is put by comprehending consciousness in systematically sublating the postulated featurelessness of Kant's thing in itself. Yet even in this respect Hegel sometimes makes heavy weather of reaching a satisfactory formulation of what one might have thought was an obvious sequence. In the *Jena Phenomenology*, for example, when dealing with the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness by means of the understanding, he was concerned primarily with the understanding and co-ordination of physical laws by means of the concept of force. The subject was given a comparatively extensive treatment in the Nuremberg texts of 1808/9, and once again the main emphasis was upon force and the understanding of the laws of physics, which were regarded as providing the understanding with insight into the "inwardness of things". It is only in the *Heidelberg Encyclopaedia* (1817) that we have any evidence of his having taken up the significance of the organism as the sublation of physical laws at this juncture. We know from his lecture-notes however, that although he broadened his terms of reference when dealing with the subject during the early Berlin period, he continued to illustrate the main thrust of his argument by means of physics. It is not easy to date the change in his conception very precisely, but in the *Berlin Phenomenology* the understanding of physical laws is clearly subordinate to the understanding of the organism. It is particularly difficult to see why he should have taken so long about formulating this mature conception, for many exactly analogous transitions, the great majority of which were already firmly grasped at the beginning of his academic career, are to be found throughout the *Encyclopaedia*.[2]

[1] *Berlin Phen*. 7, 32–36.
[2] ibid. 45–55; note 53, 17.

In the treatment of consciousness, the ego is not regarded as the merely passive recipient of material from without. Since its objectivity is its presupposition, it is conceived of as actively negating or sublating that of which it is conscious: "Since the ego or consciousness is the self-relating universal, the subject in its complete universality, I relate myself to the world as universal being-for-self i.e. thinkingly. Thinking is the universality which is for itself, it is what is active. The ego is not a quiescent atom, but restless, active, – it is infinite negativity, activity in general. What is active has the determination of universality, and it is this that thinks."[3] This activity is, however, confined to the subjective co-ordination of sense-data, experiences, laws etc. It is only when the ego is also conscious of another living being, another conscious ego, that the comparatively latent or implicit nature of its activity begins to participate in a state of inter-subjectivity.

In the *Berlin Phenomenology*, the systematic derivation of this inter-subjectivity constitutes the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness, the equivalent of the Kantian transition from "pure" to "practical" reason. Kant brought out the significance of this as follows: "Now if we compare the intelligible order of things with the analytical part of the critique of pure speculative reason, we shall see a remarkable contrast. There, it was not fundamental principles, but pure, sensible *intuition* (space and time), that was the first datum that made *a priori* knowledge possible, though only of objects of the senses . . . The moral law on the other hand, although it gives no view, does give us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world . . . namely, a law. This law (as far as rational beings are concerned) gives to the world of sense, which is a sensible system of nature, the form of a world of the understanding, that is, of a *supersensible system of nature*, without interfering with its mechanism."[4]

It could, therefore, have been uncertainty concerning the relevance of such *moral* as opposed to physical or organic laws at this juncture, which delayed formulation of Hegel's mature assessment of this transition. In his final conception, however, it is the primitive consciousness directly dependent upon the biological unity of the living being which constitutes the initial emergence in objectivity of that which the original ego can *recognize* as its counterpart or equivalent. This is no longer simply the animal organism, nor is it a being limited to the awareness of the subconscious, – to racial characteristics, sensations, feelings, dreams or insanity. It is another conscious being, conscious of its being distinct from all that is not consciousness, and self-conscious in that it is aware of its like in the original ego. It resembles Kant's moral agent in that it is above nature, "absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world", but differs from it in that its activity is

[3] ibid. 21, 10–15.

[4] Kant *Critique of Practical Reason* 73–74 (tr. T. K. Abbott, 1873, 1959) pp. 131–132.

motivated not by the conscious acceptance of a universal moral law, but, in the first or most basic instance, by nothing more than desire. On Hegel's analysis, therefore, inter-subjectivity at this level consists of each ego treating the other not as its equal but merely as an object, in Kant's terms, as a means only[5], and not as an end in itself: "In its immediacy as desire therefore, self consciousness has before it an external general object, and it therefore has to conduct itself externally and lay hold of this object, so that its activity appears externally . . . But the ego has only related itself negatively to the selfless object, which is therefore merely absorbed. Desire is therefore generally *destructive* in its satisfaction, just as it is generally *self-seeking* in respect of its content, and since the satisfaction has only been achieved in singleness, which is transient, it gives rise to further desire."[6]

The activity of the ego at the level of self-consciousness therefore consists predominantly of its attempting to subjugate its objective counterpart. Once such self-consciousness is looked at more closely, however, analyzed into a *sphere*, systematically defined in its details by drawing upon empiricism, it gives evidence of a progression from desire, drive and activity, through struggle, mastery and servitude, to community, mutual recognition and rationality. In interpreting this part of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, we should take care that the drama of mastery and servitude into which this progression draws one aspect of the everyday consciousness involved, does not divert us into overlooking the analytical and synthetic procedures basic to its exposition.[7] When attempting to grasp the progression's intended significance, it is therefore helpful to bear in mind the history of Hegel's dramatization of it. In its earliest appearance in the *System of Ethical Life*, the mastery and servitude theme is developed in the context of such economic and social relationships as are dealt with later in the *Philosophy of Right* in the course of analyzing civil society into such fundamental factors as need and satisfaction, work, the accumulation of capital, class divisions etc. In 1803/4 and 1805/6, it is employed in much the same sort of context, in order to bring out the general significance of mutual recognition in respect of the law, property and the family.[8] In the *Jena Phenomenology* however, as in all its subsequent appearances in Hegel's writings, it is presented not in an economic and social context, but as a level of self-consciousness, having consciousness as its major presupposition and reason as its major sequent.[9] This constitutes a pretty radical re-assessment, and considering the amount of literature centred upon the subject in general, it is curious in the extreme that so little attention should

[5] *Critique of Practical Reason* 155–156.
[6] *Berlin Phen.* 69, 6–8, 19–22.
[7] *Berlin Phen.* 71–89; cf. note 59, 6.
[8] *Phil. Right* §§ 189–208; *System der Sittlichkeit* (1923 ed.) 442/3; Eng. ed. H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox, Albany, 1979, pp. 125–127; *Jen. Syst.* I.307–314; III.218–222.
[9] *Jen. Phen.* §§ 178–196; *Bew.* (1808/9) §§ 27–30; *Bew.* (1809) §§ 29–37; *Heid. Enc.* §§ 352–357; *Berlin Phen.* §§ 430–435.

have been paid to this aspect of it. Sometime during 1805/6, Hegel evidently decided that although the inter-subjectivity established through the struggle for mastery is of course *implicit* in social relationships, it cannot be employed as an adequate analysis or explanation of them. This decision was probably the outcome of his growing awareness of the importance of the geographical and economic factors which play such a basic and relatively intractable part in the determination of politics and world history.[10] But whatever the reason, he certainly came to realize that there was not much point in attempting to base a pragmatically effective and responsible conception of society upon nothing more than an analysis of abstract consciousness.

Once we search a little further into the origin and background of the drama of mastery and servitude, it becomes apparent that this mature assessment of it is an outcome of Hegel's revised view of Kantianism, – that it was probably conceived of in the very first instance as a doctrine of consciousness, and that his early use of it is not only at odds with his considered conception of society, but also with the general principles of his systematic philosophy.

The idea of the mutual recognition of rational egos as the only fully justified basis of legal and political life was first worked out in detail in Fichte's *Science of Rights* (1796). Basing his political philosophy directly upon his doctrine of consciousness or theory of knowledge, Fichte took the ego to be the fundamental principle of society: "The practical faculty is the inmost root of the ego; to it everything else is attached, and with it connected. All other attempts to deduce the ego in self-consciousness have failed, because they must always presuppose what they wish to deduce; and we here see why they must fail. How was it indeed possible to assume, that the ego arises through the connection of many presentations, in none of which the ego is contained?" Rational legal relationships then arise in that: "I must recognize the free being as such in all cases, that is, must restrict my freedom through the conception of the possibility of his freedom." Fichte then goes on to "deduce" the ego's body, the recognition of the same, the right of compulsion, the establishment of government, the "right to watch that each labours sufficiently", the correct treatment of outlaws, the proper use of the pillory, international relationships etc. etc. He insists throughout, however, that every aspect of his political philosophy is related directly to the central principle of the mutual recognition of rational egos: "Our deduction asserts that the conception of law lies in the conception of reason, and that no finite rational being is possible wherein it does not occur. It does not occur in consequence of having been taught, nor through experience, nor in virtue of

[10] See *World Hist.* 152–196, *The natural context or the geographical basis of world history*, where Hegel brings out an aspect of historical developments not far removed from that of *geographical determinism*. Cf. the elaborate analysis of the complexity of economic and social factors at work in society provided, for example, in the 1824/5 lectures on the *Philosophy of Right* (Ilting IV.486–630).

arbitrary arrangements among men, etc., but in consequence of man being a rational being."[11]

This manner of thinking about social organization and politics almost certainly had an influence upon Hegel while he was still uncertain as to how the Kantian philosophy was to be developed, and it is evidently this influence which is reflected in his early use of the mutual recognition theme.[12] In his mature criticism of Kantian ethics and Fichtean political philosophy however, he points out that on account of their attempting to relate everything directly to the ego, they remain at a level of abstraction and generalization which makes it impossible for them to deal constructively with the complexities of concrete situations. He therefore treats Kant's injunction to "act from maxims which are capable of becoming universal laws", as involving nothing more than the law of identity, as being hopelessly academic, as embodying a definition of duty which simply tells us that it is duty: "To say that a planet is a planet, magnetism magnetism, spirit a spirit, is quite rightly regarded as silly; this is certainly a matter of general experience. School is the only place in which such laws have validity, and together with its logic, which propounds them in all seriousness, it has long since lost credibility with both sound commonsense and rationality." Hegel's contention is, therefore, that Kant's ethics "reach no determination", lack any specific content: "The universal, the non-contradiction of self, is something which comes to be reality in the practical sphere just as little as in the theoretical."[13] In the *Berlin Phenomenology*, he calls attention to the artificiality of Kant's distinction between the theoretical ego of "pure reason" and its practical counterpart, and then continues: "There is, moreover, no progression here beyond the abstraction of self-determination, since for the will law is supposed to be still nothing other than self-conformity, not to involve contradiction i.e. to be still nothing other than the abstract identity of the empty understanding, so that practical reason gives laws which have as their principle abstract identity, the lack of content which does in fact lack content. There is no progression beyond determining in general, although what the determining is depends on the content".[14]

Much the same sort of criticism is levelled at Fichte's political thinking. As early as 1801 Hegel was characterizing his philosophy in general as, "a consistent product of the understanding, a mass of finitudes, which the original identity cannot draw together into the focus of totality or to its absolute self-intuition."[15] He later praises him for realizing that philosophy

[11] *Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre* (Jena and Leipzig, 1796); *Fichtes Werke* (ed. I. H. Fichte) III.21, 52, 53; Eng. tr. *The Science of Rights* (A. E. Kroeger, London, 1889) 36–37, 78, 79; *Berlin Phen.* notes 23, 15; 73, 15; 95, 2; 95, 4.

[12] L. Siep *Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie* (Munich, 1979) 26–39.

[13] *Enc.* § 115; *Hist. Phil.* III.460; *Berlin Phen.* notes 13, 32; 15, 11.

[14] *Berlin Phen.* 15, 2–9.

[15] See footnote on next page.

must be a science derived from one supreme principle, but notes that in taking this to be the ego, he developed his system onesidedly: "It is from the very beginning subjective, conditioned by an opposite, and its realization is a continual rushing onward in finitude, a looking back at what has gone before. The form in which it is presented also has the disadvantage, and indeed the real drawback, of bringing the empirical ego ever before one's eyes, which is absurd, and quite distracting to one's point of view."[16] The main point of his criticism is, therefore, that just as in epistemology Kantianism displays a strong tendency to reduce the richness, complexity and pragmatic effectiveness of intellectual activity to a sequence of formal logical abstractions, so in ethics and politics it displays an equally strong tendency to reduce the obligations, predicaments and concrete developments arising in the family, society and the state to nothing more than matters of individual responsibility.[17]

Hegel was intensely aware of the more general significance of the theme of recognition, and it therefore reappears throughout the *Philosophy of Right* in connection with such topics as slavery, contract, work, social status, legal formalities, corporations, constitutional and international law etc.[18] According to his mature analysis, these further appearances of it in such highly complex legal, moral, social and political situations were beyond the genuine scope of Kantianism, the intrinsic significance of which was confined to the establishing of abstract inter-subjectivity at the level of self-consciousness. Within the *Berlin Phenomenology*, therefore, Kant and Fichtes' practical will, stripped of its rationality and circumspection, is presented as a naked drive, a brute desire to act, destroy, find satisfaction and dominate.[19] It seems, therefore, as though it was largely on account of its didactic value in illustrating the modes or levels of inter-subjectivity constituting the transition from consciousness to reason, that the reciprocal activity between Fichte's egos was allowed to develop into the drama of struggle and coercion, mastery and servitude.[20] Hegel is careful to point out that what is being dealt with at this level is neither anthropological nor psychological, but simply the relationship between two self-conscious beings, the purest abstraction of personal freedom, and in the introductory Paragraph on self-consciousness, he therefore observes that: "I know of the general object as its being mine, and since it is my presentation, I know of myself within it. – Ego =

[15] *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* (1801; tr. and ed. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf, Albany 1977) 155; *Ges. Werke* 4. 62–63.
[16] *Hist. Phil.* III.481–482; *Berlin Phen.* note 15, 19.
[17] *Berlin Phen.* note 13, 32; *Enc.* §§ 53–54; *Phil. Right* § 135.
[18] *Phil. Right* §§ 57, 71, 132, 192, 207, 217, 253, 260, 331. Cf. Siep op. cit. pp. 131–145; *Berlin Phen.* notes 77, 17; 87, 33.
[19] *Berlin Phen.* 65–71.
[20] ibid. 71–89; notes 55, 6; 87, 32.

ego expresses self-consciousness, *abstract freedom*. pure ideality."[21]

Although this confining of the significance of Kant and Fichtes' moral and political philosophy to a theory of self-consciousness was primarily the outcome of the systematic implications of the relative complexity of the subject-matters of phenomenology and sociology, it seems also to have been influenced by Schiller's essay *On Grace and Dignity* (1793). Schiller's wholehearted approval of the emphasis Kant had laid upon the moral will and duty, was tempered by his being acutely aware that the forcefulness with which he had made his main point had: "frightened away all the Graces, and could easily lead a weak understanding into looking for moral perfection in a gloomy and monastic asceticism." He pointed out, therefore, that whereas dignity simply attempts to subjugate natural drives and propensities to the mastery of reason, to coerce them to order under a Draconian constitution, to impress them with the majesty of the moral law, "grace leaves to nature, in that it is fulfilling the behests of the spirit, an illusion of spontaneity." For Schiller, therefore, ethics was either a struggle for mastery between natural propensity and rational precept, or a spontaneous and harmonious expression of the whole personality: "Man either suppresses the demands of his sensuous nature in order to establish an adequate relation with the higher demands of his rationality; or he reverses the procedure and submits the rational to the sensuous part of his being, simply going where he is pushed, driven like other appearances by natural necessity; or natural drives harmonize with rational laws, and man is one with himself." Hegel almost certainly read this essay soon after its first appearance, and he evidently found much in it of which he thoroughly approved.[22] We know from his library list that he possessed a copy of the first edition, and not only the general drift of the argument in the corresponding section of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, but also several of the details with which he illustrates it, notably the references to Greek history, indicate that it was very much in his mind when he came to prepare his lectures.[23]

The *systematic* significance of this evaluation of Schiller's qualified approval of Kantian ethics should not be overlooked. It indicates very clearly, that although the overriding purpose of Hegel's expositions was to analyze issues into the various levels of complexity constituting their concrete existence, he was no less intent upon synthesis, upon not allowing his academic or methodological preoccupations to force him into the intellectual dismemberment of what is really an integrated or living whole. Thus, in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, although Kantian and Fichtean ethics and politics are interpreted as constituting nothing more than a theory of inter-subjectivity, reference is

[21] ibid. 55, 4–6; note 55, 6.

[22] See his letter to Schelling, April 16th 1795: *Briefe* no. 11 (I. 23–26).

[23] *Berlin. Phen.* 89, 31–41; cf. note 85, 19.

also made to such inter-subjectivity's being the foundation or presupposition of more complex considerations. In the introductory Paragraph on the "universal self-consciousness" which rounds off the second main section of the work for example, he observes that: "This form of consciousness constitutes not only the *substance* of all the essential spirituality of the family, the native country, the state, but also of all virtues, – of love, friendship, valour, honour, fame."[24] It should be noted, moreover, that much of the *Anthropology* is concerned with inter-subjectivity at a natural or sub-conscious level, and that this is also referred to when dealing with self-consciousness: "In order to avoid eventual misunderstandings of the point of view just presented, it has also to be observed that the struggle for recognition in the extreme form in which it is here presented can occur only in the *state of nature*, in which men are simply *singular* beings. It remains alien to both civil society and the state, within which the recognition constituting the result of the struggle is already present."[25]

Just as in the sphere of consciousness the general object of the ego progressed into being its equal, so now in the sphere of self-consciousness, the tension between *two* mutually exclusive egos progresses into the *multiple* inter-subjectivity of "universal self-consciousness".[26] Since it was the *material* nature of the corresponding objectivity which was systematically reconstructed in the preceding sphere, the process of recognition in the sphere of self-consciousness begins with the recognition of a bodily presence: "Here, the other is external objectivity, founded in the other's independence being that of the ego, within which its otherness lies. This corporeality belongs to an ego and is an organic body. The body now bears the corporeality of an ego, and since it belongs to another ego, this corporeality has an absolute independence of me. Within it I have an immediate intuition of myself, and at the same time of something other than I am, so that this externality is still a wholly distinct unyieldingness. The object is in itself ego, it is my equal and an absolute other. This is the relationship and the question is now how this contradiction resolves itself."[27]

At the end of the process of recognition, at the highest level of self-consciousness, the outcome of mastery and servitude and the establishment of a community of need is taken to be the rationality of mutual recognition, consciousness of the freedom of all: "The master who confronted the servant was not yet truly free, for he was not yet fully aware of himself in the other. Consequently, the freeing of the servant also initiates the completion of the master's freedom. In this state of general freedom in that I am *intro*-reflecting I am immediately reflected in the *other*. Conversely, by relating myself to the

[24] ibid. 91, 12–15; cf. notes 77, 17; 87, 11; 91, 5; 91, 18.
[25] ibid. note 83, 19; cf. note 73, 30; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III. 59–63.
[26] *Berlin Phen.* 91; cf. notes 91, 28; 97, 31.
[27] ibid. 73, 21–30.

other, I immediately relate myself to *myself*. Here, therefore, we have the mighty diremption of spirit into various selves, which in and for themselves and for one another are completely free, independent, absolutely rigid, resistant, – but which are at the same time identical with one another, and hence not independent and impenetrable, but confluent as it were."[28]

f. REASON

> What I mean by *reason*, is absolute reason, or reason in so far as it is thought of as the total undifferentiation of what is subjective and what is objective. — SCHELLING.

We have already investigated the extent to which Schelling's interpretation of Spinozism influenced Hegel's attempts to think through the implications of Kant's critical philosophy during the Jena period. Extension and thought, the two attributes of Spinoza's substance, were developed teleologically by Schelling into the philosophy of nature and the idealism which includes and transcends it, both being expounded from the standpoint of absolute reason. As we have seen, he took this absolute or ultimate telos to be "the total undifferentiation of what is subjective and what is objective", and to involve the aesthetic intuition by means of which the absolute ego assesses the extent to which intelligence, self-determination, ethics, morality, law, history, religion etc. approximate to its own standpoint in overcoming the pervasive subject-object dichotomy.[1] We have also noted that just as Spinoza identified God and nature, so Schelling identified God and the absolute ego, and that the same identification is to be found in the unpublished *Logic and Metaphysics* of 1804/5.[2]

Although the treatment of reason in the *Berlin Phenomenology* is the outcome of Hegel's later and more mature assessment of Schellingianism, and although it differs considerably from the treatment of "absolute reason" in the early Jena writings, it is therefore essential, if we are to grasp its full significance, that we should take into consideration its background and development. It still bears distinct traces of its origins, and some of its main characteristics are evidently the direct outcome of Hegel's earliest reactions to Schelling's ideas. Even the Spinozistic religious theme for example, far removed though it is from his mature views, is not entirely absent from the Berlin work, which is rounded off with a reference to Christ's promise that when he has departed, his disciples will be guided and comforted by the Holy

[28] ibid. note 91, 28; cf. *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.71–73.
[1] *Berlin Phen.* introd. xxxii–xxxiii.
[2] ibid. lii; cf. Spinoza *Ethics* IV, preface.

Spirit: "The Spirit will guide you into all truth, says Christ. Spirit is not merely formally free, as is self-consciousness, but enters into all truth, and since it is implicitly reason, and the certainty that there is nothing but reason, it seeks nothing but truth."[3]

In his first acknowledged publication (1801), Hegel points out that the sublation of the subject-object dichotomy, the outcome of which must be the organizing of the various sciences within "the systematic coherence of objective totality", is the most important prospect opened up by the ways in which Fichte and Schelling had developed Kant's critical philosophy. The heart of the matter is, therefore, that the: "subject is subjective subject-object, – the object objective subject-object; and since a duality is now posited, each one of the opposites is opposed to itself, and the partition goes on *ad infinitum*. Hence, every part of the subject and every part of the object is itself in the Absolute, an identity of subject and object; every cognition is a truth, just as every speck of dust is an organization."[4] In his mature lectures on the history of philosophy, he notes that although Schelling's teleological treatment of nature and spirit has to be regarded as constituting an essential advance upon Kant, he had fallen short of what was required in that he had failed to do justice to the logical dimension of the critical philosophy: "There are two aspects to this absolute identity of subjective and objective, the conducting of nature to the subject and the conducting of the ego to the object. Such conducting could only have been genuine if it was logical however, if it had involved the pure thoughts, and neither in his exposition nor in his development did Schelling rise to proceeding logically."[5]

As we have seen, in the *Logic and Metaphysics* of 1804/5, Hegel attempted to remedy this shortcoming by treating the systematic exposition of abstract categories as the introduction to a "metaphysics" consisting of an analytical and synthetic survey of cognition, and then using this "metaphysics" in order to establish a transition to the concrete sciences embodied within the philosophy of nature.[6] It is, however, the way in which he developed this aspect of his system after 1805 which is most directly relevant to an understanding of his treatment of reason in the *Berlin Phenomenology*.

His crucial move was the decision to replace the "metaphysics of cognition" with the organic categories of the mature *Logic*. In defence of his original conception he could have argued that by treating the systematic exposition of logical abstractions as the introduction to cognition, he had managed to avoid Fichte's circularity of presuppositions[7], and that the cognition necessarily presupposed by a philosophical treatment of the natural

[3] *Berlin Phen.* 105, 22–26; cf. note 105, 23.

[4] *The Difference* etc.; *Ges. Werke* 4.65, 71; Eng. tr. 157,166.

[5] *Werke* (Suhrkamp) 20, 434–435. *Hist. Phil.* III.526 does not include the passage.

[6] *Berlin Phen.* introd. lii–liii.

[7] ibid. introd. xxix.

sciences might reasonably be regarded as different from that involved in interrelating categories. The mere difference between the systematic treatment of categories and the cognitive treatment of the concrete sciences did not provide him with a suitably positive definition of his methodology as a whole however, and in the spring of 1805, as we have seen, he decided to attempt to establish a more radical and universal basis for philosophy in general by developing the potential of the "experience of consciousness". The broad strategy involved treating cognition as the initial or most basic phase of a "scientific" exposition which would, he hoped, provide him with a satisfactory introduction to both logic and systematic philosophy.[8]

Since the resultant *Jena Phenomenology* not only started with cognition but also involved the outlines of a philosophy of spirit, it was by no means clear how its methodology, let alone its material content, could be regarded as relevant to the systematic exposition of logical categories. Was Hegel advocating the primacy of an existential approach? Was he re-asserting Kant's view that since the synthetic unity of apperception is no more than the logical unity in judgements, it has no need of an independent and preliminary justification?[9] Evidently not, since the *Phenomenology* was publicly advertized as constituting the introduction to the *Logic*. But how could one possibly formulate any such introduction without presupposing logical categories? And are we not, therefore, forced to accept Hegel's original conception of a metaphysics of cognition based upon a logic as superior to that of an "experience of consciousness" supporting a logic? If the *Phenomenology* is not part of the system itself, what is its systematic status as an introduction? It seems to be impossible to avoid the conclusion that regardless of the way in which one interprets Hegel's original phenomenological enterprise, one cannot help falling back into Fichte's infinite reiteration of presuppositions. The truth of the matter would appear to be, therefore, that the work did no more than heighten and confuse the original problem by reproducing it on a grander scale.[10]

What is more, by transferring cognition to the *Phenomenology*, and allowing the *Logic* to reach its culmination in nothing more than a series of abstract categories, Hegel seemed to have created for himself yet another apparently insoluble problem. It was not difficult to see that the cognitive activity of the theoretical, practical and absolute ego might reasonably be regarded as the immediate presupposition of the systematic treatment of the natural sciences.[11] It was not so easy to convince oneself that purely logical entities, even highly complex ones such as the Notion and the Idea, were

[8] ibid. introd. xvi.
[9] ibid. introd. xxix.
[10] H. F. Fulda, *Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik* (Frankfurt/M., 1965), has recently revived this whole nexus of problems.
[11] *Jen. Syst.* II.154–178.

relevant to the systematic exposition of concrete disciplines such as astronomy, chemistry or politics. There was clearly no point in calling Kant's basic tenet in question and asserting that such concrete disciplines could have arisen independently of universal thought-patterns. On the other hand, the precise relevance of logical categories and the relationships between them to a non-logical subject-matter was by no means clear. It was evident from the formulation of such categories as teleology and life, that in working out the final sphere of the *Logic* Hegel had physical and spiritual assimilation in mind. The content and structure of this sphere were clearly intended to bring out the universal or logical significance of the analysis of the organism which had led Kant to consider the teleological interpretation of nature so closely, to highlight the importance of the organic thinking which had caused Schelling to idealize the transcendental ego, to provide a systematic assessment of the use he himself was making of the analogues of the organism throughout the *Encyclopaedia*.[12] It was not so evident, however, that this abstract universalization and systematization of organic assimilation was more worthy than the semi-Kantianism of his former theory of cognition to be regarded as the central philosophical principle of the succeeding spheres of nature and spirit.

We have already seen how he solved the first of these problems. Only a year after having published the *Jena Phenomenology*, he had distinguished between that part of it which was in fact a doctrine of consciousness, and that which coincided with the philosophy of spirit, and so managed to integrate it into the *Encyclopaedia*. Ten years after its publication, he was treating the *Jena Phenomenology* as of interest only in so far as it threw light upon his own development, and advocating scepticism and the historical consideration of Kantianism as the best introduction to systematic philosophy. In the *Heidelberg Encyclopaedia* he openly admitted that phenomenology: "like every other philosophical science, is not an absolute beginning, but one member within the cycle of philosophy."[13] Within the mature encyclopaedic system therefore, the final section of the *Jena Phenomenology*, that dealing with art, revealed religion and absolute knowing, has its counterpart in the ultimate triad of aesthetics, revealed religion and philosophy.[14] Since both expositions were originally intended to constitute the introduction to the systematic consideration of logical categories, since the historical context of both is now reasonably clear, and since the relevant texts have been available for some years in English translations, it is certainly curious that so many of the current English text-book accounts of Hegel's thinking should continue to overrate the final or central philosophical importance of the Jena work.[15]

[12] *Enc.* §§ 204–222.

[13] *Heid. Enc.* § 36; *Berlin Phen.* introd. lvi.

[14] *Jen. Phen.* §§ 699–808, *Ges. Werke* 9. 376–434; *Enc.* §§ 553–577.

[15] See footnote on next page.

In Schelling's *System of transcendental Idealism* (1800), the ultimate telos, the introduction to the concluding "general observations on the system as a whole", consists of a similar exposition of world history, religion and aesthetics. As has already been noticed, this work almost certainly had a direct influence upon the general lay-out and content of the *Jena Phenomenology*.[16] According to Schelling, it is only at this elevated level of aesthetic intuition that the subject-object dichotomy is finally overcome. By re-stating what Schelling considered to be his supreme philosophical accomplishment at the relatively basic level of a "metaphysics of subjectivity", Hegel had, therefore, even in the *Logic and Metaphysics* of 1804/5, gone a long way toward distinguishing between a doctrine of consciousness and a philosophy of spirit.[17] The *Berlin Phenomenology*, like the central expositions of Schelling's work, has its systematic placing within the *Philosophy of Spirit*, not in the transition from Logic to Nature. Nevertheless, its treatment of reason as the sublation of the subject-object dichotomy at the level of the transition from the sub-conscious to psychology has much more in common with the earlier "metaphysics of subjectivity" than with the corresponding Schellingian perspectives of the *Jena Phenomenology*.[18]

How, then, is reason defined in the Berlin work? As in the case of consciousness and self-consciousness, and, indeed of every other level and sphere throughout the *Encyclopaedia*, its positive definition rests principally upon that which it is taken to presuppose. To use Hegel's own terms, it is presented or defined as "negating" or "sublating" that which precedes it in the systematic progression established by the analytical and synthetic procedures of comprehending consciousness. As we have seen, in the sphere of consciousness as such, the initial level dealt with in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, a beginning is made with a complete and radical opposition between the subjectivity of the ego and the featureless objectivity of the non-ego. Through the ego's progressive determination of objectivity by means of sensuousness, perceiving and the understanding, a level is finally reached at which the subjectivity of the ego is conscious not only of sensuous impressions, objects or physical laws, but also of an animate objectivity, a living being like itself. It was also pointed out that by formulating this systematic

[15] Earlier introductory accounts, J. H. Stirling *The Secret of Hegel* (1865), E. Caird *Hegel* (1888), W. T. Stace *The Philosophy of Hegel* (1924), G. R. G. Mure *An Introduction to Hegel* (1940) concentrated instead upon the importance of the *Logic*, and made very little mention of the *Phenomenology*. J. N. Findlay *Hegel. A Re-examination* (1958) and C. Taylor *Hegel* (1975), are typical of the more recent trend.

[16] *Berlin Phen.* introd. xxxii; Schelling *Werke* 2. 587–634.

[17] *Jen. Syst.* II.165–178. Seen in this light, the *Jena Phenomenology* appears even more clearly as an aberration from Hegel's main line of development.

[18] *Jen. Phen.* §§ 231–437, *Ges. Werke* 9. 132–237.

sublation of the original subject-object dichotomy, comprehending consciousness is also recapitulating the physical and sub-conscious presuppositions of the basic or original ego, and that the objectivity of which this ego is conscious is therefore its own presupposition.

In the succeeding sphere of self-consciousness, the basic procedure is the same. A beginning is made with the subject-objectivity of two egos conscious of each other as objects of desire. Out of the ensuing interactions emerges the inter-subjectivity of communal provision, which in its turn gives rise to the fuller objectivity of mutual recognition. What the analytical and synthetic procedures of comprehending consciousness bring to light in consciousness as a whole is, therefore, a general progression in degree of objectivity. For Hegel therefore, as for Schelling, the reason in which consciousness culminates is the sublation of various subject-object dichotomies. There are, however, important differences between the specific nature of the dichotomies they consider, as well as between their conceptions of this sublation, at least when one compares the *System of transcendental Idealism* with the *Berlin Phenomenology*. For Schelling, the *pervading* dichotomy is only overcome through the aesthetic intuition of the absolute ego, and persists throughout social life, world history, religion and, to some extent, even in art. For Hegel, the *basic* dichotomy is overcome through the rational inter-subjectivity of self-consciousness, and so gives rise to the reason presupposed by the more complex levels of spirit. In fact consciousness or phenomenology, in that it is still vitiated, even at the level of reason, by the subject-object disparity, is, on his analysis, not to be regarded as a sphere of spirit proper: "Despite its being-for-self, the ego is at the same time not for itself, since it is merely related to an other which is given to it. The freedom of the ego is therefore simply abstract, conditioned, relative. Spirit at this juncture is certainly no longer immersed within nature. In that it is intro-reflected and related to nature however, it simply appears, for it merely stands in relation to actuality and is not yet *actual* spirit. This is why we call that part of science in which this form of spirit is considered phenomenology."[19] Even extremely basic levels of *Psychology* such as intuition, recollection and imagination are therefore presented as presupposing the reason which constitutes the culmination of the *Berlin Phenomenology*.[20] Consequently, reason as defined by Hegel is not the *actual* involvement with objectivity evident in language, politics, art etc., but simply a general and still abstract conviction, something which, in so far as it is no longer concerned with subject-object problems, is not so far removed from commonsense realism: "the belief and trust that I am able to cognize things, that they are not able to conceal

[19] *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.87.
[20] *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.79–199.

themselves, that they are as I cognize them to be, as I determine them through the spiritual activity of my thinking them over, – that I do not remain subjective in this, but relate myself wholly objectively, penetrating to the inwardness of things and apprehending general objects as they are."[21]

It should not be forgotten, that this rational sublation of the subject-object dichotomy, this "belief and trust" in the validity of objective cognition, as dealt with in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, is a level or sphere of everyday consciousness. It is the abstract and general presupposition of the subject-matter of the succeeding sphere of *Psychology*, – of intuition, recollection, imagination etc., just as the absolute Idea, the final category of the *Logic*, is the abstract and general presupposition of the subject-matter of the *Philosophy of Nature*, – of space, time, motion etc. Intuition, recollection, imagination etc. are more than a mere conviction, since they actively assimilate what is objective to them.[22] Space, time and motion etc. are more than a mere logical category, since they constitute the basis of objectivity.[23] Nevertheless, both this particular logical category and this particular level of consciousness are matters of central importance to the whole Hegelian system. Although both are part of the subject matter of the *Encyclopaedia*, the Idea being nothing more than an abstract category, reason being nothing more than a level of consciousness, both are also an integral part of its general methodology and systematic structure.

It is worth examining precisely why this is so. The everyday consciousness which rounds off the *Berlin Phenomenology* is taken to be rational on account of its no longer being involved in the subject-object disparities which beset consciousness and self-consciousness. It is apparent from Hegel's exposition that this means in effect that it is essentially a matter of being conscious of its systematic derivation, of the levels of consciousness etc. subordinate to it, of the relative incoherence of regarding subject-object dichotomies as absolute or insurmountable.[24] In this respect it therefore coincides with the general systematic implications of the absolute Idea, which through the clarification of the systematic interrelationships between abstract categories carried out in the *Logic*, has already been shown to involve the co-ordination of all that it presupposes. Although the absolute Idea is nothing more than a logical abstraction, it is, therefore, the universal pattern for all the other systematic expositions of the philosophies of nature and spirit. In so far as each and every level within the *Encyclopaedia* is expounded in context, in respect of its derivation from what it presupposes and the complexity relationships in which it stands to that by which it is presupposed, Hegel is therefore justified

[21] *Berlin Phen*. 103, 33–38.
[22] *Phil. Sub. Sp*. I.89.
[23] *Phil. Nat*. I.221–240.
[24] *Berlin Phen*. introd. xlvi; cf. notes 101, 18; 101, 30; 103, 16.

in presenting the work as the direct expression of the Idea. In that all these levels also involve their particular "empirical" content, he takes it to be the expression of the Notion of its subject-matter.[25] Consequently, in the subject-matter of the final sphere of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, the universal category of the Idea, the systematic derivation of the empirical content, establishes the structure or Notion of what is already, in its own right as everyday consciousness, the fully conscious co-ordination and sublation of that which it presupposes: "As the *Idea*, reason appears here in the determination of its constituting the unity of the general opposition between the Notion and reality, an opposition which at this juncture has had the preciser form in which the Notion exists for itself, i.e. in which consciousness is confronted externally by the object."[26]

Once one has grasped the broad implications of the Idea's coinciding with consciousness in constituting reason at this particular juncture, it is worth considering the relationship between this rational consciousness constituting the subject-matter of the final sphere of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, and the comprehending consciousness which carries out the systematic exposition of the whole work. To what extent, at this juncture, is the comprehending consciousness which is expounding rational consciousness identical with the Idea? As has already been pointed out in the opening chapter, since comprehending consciousness depends for its subject-matter upon its empirical counterpart, it is certainly more than an abstract category or a universal methodology. It could be said, therefore, that comprehending consciousness is the Idea as cognitive consciousness, for it is only by means of empirical consciousness that it can advance beyond the mere reiteration of its logical self-sufficiency, and so elicit the Notion of the subject-matter of the *Encyclopaedia*. On the other hand, the exposition of the Idea as the culmination of the *Logic* itself presupposes a rational consciousness.[27] Within the whole encyclopaedic system, it is therefore the rational consciousness constituting the subject-matter of the final sphere of the *Berlin Phenomenology* which eventually, that is to say, through the stages critically analyzed in the *Philosophy of Spirit* and the *Logic*, finds its most universal expression in the logical category of the Idea, and the resulting combination of Idea and rational consciousness which constitutes the Notional comprehension basic to establishing the systematic context of reason.

This, then, is Hegel's solution to the second problem created by integrating the treatment of consciousness into the philosophy of spirit and

[25] ibid. introd. xxii.

[26] ibid. 93, 17–21; cf. 97–99.

[27] Not intuition, as Schelling maintained in the lectures he delivered at the University of Munich in 1827 (*Werke* 5.208): "Even in the first step of his *Logic* Hegel presupposes intuition, and he could make no progress at all without relying upon it."

removing cognition from the final sphere of the *Logic*. As purely logical entities, the Notion and the Idea derive their validity solely from their presuppositions, their systematic context. As organs of cognition, relevant to the systematic exposition of concrete disciplines such as astronomy, chemistry or phenomenology, they derive their effectiveness from a rational consciousness, which they themselves structure, but upon which they also depend. This inter-dependence of subject-matter and system, of reason and the Idea, is emphasized in the final section of the *Berlin Phenomenology*: "Reason in general is the Idea, for the Idea is reason: we do not possess the Idea, it possesses us, so that reason also possesses us, being our substance. When we say that the Idea is rational, rational is the predicate, and the Idea, although it is what matters and has power, still appears to be independent. In that we have to regard reason in this way, we know it to be that which is substantial, activity, infinite form, that which determines itself from out of itself i.e. the Idea, which is neither fabricated nor acquired. We present the Idea to ourselves as being what is thought, and reason as being more in and for itself, but we must discard these forms and take the Idea and reason to be identical."[28]

Although Hegel calls attention to the significance of this rational consciousness for the encyclopaedic system as a whole, it should not be forgotten that what is being dealt with in the final sphere of the *Berlin Phenomenology* is no more than the natural origin, the most basic, abstract and general form of the rational Idea motivating the expositions of the *Encyclopaedia*. The real or concrete significance of these expositions depends upon an acquaintance with empirical disciplines which at this juncture is still far beyond the scope of the embryonic rationality under consideration. Since it is not, however, beyond its potential competence, it may be said that the overall philosophical significance of the reason dealt with at this juncture is much the same as that of the Kantian epistemological and ethical doctrines assessed in the immediately preceding spheres.[29] The general import of the *Berlin Phenomenology* is, therefore, that just as Kantian epistemology is concerned with the wholly universal foundations of the empirical sciences, just as Fichtean ethics is concerned with the general inter-subjectivity without which there could be no civil society, so Schellingian rationality is concerned with the basic principle of consciously systematic thought. The further implications of this tripartite concern do not fall within the scope of phenomenology, but are to be worked out in other spheres of the *Encyclopaedia*.

In listing the contents of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, the attempt has been made to bring out the pervasive triadicity of the work, and it may, therefore, be of some value to conclude this chapter by commenting upon this cele-

[28] *Berlin Phen*. 99. 17–26.
[29] ibid. note 99, 12; cf. introd. lxiv.

brated aspect of Hegel's methodology. It will probably already have been noticed, that the analysis and synthesis, the asymmetrical relationships, levels, hierarchies and spheres, the universal or "logical" structures involved in Hegel's exposition of the systematic implications of Kant's critical philosophy, are aspects of a basic philosophical procedure which has much in common with the time-honoured and well-proved method of resolution and composition.[30] It will probably also have been noticed, moreover, that this basic procedure can be carried through to completion, in the sense that it can be made to yield all the philosophically significant results noticed so far, without its giving any indication of a triadic pattern. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, when discussing the triadic "sublation" of "opposites" in Schellingianism, Hegel notices how difficult it sometimes is to distinguish such a procedure from "sophistry, hocus pocus, juggling etc."[31] If what is so often passed off as Hegelianism is ever to be anything more than a mumbo jumbo, it is indeed essential that Hegel's imposition of triadicity should be recognized as a strictly secondary procedure, absolutely committed, if it is to have any claim to validity, to respecting the relationships and structures already established by the basic and essential procedures of analysis and synthesis. Hegel quite evidently regarded the triadicity of his expositions as a matter of considerable importance however, and it is therefore fortunate that in comparison with the intellectual labour involved in grasping and expounding the primary significance of his work, it should be so easy to reproduce this secondary aspect. Doing so simply involves grouping the levels of a sphere into a syllogistic pattern, a progression from a major to a minor premiss, and so to a conclusion. What emerges can then be presented as an inter-connected whole consisting of the "logical" moments of universality, particularity and singularity. It is quite evident from the way in which he went about eliciting some of his triads however, that we should be very cautious about reading too much philosophical importance into them. The *Psychology*, for example, the sphere immediately following the *Berlin Phenomenology*, was only provided with an overall triadic structure in 1830, and the method employed in establishing it was typographical. Hegel merely shifted a Paragraph formerly included in *Objective Spirit* back into *Subjective Spirit*.[32] If he felt no compunction about doing this sort of thing with a major sphere, it is hardly surprising that the ways in which he went about establishing his minor triads should be many and wonderful. When preparing his lectures on the *Anthropology* for example, searching for material relating to the therapeutic properties of magnetization, he evidently noticed that a group

[30] Pioneered by Aristotle, used so effectively by the scholastics, Galilei and Hobbes, and recently shown to be part of the intellectual armoury of both Descartes and Locke, see P. A. Schouls *The Imposition of Method* (Oxford, 1980).
[31] *Hist. Phil.* III.526; *Werke* (Suhrkamp) 20.435.
[32] *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.xcvi; III.265–269; *Enc.* §§ 481–482.

of Dutchmen had investigated the effect of magnetization upon *four* different kinds of animal. Since he was not too happy about retailing such information without also indicating its triadicity, he observed in his lectures that: "the power of the magnetizer acts not only upon man, but also upon dogs, cats and monkeys." The pigeons involved in the empirical consciousness on which the statement is based were, therefore, simply omitted.[33] It should be noted, however, that although it is certainly difficult to see much difference between this sort of thing and the "sophistry" of the Schellingians, the triadicity it gives rise to has little bearing upon the philosophical or practical significance of the basic expositions of psychology and animal magnetism. By and large, it can indeed be regarded as of only minimal relevance to the systematic treatment of the subject-matter of the *Encyclopaedia*.

g. THE CRITICS

> This is method, and it's dialectical all right. – The Notion tumbles over into its opposite; like a bad acrobat however, it keeps landing on its belly, and only after a number of such tries does it manage to turn a complete somersault back onto its feet. — F. EXNER.

In the course of the introduction we have seen that there was no agreement during Hegel's lifetime as to the precise nature of "phenomenology", that there is still no consensus as to the relationship in which his conception of the discipline stands to the main tenets of Kantianism, and that even his reasons for including a *Phenomenology* within the *Encyclopaedia* have attracted very little attention. It need come as no surprise to learn therefore, that worthwhile reactions to this aspect of his philosophy are scarce in the extreme.

It should not be assumed, however, that the *Berlin Phenomenology* was completely at odds with the philosophical preoccupations of Hegel's contemporaries, or that it cannot be placed in any philosophical tradition. As a systematic treatment of subject-object dichotomies, it is of interest to anyone convinced that no philosophy can dispense with a theory of subjective knowledge. Looked at historically, it can therefore be seen as part of one of the main themes of traditional western philosophy, – as a re-thinking of Plato's distinction between belief and the physical world, of Aristotle's attempt to equate the senses with their objects, of Leibniz's correlating the appearance of material things with the substance of the monads, of Hume's examining of the ways in which sense impressions relate to the constancy and

[33] *Phil. Sub. Sp.* II.297; cf. note p. 549.

coherence of objects etc.[1] In this broad perspective, it can also be seen as having certain common ground with J. H. Lambert's *Neues Organon* (2 vols. Leipzig, 1764), in which phenomenology is presented as enabling the philosopher to distinguish between true and illusory knowledge, between a real and an apparent position in space for example, between an object and an hallucination, genuine and imagined beauty, moral goodness and hypocrisy, postulated and actual probability etc. Hegel's classification of the critical philosophy as a whole as being essentially phenomenological[2] helps to relate his conception of the discipline to another well-defined philosophical tradition. As we have noticed, however, he could not have agreed with Kant's confining of the scope of phenomenology to consideration of the epistemological problems involved in distinguishing between relative and absolute space and motion, or with Fichte's treatment of it as simply a general doctrine of appearance and illusion.[3]

In early nineteenth century works concerned with the subject-matter Hegel deals with the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, the broad distinction between anthropology and psychology is common enough, but despite the almost ubiquitous influence of Kant's *Anthropology*, there is little evidence of the more purely philosophical considerations which gave rise to Hegel's placing of phenomenology between these two disciplines. J. H. Abicht (1762–1816) for example, in his *Psychologische Anthropologie* (Erlangen, 1801), pp. 7–8, defines phenomenology as, "the doctrine of the simple and more composite phenomena of the soul". Like Hegel, he is certainly concerned with the physiological foundations of psychic phenomena, and he attempts to present his material systematically, but much of what he treats as the subject-matter of psychology is what Hegel includes within the *Anthropology*. W. Liebsch (d. 1805), in his *Grundriss der Anthropologie physiologisch und nach einem neuen Plane bearbeitet* (2 vols. Göttingen, 1806/8) warmly acknowledges the influence of Kant, and formulates a basically triadic and systematic exposition of the subject-matter of *Subjective Spirit* (pp. ix–xii), the general theme of the middle section of which bears some resemblance to the treatment of inter-subjectivity in §§ 424–437 of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, but there is no evidence in his work of any corresponding treatment of the ego or of reason. J. C. Goldbeck (1775–1831), in his *Grundlinien der organischen Natur* (Altona, 1808), also refers to Kant, and makes an attempt to provide his work with a philosophical or hierarchical structure (pp. 11–12). What is more, he develops a "phenomenology" in which a general progression is made from more basic to more complex phenomena (pp. 24–52). The

[1] Plato *The Republic* 509 d et seq.; Aristotle *De Anima* II vi; Leibniz *De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis* (*Philosophische Schriften* ed. C. I. Gerhardt vol. 7 p. 319); Hume *A Treatise of Human Nature* (ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 1951 pp. 1, 194).
[2] *Berlin Phen.* 11,30–13,11.
[3] ibid. introd. xv.

subject-matter of this part of his work is quite different from that of Hegel's doctrine of consciousness however, being drawn largely from the field of physiology. These contemporary phenomenologies could, therefore, have influenced Hegel's early attempts to relate consciousness to sub-conscious states such as animal magnetism and mental derangement, but they cannot have played much part in his decision to treat it as a matter of central philosophical importance.[4] As we have seen, it was almost certainly Schelling's *System des transcendentalen Idealismus* (Tübingen, 1800), which provided the basic model for the *Jena Phenomenology*.[5]

Hegel was distributing stitched and unstitched copies of the *Jena Phenomenology* as early as April 7th 1807. At about that time a stitched copy, printed on vellum, was sent to Goethe, who, after coming across the reference to a botanical matter in the preface, wrote as follows to his friend T. J. Seebeck (1770–1831): "To say anything more monstrous is indeed not possible. It seems to me quite unworthy of a rational man to want to annihilate the eternal reality of nature by means of a miserable sophistical joke . . . When a distinguished thinker manages to contradict and obliterate an idea by means of ingenious and mutually self-nullifying words and phrases, one knows not what to say."[6] The work was advertized in the *Bamberger Zeitung* on June 28th and July 9th, and a couple of months later Jean Paul (1763–1825) wrote to F. H. Jacobi (1743–1819): "After the confused way in which he wrote or cogitated against you, Hegel even turned out to be surprising, – at least he has surprised me immensely by the clarity, style, freedom and vigour of his latest philosophical system; he too has broken away from father-polyp Schelling, although this whole series of bifurcating arm- and head-polyps can easily join up in the father creature again."[7] A second advertisement appeared in the *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* on October 28th, and a few days later Schelling wrote to Hegel telling him that although he had had the book throughout the summer, he had only managed to read the preface: "since the various engagements and diversions of the season have deprived me not only of the time but also of the quiet required for studying such a work."[8] A third advertisement was inserted in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* on November 25th, and shortly afterwards Jacobi wrote to J. F. Fries (1773–1843) to tell him that he was making "heavy weather of Hegel's ponderous tome" and that he hoped the forthcoming reviews would inform him as to what it was all about.[9] Fries was also reading the work, and a few days later wrote back to

[4] ibid. introd. xv.

[5] ibid. introd. xxxii.

[6] Hegel *Briefe* no. 94; *Jena Phen.* § 2; Goethe *Werke* Abtheilung IV Band 23 (Weimar, 1900), November 28th 1812. Seebeck evidently managed to clarify the matter somewhat, see Goethe's letter of January 15th 1813.

[7] Letter, September 6th 1807: *Sämtliche Werke* (ed. E. Berend, Berlin, 1955 ff.) vol. 5 p. 164.

[8] Hegel *Briefe* no. 107, November 2nd 1807.

[9] E. L. T. Henke *Jakob Friedrich Fries* (Leipzig, 1867) p. 314.

say that although he regarded Hegel's language as "very nearly intolerable", he found his basic intention clear enough. He opined that he was intent upon, "providing a general philosophical history of the human spirit or of reason." In that the work postulated both the fluidity of knowledge and "the dead sea of absolute truth", he took it to be basically self-contradictory however, and he wished those attempting to review it in detail "the very best of luck."[10] Schelling knew that K. J. H. Windischmann (1775–1839) was reviewing the work, and at the end of July 1808 he wrote enquiring as to the progress he was making: "I'm dying to know how you're getting on with Hegel. I'd like to see how you have unravelled the elf-lock, the tangled skein; I hope you haven't judged it from the God-fearing point of view, although on the other hand it would be wrong to allow him to get away with setting up a general standard in this way, which is just what his individualistic approach is most likely to do."[11] Even Hegel's friend, the botanist F. J. Schelver (1778–1832), who was subsequently to back his appointment at Heidelberg, evidently stated publicly not only that he was unable to understand the *Phenomenology*, but also that it was "devoid of scientific order."[12]

It could be the case, however, that the general reception was rather more positive than might appear from these reactions. Seven hundred and fifty copies of the work were printed, twenty two years later they had nearly all been sold, and during this time Hegel was not entirely lacking in admirers prepared to put pen to paper in praise of the book.[13] P. G. van Ghert (1782–1852) for example, a Dutch civil servant, enthusiastic animal magnetizer and former pupil of Hegel's, wrote to him in August 1809 "filled with the holiest feeling of respect and friendship," eulogizing the "divine Phenomenology", and asking where the second part of it was. To some extent the oddity of his correspondence was probably the result of his imperfect command of German. The following June he wrote again, in a similar vein, asking what other works Hegel was thinking of publishing, and observing (sic) that: "You derive a certain satisfaction from your followers' honouring you as the genuine philosopher, which you are indeed, and also daring to publicize your excellence abroad, in spite of the hate of the non-philosophers and Schellingian phrase-mongers."[14] The Schellingian G. H. Schubert (1780–1860), who knew Hegel personally at Jena and Nuremberg, and during his later university career was professor of natural history at Munich, in the autobiography he published a quarter of a century after Hegel's death,

[10] R. Zoeppritz *Aus F. H. Jacobis Nachlass* (Leipzig, 1869) II.20.

[11] G. L. Plitt *Aus Schellings Leben* (Leipzig, 1870) II.128.

[12] Hegel *Briefe* no. 164, September 21st 1810.

[13] *Ges. Werke* 9.459, 475.

[14] Hegel *Briefe* no. 149, August 4th 1809, no. 160, June 22nd 1810; see R. J. de Folter *Van Ghert und der Hegelianismus* in *Hegel-Studien* vol. 14 pp. 243–277 (1979); *Phil. Sub. Sp.* II.557–561.

referred to the *Jena Phenomenology* as "one of the most widely admired literary productions of the time in the field of philosophy."[15]

The contemporary reviews were something of a mixed bag. The most perceptive was that by C. F. Bachmann (1785–1855), a pupil of Hegel's at Jena, who subsequently became one of his most incisive and persistent critics.[16] Contrasting Schelling's intuitiveness with Hegel's systematic approach, he suggested that the former might be regarded as the modern Plato, the latter as the modern Aristotle, and drawing upon his knowledge of the Jena lectures, presented the *Phenomenology* as a preparation for systematic philosophy and practical activity: "For we philosophize for our own, for the fatherland and the state. Philosophy must have a stimulating effect upon action, it must awaken nobility of sentiment, teach us to think effectively and act well; the system is a nourishment only to the manly and the valiant, the effeminate and the cheap-minded are destroyed by it." After his review had been published, Windischmann wrote to Hegel to say that the study of the "system of science" had convinced him that: "when the age in which it is understood has dawned, it will be revealed as the blue-print of the liberation of mankind, the key to the new gospel foretold by Lessing." The review is distinctly dull and pedestrian however, and Windischmann concludes it by admitting that he is not certain that he has understood what Hegel is driving at.[17] Friedrich Köppen (1775–1858), a disciple of Jacobi's and professor of philosophy at Landshut, was almost certainly the author of the nondescript review which appeared in the *Hallische Literatur-Zeitung* at the end of April 1809.[18] In the Netherlands, the book was reviewed in an extremely hostile manner by the Kantian Schellingian Johan Kinker (1764–1845), who concentrated mainly upon its preface and conclusion, informed his readers that he was not convinced that there could be any *science* of the absolute, and made much of a comparison between Hegel's doctrine of consciousness and what he considered to be the completely antithetical materialist system of the French philosopher P. H. Azaïs (1766–1845).[19] Van Ghert informed Hegel of this review, and published a lengthy and surprisingly able criticism of it, in which he paid particular attention to the significance of those sections of the *Phenomenology* devoted to sense-certainty and perception, and emphasized the importance of the systematic structure of the work.[20]

As a result of the severely limited significance ascribed to phenomenology

[15] G. H. von Schubert *Der Erwerb aus einem vergangenen . . . Leben* (3 vols. Erlangen, 1854/5) II.314–317.

[16] *Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, Jahrgang 1810, Erste Abtheilung, pp. 145–163, 193–209.

[17] Hegel *Briefe* no. 155, April 27th 1810; *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* 1809, no. 31–34, 7.–10. II cols. 241–272.

[18] *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* no. 115, 1809, April 24th and 25th.

[19] *Schouwburg van In-en Uitlandsche Letter-en Huishoudkunde* no. 9 pp. 502–508 (1810); P. H. Azaïs *Des Compensations dans les destinées humaines* (1809, 1846^5).

[20] See footnote on next page.

in the Nuremberg writings, the publication of the *Science of Logic* (1812–1816), and the appearance of the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia* in 1817, in which Hegel gave his reasons for including phenomenology within systematic philosophy, informed interest in the *Jena Phenomenology* waned rapidly during the decade following its publication. Hegel was quite evidently content to let it do so, and concentrated upon clarifying his systematic re-interpretation of it. He lectured regularly on phenomenology throughout the Heidelberg and Berlin period, treating it in general terms when dealing with his system as a whole (Winter 1816/17, Summer 1818, Winter 1818/19, Winter 1826/7), and devoting separate courses to expounding its content and systematic context in detail (Summer 1817, Summer 1820, Summer 1822, Summer 1825, Winter 1827/8, Winter 1829/30). Since the average attendance at these lectures was somewhat higher than that at the corresponding courses on the *Philosophy of Right*, it is rather disappointing that only three sets of student lecture-notes are known to have survived.[21]

The Abicht-Liebsch-Goldbeck tradition of predominantly non-philosophical phenomenologies continued into the 1820's. Joseph Hillebrand (1788–1871) for example, in *Die Anthropologie als Wissenschaft* (Mainz, 1823), developed a "somatological" phenomenology (pp. 57–83) concerned with such *basic* appearances or phenomena as health and disease, waking and sleep, malformations of the body etc., and a "psychological" counterpart (pp. 348–377) concerned with more complex phenomena such as ecstasy, dreams, somnambulism, derangement etc., that is to say, with a subject-matter dealt with by Hegel in the *Organics* and the *Anthropology*, the immediate *presuppositions* of the doctrine of consciousness. J. E. von Berger (1772–1833), in his *Grundzüge der Anthropologie* (Altona, 1824), made an interesting attempt to work out the systematic interrelationship between physiology, anthropology and psychology (pp. 15–22), and developed a "phenomenology of the soul" (pp. 538–560), concerned mainly with such sub-conscious phenomena as dreams and mental derangement. It is possible that he was influenced by Hegel's re-interpretation of the *Jena Phenomenology*, for he refers to the work (p. 533), but the general impression created by his systematic approach is that it arose out of his own consideration of what he was dealing with. G. E. Schulze (1761–1833) opens his *Psychische Anthropologie* (Göttingen, 1816, 1826²) with an account of the ego and consciousness, but in doing so he was probably influenced by Kant or Fichte, for although he deals with a wide range of sub-conscious and psychological phenomena in a broadly systematic manner, he seems to have very little idea of placing the ego *within* this sequence.

[20] Hegel *Briefe* no. 177, February 25th 1811; *Aanmerkingen op de . . . Recensie van . . . Hegel* (*De Recensent*, Amsterdam, 1811, no. 2 pp. 1–15); cf. W. van Dooren *Eine Frühe Hegel-Diskussion in Holland* (*Hegel-Studien* vol. 11 pp. 211–217, 1976).
[21] *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.cxiii.

During the 1820's several attempts were made to apply interpretations of recent developments in philosophy to the general field of psychology. Since this is what Hegel was doing, there are certain similarities between the results, although the differences between the presuppositions out of which they arose make it difficult to evaluate them. J. C. A. Heinroth (1773–1843) for example, in his *Lehrbuch der Anthropologie* (Leipzig, 1822), has a section on "the life of the soul" (pp. 75–104) the subject-matter of which corresponds fairly closely to that of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, but the general tone of his book, though academically philosophical, is quite unlike that of Hegel's. The second part of Ernst Stiedenroth's (1794–1858) *Psychologie* (2pts. Berlin, 1824/5) contains sections strongly reminiscent of the treatment of self-consciousness in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, but we know that Hegel did not think highly of the work.[22] H. B. von Weber's *Handbuch der psychischen Anthropologie* (Tübingen, 1829) is particularly interesting in this respect, since it begins with a treatment of self-consciousness, was evidently influenced by Fichte, and was written with a practical objective in mind, principally for criminologists. Any consideration of the contemporary relevance of the criticism of Fichte's ethics contained in the second main section of the *Berlin Phenomenology* ought, therefore, to involve some reference to the work.[23]

Two of Hegel's protégés published works on the doctrine of consciousness while he was still alive, and it is not difficult to see why he should have approved of one of them, J. G. Mussmann's (1798?–1833) *Lehrbuch der Seelenwissenschaft* (Berlin, 1827).[24] The comprehensively triadic structure probably pleased him, and although he could not agree with the precise assessments by means of which Mussmann developed his systematic placing of consciousness, his independence of judgement as to the details of the enterprise probably struck him as greatly preferable to the unintelligent emulation he found in so many of his other pupils. What is more, Mussmann had a clear grasp of the central importance of Hegel's main point – the inclusion of the doctrine of consciousness within the encyclopaedic system, with the sub-conscious as its immediate presupposition and practical psychology as its immediate sequent (§§ 69–76, pp. 213–249). This was not the case with G. A. Gabler (1786–1853), who in his *Kritik des Bewusstseins* (Erlangen, 1827), vacillated between treating phenomenology as the introduction to systematic philosophy, and as an integral part of it. The first section of his book is essentially a paraphrase of the introduction to the *Jena Phenomenology*. The second follows the *Berlin Phenomenology* in emphasizing the significance of reason as the culmination of consciousness. Gabler took the Hegel texts to be a basis for scholastic exposition and elaboration, and

[22] *Berliner Schriften* (ed. J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg, 1956) pp. 567–571; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.392.
[23] *Berlin Phen.* introd. pp. lix–lxviii; cf. *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.387.
[24] *Berliner Schriften* pp. 638–645 (1827).

attempted to illustrate their wider significance with reference to the *Logic* and the general history of philosophy. His original plan was to produce further volumes dealing with the genuinely encyclopaedic nature of Hegel's system, but they were never published, evidently because he found himself unable to think through the implications of the problems he had tackled. He had seen the central importance of the section on reason in the *Berlin Phenomenology*, but he did not manage to distinguish clearly between everyday and comprehending consciousness, and the full significance of the systematic interrelationship between the logical abstraction of the Idea and rational consciousness eluded him.[25]

During the decade or so following Hegel's death, a number of his followers published works relating to the systematic context of the *Berlin Phenomenology*. All of them were also concerned with examining and re-thinking the propaedeutic to the mature system, although they all saw the *Jena Phenomenology* as constituting the subjective and the *Logic* the objective introduction.[26] Their main reason for concentrating so much attention upon this part of the system was the strong tendency in the non-Hegelian philosophy of the time to psychologize Kantianism. As we have already noticed, Hegel himself had been fully aware of this general drift in the philosophical developments of the time, and during the Berlin period had planned a work comparable in detail and scope to the *Philosophy of Right* in order to draw it into perspective.[27]

The work was never written, and Ludwig Boumann (1801–1871), who had the job of editing the corresponding section of the *Encyclopaedia* took much longer than most of his colleagues in working over the materials he had at his disposal.[28] It could, of course, have been argued that Hegel's *Logic* had made it impossible for any self-respecting Kantian to simply psychologize philosophy, but J. F. Fries (1773–1843), J. F. Herbart (1776–1841), F. E. Beneke (1798–1854) played the game of emphasizing the affinity between their psychological approach and empiricism, doubts were being raised in other quarters as to the relationship between the *Logic* and concrete reality, and the would-be orthodox defenders of Hegelianism were therefore forced to attempt to expound the systematic context of the *Berlin Phenomenology* with reference to the concrete empirical disciplines to which it is related in the *Encyclopaedia*.

It would, perhaps, be a little unfair to create the impression that the result

[25] His book was published under the main title of *Lehrbuch der philosophischen Propädeutik* (1827; ed. G. J. P. J. Bolland, Leiden, 1901).

[26] H. F. Fulda *Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik* (Frankfurt/M., 1965) pp. 61–62.

[27] *Berlin Phen.* introd. xxvii; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.cxv, 90–139.

[28] He was also temperamentally incapable of taking up the cudgels in the controversies of the time: see *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.142.

was a complete fiasco. Thoroughly investigated, in the light of a clear concepton of Hegel's own intentions, it could certainly provide the basis for a valuable historical study. Here, however, we can do no more than indicate its main features.

One of the most serious shortcomings of those who wrote in defence of what they took to be the orthodox Hegelian approach in this field, was the failure to grasp the significance of Hegel's insisting that any worthwhile philosophical exposition of it must be based upon the commonsense realism of the analytical and synthetic procedures employed as a matter of course by any effective and responsible empiricism. They were so impressed by the broad outlines and general structure of the system, that they failed to investigate its foundations, the way in which had been built up. Consequently, they all tended to scholasticize Hegel, and no one had a good word to say for Mussmann. K. L. Michelet (1801–1893), for example, who had carried out the task of editing the *Philosophy of Nature*, and should, therefore, have known better, published a *System of Philosophy* as late as the 1870's in which he simply reproduced the interpretation of the empirical material he found in Hegel's standard works.[29] In his *Anthropologie und Psychologie oder die Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes* (Berlin, 1840), he gave evidence of rather more originality than he did later in life, since he re-organized Hegel's treatment of much of the basic empirical material. As is well known he also displayed one stroke of pure genius in entirely removing the *Berlin Phenomenology* from its systematic context, a procedure which he justified by maintaining that: "The Phenomenology of Spirit cannot have two scientific placings within the system. If it constitutes the science preliminary to the Logic, it cannot occur again as a moment of Subjective Spirit."[30] J. K. F. Rosenkranz (1805–1879) published his *Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjektiven Geist* in 1837, and subsequently made such a name for himself as an orthodox exponent of Hegelianism, that the work was evidently read as a substitute for the original and ran to a third edition as late as 1863. Even in this final version however, he still follows Hegel's expositions closely, and fails to give any real evidence of a living insight into what they are all about. A considerable section of the book (pp. 270–318) is devoted to the *Berlin Phenomenology*, and some attempt is made to find common ground with the Herbartians (p. 313). J. E. Erdmann (1805–1892) based his lectures at Halle on his *Grundriss der Psychologie* (Leipzig, 1840, 1873[5]), in which he not only followed the *Berlin Phenomenology* closely (pp. 55–74) but also attempted to

[29] *Das System der Philosophie* (4 vols. Berlin, 1876/9). The third volume is devoted to the natural sciences, and gives no evidence of any intelligent grasp of the tremendous advances that had been made since Hegel's death in the general understanding of nearly every field of natural science dealt with in the *Philosophy of Nature*: see Phil. Nat. I.284.

[30] Op. cit. p. v. Michelet could not resist including the mastery and servitude theme, – under the general heading of "social drives" (pp. 474–486).

interpret it in detail by referring back to Hegel's *Logic*, to Herbart and Hume when dealing with perception, to Hobbes and Spinoza when dealing with mastery and servitude etc. His general interpretation of the work was, therefore, similar to Gabler's. Carl Daub (1765–1836) had given his first lectures on philosophical anthropology as early as 1797, had backed Hegel's appointment at Heidelberg and had corresponded with him throughout the Berlin period. His *Vorlesungen über die philosophische Anthropologie* (Berlin, 1838), edited from manuscript material and lecture-notes by his friends, were regarded by this school as a major contribution to the orthodox interpretation of Hegelianism.[31] Although they contain many interesting references to Hegel's work, including a condensed summary of the *Jena Phenomenology* (pp. 152–153), they are, however, too rooted in their own background to be regarded as either exposition or criticism. They are really an independent treatment of approximately the same basic material. It is a treatment which shares much common ground with Hegel's however, especially in its placing of consciousness within the context of the sub-conscious and psychology. H. F. W. Hinrichs (1794–1861), in *Die Genesis des Wissens* (Heidelberg, 1838), attempted to relativize the importance of phenomenology as an introduction to the mature system by pointing out that in principle any sphere of the *Encyclopaedia* could serve this purpose. In 1845 Boumann eventually published what until very recently has remained the standard edition of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, the most remarkable characteristic of which is the complete absence of any elucidatory material relating to the crucial section on reason. This poor editing probably accounts to a considerable extent for the almost total neglect of the work by Hegel scholars.[32]

Apart from Eduard Bobrik (1802–a.1857), who tried to mediate between the two sides in this controversy, the non-committed seem to have made little attempt to find common ground between the empirical psychologists and the would-be Hegelians.[33] Unsparing criticism and outright condemnation became the order of the day. Franz Exner (1802–1853), Herbartian and professor of philosophy at Prague, produced a scathing analysis of the whole school of Hegelian "psychologists" in his widely read *Die Psychologie der Hegelschen Schule* (Leipzig, 1842, 1844²), characterizing their entire corporate enterprise, and by no means entirely unjustly, as "an undisciplined fooling about with empty concepts, which not infrequently lapses into being completely scatterbrained."[34] When one makes allowances for the interpretations in the light of which Exner was reading the Hegelian text, one has to admit that his assessment of the *Berlin Phenomenology* (p. 25f.) is still one of the most judicious in print. Of mastery and servitude, he asks: "How much

[31] *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.clvii.
[32] *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.3–77.
[33] *Neues praktisches System der Logik: Ursprüngliche Ideenlehre* (Zürich, 1838).
[34] Op. cit. pp. 108–109. The quotation at the head of this chapter is to be found on p. 67.

truth is there in the whole business? That legally regulated social relationships develop slowly, and mainly by means of confusion, strife and violence. The subject is not a purely psychological one however; it belongs to the philosophy of history, which, if it is to give rise to real insight, and not simply a few bright ideas, requires that a wide range of other elements, as well as the psychological, should be taken into consideration." Rosenkranz, in his *Widerlegung der von Herrn Dr. Exner gegebenen vermeintlichen Widerlegung der Hegel'schen Psychologie* (Königsberg, 1843), replied by classifying Exner's attack, in accordance with Hegelian jargon, as "a product of the polemic of the abstract understanding" (p. 370), emphasizing the importance of empiricism to Hegelianism (p. 387), reprimanding Exner for the presumption of assuming that philosophy ought to be useful (p. 394), and advising him to read more Aristotle (p. 402). C. H. Weisse (1801–1866), who had already translated and edited *De Anima*, and broken with Hegel in order to develop a neo-Kantian metaphysics, weighed in with a carefully reasoned *Die Hegel'sche Psychologie und die Exner'sche Kritik* (1844), the main outcome of which was the suggestion that the Herbartians and Hegelians ought to drop their differences and co-operate.[35]

Although the constructive outcome of this controversy between the two sides was minimal, and although the issues at stake have never been revived since it finally petered out in the 1850's, it did have the virtue of touching upon a genuine difficulty in the interpretation of the *Berlin Phenomenology*. Hegel himself would probably have recognized it as a variation on the problem he himself had faced in co-ordinating empirical and comprehending consciousness.

It is doubtful if he would have been able to recognize much of his own work in some of the other controversies which developed out of his doctrine of consciousness at about this time, although several of them are still living issues. Weisse, for example, had noticed that the claim of the Hegelians that they recognized no difference "between knowledge gained by pure thought and that gained through experience" had, "through a series of misunderstandings", given rise to "the latest of Ludwig Feuerbach's enterprises, which involves throwing overboard all a priori or genuinely speculative elements, and proclaiming pure, naked naturalism to be philosophy."[36] Evidently unaware of the existence of the *Philosophy of Nature* or *Anthropology*, the presuppositions of the *Berlin Phenomenology*, let alone the relationship between empirical and comprehending consciousness, Feuerbach was to ask: "Where, in Hegelian psychology, is the corpus whereby the immaterial soul takes possession of its body?"[37] He cannot have been very diligent in

[35] *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie* vol. XIII pp. 258–297, 1844.
[36] loc. cit. pp. 277–278.
[37] *Sämtliche Werke* X. 186–206, see especially p. 194.

searching out the answer to the question, for he replied to it himself with an emphatic "Nowhere", and so far as we know, never had any occasion to change his mind. As is widely recognized, Marx took up this line of interpretation with particular reference to the master-servant relationship, and developed a philosophy of history out of it by applying it to the economic factors involved in social relationships.[38] Of the extensive modern literature devoted to this subject, particular mention should, perhaps, be made of Alexandre Kojève's *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (Paris, 1947), G. A. Kelly's *Notes on Hegel's "Lordship and Bondage"* (*Review of Metaphysics* vol. 19 no. 4 pp. 780–802, 1965), and Ludwig Siep's *Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie* (Freiburg/Munich, 1979).

Feuerbach's interest in Hegel's doctrine of consciousness was an offshoot of his religious preoccupations, and in this respect he shared common ground with a group of thinkers who concentrated upon this part of the system because they were concerned with the religious implications of the concept of personality. Friedrich Richter (1802–a.1855) was evidently the first of Hegel's followers to extract from his doctrine of consciousness evidence for the mortality of the individual,[39] and immediate rejoinders followed from Weisse[40], I. H. Fichte (1796–1879)[41] and K. F. Göschel (1781–1861)[42]. The various arguments relating to the problem employed by the Hegelians of the time were submitted to a full-scale survey and analysis by the Finn J. W. Snellman (1806–1881)[43], were still a topic of some general concern during the second half of the century, –J. Schaller (1807–1868) *Leib und Seele* (Weimar, 1855, 1858^3), A. Seth (1850–1931) *Hegelianism and Personality* (Edinburgh, 1887, 1893^2), and in a modified form are evidently able to arouse interest and give rise to application even in our own time.[44]

In so far as phenomenology has come under discussion in connection with the introduction to systematic philosophy, it has of course been the Jena rather than the Berlin work which has attracted attention, there having been little awareness of the significance of the relationship between the Idea and reason within the system. I. H. Fichte and R. Haym (1821–1901) for example, regarded the *Jena Phenomenology* as a necessary stage in the history of Hegel's own development.[45] H. M. Chalybaeus (1796–1862) took it to be a

[38] *Die entfremdete Arbeit* (1844), *Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt* (1844); in *Marx Engels Werke. Ergänzungsband* I (Berlin, 1974) 510–522, 568–588.

[39] *Die neue Unsterblichkeitslehre* (Breslau, 1833).

[40] *Die philosophische Geheimlehre von der Unsterblichkeit des menschlichen Individuums* (Dresden, 1834),

[41] *Die Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer* (Elberfeld, 1834, 1855^2).

[42] *Von den Beweisen für die Unsterblichkeit* (Berlin, 1835).

[43] *Versuch einer speculativen Entwickling der Idee der Persönlichkeit* (Tübingen, 1841).

[44] Hermann Drüe *Psychologie aus dem Begriff. Hegels Persönlichkeitstheorie* (Berlin and New York, 1976) pp. 392.

[45] See footnote on next page.

necessarily integral part of the system itself.[46] K. P. Fischer (1807–1885) regarded it as partly subjective and psychological and partly objective and philosophical, and the objective aspect alone as constituting the genuine introduction to systematic thinking.[47] H. Ulrici (1806–1884) saw it as an introduction which itself presupposes absolute knowledge.[48] J. B. Baillie (1872–1940) was the first in the English-speaking world to emphasize its importance, and justified doing so by comparing it with the *Logic* and pointing out that although both constituted part of the *Encyclopaedia*, in a certain respect each could also be regarded as constituting the whole system.[49] Essentially the same attitude has been adopted by J. N. Findlay, who has maintained that the *Jena Phenomenology* sounds all the themes to be worked out in detail in the later system, that it can be dropped once one has advanced to the properly philosophical point of view, and, most recently, that the *Berlin Phenomenology* is "a vastly improved version of it."[50]

The other main approach has been through the subject-matter of Hegel's "psychology". In this case, more attention has been paid to the *Berlin Phenomenology*, but little real success has attended the attempts to bring out its philosophical significance. Johanna Dürck for example, *Die Psychologie Hegels* (Bern, 1927), tried to establish the relevance of Hegel's systematic exposition to modern psychological research, but did little more than ponder upon the significance of his triads. Fritz Weisskirchen, *Die Philosophie Hegels in ihrer Bedeutung für die Psychologie* (Bonn, 1951) did excellent work on the teleological role of the ego in the exposition of the *Anthropology*, but has managed to attract the attention of neither the Hegel scholars nor the psychologists. Iring Fetscher made a brave attempt (1950) at indicating the significance of the systematic context of phenomenology within the *Encyclopaedia*, but finally published his thesis, *Hegels Lehre vom Menschen* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1970), without submitting it to the necessary revision. Murray Greene managed to draw some attention to the *Anthropology* by means of his *Hegel on the Soul* (The Hague, 1972), but has not been able to sustain the interest. At about the same time L. B. Puntel, in his *Darstellung, Methode und Struktur* (Bonn, 1973), made a powerful plea for reconsidering the overall significance of the structure of "subjective spirit" which almost certainly deserves more attention than it has received so far.

[45] *Über das Verhältnis der Erkenntnislehre zur Metaphysik* (*Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie* I. 130, 1837); *Hegel und seine Zeit* (Berlin, 1857).

[46] *Phänomenologische Blätter* (Kiel, 1841) p. iv; *Entwurf eines Systems der Wissenschaftslehre* (Leipzig, 1846) p. 11.

[47] *Spekulative Charakteristik und Kritik des Hegelschen Systems* (Erlangen, 1845) p. 186.

[48] *Das Grundprinzip der Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1845) I.686.

[49] *The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic* (London, 1901); *The Phenomenology of Mind* (1910; London, 1949[3]), translator's introduction.

[50] *Hegel: A Re-examination* (London, 1958) p. 83; *Jena Phen.* (1977) p. v; D. Henrich *Hegels philosophische Psychologie* (Bonn, 1979) p. 24.

Now that the full text of the *Berlin Phenomenology* is available, and the attempt has been made to relate it to its Kantian background and bring out its systematic significance, it is to be hoped that the foundations have been laid for a more constructive approach to this crucial aspect of the Hegelian system.

h. THE TEXT

Heu quantum fati parva tabella vehit! — OVID.

The central part of the present text is that published by Hegel in the third edition of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830). It is printed here in bold type, the emphasized words being indicated by italics, and consists of eleven headings and twenty seven numbered Paragraphs (§§ 413–439), six of which include supplementary passages or Remarks. Although this edition was the last to be seen through the press by Hegel himself, and since the manuscript has disappeared has to be regarded as definitive, a few minor adjustments have been made, mainly in order to bring it into line with the excellent version published by F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler in 1959.[1] By consulting the second edition (1827), it has been possible, in a few instances, to correct spelling (90,9), emphasis (10,21; 10,32), grammar (46,3) and punctuation (70,19). An emendation made by Boumann in 1845 has been accepted (82,25), as has a correction made by Nicolin and Pöggeler (82,23). The punctuation has been modernized, as has the spelling of such words as *Thätigkeit* (10,21), *Selbstbewußtseyn* (64,17) *selbstständig* (70,19), *nothwendig* (82,32), *Wiederscheinen* (90,9). The original 1830 text is now most conveniently available in *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.2–77, where the English translation of it also indicates how much of the first edition (1817) was included within the final version.

These Paragraphs developed out of the *Jena Phenomenology* §§ 91–239 (1807), the *Doctrine of Consciousness* (1808/9) §§ 1–33, the second *Doctrine of Consciousness* (1809) §§ 1–42[2], the *Heidelberg Encyclopaedia* §§ 329–362 (1817) and the first *Berlin Encyclopaedia* §§ 413–439 (1827), and notes on the ways in which this development helps us to understand them have been provided in the commentary. Reference to the earliest equivalents of a Paragraph often enables us to bring out the consistency and continuity of Hegel's thinking and development (24,31; 26,15; 32,16; 103,11). The *Heidelberg Encyclopaedia* has been referred to mainly in order to show how his ideas developed during the

[1] *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)* (ed. F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg, 1959).

[2] Now most conveniently available in *Nürnberger und Heidelberger Schriften* (1808–1817): Werke 4.70–85, 111–123 (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/M., 1975).

Berlin period (13,17; 25,19; 51,2, 53,17; 66,17; 75,9; 81,20). Significant additions to the second (82,25; 85,2; 85,21) and third (33,9; 45,17; 55,5; 69,22; 71,22; 85,28; 91,18) editions have been noted, as has the insertion of a number of headings in 1830 (30, 17; 43,1; 45,30; 64,16).

The main body of the present text is a set of lecture notes taken down during the Summer Term of 1825 by Karl Gustav von Griesheim (1798–1854), an army officer then stationed in Berlin.[3] The lectures were based upon the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia*, but by this time all the main characteristics of Hegel's mature ideas on phenomenology had already developed, and there has therefore been no difficulty in inserting the 1830 Paragraphs at the requisite junctures. Passages from the *Heidelberg Encyclopaedia* included within Griesheim's text have been noted in the commentary, the only alteration to the text being the omission of the original Paragraph numbers.

Griesheim's account of these lectures runs to fifty-seven pages. Like the rest of his Hegel manuscripts, it is written in such a beautifully clear and consistently neat hand, that he must have used shorthand during the lectures and then copied out longhand in his own time. Contemporary accounts, the various sets of lecture-notes that have survived, and, indeed, a realistic assessment of the difficulties involved in communicating such a body of thought, all indicate that Hegel must have spoken very slowly in the lecture-room.[4] From the frequently chaotic nature of Griesheim's punctuation and the way in which the purely verbal aspect of his text stands up to the most rigorous and detailed analysis, it looks as though he must have taken down every word spoken. His longhand copy is quite evidently a faithful reproduction of his shorthand, and with the exception of the emendations noted below, has been reproduced precisely as it stands in the original manuscript. When translating it, however, it has often been necessary to re-think its punctuation. The version published in *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.270–356 (1978) was prepared at the Hegel Archive in Bochum from photocopies, and has been very carefully re-checked against the original. The alteration of the manuscript text deemed necessary for this edition amounts to no more than placing the page numbers in brackets (4,1; 4,27; 6,29 etc.) adjusting the punctuation (26,4; 32,17; 72,30; 74,11; 86,12; 102,18), putting right a few obvious slips (2,17; 4,30; 68,3; 72,9) and a couple of misspellings (16,32; 92,4), and bringing a number of inflexions into line with normal usage (10,5; 14,10; 26,35; 28,2; 28,8; 30,3; 40,31; 42,22; 84,9; 88,17; 102,7). The only emendation

[3] On Griesheim, see *Phil. Nat.* I.287. The manuscript, *Philosophie des Geistes vorgelesen von Professor Hegel*. Sommer 1825. Ms. germ. quarto 544 pp. 263–320, is in the possession of the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Handschriftenabteilung, Potsdamer Strasse 33, D-1000 Berlin 30.

[4] The 1450 lines of the Griesheim text in the present edition represent 395 minutes of lecturing. The average pace of Hegel's delivery may therefore be gauged by reading it at the rate of a little less than four lines a minute.

not noted in the commentary is the substitution of *solchem* for *solchen* at the end of 38,32.

The other set of notes relating to these 1825 lectures was that taken down by another army officer, H. von Kehler.[5] It consists of thirty-four pages, very closely written in a semi-shorthand, evidently while Hegel was actually lecturing. Frequently recurring words such as *allgemein, auch, durch, nicht, Thätigkeit, zusammen* are written in shorthand, and nearly all inflexions are omitted, so that much of the consistency and purity of the printed extracts is simply due to their having been deciphered. Kehler's account is generally less careful and complete than Griesheim's, but where his version differs from the main text in a way which could possibly provide us with a superior reading, the relevant extract has been included in a footnote (4,36; 8,34; 12,39; 14,32; 18,36 etc.). The great advantage of his account is that it enables us to date the lectures. We know from the University records that during the Summer Term of 1825 Hegel lectured on *Subjective Spirit* between five and six o'clock in the afternoon, on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays.[6] We know from Kehler that he began to deal with *Phenomenology* on Thursday, July 28th, and finished on Friday, August 12th, and that the present text consists of a series of nine lectures (3,16; 11,13; 21,37; 33,16; 43,17; 59,9; 67,30; 79,34; 93,22).

Ludwig Boumann (1801–1871) provided this section of the *Encyclopaedia* with *Additions* in 1845. All his material, together with an English translation, is available in *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.2–77. Some note has been taken of his work on the published Paragraphs (70,1; 82,25), and his Additions have frequently been referred to in the commentary. He had seven manuscript sources at his disposal, the earliest dating from 1817, the latest from 1830, all but one of which, the Griesheim text, have since been lost.[7] In preparing the Additions, however, he simply conflated everything into passages illustrating the printed Paragraphs, giving no indication of its origin, and in some cases showing astonishing lack of judgement as to what is philosophically significant. He failed to provide the section on Reason with any additional material for example. Since he had material relating to the lectures on Phenomenology delivered by Hegel during the Winter Terms of 1827/8 and 1829/30, it is reasonable to assume that any extra light he throws upon the 1825 text originates from this later period (27,1; 27,31; 43,8; 49,23; 51,2; 57,22; 67,24; 81,11; 85,19; 91,28). In some cases, however, there is also the possibility of his having included material which just happened to be omitted in 1825 (71,14; 95,12), or which was dropped after the earlier lectures given in the

[5] The manuscript, *Philosophie des Geistes nach Hegel*. Sommer 1825. Ms. Chron. 1906.6 pp. 183–217, is in the possession of the Universitätsbibliothek, Goetheallee 6, 69 Jena.

[6] See the lists of lectures published at the end of J. Hoffmeister's *Berliner Schriften 1818–1831* (Hamburg, 1956).

[7] *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.cliii.

Summer Terms of 1817, 1820 and 1822 (83,19; 91,28; 93,6). On two occasions (81,20; 85,21), what he provides throws direct light upon Hegel's reasons for revising the printed Paragraphs in 1827.

In 1975 F. Nicolin and H. Schneider published the notes which Hegel had before him while lecturing on the *Berlin Phenomenology*. They relate mainly to the lectures of 1817, 1820 and 1822, but Hegel seems also to have used them in 1825, and there is some reason at least for attempting to connect them with an even later stage of his development.[8] They have been referred to in the commentary when they confirm (83,19; 91,28; 93,6) or supplement (63,38; 85,31; 95,12; 99,12) Boumann in a particularly important way, when they help us to understand why certain alterations were made to the *Encyclopaedia* (71,14; 85,2), and when they throw an otherwise unknown sidelight upon the main text (23,15; 27,6; 45,17; 49,35; 73,30).

i. THE LANGUAGE

> What expresses *itself* in language, *we* cannot express by means of language. — WITTGENSTEIN.

Apart from its general didactic value, analysis of the language of the *Berlin Phenomenology* serves two main purposes. The first is that it provides us with detailed confirmation of the accuracy and authenticity of the Griesheim text, the vocabulary and syntax of which accord completely with those of Hegel's published works, most notably the *Logic* and the later editions of the *Encyclopaedia*. The second is that it presents us with certain clearly defined philosophical problems, by means of which we can test the validity of whatever significance or non-significance we are attempting to read into Hegel's accomplishment.

It is evident from the words defined here, that in interpreting this accomplishment, it is essential not to confuse its two basic elements of empirical and comprehending consciousness. It is *empirical* analysis of everyday consciousness, and empirical analysis alone, which enables Hegel to bring into consideration such aspects of our everyday mentality as 'consciousness', 'positing', 'thinking', 'certainty' etc., and to discuss the ways in which such modes of thought, in so far as they themselves have their own everyday contexts and subject-matters, involve 'extrinsicality', 'relation', 'relationship', 'relatedness' etc. It is, moreover, empirical consciousness which brings to light the 'independence', 'objectivity', 'reality', 'infinitude' etc. located within the range of subject-object dichotomies surveyed within the *Phenomenology*.

[8] *Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen zum subjektiven Geist* (*Hegel-Studien* vol. 10 pp. 35–51, 1975), *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.cxv.

It is, however, *comprehending* consciousness which endows the great majority of the words defined here with their meanings. A fundamental procedure of relating and comparing gives significance to 'posit', 'contradiction' and 'determination'. 'Stage', 'initial', 'immediate', 'implicit' derive their meanings from the beginnings of the basic progressions from the less to the more complex, and the hierarchical structure pervading these progressions establishes the significance of 'content', 'being of an ideal or real nature' 'comprehension', 'sphere', 'substance', 'negation', 'sublation' etc. Thorough comprehension of the meanings of such words as 'transition', 'movement', 'progress', 'dialectic' is essential if one is not to confuse such structuring with spatial and temporal sequences. The central principles of the whole Hegelian system become apparent in such words as 'form', 'truth', 'Notion', 'ideality', 'Idea', 'absolute', – perhaps also in 'particularity', 'singularity' and 'universality'. Bearing in mind the controversies surrounding the significance of the first major sphere of the *Encyclopaedia*, it is therefore worth considering very carefully indeed what is meant when the system as a whole is said to be 'logical'.

Definitions

Absolute: absolut. Used of whatever is disengaged or free from dependence, qualification or imperfection. Since the adjective implies comparison with what is not disengaged or free in the respect under consideration, it is especially relevant to the two extremes of a hierarchy, and is therefore employed in the *Logic* with particular reference to the most basic and the most complex of the categories (*Enc.* §§ 86, 87, 213).

29,25 'The absolute determination of the object being that the determinations of what is subjective and what is objective are identical'.

61,15 'For self-consciousness, since it is absolute self-certainty, the object is a nullity which is unable to endure its absolute ideality.'

97,12 'Truth is the Notion, within which, since we may say that it is what we have called absolute subjectivity, – reality, objectivity, universality is simply identical with this subjectivity'.

Certainty: Gewissheit. Basic to consciousness is the quality or state of being subjectively certain of itself, basic to spirit is the certainty that rationality pervades both what is subjective and what is objective. Hegel discusses the precise meaning of the word at some length, distinguishing clearly between belief, certainty and truth (9,7–11,19).

9,19 'The certainty of my self is what is most certain, since I am a general object to myself'.

55,28 'I know of something, and if I did not have that which I know within the certainty of myself, I should know nothing of it'.

105,13 'Spirit is free in the world, having the certainty of rationality'.

Comprehend: begreifen. The verb corresponding to the logical category of the Notion (Begriff), see the *Logic* (*Enc.* §§ 160–162). It refers to the inclusion of the subject-matter within the systematic exposition, and Hegel calls attention to the similarity between this and, 'the natural procedure of grasping with the hand' (*Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.cxxvi; III.193,31).

17,35 'For us, consciousness itself is object, and is comprehended. Since there is therefore more within our comprehending consciousness than within empirical consciousness, we do get behind it'.

99,27 'Reason or Idea does not only have its place where it comes forth here, for it also comes forth in Notional comprehension.'

Consciousness: Bewusstsein. As distinct from the soul or the sub-conscious, consciousness presupposes the self-conscious subjectivity of the individual ego. As distinct from a primitive 'psychological' state such as intuition, it does not yet involve the complete sublation of the basic subject-object dichotomy established by the ego. The main theme of the *Phenomenology* is the systematic analysis of the degrees or levels of consciousness falling between these two extremes.

3,16 'Consciousness constitutes spirit at the stage of reflection or relationship, that is, as appearance.'

35,7 'Consciousness has a negative being over against itself, the negative of the ego being posited as independent.'

103,29 'Although consciousness is mainly concerned with external beings, which have a certain final independence of their own, it also knows of the object that it is the negative of its own, its other.'

Content: Inhalt. In the *Logic* (*Enc.* §§ 133–134), Hegel emphasizes the interdependence of content and form. In the *Phenomenology*, the progressive determination of a basic postulate such as an undefined object, is presented as providing a form with content. Cf. the definition of *form* and *Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.cxxxvii.

19,4 'We have had to determine the object in respect of consciousness as the other of the ego, but what is the content of the object?'

35,2 'Although the determinations of feeling, external or internal, certainly pertain to sensuousness as content, and to what is spatial and temporal as form, both together pertain to spirit in its concrete form, to its feeling and intuition.'

63,13 'Self-consciousness therefore drives toward . . . the provision of content and objectivity for its abstract self-knowledge.'

Contradiction: Widerspruch. In the *Logic* (*Enc.* §§ 33, 48, 89, 114, 194), Hegel

makes the point that what systematic or Notional exposition, *comprehending* consciousness, exhibits as a hierarchy of complementary levels, will appear to empirical consciousness to be an agglomerate of mutually exclusive or contradictory propositions, statements, standpoints etc. It is mainly contradiction of this kind which is referred to in the *Phenomenology*.

57,26 'At the same time self-consciousness is therefore also consciousness, the preceding stage, and is the contradiction of itself as both consciousness and self-consciousness.'

73,13 'There is, therefore, a positing of the highest contradiction, – that between the clear identity of both on one side and the complete independence of each on the other.'

The *Phenomenology* also contains instances of such contradiction *also* being ascribed to *everyday* consciousness *itself*, largely on account of its pervasive subject–object dichotomy.

7,21 'The standpoint of consciousness is that of contradiction, and of the merely formal resolution of the same.'

21,17 'Although the ego or consciousness therefore relates itself negatively to the object, it also does so affirmatively, being the contradiction of being negation on the one side, and at the same time relation.'

61,34 'All drive begins from the proposed resolution of a contradiction.'

Determination: Bestimmung. In the *Logic* (*Enc.* §§ 89–95), Hegel quotes Spinoza's 'omnis determinatio est negatio' approvingly, and makes the point that everything is what it is by virtue of its qualities, that is to say, by *not* being the qualities it does *not* possess. It is in this obvious if not straightforward sense that he uses 'determination' throughout the *Phenomenology*.

11,26 'Consciousness appears to be differently determined according to the variety of the general object given, and its progressive formation to be an alteration of the determinations of its object.'

49,20 'If law is not internally determined, it is not law.'

101,31 'Since it is spiritual, the activity of spirit, we have self-consciousness with the determination that what spirit is, things are also.'

Dialectic: Dialektik. In the *Logic* (*Enc.* §§ 48, 79–82), the 'understanding' is characterized as being blinkered by its own particular preoccupations, 'dialectic' as being capable of relativizing preoccupations in general, and 'speculation' as concerned with the architectonic of co-ordinating the relativizations of the dialectic. It is clear, therefore, that Hegel conceived of his philosophical system as being predominantly 'speculative' rather than 'dialectical', and this is reflected in his usage.

11,21 'Since the ego only has being-*for-self* as formal identity, it has the *dialectical* movement of the Notion, the progressive determination of

consciousness, not as its *own* activity but as *implicit*, and as an alteration of the object.'

67,26 'In that it is implicitly selfless and has being for self-consciousness as such, the general object can offer no resistance to this activity; the dialectic of its self-sublating nature exists here as the activity of the ego.'

67,35 'Self-consciousness is active, the dialectic of the general object being posited in consciousness.'

Extrinsicality: Aussereinander. The state in which entities or things are external or extraneous to one another in either space or time, see *Phil. Nat.* I.155–156; *Phil. Sub. Sp.* III.143.

31,6 'Self-consciousness kindles itself out of consciousness of life, life being the ideality of external being, of extrinsicality.'

35,19 'Extrinsicality can only be present in sensation in that such a sensation passes away again, and can only have being in the subject as a unit, negation being the taking of its place by another and yet another etc.'

Form: Form. See the definition of *content* for the relationship between the two, which is what Hegel usually has in mind when employing the word.

7,8 'Posited initially as ego, spirit's self-identity is only its abstract formal ideality.'

57,24 'Since abstract self-consciousness is the *initial* negation of consciousness, it is still burdened with an external object, with the formal negation of what pertains to it.'

103,12 'Substantial knowledge is the form of reason.'

Cf. 11,13; 31,24; 35,3; 97,14; 99,22; 101,11.

In certain instances however, this implied reference to content is absent.

47,34 'In so far as we conceive of necessity as inner connectedness, we are omitting the form of immediacy.'

75,35 'All this still lacks the determination of universality, since it still has the form of immediate singularity.'

85,14 'The only form in which the recognition of one self-consciousness by another can be brought about is that of force, imperiousness.'

The word is also used in an untechnical or figurative sense, simply to mean 'sort' or 'kind'.

23,28 'We have thought it advisable to make this observation in respect of idealism, in so far as this form of it . . . is taken to be final.'

45,16 'It is precisely here, in so far as something is determined as *object*, that the contradiction of the finite throughout all forms of logical spheres is at its most concrete.'

91,12 'This form of consciousness constitutes not only the *substance* of all the essential spirituality of the family . . . but also of all virtues.'

General object: Gegenstand. In the *Phenomenology*, as throughout the *Phil. Sub. Sp.* (I.cxxv), Hegel uses *Gegenstand* to refer to what is general, unspecified, undifferentiated, and *Objekt* to refer to what is particular, specific, distinct (cf. *Phil. Nat.* I.163).

7,24 'We have a world which is exterior to us and which is firmly for itself, and at the same time, in that I am consciousness, I know of this general object, it is posited as of an ideal nature.'

27,21 'My general object is no longer an other, but myself.'

103,13 'Substantial knowledge is the form of reason. This form distinguishes the self-knowing subject and general object.'

Idea: Idee. In the *Logic* (*Enc.* §§ 213–215), the supreme category of the absolute Idea is shown to involve the co-ordination of all the less complete categories it presupposes. Although it is nothing more than a *logical abstraction*, it is, therefore, the *universal pattern* for all the other systematic expositions of the philosophies of nature and spirit. Within the *Phenomenology*, it finds its most complete expression in reason (*Berlin Phen.* introd. ch. f.).

11,15 'Certainty . . . is the formal factor in consciousness, consciousness which is wholly abstract, contentless, and it is therefore inadequate to the Notion and even more so to the Idea.'

93,17 'As the *Idea*, reason appears here in the determination of its constituting the unity of the general opposition between the Notion and reality.'

99,7 'Reason . . . is the Idea, the actively effective Idea, and it is therefore the unity of the Notion in general with objectivity.'

Ideality. Idealität. Since the Idea co-ordinates the less complete categories it presupposes and so constitutes the universal pattern for all the systematic expositions of the philosophies of nature and spirit, each finitude has its ideality, that within which it has its systematic placing. In the *Logic* (*Enc.* § 95), the recognition of this is taken to be the mark of 'every genuine philosophy.'

19,32 'It pertains to the nature, the very actuality of spirit, to be the ideality of nature, and its natural determination is that of the microcosm.'

61,15 'For self-consciousness, since it is absolute self-certainty, the object is a nullity which is unable to endure its absolute ideality.'

97,16 'To this extent, the Notion is subjectivity, ideality.'

Immediate: unmittelbar. The word was widely employed in religious contexts, and it is with regard to these and closely related philosophical matters that it receives its most extensive treatment in the *Enc.* (§§ 61–78). In the *Phenomenology* however, as throughout the *Phil. Nat.* (I.158–159), it is used in a perfectly general manner to refer to anything devoid of an inter-

mediary. It is therefore usually the basic level of a sphere which is said to be immediate.

3,34 'The immediate self-identity of the ego is also sublated once again through its repulsion.'

31,18 'Initially, consciousness is *immediate*, and its relation to the general object is therefore the simple unmediated certainty it has of it.'

77,12 'In so far as the immediate singularity of my self-consciousness and my freedom are not separated, I am unable to surrender anything of my particularity without surrendering my free independence.'

Implicit: an sich. In the *Logic* (*Enc.* §§ 91–92), *implicit* being is characterized as the 'merely empty abstraction of being', devoid as yet of any determinateness, and what is taken to be the most basic level of a sphere is, therefore, often said to be implicit. The word is also involved in Hegel's *triadic* thinking however, since he often speaks of what is implicit in a sphere as containing the potential of the 'being-for-self' of the second level and the 'being-in-and-for-self' of the *third* (*Phil. Nat.* I.159; *Berlin Phen.* introd. lxxvii).

65,31 'Since self-consciousness is desire, and in itself is wholly abstract, the contradiction is therefore that of its abstraction and its immediacy in respect of ego = ego, which is implicitly the Idea, the unity of itself and of the object.'

87,34 'The instrument also serves the master willingly therefore, being implicitly free self-consciousness.'

103,16 'Since spirit is implicitly reason, it is reason relating itself to reason, the certainty of reason consisting of its relating itself to what is rational.'

Independent: selbständig. In accordance with the ordinary usage of his day, Hegel employs the word to refer to anything which is not conditioned by anything else, to states in which something does not depend upon something else (*Phil. Nat.* I.159–160).

3,32 'Ego is for itself, and since the other is also for itself, it is impenetrable, independent of this being-for-self.'

79,6 'The true relationship is however that of the single self's not being able to bear the other's being independent of it, so that they necessarily drift into a struggle.'

103,30 'Although consciousness is mainly concerned with external beings, which have a certain final independence of their own, it also knows of the object that it is the negative of its own, its other.'

Infinite: unendlich. In the *Logic* (*Enc.* §§ 93–95), what is *genuinely* infinite is shown to be 'something which in its transition (q.v.) into its other coalesces only *with itself*.'

5,17 'Ego remains ego, infinite in its self-relatedness.'

67,3 'It is not for the stone itself that its finitude is a limit: the limit is present only for that which is beyond it, consciousness of limit expressing infinitude.'

99,22 'We know reason to be that which is substantial activity, infinite form, that which determines itself from out of itself i.e. the Idea.'

Initial: erst. This is a factor in a *systematic* or *structural*, not a spatial or temporal sequence. What is 'initial' is so within its sphere or context, and is often also characterized as being 'immediate' or 'implicit.'

37,27 'Initially therefore, consciousness is active in that it brings these various sensations together in one point.'

61,39 'The initial is not the absolute negation, being in itself only the negation of what is immediate.'

93,11 'Initially, it is as they appear within each other that these single beings are held within the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness.'

Hegel's use of such concepts as 'higher' and 'lower' (39,29; 51,19; 79,10; 81,20), 'beginning' (105,22), is usually to be understood in the same sense.

Logical: logisch. Systematic or structural. The Logic exhibits the *structure* of the system most clearly, since its subject-matter is abstract categories and it is therefore not blurred or disturbed to any very great extent by the findings of empirical consciousness.

11,27 'The progressive logical determination of the object is what is *identical in subject* and *object*.'

29,35 'Spirit's . . . activity is its own act, which is not a progressive determining of the object. To this extent, we have before us here the series of logical developments.'

45,16 'It is precisely here, in so far as something is determined as *object*, that the contradiction of the finite throughout all forms of logical spheres is at its most concrete.'

Movement: Bewegung. Like what is 'initial' (q.v.), this is a factor in a systematic or structural, not a spatial or temporal sequence. The 'movement' within the *Phenomenology* is the structure elicited from its subject-matter by comprehending consciousness.

11,21 'Since the ego only has being-*for-self* as formal identity, it has the *dialectical* movement of the Notion, the progressive determination of consciousness, not as its *own* activity but as *implicit*, and as an alteration of the object.'

27,4 'The objective of each movement of consciousness is to annihilate this otherness, so that the ego may become concrete and therefore spiritual.'

29,12 'The progressive movement is, however, precisely the progressive determination of thought, of the object, through thought.'

Negation: Negation, Negativität, Negative. The first refers to what is general, the second to what is absolute (q.v.), the third to what is specific or particular.

19,12 'It being only through the negation of the form or mode of feeling that the ego is for itself.'

3,12 'As this absolute negativity, ego is implicitly the identity within the otherness.'

7,10 'Now, as subjective intro-reflection, (spirit) is related to this substantiality as to its negative, to that which is dark and beyond it.'

All three terms are used to refer to *two basically different kinds* of negation. The first and more important of these is what one might call logical (cf.), systematic or structural negation, – that of a particular level of complexity including or sublating i.e. negating its presuppositions.

57,23 'Since abstract self-consciousness is the *initial* negation of consciousness, it is still burdened with an external object.'

49,24 'The determinateness of law as law does not progress into subjectivity, singularity, negative self-relation however; there is no positing of absolute negativity, for the two aspects only have being within the connectedness of the law.'

89,9 'The other aspect is that of one's own will being worked off through service. This involves the negative of the single will of the self, or rather the sublation of the singularity of self-consciousness.'

The second basic kind of negation is that of difference, distinctness or opposition, and subsists principally in the subject-matter, the everyday consciousness of the *Phenomenology*, not in its system or structure.

65,35 'Consciousness as self-certainty is affected internally with a negation, which we refer to as a limit or deficiency.'

21,14 'The ego is not a quiescent atom, but restless, active, – it is infinite negativity, activity in general.'

17,34 'Ordinary consciousness therefore has something which is superior to it, and this is the object, the negative of it, the beyond, the behind, the above.'

Notion: Begriff. The systematic placing and structuring of any aspect of the *subject-matter* of the *Phenomenology* in accordance with the universal pattern of the Idea (q.v.) is referred to as the eliciting of its Notion. Hegel calls attention to the similarity between this and, 'the natural procedure of grasping with the hand' (*Phil. Sub. Sp.* I.cxxvi; III.193,31); cf. the definition of 'comprehend.' If etymology is worth taking into consideration, 'Notion', with its implication of objectivity, deriving from its having its root in 'noscere' (to know), is, therefore, preferable to 'Concept', with its implication of subjectivity (from 'concipere', to conceive), as the English equivalent.

17,17 'We comprehend consciousness, we know of it, have the Notion of it before us, and it is thus that we speak of it with its determinations before us.'

59,34 'It is thus that we reach self-consciousness, and this is the Notion of its determinations.'

99,8 'Reason . . . is the Idea, the actively effective Idea, and it is therefore the unity of the Notion in general with objectivity.'

Object: Objekt. In the *Phenomenology*, as throughout the *Phil. Sub. Sp.* (I.cxxv), Hegel uses *Objekt* to refer to what is particular, specific, distinct, and *Gegenstand* to refer to what is general, unspecified, undifferentiated (cf. *Phil. Nat.* I.163).

21,3 'The general object is an object, out there for itself, posited immediately, encountered, as if it were not posited.'

37,25 'The manifoldness is therefore related to one point, which is known as singularity, or more precisely as an object, a sensuous object in space and time.'

103,26 'The true standpoint is that of there being no abyss between the object and knowing subjectivity.'

Of an ideal/real nature: ideell/reell. In the *Phenomenology*, both terms involve reference to a relationship in which two distinct entities constitute a *homogeneous unity*. Hegel is making use of terminology developed by Schelling in the course of grappling with the Fichtean problem of the relationship between the ego and the non-ego: '*Now the bounds* (dividing the ego from the non-ego) *must however be both of a real and of an ideal nature*. They are *of a real nature* in that they are independent of the ego, since the ego is not actually limited in any other way: they are *of an ideal nature* in that they are dependent upon the ego, since the ego only posits itself through perception as that which is limited. Both statements, that the bounds are of a real nature and that they are simply of an ideal nature, may be deduced from self-consciousness.' – *System des transcendentalen Idealismus* (1800) p. 76; *Werke* 2.385. He evidently found this Schellingian terminology convenient, and did not confine his use of it to epistemological or psychological problems: *Logic* (*Enc.* §§ 96–98); *Phil. Nat.* I.164–165.

In the *Phenomenology*, it is everyday consciousness which exhibits such relationships, and comprehending consciousness which structures them. In a relationship involving that which is of an ideal nature, one of the entities predominates in bringing about the homogeneous unification.

5,2 'The immediate implication of the other's being posited as independent, is that it is also posited as of an ideal nature, and it is of an ideal nature for and in the ego, which is the subject.'

77,33 'Desire relates itself only to itself, and what is now demanded is that the ego should take up another into its consciousness, not know it as being of

an ideal nature and have it before itself in contradiction of free self-consciousness.'

105,6 'Although consciousness is within this unity, it also supersedes the standpoint of consciousness, which is of an ideal nature to it.'

In a relationship involving that which is of a real nature, one or more of the entities, on account of their reality, are distinct from and yet an aspect of a homogeneous unity.

63,18 'Ego = ego, in which the ego is not yet of a real nature.'

91,6 'Each is therefore universal and objective, and possesses the real nature of universality as reciprocity.'

91,28 'Although the ego itself is what is most unyielding, in that it is formed, it is the equal of its universality in its determinate being, and is therefore implicitly free universality, of a real nature.'

Particularity: Besonderheit. Although this is now a perfectly ordinary term, the most distinguished German lexicographer of Hegel's day (Adelung) refers to it as, 'a word which some have recently dared' to put into currency. Hegel evidently uses it in order to emphasize the strict technicality of the meaning it derives from the triadic structure of the Notion (q.v.). Just as the syllogism has its major premiss, its minor premiss and its conclusion, so the stages (q.v.) within the whole sphere (q.v.) of the Notion (q.v.) are grouped into the three moments of the universal, the *particular* and the singular (*Logic, Enc.* §§ 163–165; *Phil. Nat.* I.166–167). Within the whole structure of the *Phil. Sub. Sp.* for example, *Anthropology* is the level of universality, *Phenomenology* of particularity, *Psychology* of singularity.

5,32 'This is due to what has been observed, namely, that the ego only dirempts, particularizes and distinguishes itself as a being-for-self.'

75,34 'In self-consciousness . . . the other is different, being the consciousness of what is mine, my purpose, my particularity, my desire etc.'

77,25 'Others have property which might be of use to me as a particularity, and I therefore appropriate it.'

Posit: setzen. The precise meaning of the term is best grasped by considering the relationship involved in being *of an ideal/real nature* (q.v.). It can be most conveniently considered as 'awareness', – a) strictly confined to the subject-object dichotomies of the ego, a concept almost certainly derived from Fichte; b) operating through comprehending consciousness, a concept deriving from Schelling's aesthetic intuition (*Berlin Phen.* introd. lxxiii).

a) 3,29 'Ego is for itself, negates itself, posits itself as negative being.'

49,25 'There is no positing of absolute negativity, for the two aspects only have being within the connectedness of the law.'

81,10 'It is this that posits the contradiction which is resolved by mutual coercion, struggle.'

b) 5,17 'Hitherto, we have posited the soul as having general qualities or determinations.'

7,7 'Posited initially as ego, spirit's self-identity is only its abstract formal ideality.'

75,31 'It is within my determinate being that the other has to have validity. In the way that this is now posited initially, there is as yet . . . no positing of any difference.'

Progress: Fortgang. The systematic or logical (q.v.) movement (q.v.) from the less to the more complex.

29,12 'The progressive movement is, however, precisely the progressive determination of thought, of the object, through thought.'

57,6 'The subject has now raised itself in the progressive formation of consciousness, to ego, subjectivity in general.'

97,20 'The Notion posits a difference for itself and progresses into the difference of singularity.'

Reality: Realität. In the *Logic* (*Enc.* § 91), reality is defined as a quality, a 'determinateness which *is*, as distinct from the *negation* which is contained in but distinguished from it.'

23,37 'What has to be done is not simply to posit such a determination, nor simply to posit the effect of the object in a realistic manner.'

59,13 'Since the ego here is still not determined at the same time as being generally objective, there is a lack of reality, of determinate being.'

101,3 'Nature is rational i.e. Idea, the representation, reality, of the self-objectifying Notion.'

Relation: Beziehung. Any basic or fairly simple connection, correspondence or association between things. In the *Phenomenology*, it refers, therefore, to what subsists within everyday consciousness, and has little to do with the structure or system of the work (cf. *Phil. Nat.* I.170).

17,4 'Consciousness consists of relation to an object which is also a beyond for knowledge.'

33,17 'Initially, consciousness is immediate, and its relation to the general object is therefore the simple unmediated certainty it has of it.'

75,9 'The immediacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness however, in which, as in its sign and instrument, it has its own *self-awareness*, as well as its being *for others* and its mediating relation with them.'

Relationship: Verhältniss. The word is used to refer to connections more complex than 'relations' (q.v.). *Relatedness* (Verhalten) refers to a relationship, *one* factor of which tends to be predominant or to take the initiative (*Phil. Nat.* I.169–170).

3,1 '*Consciousness* constitutes spirit at the stage of reflection or *relationship*.'

43,5 'As such, the general object is a combination of sensuous thought-determinations and of the extended thought-determinations of concrete relationships and connections.'

99,16 'At this juncture, reality is self-consciousness, ego in relationship with an object presented to it externally.'

65,5 'Ego relating itself to an object which is also another, but which is self-consciousness too, the relatedness of one self-consciousness to another.'

103,33 'Spirit, however, knows the basis to be identity, within which relatedness there is the belief and trust that I am able to cognize things.'

Singularity: Einzelnheit. The third moment in the triadic structure of the Notion (q.v.); cf. the definitions of 'particularity' and 'universality' and *Enc.* §§ 163–165.

37,24 'The manifoldness is therefore related to one point, which is known as singularity, or more precisely as an object.'

89,10 'This involves the negative of the single will of the self, or rather the sublation of the singularity of self-consciousness.'

101,21 'As the pure singularity of subjectivity, reason is therefore determined in and for itself.'

Sphere: Sphäre. A hierarchy or progress (q.v.) of stages (q.v.), regarded as a completed whole. In the present work, for example, there are three major spheres, – consciousness (§§ 418–423), self-consciousness (§§ 424–437) and reason (§§ 438–439), which can also be regarded as *stages* within the more comprehensive sphere of *Phenomenology*. This completed whole, in its turn, can be regarded as a stage within the still more comprehensive sphere of *Subjective Spirit* (*Enc.* §§ 388–482). Although the sphere is, therefore, an essential part of the logical (q.v.) aspect of Hegel's expositions, it relates more simply and directly to their basic subject-matter than does the *triadic* structure of the Notion (q.v.).

7,14 'As ego, spirit is *essence*, but since reality is posited in the sphere of essence . . . spirit as consciousness is only the *appearance* of spirit.'

23,27 'Things also have a finite mode of existence, and so resemble such thinking as relates itself to the lower, finite, sensuous sphere.'

39,17 'This is the transition from sensuous consciousness to perception or reflection, logically, from the sphere of being to that of essence.'

Stage: Stufe. The basic constituent of a sphere (q.v.), which, if capable of being submitted to further analysis and systematic exposition, can itself be resolved into a sphere. Although it is, therefore, a wholly universal or logical (q.v.) principle, it always depends for its significance upon the findings of empirical consciousness.

3,3 '*Consciousness* constitutes spirit at the stage of reflection or *relationship*, that is, as *appearance*.'

27,23 'The second stage always has the significance of being the truth of the first.'

103,5 'Spirit . . . does this through the stages of intuition, presentation and thought,'

Sublate: aufheben. The term is best understood if it is considered with logical, systematic or structural negation (q.v.) in mind. Sublation *also* involves a *particular* level of complexity including or negating its presuppositions. Structural negation is predominantly the outcome of the analytical procedures of comprehending consciousness however, whereas 'sublation' involves much more emphasis upon the spontaneous establishment of hierarchical structures *within* the *everyday* consciousness constituting the *subject-matter* of the *Phenomenology*.

3,34 'The immediate self-identity of the ego is also sublated once again through its repulsion.'

57,28 'In ego = ego however, consciousness and negation in general are already implicitly sublated.'

93,27 'This immediate independence has already disappeared, the immediate singularity has sublated itself in order to acquire itself.'

Substance: Substanz. In the *Logic* (*Enc.* §§ 150–159), the general category of substance is shown to involve universal necessity, causality, reciprocity etc. Hegel also associated it with Spinoza's conception of God, which he therefore criticized for not allowing any validity to the free subjectivity of the ego (*Enc.* § 50; *Berlin Phen.* introd. xxxii). Such free subjectivity presupposes, but is not immersed in universal reciprocity, and in the *Phenomenology* it is therefore quite frequently the case that 'substance' is almost synonymous with 'general presupposition' or 'systematic derivation.'

13,13 'With regard to *Spinozism* however, it is to be observed that spirit emerges from substance as free subjectivity.'

99,18 'We do not possess the Idea, it possesses us, so that reason also possesses us, being our substance.'

103,14 'Since this takes place within the substance, there is the certainty on the side of that which knows, that the general object is not truly alien to it.'

Thinking: Denken. As in the case of the first kind of positing (q.v.), the 'thinking' referred to in the *Phenomenology* is strictly confined to the subject-object dichotomies of the ego, and is therefore not to be confused with the much more complex thinking of the *Psychology* (*Enc.* §§ 465–468), which also involves memory, language, phantasy etc. (*Berlin Phen.* note 21,15).

31,24 'Consciousness, as relationship, contains only those categories

pertaining to the abstract ego or formal thinking, and it takes them to be determinations of the object.'

35,31 'In that space is not thought but external, it is therefore the universality of thought as not thought.'

55,14 'I am now what thinks, and in that the ego relates itself thinkingly to animation, subjectivity or animation comes into being for it there.'

Transition: Uebergang. Like what is 'initial' (q.v.), this is a factor in a systematic or structural, not a spatial or temporal sequence. It involves 'movement' (q.v.), usually 'progress' (q.v.) from one 'stage' (q.v.) to another.

11,19 'Truth, moreover, is something other than certainty, and we shall subsequently have to expound this transition more precisely.'

51,15 'The transition is made from necessity to *subjectivity*, or what is implicitly Idea, *animation*.'

89,39 'This is now the transition from the single self-consciousness of desire to what is universal.'

Truth: Wahrheit. In the *Logic* (*Enc.* §§ 33, 213), a distinction is drawn between correctness, or the absence of contradiction (q.v.) in propositions, and *truth*, or structural negation (q.v.) of the Idea's (q.v.) including the subject-matter of any empirical discipline within its Notion (q.v.). The 'truth' of anything is therefore the unity within which it is sublated (q.v.) or negated. In the case of the syllogism for example, the conclusion is the truth of its premisses. It is therefore relative to the particular context under consideration, in which case Hegel speaks of a *proximate* truth, and absolute (q.v.) in that the Idea or reason includes everything within itself.

25,24 'The goal of spirit, as consciousness, is to make this its appearance identical with its essence, to raise *its self-certainty* into truth.'

45,31 'The proximate *truth* of perceiving is that the general object is, rather, an *appearance*.

99,28 'Reason or Idea does not only have its place where it comes forth here, for it also comes forth in Notional comprehension, which is a point at which the Idea attains to its truth, at which the other raises itself to its truth, its Idea.'

Universality: Allgemeinheit. The first moment in the triadic structure of the Notion (q.v.). Just as the syllogism has its major premiss, its minor premiss and its conclusion, so the stages (q.v.) within the whole sphere (q.v.) of the Notion (q.v.) are grouped into the three moments of the *universal*, the particular and the singular (*Enc.* §§ 163–165). The level or stage of what is universal is, therefore, also that of what is immediate (q.v.), implicit (q.v.), initial (q.v.). In respect of the presupposed or preceding sphere however, the

same level can constitute the negation (q.v.), sublation (q.v.) or truth (q.v.) of what is particular or singular.

25,3 'I am a singular, there are many such singulars, and objectivity is, then, the universality of this many.'

91,2 'Each self has *absolute independence* as a free singularity.'

101,20 'Reason is the pure Notion existing for itself, ego, self-certainty as infinite universality.'

Abbreviations

Throughout the introduction and the notes, the following abbreviations have been used in referring to certain standard editions and translations of Hegel's works.

Ges. Werke	*Gesammelte Werke* (Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1968–).
Jen. Syst. I	*Jenaer Systementwürfe I* (ed. K. Düsing and H. Kimmerle, *Ges. Werke* vol. 6, Hamburg, 1975).
Jen. Syst. II	*Jenaer Systementwürfe II* (ed. R.-P. Horstmann and J. H. Trede, *Ges. Werke* vol. 7, Hamburg, 1971).
Jen. Syst. III	*Jenaer Systementwürfe III* (ed. R.-P. Horstmann, *Ges Werke* vol. 8, Hamburg, 1976).
Ges. Werke 9	*Phänomenologie des Geistes* (ed. W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede, *Ges. Werke* vol. 9, Hamburg, 1980).
Jena Phen.	*Phenomenology of Spirit* (tr. A. V. Miller, ed. J. N. Findlay, Oxford, 1977).
Bew. (1808/9)	*Bewusstseinslehre für die Mittelklasse (1808/09)* (ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel in the *Theorie Werkausgabe* vol. 4 pp. 70–85, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/M., 1975).
Bew. (1809)	*Bewusstseinslehre für die Mittelklasse (1809 ff.)* (ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel in the *Theorie Werkausgabe* vol. 4 pp. 111–123, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankurt/M., 1975).
L. Logic	*Science of Logic* (tr. A. V. Miller, London and New York, 1969).
Heid. Enc.	*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse . . . aus der Heidelberger Zeit* (ed. H. Glockner, *Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe* vol. 6, Stuttgart, 1927).
Enc.	*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1830) (ed. F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg, 1959).

Logic	*Logic. Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830) (tr. W. Wallace, 3rd ed. Oxford, 1975).
Phil. Nat.	*Philosophy of Nature* (ed. and tr. M. J. Petry, 3 vols. London and New York, 1970).
Phil. Sub. Sp.	*Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* (ed. and tr. M. J. Petry, 3 vols. Dordrecht and Boston, 2nd ed. 1979).
Sub. Sp. Notes	*Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen zum subjektiven Geist* (ed. F. Nicolin and H. Schneider, *Hegel-Studien* vol. 10 pp. 11-77, Bonn, 1975).
Berlin Phen.	The present work.
Phil. Right	*Philosophy of Right* (ed. and tr. T. M. Knox, Oxford, 1962).
World Hist.	*Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* (tr. H. B. Nisbet, introd. D. Forbes, Cambridge, 1975).
Hist. Phil.	*Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (tr. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, 3 vols. London and New York, 1963).
Briefe	*Briefe von und an Hegel* (ed. J. Hoffmeister and F. Nicolin, 4 vols. Hamburg, 3rd ed. 1969–1977).

Die Berliner Phänomenologie

The Berlin Phenomenology

\+ # DIE PHÄNOMENOLOGIE DES GEISTES

Das Bewußtsein

§ 413

Das *Bewußtsein* macht die Stufe der Reflexion oder des *Verhältnisses* des Geistes, seiner als *Erscheinung*, aus. Ich ist die unendliche Beziehung des Geistes auf sich, aber als *subjektive*, als *Gewißheit seiner selbst*; die unmittelbare Identität der natürlichen Seele ist zu dieser reinen ideellen Identität mit sich erhoben, der Inhalt von jener ist für diese für sich seiende Reflexion *Gegenstand*. Die reine abstrakte Freiheit für sich entläßt ihre Bestimmtheit, das Naturleben der Seele, als ebenso frei, als *selbständiges Objekt*, aus sich, und von diesem als *ihm äußern* ist es, daß Ich zunächst weiß, und ist so Bewußtsein. Ich als diese absolute Negativität ist an sich die Identität in dem Anderssein; Ich ist es selbst und greift über das Objekt als ein *an sich* aufgehobenes über, ist *Eine* Seite des Verhältnisses und das *ganze* Verhältnis; – das *Licht*, das sich und noch Anderes manifestiert. 5 10 15

\+ \+ „Das Bewußtsein macht die Stufe der Reflexion oder des Verhältnisses des Geistes, seiner als Erscheinung, aus. Ich ist die unendliche Beziehung des Geistes auf sich, aber als subjektive, als Gewißheit seiner selbst." Ich ist nun diese Subjektivität, diese unendliche Beziehung auf sich, aber darin liegt, nämlich in dieser Subjektivität, die negative Beziehung auf sich, die Diremtion, das Unterscheiden, das Urtheil. Ich urtheilt, dieß macht dasselbe zum Bewußtsein, stößt sich von sich ab, dieß ist eine logische Bestimmung. Sich auf sich beziehende Negativität ist Allgemeinheit, aber in dieser negativen Beziehung auf sich ist die Besonderung ebenso darin enthalten, dieß ist so gesetzt daß es wesentlich sei, die Einzelnheit als Subjektivität und die Besonderung. 20 25

Wir haben nun zunächst zu betrachten wie sich in ihm die beiden Seiten gegen einander bestimmen. Ich ist das Fürsichsein, indem es sich besondert stößt es sich von sich selbst ab, setzt das Negative seiner, in seiner unendlichen Negativität ist es die Negation seiner. Wir müssen uns gleichsam einen Augenblick bei dieser Negation aufhalten, Ich ist Fürsichseiendes, negiert sich, setzt sich als Negatives d.h. es setzt ein Anderes seiner und dies ist ebenso als Fürsichseiendes, dieß ist frei gesetzt von dem Ich. Ich ist für sich, das Andere ist auch für sich, so ist es undurchdringlich, selbstständig gegen das Fürsichseiende, ist aber drittens zugleich bezogen auf das Ich. Die unmittelbare Identität des Ich mit sich selbst wird ebenso wieder aufgehoben durch seine Repulsion, das andere Insichsein ist aber ebenso ideell gesetzt, 30 35

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

Consciousness

§ 413

***Consciousness* constitutes spirit at the stage of reflection or *relationship*, that is, as *appearance*. Although ego is spirit's infinite self-relation, it is so in that it is *subjective self-certainty*, the immediate identity of the natural soul being raised to the pure and ideal nature of this self-identity, for which its content is reflection which is for itself i.e. *a general object*. The being-for-self of pure and abstract freedom lets its determinateness, the natural life of the soul, go forth from itself as being equally free, as *independent object*, and in that it first knows of this object as being *external to it*, ego is consciousness. As this absolute negativity, ego is implicitly the identity within the otherness. It is itself ego and it invades the object as if this object were *implicitly* sublated. It is *one* aspect of the relationship and the *whole* relationship, – the *light* which manifests another as well as itself.**

"Consciousness constitutes spirit at the stage of reflection or relationship, that is, as appearance. Although ego is spirit's infinite self-relation, it is so in that it is subjective self-certainty." Ego is now this subjectivity, this infinite self-relation. Lying within this however, namely within this subjectivity, is negative self-relation, diremption, distinction, judgement. Ego judges, and it is this that makes consciousness of it; it repels itself from itself, which is a logical determination. Self-relating negativity is universality, but particularization is also contained within this negative self-relation, being so posited that it is essential, the singularity as subjectivity, and the particularization.

We now have to begin by observing how both sides determine one another within it. Ego is being-for-self, and in that it particularizes itself, it repels itself from itself, posits the negative of itself, being the negation of itself in its infinite negativity. For a while, as it were, we must now concern ourselves with this negation. Ego is for itself, negates itself, posits itself as negative being, that is to say that it posits a being other than itself, and that this also has being as a being-for-self, is freely posited by the ego. Ego is for itself, and since the other is also for itself, it is impenetrable, independent of this being-for-self. In the third instance however, it is at the same time related to the ego. While the immediate self-identity of the ego is also sublated once again through its repulsion, the other being-in-self too, is posited as of an

unmittelbar (264) darin daß es selbstständig gesetzt ist, ist das Andere auch
+ ideell gesetzt, es ist für das Ich und im Ich ideell, welches Subjekt ist. „Als diese absolute Negativität ist die unendliche Beziehung des Geistes auf sich die Identität in ihrem Anderssein; Ich ist es selbst und greift über das Objekt über, ist eine Seite des Verhältnisses und das ganze Verhältniß; – das Licht, 5 das sich und noch Anderes manifestirt." Das Ich greift auch über das Subjektive, setzt es als ideell, so daß es nur Moment des Ichs ist, Ich ist die eine Seite, das Objekt die andere, aber Ich ist auch das ganze Verhältniß. Das Thun des Allgemeinen ist sich herabzusetzen zu einer Seite, dieß ist die Diremtion, das Urtheil, aber wie wir im Urtheil sagen die Rose ist roth und 10 die Rose es ist die roth ist, so ist auch das Subjekt unterschieden, aber ebenso bleibt Ich das Ganze in welchem dieß nur als Moment erscheint. So haben wir das Ich als die Welt, so das Bewußtsein als ein Ich welches eine Welt in sich hat und davon weiß. Zunächst haben wir hier keine Seele mehr, die Leiblichkeit ist abgethan, indem die Realität des Allgemeinen selbst das Allgemeine ist,* 15 Ich bleibt Ich, die unendliche Beziehung desselben auf sich. Alsdann haben wir bisher die Seele gesetzt mit allgemeinen Qualitäten oder Bestimmungen, etwa als Weltseele, Seele einer Nation u.s.w. sie hat sich aber nun auch als Subjektivität bestimmt, aber so daß sie innerhalb ihrer selbst bleibt. Die Individualität ist in eine Leiblichkeit eingeschlossen und die fühlende Seele 20 verhält sich nun in dieser geschlossenen Leiblichkeit. Wir haben Empfindungen gehabt, beim Somnambulismus, bei der Verrücktheit haben wir zwar auch von Bewußtsein gesprochen aber nicht gleichsam *ex professo*, sondern anticipirend insofern das Seelenhafte als Zustand erscheint am Bewußtsein, überhaupt haben wir die fühlende Seele gehabt, sie hat 25 Empfindung, Gefühl, sagen wir man fühle etwas, so nehmen wir schon ein Objekt draußen an, dieß (265) ist aber schon vom Standpunkte des Bewußtseins genommen, die fühlende Seele ist auch in der Leiblichkeit und Gestalt verschlossen, erst das Bewußtsein tritt in die Objektivität, erst da
+ haben wir den Unterschied in einer äußeren Welt. Dies liegt in dem Gesagten 30 daß Ich nur als das Fürsichseiende sich dirimirt, besondert und unterscheidet. Dadurch daß es das unendliche Fürsichsein ist, ist das Unterschiedene, das Negative auch Fürsichseiendes, als gleichgültiges, freies Objekt bestimmt. Freies nun kann Freies ertragen, hier ist es das freie Ich welches sich unterscheidet und im Unterscheiden sich die Bestimmung der Freiheit giebt. Dieß 35

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 185: Eben das Thun des Allgemeinen ist dies, sich herabzusetzen zu dieser Seite, und das Besondere sich gegenüber zu setzen, und so ist es selbst eine Seite. Die Rose ist roth, das Subject bleibt, das Roth gehört der Rose an, das Object wird unterschieden, und es bleibt das Ganze, an welchem dies als Moment erscheint. Das Bewußtsein und eine Welt vor jene, die es auf sich bezieht und von der es weiß. Erst hier haben wir Subject, wir haben keine Seele mehr, die Leiblichkeit ist abgethan, indem das Allgemeine für sich selbst ist, indem die Realität der Seele selbst das Allgemeine ist.

ideal nature. The immediate (264) implication of the other's being posited as independent, is that it is also posited as of an ideal nature, and it is of an ideal nature for and in the ego, which is the subject. "As this absolute negativity, the infinite self-relation of spirit is identity within its otherness; it is itself ego
5 and it invades the object, it is one aspect of the relationship and the whole relationship, – the light which manifests another as well as itself." The ego also invades what is subjective, posits it as of an ideal nature, so that it is only a moment of the ego. Ego is the one aspect, the object the other, although ego is also the whole relationship. The act of the universal is to reduce itself to an
10 aspect, and this is diremption, judgement. However, just as in the judgement we say that the rose is red and that it is the rose that is red, so, while the subject is different, the ego also remains the whole within which the subject appears only as a moment. Since we have the ego as the world therefore, we have +
consciousness as an ego which has a world within itself and knows of it. From +
15 the very beginning, we no longer have soul at this juncture, for in that the reality of the universal is itself the universal, corporeity is done away with.* Ego remains ego, infinite in its self-relatedness. Hitherto, we have posited the soul as having general qualities or determinations, as world-soul, as the soul of a nation etc. It has now also determined itself as subjectivity however,
20 although in such a way as to remain within itself. Individuality is enclosed within a corporeity, and the feeling soul now relates itself within this closed corporeity. Although we have had sensations in somnambulism, and have certainly also spoken of consciousness in respect of derangement, we have done so by anticipation and not *ex professo* as it were, in so far as what is
25 soul-like appears in consciousness as a state. We have dealt in general with the feeling soul, which has sensation, feeling. If we say that something is felt by +
someone, we already assume an object out there, and this assumption (265) is already made from the standpoint of consciousness. The feeling soul is also confined within corporeity and shape however, and it is consciousness which
30 first enters into objectivity, which first presents us with difference within an external world. This is due to what has been observed, namely, that the ego only dirempts, particularizes and distinguishes itself as a being-for-self. In that the ego is infinite being-for-self, what is distinct or negative also has being-for-self, and is determined as an indifferent and free object. What is free
35 can now endure what is free, it being the free ego which distinguishes itself and gives itself the determination of freedom within the distinguishing. This

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 185: The precise act of the universal is to reduce itself to this aspect and to posit the particular over against itself. Through this it is itself an aspect. The rose is red, the subject remains, the red belongs to the rose, the object is distinguished, and it remains the whole, on which this appears as a moment. Consciousness and a world before it which it relates to itself and of which it knows. Here for the first time we have subject, we no longer have soul, in that the universal is for itself, in that the reality of the soul is itself the universal, corporeity is done away with.

ist die Bestimmung dieser beiden Seiten. In dieser Bestimmung ist nun das Weitere, daß Ich auch die Beziehung ist und zwar die Totalität, die Einheit dieser beiden, aber zunächst nur als Beziehung wesentlich darum weil die Subjektivität die unendliche Beziehung auf sich ist. Zunächst haben wir also zwei gegeneinander gleichgültige, diese sind so aufeinander bezogen, daß das Eine Subjekt ist, in welchem das Andere nur Ideelles ist. 5

§ 414

Die Identität des Geistes mit sich, wie sie zunächst als Ich gesetzt ist, ist nur seine abstrakte, formelle Idealität. Als *Seele* in der Form *substantieller* Allgemeinheit, ist er nun die subjektive Reflexion-in-sich, auf diese Substantialität als auf das Negative seiner, ihm Jenseitiges und Dunkles bezogen. Das Bewußtsein ist daher, wie das Verhältnis überhaupt, der *Widerspruch* der Selbständigkeit beider Seiten und ihrer Identität, in welcher sie aufgehoben sind. Der Geist ist als Ich *Wesen*, aber indem die Realität in der Sphäre des Wesens als unmittelbar seiend und zugleich als ideell gesetzt ist, ist er als das Bewußtsein nur das *Erscheinen* des Geistes. 10 15

\+ ,,Die Identität ist nur die formelle, der Geist, der als Seele in der Form substantieller Allgemeinheit, der in sich seienden Schwere ist, ist also die subjektive Reflexion in sich auf ein Dunkles bezogen, nämlich auf ein anderes Starres, Selbstständiges, und das Bewußtsein ist, wie das Verhältniß überhaupt, der Widerspruch der Selbstständigkeit der Seiten, und ihrer Identität, in welcher sie aufgehoben sind.'' Der Standpunkt des Bewußtseins ist der des Widerspruchs und der nur formellen Lösung desselben; das Bewußtsein ist beides, wir haben eine Welt außer uns, sie ist fest für sich und zugleich indem ich Bewußtsein bin, so weiß ich von diesem Gegenstand, ist er als ideell gesetzt, er ist so nicht selbstständig, sondern als aufgehoben, dieß sind die zwei Widersprechenden, das Selbstständige und die Idealität der objektiven Seite. Das Bewußtsein ist nur dieser Widerspruch und die Fortbewegung (266) des Bewußtseins ist die Auflösung desselben. 20 25

Zu bemerken ist hierbei daß wir die Beziehung, daß nämlich das selbstständige Objekt als aufgehoben gesetzt ist, Wissen heißen. Wir sagen Bewußtsein, ich weiß u.s.w. das Bewußtsein ist daß ich weiß, Wissen heißt nichts Anderes als daß ein Objekt in seiner Idealität gesetzt ist, dadurch daß es in mir gesetzt ist. Wenn etwas in den Punkt des Ichs gehen soll, so muß es gleichsam zerquetscht, ganz wirklichkeitslos gesetzt werden, so daß es gar keine Selbstständigkeit für sich behält und dieß in uns Gehen nennen wir 30 35

is the determination of these two aspects, and it involves the further determination of the ego's also constituting the relation, as well as the totality, the unity of them both. Initially however, it only does so as a relation, the essential reason being that subjectivity is infinite self-relation. In the first 5 instance therefore, we have two mutually indifferent factors, so related to one another that the one is a subject in which the other is merely of an ideal nature.

§ 414

Posited initially as ego, spirit's self-identity is only its abstract formal ideality. As *soul*, spirit has the form of *substantial* universality. Now, as subjective intro-reflection, it is related to this substantiality 10 as to its negative, to that which is dark and beyond it. Like relationship in general, consciousness is therefore the *contradiction* between the independence of both aspects and their identity, in which these aspects are sublated. As ego, spirit is *essence*, but since reality is posited in the + sphere of essence as immediate being, and at the same time as of an 15 ideal nature, spirit as consciousness is only the *appearance* of spirit. +

"The identity is only formal. Spirit, as soul, has the form of substantial universality, of the being-in-self of gravity, as subjective intro-reflection it is related to a darkness, that is to say, to something else, which is rigid and independent. Consciousness, like relationship in general, constitutes the 20 contradiction of the independence of the aspects and the identity in which they are sublated." The standpoint of consciousness is that of contradiction, + and of the merely formal resolution of the same. Consciousness constitutes + both, – we have a world which is exterior to us and which is firmly for itself, and at the same time, in that I am consciousness, I know of this general object, 25 it is posited as of an ideal nature, and has being therefore not as what is independent but as what is sublated. The two contradictory aspects are, therefore, what is independent, and the ideality of the objective aspect. Consciousness is simply this contradiction, (266) the resolution of which constitutes the progression of consciousness.

30 It is to be noticed that this relation, in which the independent object is posited as being sublated, is what we call knowledge. We speak of consciousness, I know etc., consciousness being my knowing, knowing being nothing other than an object's being posited in its ideality in that it is posited in me. If anything is to pass into the point of the ego it has to be crushed so to speak, 35 posited as being wholly devoid of actuality, so that it retains no trace of its own independence. This passing into us, by means of which the content is +

wissen, der Inhalt ist so der meinige. Ich und das Meinige und dies bestimmt sich auf irgend eine Weise d.h. ich weiß es. Die Seele dagegen weiß noch nicht, es ist Bestimmung in ihr, aber sie weiß noch nicht, daß aber im Ich ein Inhalt gesetzt ist, ist Wissen. Das Wissen kann verschiedene Formen haben, ein Wissen das ein Glauben ist oder ein Wissen aus Ueberzeugung, aber es ist 5 abgeschmackt einen Gegensatz von Glauben und Wissen zu behaupten, was ich glaube weiß ich; ein Anderes aber ist das Glauben als Wissen und ein anderes ist das Wissen als wissenschaftliches Wissen, als vernünftiges Wissen, dieß ist kein Glauben. Wissenschaft und Glauben kann man entgegensetzen, wenn ich etwas weiß auch seinen Zusammenhang, so ist dieß nicht bloß 10 glauben sondern Wissen. Dies ist etwas sehr Einfaches, aber man muß damit Bescheid wissen um sich nicht in solchen leeren Formen herumzutreiben; es werden viele Bücher geschrieben über das Wissen, ohne daß man weiß was das Wissen ist.* – Wenn man nun sagt: „Ich weiß", und man reflektirt darauf daß irgend ein Inhalt so mein, in meinem Ich ist, so kann es sein daß man dies 15 Gewißheit nennt. Ich weiß etwas und habe Gewißheit davon, beides muß aber unterschieden werden; Wissen ist überhaupt in meinem Bewußtsein, aber die Gewißheit drückt die Identität des Inhalts mit meinem Ich aus, mit mir als dem Wissenden, die Gewißheit meiner selbst ist die allergewisseste, ich bin mir Gegenstand, habe die Gewißheit meiner selbst (267) bin 20 Gegenstand meines Bewußtseins, da ist beides unmittelbar identisch und sofern ich diese unmittelbare Identität ausspreche habe ich die Gewißheit, es ist dasselbe Subjekt was Gegenstand ist und diesen Gegenstand hat. Aber aller Inhalt ist trennbar von mir als Ich, ich bin das allgemeine Subjekt, die vollkommene Abstraktion in der nichts selbstständig, nichts fest ist, in der 25 Festes vielmehr zur Verrücktheit führen würde. Die Gewißheit spricht nun aus daß solcher Inhalt identisch mit mir ist, als eine Qualität meiner, eine Bestimmung meines gegenständlichen Ichs, meiner Realität, es ist das Meinige, was ich höre, sehe, glaube u.s.w. dessen bin ich gewiß, es ist fest in mir, es ist in meinem Ich, es mag nun Vernunft, unmittelbares Bewußtsein, 30 Anschauung u.s.w. sein, in meinem Ich ist das ungetrennt, aber untrennbar ist es nicht, denn Ich ist die reine Abstraktion, kann es wieder los lassen, kann von Allem abstrahieren, ich kann mich um das Leben bringen, mich von

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 187: Die fühlende Seele weiß noch nicht, weil sie noch nicht als Ich bestimmt ist, nur Ich weiß, und das heißen wir eben Wissen, daß im Ich irgend ein Inhalt gesetzt ist. Dies Wissen ist nur Wissen überhaupt, das verschiedene Form annehmen kann, ein Glauben, und durch Einsicht, Ueberzeugung; auf Gründe, wissenschaftlich, Räsonnement, mit dem Begriff, vernünftiges Wissen, das ist dann kein Glauben, ist weiter. Glauben ist auch Wissen, Wissenschaft und Glauben kann man entgegen setzen; der Glauben kann auch vernünftig sein, aber die Form ist anders. Wissen ist sehr einfache Bestimmung, aber darüber muß man Bescheid wissen, um sich mit solchen leeren Gegensätzen nicht herumzutreiben; es ist mir vorausgesetzt, was Wissen sei und wenn man so etwas voraussetzt als etwas Bekanntes, ist anzunehmen, weil man nicht weiß, was es ist.

mine, is what we call knowing. I know something in that there is a certain self-determining of the ego, of what is mine and of this something. The soul + on the other hand still does not know, contains determination without yet knowing. Knowledge, however, is the positing of a content in the ego, and since it can be a matter of belief or of conviction, it can have various forms. It is absurd, however, to maintain that belief and knowledge are opposed, for what I believe, I know. Belief as knowledge is something different however, as is knowledge which is scientific or rational, for this is not belief. Opposition between science and belief may be posited, but if I know something as well as its connectedness, this is knowledge and not merely belief. Know- + ledge is something very simple, but one has to know thoroughly if one is to avoid floundering about in such empty forms; many books are written about knowledge without knowing what knowledge is.* – Now if one says, "I know", and reflects that this implies that a certain content is mine, is within my ego, one may call this certainty, although a distinction has to be drawn between my knowing something and my being certain of it. Whereas my consciousness contains knowledge in a general manner, certainty gives expression to the content's being identical with my ego, with me as a knowing being. The certainty of my self is what is most certain, since I am a general object to myself, am certain of myself, (267) am the general object of my consciousness. There is an immediate identity of both aspects, and I have + certainty in so far as I express this immediate identity, the general object and the possession of the same being one and the same subject. All content is separable from me as ego however, since I am the general subject, the complete abstraction within which nothing is independent, nothing fixed, and in which anything fixed would rather give rise to derangement. Cer- + tainty now expresses such a content's being identical with me as a quality of what I am, a determination of my ego's general objectivity, my reality. It is what is mine, what I hear, see, believe etc., that of which I am certain. It is fixed within me, it is in my ego, be it reason, immediate consciousness, intuition etc., and it is unseparated although not inseparable in my ego, since ego is the pure abstraction and can discard it once again, abstract from everything. I can take my own life, free myself from everything. All such +

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 187: The feeling soul still does not know, for it is not yet determined as ego. Only the ego knows, the precise definition of knowledge being that a certain content is posited in the ego. This is only knowledge in general, and it can assume various forms, – it can be a belief, and by means of insight, conviction; it can be based on reasons, scientific, a matter of facile reasoning or of the Notion, rational knowledge. That is not belief, but an advance. Belief is also knowledge. Science and belief may be set in opposition; belief can also be rational, but the form is not the same. Knowledge is a very simple determination, but one has to know it thoroughly in order not to be floundering about with such empty antitheses. I presuppose what knowledge is, and when in this manner one presupposes something as something known, it is to be accepted, for one does not know what it is.

Allem los machen. Aller solcher Inhalt ist daher vom Ich auch trennbar und dieß macht den weiteren Unterschied der Gewißheit und Wahrheit aus. Die Menschen sind vollkommen gewiß gewesen daß die Sonne sich um die Erde bewegt, davon konnten sie nicht abstrahiren, aber trennbar ist es doch, + heutigen Tages hat man andere Ansichten, der Mensch findet dann daß er sich getäuscht hat, giebt es auf, ist von der Unwahrheit seiner Gewißheit überzeugt. Gewißheit findet in Allem statt, wo etwas auch in Überlegung ist da ist es auch ungewiß, beschließen heißt dann es befestigen, es zusammenschließen mit mir. Man sagt die Gewißheit ist das Höchste, dieß ist in diesem Sinne hier ganz richtig, aber es ist nur das Formelle, die Frage ist wovon man gewiß ist oder die Gewißheit ist nur subjektiv, es ist nur meine Bestimmung, nur formelle Identität, sie ist nicht das Höchste, sie ist für sich einseitig, die abstrakte Subjektivität. Die Gewißheit ist das Formelle des Bewußtseins, das ganz abstrakt, inhaltsloses Bewußtsein und so dem (268) Begriff nicht gemäß ist, viel weniger der Idee, es kann darin jeder Inhalt sein und jeder ist trennbar von der Gewißheit, den wahren Inhalt aber verschlechtert es nicht ob ich seiner gewiß bin oder nicht, Wahrheit ist auch etwas anderes als Gewißheit und diesen Uebergang haben wir nachher auch näher anzugeben.

§ 415

Da Ich *für sich* nur als formelle Identität ist, so ist die *dialektische* Bewegung des Begriffs, die Fortbestimmung des Bewußtseins, ihm nicht als *seine* Tätigkeit, sondern sie ist *an sich* und für dasselbe Veränderung des Objekts. Das Bewußtsein erscheint daher verschieden bestimmt nach der Verschiedenheit des gegebenen Gegenstandes und seine Fortbildung als eine Veränderung der Bestimmungen seines Objekts. Ich, das Subjekt des Bewußtseins, ist Denken, die logische Fortbestimmung des Objekts ist *das in Subjekt* und *Objekt Identische*, ihr absoluter Zusammenhang, dasjenige, wonach das Objekt das Seinige des Subjekts ist.

Die Kantische Philosophie kann am bestimmtesten so betrachtet werden, daß sie den Geist als Bewußtsein aufgefaßt hat und ganz nur Bestimmungen der Phänomenologie, nicht der Philosophie desselben enthält. Sie betrachtet *Ich* als Beziehung auf ein Jenseitsliegendes, das in seiner abstrakten Bestimmung das Ding-an-sich heißt, und nur nach dieser Endlichkeit faßt sie sowohl die Intelligenz als den Willen. Wenn sie im Begriffe der *reflektierenden* Urteilskraft zwar auf die *Idee* des Geistes, die Subjekt-Objektivität, einen *anschauenden Verstand* usf., wie auch auf die Idee der Natur

content is also separable from the ego therefore, and it is this that constitutes the further difference between certainty and truth. People have been completely certain that the Sun moves about the Earth. Although they were unable to abstract from it, this is separable, and people today have other views. Man finds that he has deceived himself therefore, and abandons a view, is convinced of the untruth of his certainty. Everything gives rise to certainty, although if something is also being considered it is also uncertain, and deciding is then a matter of fixing it, uniting it with myself. Certainty is said to be what is highest, and the remark is perfectly justified in the context under consideration. It is also what is merely formal however, the point at issue being what one is certain of, certainty alone being merely subjective, merely my determination, merely formal identity. It is not what is highest, but for itself onesided, abstract subjectivity. It is the formal factor in consciousness, consciousness which is wholly abstract, contentless, and it is therefore inadequate to the (268) Notion and even more so to the Idea. It can have any content, and all content is separable from it, although a true content is no less true on account of my being certain of it or not. Truth, moreover, is something other than certainty, and we shall subsequently have to expound this transition more precisely.

§ 415

Since the ego only has being-*for-self* as formal identity, it has the *dialectical* movement of the Notion, the progressive determination of consciousness, not as its *own* activity but as *implicit*, and as an alteration of the object. Consequently, consciousness appears to be differently determined according to the variety of the general object given, and its progressive formation to be an alteration of the determinations of its object. Ego, which is the subject of consciousness, is thought. The progressive logical determination of the object is what is *identical in subject* and *object*, their absolute connectedness, that whereby the object is the subject's own.

The Kantian philosophy is most accurately assessed in that it is considered as having grasped spirit as consciousness, and as containing throughout not the philosophy of spirit, but merely determinations of its phenomenology. It treats the *ego* as related to that which lies beyond it, calls the abstract determination of this the thing-in-itself, and grasps intelligence as well as will only in accordance with this finitude. In the Notion of the *reflecting* judgement it certainly touches upon the *Idea* of spirit, subject-objectivity, an *intuiting understanding* etc., as well as the Idea of

kommt, so wird diese Idee selbst wieder zu einer Erscheinung, nämlich einer subjektiven Maxime, herabgesetzt (s. § 58, Einl.). Es ist daher für einen richtigen Sinn dieser Philosophie anzusehen, daß sie von *Reinhold* als eine Theorie des *Bewußtseins*, unter dem Namen *Vorstellungsvermögen*, aufgefaßt worden ist. Die *Fichtesche* Philosophie hat denselben Standpunkt, und Nicht-Ich ist nur als *Gegenstand* des Ich, nur im *Bewußtsein* bestimmt; es bleibt als unendlicher Anstoß, d. i. als *Ding-an-sich*. Beide Philosophien zeigen daher, daß sie nicht zum *Begriffe* und nicht zum *Geiste*, wie er *an und für sich ist*, sondern nur, wie er in Beziehung auf ein Anderes ist, gekommen sind. 5 10

In Beziehung auf *Spinozismus* ist dagegen zu bemerken, daß der Geist in dem Urteile, wodurch er sich als *Ich*, als freie Subjektivität gegen die Bestimmtheit konstituiert, aus der Substanz, und die Philosophie, indem ihr dies Urteil absolute Bestimmung des Geistes ist, aus dem Spinozismus heraustritt. 15

Die Kantsche Philosophie kann am bestimmtesten so betrachtet werden, daß sie den Geist als Bewußtsein aufgefaßt hat und ganz nur Bestimmungen der Phänomenologie, nicht der Philosophie desselben, enthält. Das Bewußtsein ist der Standpunkt der Kantschen und Fichteschen Philosophie. 20 Kant hat angestellt eine Kritik des Erkenntnißvermögens, der Vernunft und was dann von der Vernunft übrig bleibt, nicht weg kritisirt ist, ist die unbestimmte Vernunft, das Selbstbewußtsein, das Ich, die Identität Ich = Ich und er hat so die reinen Verstandes Bestimmungen an die Stelle der Vernunft gesetzt, Denken hat bei ihm nur den Sinn des abstrakten Denkens 25 des Verstandes, es ist noch nicht als konkret. In diesem kritischen Verfahren werden Kathegorien angegeben, die Bestimmung des Denkens, das Erkennen d.h. einen Gegenstand bestimmt Denken, ist damit ausgemertzt.* Es scheint daß in der Bestimmung der praktischen Vernunft in der Kantschen Philosophie sich die Vernunft auf konkretere Weise auf thut; Ich soll das 30 Bestimmen des Willens sein, Ich das sich selbst Gesetze giebt und die sittlich praktischen Gesetze sollen nur gelten in so fern das Ich sie sich giebt. Im Theoretischen kann die Vernunft nicht bestimmen, da sehen wir nur Ich gleich Ich, die abstrakte Identität, so daß die Vernunft in nichts Anderem besteht als im Ordnen des Stoffes, Stoff heißt der bestimmte Inhalt, der 35 kommt nicht der Vernunft zu, hingegen im Praktischen ist das Ich bestimmend. Wir wissen nur nicht wie das Theoretische dazu kommt das Ich zu setzen und wie das Ich mit einem Male dazu kommt sich zu bestimmen

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 189: In dem kritischen Verfahren werden die Kategorien was die Bestimmung des Denkens ist, alles Erkennen, d.h. bestimmtes Denken, ausgemerzt.

nature, but it then reduces this Idea to an appearance, to a subjective maxim (see § 58, Intr.). *Reinhold* may therefore be regarded as having interpreted this philosophy correctly in that he has treated it, under the name of the *presentative faculty*, as a theory of *consciousness*. The standpoint of the *Fichtean* philosophy is no different, the non-ego being determined only as *set over against* the ego, as within *consciousness*, and therefore as remaining as an infinite impediment, i.e. a *thing-in-itself*. It is evident from both philosophies therefore that they have attained neither to the *Notion* nor to *spirit* as it *is in and for itself*, but only to spirit as it is in relation to another.

With regard to *Spinozism* however, it is to be observed that spirit emerges from substance as free subjectivity opposed to the determinateness, in the judgement whereby it constitutes itself as *ego*, and that philosophy emerges from Spinozism in that it takes this judgement to be the absolute determination of spirit.

The Kantian philosophy is most accurately assessed in that it is considered as having grasped spirit as consciousness, and as containing throughout not the philosophy of spirit, but merely determinations of its phenomenology. The standpoint of the Kantian and Fichtean philosophy is consciousness. Kant has instituted a critique of the faculty of cognition, of reason, and what is then left of reason, what is not criticized away, is indeterminate reason, self-consciousness, the ego, the identity of ego = ego. It is thus that he has replaced reason with the pure determinations of the understanding; thinking, for him, is nothing more than the abstract thinking of the understanding, it is not yet concrete. In this critical procedure categories are propounded, the determination of thinking, cognizing i.e. a general object, thought determinately, is eradicated.* In the Kantian philosophy, it is apparently the case that reason reveals itself in a more concrete mode in the determination of practical reason. It is supposed to be the ego which determines the will, which enjoins laws upon itself, and the laws of practical ethics are supposed to have validity only in so far as the ego prescribes them for itself. Since reason cannot determine in what is theoretical, where we see only one ego like the other, abstract identity, reason consists in nothing other than the ordering of the material, the material being the determinate content, which does not come within the scope of reason. In what is practical on the contrary, the ego is the determining factor. We do not know, however, how what is theoretical comes to posit the ego, and how the ego suddenly becomes self-determining

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 189: In the critical procedure the categories become what the determination of thought is, all cognizing, i.e. determinate thinking, is eradicated.

wenn das Bestimmen nicht dem Ich angehört und so kann Theoretisches und Praktisches keinen Unterschied machen. (269) Es bleibt abgesehen hiervon bei der Abstraktion des Sichselbstbestimmens, denn das Gesetz für den Willen soll wieder kein anderes sein als die Uebereinstimmung mit sich selbst, kein Widerspruch, dieß heißt wieder nichts Anderes als die abstrakte 5 Identität, die des leeren Verstandes, so daß die praktische Vernunft Gesetze giebt deren Prinzip die abstrakte Identität, das Inhaltslose, das in der That Inhaltslose ist. Es bleibt beim Bestimmen überhaupt, es kommt aber auf den Inhalt an was das Bestimmen sei, und da ist denn hier die Identiät mit sich + wieder die Bestimmung des Prinzips; man kommt also bei dem Begriff der 10 Vernunft nicht über den Verstand hinaus.* – Die Fichtesche Philosophie ist eine consequente Darstellung der Kantschen. Ich ist die Vernunft und Fichte stellt es mit Kraft an die Spitze und hat dann gesucht davon weiter zu gehen. Die Fichtesche Philosophie hat so den Bestimmungen von denen Kant überhaupt empirisch spricht, als Kathegorien, Denkbestimmungen, 15 verworfen und ihnen den Werth für das Erkennen abzusprechen, dagegen versucht diese Bestimmungen aus dem Ich selbst abzuleiten. Diese Kathegorien sind nicht die Weise wie das Wesen erkannt werden kann, sie sind nicht vernünftig aufgefaßt. – Diese Gewißheit seiner selbst ist also der Standpunkt der Kantschen und Fichteschen Philosophie und das Nähere ist 20 dann für die Erfüllung des Ichs, daß wie im Bewußtsein die Gewißheit, das Abstraktum für sich ist, das Wissen das zu seiner Bedingung ein Ding, ein Nichtich, ein Anderes hat, das Ich hat so als Abstraktum die Bestimmung außer ihm. Vorhanden ist alles was die Vernunft fordert, die Bestimmung des Abstrakten ist auch vorhanden aber außerhalb des Ich, so ist die Kantsche 25 und Fichtesche Philosophie behaftet mit einem solchen Jenseits und bleibt damit behaftet. Es ist ein consequentes Verstehen auf dieser Seite, es ist das Bedürfniß eines systematischen und nothwendigen Inhalts, aber das System dieser Denkbestimmungen bleibt mit dem Jenseits behaftet, das Ding an sich bleibt ein unendlicher Anstoß. Beide Philosophien zeigen daß sie nicht zum 30 Begriff, nicht (270) zum Geist gekommen sind.

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 189: Im Theoretischen könne der Verstand nichts erkennen; die Vernunft bestehe nur im Ordnen des Stoffes, der aber komme ihr nicht zu, die Vernunft sei bestimmt in sich selbst. Im Praktischen aber sei das Ich bestimmt. Man weiß nicht, wie das Ich nach dieser Seite sich bestimmen solle, wenn der Natur des Ich das Bestimmen immanent ist, so kann Theoretisches und Praktisches keinen Unterschied machen; aber es bleibt auch im Praktischen bei der Abstraktion des Sichselbstbestimmens, denn das Gesetz für den Willen soll kein anderes sein, als die Uebereinstimmung seiner mit sich selbst, daß kein Widerspruch sei in seiner Bestimmung, d.h. nichts anderes, als die abstrakte Identität, die Identität des leeren Verstandes. Ich bestimmt sich, dabei bleibt es, beim Bestimmen überhaupt, aber es kommt darauf an, was das Bestimmen sei, und für dies Bestimmte sei die Identität das Prinzip, die Uebereinstimmung mit sich; damit kommt man also auch wieder nicht über den Verstand hinaus.

if the determining does not pertain to it. How, then, can what is theoretical and what is practical constitute a difference? (269) There is, moreover, no progression here beyond the abstraction of self-determination, since for the will law is supposed to be still nothing other than self-conformity, not to involve contradiction i.e. to be still nothing other than the abstract identity of the empty understanding, so that practical reason gives laws which have as their principle abstract identity, the lack of content which does in fact lack content. There is no progression beyond determining in general, although what the determining is depends on the content. Here once again therefore, self-identity constitutes the determination of the principle, and in the Notion of reason one gets no further than the understanding.* – The Fichtean philosophy is a consistent exposition of the Kantian. Ego is reason, and placing it forthrightly at the apex, Fichte has then attempted to go beyond it. The determinations of which Kant speaks in a generally empirical manner have therefore been rejected by the Fichtean philosophy as categories and thought-determinations. Their worth for cognition has been denied, while the attempt has been made to derive these determinations from the ego itself. These categories are not the mode in which the essence may be cognized, for they are not rationally apprehended. – This self-certainty is, then, the standpoint of the Kantian and Fichtean philosophy. With regard to the filling of the ego therefore, the more precise determination is that as in consciousness, the certainty or abstraction is what is for itself, while knowledge has a thing, a non-ego, an other as its condition. As an abstraction therefore, the ego derives determination from without. All that reason requires is present, the determination of the abstraction also being present, although outside the ego. The Kantian and Fichtean philosophy is therefore burdened with such a beyond, and remains so. It constitutes a consistent understanding of this aspect, the need for a systematic and necessary content. The system of these thought-determinations remains burdened with the beyond however, the thing-in-itself remaining an infinite impediment. Both philosophies make it evident that they have not attained to the Notion, have not (270) reached spirit.

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 189: The understanding could then cognize nothing in what is theoretical; reason would consist only of the ordering of the material, which would not come within its scope however, reason being determined within itself. In what is practical however, the ego is determined. One does not know how the ego should determine itself from this aspect. If the nature of the ego is immanent within the determining, what is theoretical and what is practical cannot constitute difference. In what is practical however, there is no progression beyond the abstraction of self-determination, since for the will law is supposed to be nothing but self-conformity, there being no contradiction in its determination i.e. to be nothing but abstract identity, the identity of the empty understanding. Ego determines itself, and it gets no further than determining in general; it depends on what the determining is however, and for this determinate being identity is the principle, the self-conformity; once again therefore, one gets no further than the understanding.

Hier müssen wir eine Reflexion auf eine anscheinende Verwicklung machen, die sich unmittelbar hervorthut bei unserer wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung. Die Gewißheit ist ein Bewußtsein auch mit einem Objekte behaftet d.h. das Bewußtsein ist Beziehung auf ein Objekt, das für das Wissen auch ein jenseitiges ist, ein Nichtich. Dieser Gegensatz kommt auch an uns in anderer Gestalt in Beziehung auf die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung. Wir haben Wissen, Gewißheit und Objekt, in diesem Gegensatze ist das Objekt das Bewußtlose, wir haben ein Moment des Bewußtseins als solches und ein anderes Moment, die Bewußtlosigkeit gegen das Bewußtsein, dieß kommt nun also wie gesagt in Beziehung auf die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung mit einer Schwierigkeit vor. Wenn wir vom Bewußtsein sprechen, so sprechen wir vom Bewußtsein eines jeden als solchen und was vom Bewußtsein gesagt wird ist ein Wissen überhaupt und so verlangen wir daß er dieß in seinem Wissen findet, er dazu berechtigt ist. Dieß ist auch ganz wichtig, eine Seite muß jeder in seinem Wissen finden. Aber die andere Seite ist die bewußtlose Seite, dieß ist näher der Begriff. Wir begreifen das Bewußtsein, wir wissen davon, haben den Begriff davon vor uns, wir sprechen so von Bewußtsein und haben Bestimmungen des Bewußtseins vor uns, die das Bewußtsein als solches, als empirisches nicht hat, nicht weiß, das was im Begriff des Bewußtseins liegt kommt nicht dem Bewußtsein als solchen zu, nicht im empirischen Bewußtsein vor, nicht im Bewußtsein wie es steht und geht. Es ist eine gewöhnliche Einwendung, daß jeder in seinem empirischen Bewußtsein das finden will, was aus dem Begriff des Bewußtseins hervorgeht, und man hat dieß auch so ausgedrückt, man könne nicht hinter das Bewußtsein kommen, es sei das Höchste, noch erkennen was hinter ihm liegt, Fichte wolle nun das Bewußtsein selbst begreifen, aber hinter dasselbe, darüber hinaus könne man nicht kommen, es sei das Höchste. Dieß heißt nun (271) nichts Anderes als das Bewußtsein könne man nicht begreifen, aber über das empirische, reflektierende Bewußtsein ist allerdings das begreifende Bewußtsein, und was wir vom Bewußtsein begreifen muß sich allerdings in jedem begreifenden Bewußtsein finden. Wenn so daß empirische Bewußtsein eine Einwende macht gegen das begreifende Bewußtsein, so ist die Widerlegung unmittelbar im Bewußtsein selbst, das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein hat so etwas was über ihm ist, dieß ist das Objekt, das Negative seiner, jenseits, hinter oder drüber, es ist ein Negatives, ein Anderes als das Bewußtsein. Für uns ist das Bewußtsein selbst Objekt, und ist begriffen, in unserem begreifendem Bewußtsein ist so mehr als in dem empirischen Bewußtsein und wir kommen so hinter dasselbe. Es ist das was wir von demselben begreifen das Bewußtsein, aber darum ist es zu thun daß der Mensch wisse was er ist und dieß ist auch Anderes, als daß er es bloß ist.

Wir haben zunächst betrachtet das Wissen für sich und sind dann über gegangen zum Objekt dieß ist ein Anderes gegen das Bewußtsein und ist hier

At this juncture an apparent complication becomes immediately evident in the course of our scientific consideration, and has to be reflected upon. In consciousness, certainty is also burdened with an object i.e. consciousness consists of relation to an object which is also a beyond for knowledge, a non-ego, – an opposition which also occurs in us in another shape, in respect of scientific consideration. We have knowledge, certainty and object, and in this opposition the object is what is unconscious. We have a moment of consciousness as such, and another moment, consisting of what is unconscious opposed to consciousness. As has been observed, this gives rise to a difficulty in respect of scientific consideration. When we speak of consciousness, we speak of the consciousness of each as such, and what is said of consciousness is a general knowledge. We require, therefore, that each should discover consciousness in his knowledge, for each is justified in doing so. It is of utmost importance, that each should discover one aspect in his knowledge. The other aspect is the unconscious one however, which more precisely considered is the Notion. We comprehend consciousness, we know of it, have the Notion of it before us, and it is thus that we speak of it with its determinations before us. Consciousness as such, as what is empirical, does not have these determinations before it, does not know of them. That which lies in the Notion of consciousness does not pertain to consciousness as such, to empirical or everyday consciousness. It is commonly asserted that each will find in his empirical consciousness what proceeds forth from the Notion of consciousness, and this has also given rise to the dicta that one cannot get behind consciousness, that it is the highest, that one cannot cognize what lies behind it, that Fichte wanted to comprehend consciousness itself, but that since it is the highest, one is unable to get over and beyond it. Although this clearly implies (271) that consciousness cannot be comprehended, comprehending consciousness is certainly superior to empirical, reflecting consciousness, and what we comprehend of consciousness must certainly find itself in every comprehending consciousness. Consequently, when empirical consciousness objects to comprehending consciousness, the immediate refutation of the objection is in consciousness itself. Ordinary consciousness therefore has something which is superior to it, and this is the object, the negative of it, the beyond, the behind, the above, – which is a negative, an other than consciousness. For us, consciousness itself is object, and is comprehended. Since there is therefore more within our comprehending consciousness than within empirical consciousness, we do get behind it. Consciousness is what we comprehend of it. This is why man must be brought to know what he is, and this too is something other than his simply being it.

In the first instance we considered knowledge for itself, and we then passed over to the object, which is an other, opposed to consciousness, and which is

so gefaßt daß darunter verstanden wird der Begriff des Bewußtseins.* Die nächste Frage ist nun, was ist der Inhalt des Objekts? Das Objekt haben wir bestimmen müssen beim Bewußtsein, es ist das Andere des Ichs, aber was ist nun der Inhalt des Objekts? Was macht Ich sich zum Gegenstand? Es ist nun keine andere Bestimmung für das Objekt vorhanden, als das was wir schon 5 hatten in der natürlichen Seele, in der Empfindung, im Gefühl, diese Empfindung mag innerlich oder äußerlich sein, so ist nur das Bewußtsein daß die Seele als allgemein für sich ist, sich herausgezogen hat aus der Leiblichkeit und diese, das Fühlen, Finden u.s.w. aus sich abtrennt, hinaus wirft. Ich, das Allgemeine, die Seele für sich, dieß kommt nirgend anderswo 10 her als aus der Gefühlssphäre, dadurch ist es bedingt, dieß ist das Andere für das Ich, nur sein Gefühl ist sein Anderes, bestimmt sich so, nur die Form, die Weise des Gefühls (272) ist es durch deren Negation das Ich für sich selbst ist, Ich ist nur für sich als Negation seines Gefühls, seine Empfindungsbestimmungen, es ist sofern es sie als das Negative seiner setzt, es ist nur 15 indem es sich auf ein Objekt bezieht und dieß ist der Gefühlsinhalt selbst, der Inhalt ist das unendliche Urtheil des Subjekts wodurch es das was es zunächst ist als das Negative seiner setzt, seine Gefühlsbestimmungen aus sich hinaus wirft, als Objekt, als Welt vor sich hat. Was im Bewußtsein ist ist im Gefühl, alles muß empfunden werden, dieß giebt man leicht zu, diese Empfindungs- 20 bestimmungen haben jetzt die Form einer Außenwelt für das Subjekt, die Welt muß vorher draußen sein ehe sie Eindruck auf uns macht. Die Wahrheit, die Objektivität, die wahrhafte Objektivität der Welt ist eine weitere Seite, der Inhalt des Bewußtseins sind hier Empfindungsbestimmungen, wo diese herkommen das ist etwas Anderes, davon haben wir hier zu abstrahiren. Es 25 sind Empfindungsbestimmungen, die Welt war eine subjektive Empfindungswelt und hier ist es Bewußtsein von einer Welt, es sind die von sich abgetrennten, hinausgeworfenen Empfindungsbestimmungen. Ich empfinde Hartes, ich bin es selbst der das Harte hat und unterscheide dann zwei, mich und das Harte, das Objekt. 30

Der Geist ist Idealität der Natur, dieß gehört zu seiner Natur, zu seiner Wirklichkeit selbst und seine natürliche Bestimmung ist der Mikrocosmus, diese Totalität die er ist und die ihm aufgeht in der Empfindung, was ihm im Gefühl manifestirt wird ist die gegenständliche Welt.

Das dritte was zumerken ist, in Rücksicht auf das Objekt, ist daß der Inhalt 35

* *Kehler Ms.* SS. 190–191: Ohnehin, wenn das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein einen Mißverstand aufbringt gegen das begreifende Bewußtsein, so ist die Widerlegung im Bewußtsein unmittelbar vorhanden, denn das Bewußtsein hat hinter sich oder vor sich das Objekt, das negative seiner. In unserem begreifenden Bewußtsein ist ohne Zweifel mehr, als im nicht begreifenden Bewußtsein, so kommen wir hinter dasselbe, und wissen mehr davon, als es von sich selbst weiß. Daß der Geist wisse was er ist, darauf kommt es an. (191) Das Wissen für sich betrachteten wir, dann gingen wir über zum Objekt, daß es ein anderes gegen das Bewußtsein wäre, und dies andere haben wir so gefaßt, inwiefern darunter auch der Begriff des Bewußtseins verstanden wird.

grasped here as being understood to be the Notion of consciousness.* The question that now presents itself is that of the content of the object. We have had to determine the object in respect of consciousness as the other of the ego, but what is the content of the object? What does ego take to be its general + 5 object? No other determination for the object is present, than that we have already had in the natural soul, in sensation, in feeling. Regardless of this sensation's being internal or external, consciousness is merely the soul's having general being for itself, having drawn itself forth from corporeity, separated off and expelled from itself feeling, finding etc. Ego, the universal, + 10 the being-for-self of the soul, proceeds from nowhere but the sphere of feeling. It is by this that it is conditioned, this is the ego's other, its feeling only, and it determines itself as such, it being only through the negation of the form or mode of feeling (272) that the ego is for itself. Ego is for itself only as negation of its feeling, the determinations of its sensation. It has being in so 15 far as it posits them as the negative of itself. It is only in that it relates itself to + an object, which is itself the feeling or content. The content is the infinite judgement of the subject, whereby it posits what it is initially as the negative of itself, expels the determinations of its feeling from out of itself, and has them before itself as an object or world. What is in consciousness is in feeling, + 20 it being readily admitted that everything has to be sensed. For the subject, these determinations of sensation now have the form of an external world. The world must previously be outside us, before it makes an impression upon us. The truth, the objectivity, the true objectivity of the world, is a further aspect; at this juncture, the content of consciousness consists of 25 determinations of sensation. Where they come from is another matter, which + at this juncture we do not have to enter into. Determinations of sensation are + given; the world was a subjective world of sensation, and here it is consciousness of a world, this world being the determinations of sensation which have been separated and expelled from oneself. When I have sensation of 30 hardness, I myself am what possesses the hardness, and I then distinguish the two, myself and the hardness, the object.

It pertains to the nature, the very actuality of spirit, to be the ideality of nature, and its natural determination is that of the microcosm, this totality, which it is, and which dawns before it in sensation. What is made manifest to 35 it in feeling, is the general objectivity of the world. +

In the third instance, it has also to be observed of the object that it is the

* *Kehler Ms.* pp. 190–191: Nevertheless, when ordinary consciousness applies a perverted understanding to comprehending consciousness, the immediate refutation of this is present in consciousness itself, for consciousness has the object, its negative, behind or before it. There can be no doubt that there is more in our comprehending consciousness than in uncomprehending consciousness, so that we do get behind it, and know more of it than it knows of itself. Spirit must know itself, this is the crux. (191) We considered knowledge for itself, then we passed over to the object, as if it were an other, opposed to consciousness, and we have grasped this other in so far as it is also understood to be the Notion of consciousness.

der Empfindung das ist wozu Ich sich wissend verhält. Wie verhalte ich mich dazu und was ist die nähere Bestimmung meiner als Bewußtsein mich zu dieser Gegenständlichkeit verhaltend? Der Gegenstand ist Objekt, draußen, für sich, unmittelbar gesetzt, vorgefunden, als ob er nicht gesetzt wäre. (273) Das fürsichseiende Allgemeine hat seinen Inhalt, seine Totalität von Bestimmungen von sich frei entlassen, die für das Subjekt nun sind, gegeben sind, ein nicht durch mich Gesetztes. Dieß ist die allgemeine Bestimmung. Aber die Frage wie ich mich verhalte zum Objekt ist hierin auch nicht enthalten und um dieß zu bestimmen ist zu sehen wie Ich, das Bewußtsein näher ist. Es ist das Allgemeine das sich zu sich selbst verhält, das Subjekt in seiner vollkommenen Allgemeinheit, ich verhalte mich also als das allgemeine Fürsichsein zur Welt d.h. denkend, Denken ist die Allgemeinheit die für sich ist, diese ist thätig, Ich ist nicht ein ruhendes Atom, es ist unruhig, thätig, es ist die unendliche Negativität, überhaupt Thätigkeit und das Thätige hat die Bestimmung der Allgemeinheit, dieß ist denkend. Das Ich, das Bewußtsein verhält sich also zum Objekt negativ aber auch affirmativ, es ist dieser Widerspruch einerseits Negation und zugleich Beziehung, diese affirmative Beziehung meiner auf das Objekt ist weil Ich eben Ich bin, denkende Thätigkeit, ich verhalte mich denkend. Ich heißt ein Jeder d.h. als Ich ist er denkend und sofern das Ich sich verhält, verhält es sich denkend. Dieß versteht sich von sich selbst wenn man weiß was denken ist; denken ist die Thätigkeit des Allgemeinen und Ich ist das Allgemeine das für sich ist. Ich ist also im Bewußtsein thätig als denkend, dieß kann paradox scheinen, aber man kann mancherlei meinen, vermuthen, aber von Vermuthungen kann hier nicht weiter die Rede sein. – Wie verhält sich nun das Denken eines Objekts, das bestimmt ist als das Andere seiner selbst? Es denkt also das Objekt und die Denkbestimmungen sind Bestimmungen des Objekts oder die Denkbestimmungen erscheinen ihm nicht als seine Thätigkeit, Thun, sondern erscheinen dem Ich als Bestimmungen des Objekts, oder das Subjekt ist nur für uns denkend, dem Bewußtsein erscheinen die Denkbestimmungen als gegeben vorgefunden, die Denkbestimmungen haben die (274) Form von äußerlichen und dieß ist die bewußtlose Seite die für uns vorhanden ist, nicht für den Begriff selbst, für ihn sind die Bestimmungen als vom Objekt gegeben. Das Bewußtsein ist die denkende Seele, der Geist ist vernünftig und die Realisation des Bewußtseins ist es sich zu erheben vom abstrakten Denken zur Vernünftigkeit.

Im Bewußtsein ist der Geist als Ich bestimmt, dieß ist also als denkend und die Bestimmungen des Bewußtseins sind also Bestimmungen des Denkens, aber indem das Bewußtsein Verhältniß ist, so erscheinen die Bestimmungen als das Andere, als das Negative des Ich, als Äußerlichkeit, Gegebenes, Vorgefundenes. Wir haben gesagt daß einerseits der Inhalt dem Gefühl angehört, daß es die Empfindungen sind die herausgesetzt werden als Anderes und hierzu verhält sich der Geist denkend, denkt diesen Inhalt. Als

content of sensation to which the ego relates itself in knowing. How do I relate myself to it, and what is my preciser determination as consciousness in relating myself to this general objectivity? The general object is an object, out there for itself, posited immediately, encountered, as if it were not posited. (273) The universal which is for itself has freely released its content, it totality of determinations from itself, and these now have being for the subject, are given as something not posited through me. This is the general determination. The question as to how I relate myself to the object is not contained here either however, and in order to define it, the ego or consciousness has to be looked at more closely. Since the ego or consciousness is the self-relating universal, the subject in its complete universality, I relate myself to the world as universal being-for-self i.e. thinkingly. Thinking is the universality which is for itself, it is what is active. The ego is not a quiescent atom, but restless, active, – it is infinite negativity, activity in general. What is active has the determination of universality, and it is this that thinks. Although the ego or consciousness therefore relates itself negatively to the object, it also does so affirmatively, being the contradiction of being negation on the one side, and at the same time relation. This affirmative relation of myself to the object has being precisely because I am ego, thinking activity, because I relate myself thinkingly. Ego is each one of us i.e. as ego each is thinking, and in so far as the ego relates itself, it does so thinkingly. This is self-evident if one knows what thinking is, for it is the activity of the universal, and ego is the universal which is for itself. Ego is therefore active in consciousness as thinking. This can appear to be a paradox, but although all kinds of opinions and suppositions are possible, this is not the place to say any more about them. – How then does thinking relate itself to an object determined as being its own other? We can say then that it thinks the object, and that the thought-determinations are determinations of the object, or that the thought-determinations appear to the ego not as its activity or act, but as determinations of the object, or that it is only for us that the subject is thinking, to consciousness the thought-determinations appear to be given, encountered. The thought-determinations have the (274) form of being external, and this is the unconscious aspect present for us. It is not present for the Notion itself however, for which the determinations are as rendered by the object. Consciousness is the thinking soul. Spirit is rational, and consciousness realizes itself in that it raises itself from abstract thinking to rationality.

In consciousness, spirit is determined as ego, that is to say as thinking, and the determinations of consciousness are therefore determinations of thinking. In that consciousness is relationship however, the determinations appear as the other, as the negative of the ego, as externality, as what is given or encountered. We have observed that one aspect of the content pertains to feeling, that it is the sensations which are projected outwards as an other, and that it is to this that spirit relates itself thinkingly, in that it thinks this content.

objektiv gesetzt sind die Gefühle einerseits Gefühlsinhalt, andererseits wie er durchs Denken gesetzt ist. Es ist der Standpunkt des subjektiven Idealismus,* wir sind es die den Inhalt denkend bestimmen, so daß beide Momente desselben uns angehören. Dabei muß man wissen, daß dieser subjektive Idealismus nur eine Seite der Philosophie, des wahrhaften Idealismus ist. Wir werfen den Inhalt aus unserer Empfindung dieß ist unsere Thätigkeit, aber es wird nicht behauptet daß es nur unsere Thätigkeit ist, dieß wäre ebenso unvernünftig als die Behauptung daß es nur gegeben ist, als ob wir unthätig dabei sind, unser Wissen ist unsere Thätigkeit, dieß ist aber nur eine Seite, die Bestimmungen müssen produzirt werden, sonst hätten wir sie nicht; das Denken ist Einheit der Subjektivität und Objektivität, was für den Geist ist, ist auch, die Objektivität ist die Allgemeinheit, Identität des Subjekts und dessen was ihm gegenüber gesetzt ist. Der subjektive Idealismus ist durch die Be= (275) hauptung, daß alles nur durch unsere Thätigkeit ist, nicht wahrer Idealismus, die Thätigkeit ist wesentliches Moment, aber nur eine Seite. Wenn man nun nach dem subjektiven Idealismus sagt, die Vorstellung von Raum, Geruch, Farbe u.s.w. kommen nur uns zu, die Dinge seien etwas besseres, wir thun den Dingen erst diese Endlichkeit, Äußerlichkeit an u.s.w. so ist richtig daß indem wir uns zu ihnen verhalten wir uns sinnlich verhalten und selbst beim Denken auch das sinnliche Moment an uns haben. Allein die Dinge sind nicht besser als wir, sie sind ebenso sinnlich, endlich, es ist beides ein und dieselbe Sphäre. Diese Subjektivität die den Inhalt der Vorstellung oder dessen was das Bewußtsein vor sich hat ausspricht ist ein untergeordneter Stoff, es ist dieß allerdings Schuld des Denkens, des Subjekts, aber es kommt nicht diese Schuld ihm allein zu, sondern die Dinge haben ebenso eine endliche Weise der Existenz, wie das Denken, das sich auf der niederen, endlichen, sinnlichen Sphäre verhält. Diese Bemerkung haben wir in Beziehung auf den Idealismus machen wollen, insofern diese Art als letzte Form verstanden wird, daß wir thätig sind, Zeitlichkeit, Räumlichkeit aus uns hinausgeworfen als ob diese äußere Thätigkeit das Ganze dessen wäre, was vorhanden ist. Unsere Thätigkeit ist eine Seite, aber ebenso ist auch die andere Seite daß der Gegenstand auch ist. Was die Objektivität anbetrifft so hat sie den Sinn eines Negativen des Bewußtseins und zweitens der Identität des Gegenstandes und des Subjekts, beide sind bestimmt, aber gleich wie das Eine bestimmt ist, so ist auch das Andere, sie ist das Allgemeine, diese Einheit beider, so daß es weder nur darum zu thun ist solche Bestimmung zu setzen, noch ebenso wenig nach realistischer Weise nur Einwirkung des Objekts zu setzen.†

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* *Kehler Ms.* S. 192: . . . der Kantischen und Fichtischen Philosophie, subjektiver Idealismus; . . .

† *Kehler Ms.* S. 193: Die Objektivität hat diesen Sinn, ein Negatives des Bewußtseins, zweitens ist sie die Identität des Gegenstandes und des Subjekts, das was als Subjekt bestimmt ist, ist auch Gegenstand, und was als Objekt ist, ist auch als Subjekt; daß es weder nur unser Thun ist, die Bestimmung zu setzen, und ebenso wenig nur Einwirkung von dem Objekt, daß wir diese Vorstellung haben.

Posited as being objective, one aspect of the feelings is the content of feeling, while the other is the way in which this content is posited through thinking. This is the standpoint of subjective idealism.* It is we who determine the content thinkingly, so that both moments of it belong to us. It has to be realized however, that this subjective idealism is only one aspect of philosophy, of true idealism. We expel the content from out of our sensation, this is our activity, but it will not be asserted that this is solely our activity. This would be just as irrational as the assertion that it is merely given, as if we were inactive in the matter. Our knowledge is our activity; this is only one aspect however, the determinations have to be produced, otherwise we should not have them. Thinking constitutes the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. What has being for spirit also has being, the objectivity is the universality, the identity of the subject and of that which is posited over against it. On account of its assertion (275) that everything only has being through our activity, subjective idealism is not true idealism. The activity is an essential moment, but only one aspect. If one follows subjective idealism and says that the presentation of space, smell, colour etc. simply comes to us, that things are something better, that we initiate this finitude, externality in things, the truth here is that in that we relate ourselves to them we do so sensuously, and that even in thinking we are still involved in the moment of sensuousness. But things, in that they are just as sensuous and finite, are no better than we are, so that both aspects constitute one and the same sphere. This subjectivity, which expresses the content of presentation, of what consciousness has before itself, is a subordinate matter. It is, it is true, the fault in thinking, in the subject, but this is not the only origin of this fault, for things also have a finite mode of existence, and so resemble such thinking as relates itself to the lower, finite, sensuous sphere. We have thought it advisable to make this observation in respect of idealism, in so far as this form of it, in which we are active, and project temporality, spatiality out of ourselves as if this external activity were the whole of what is present, is taken to be final. Our activity is one aspect, but there is also the other aspect of there also being the general object. Objectivity has the significance of being a negative in respect of consciousness, and, secondly, in respect of the identity of the general object and of the subject. Both are determined, but the one is determined just as the other is, and the objectivity is the universal, this unity of both. Consequently, what has to be done is not simply to posit such a determination, nor simply to posit the effect of the object in a realistic manner.†

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 192: . . . of the Kantian and Fichtean philosophy, subjective idealism.

† *Kehler* Ms. p. 193: Objectivity has the significance of being a negative in respect of consciousness; secondly, it is the identity of the general object and of the subject, – what is determined as subject also being a general object, and what has being as object, also having being as subject; that we have this presentation is not simply the act of our positing the determination, any more than it is simply the effect of the object.

(276) Die Objektivität hat aber auch drittens den Sinn der Allgemeinheit des Subjektiven des Bewußtseins. Ich bin einzeln, es sind viele solcher Einzeln und Objektivität ist dann die Allgemeinheit dieser Vielen. Nach diesem Sinn ist das was Gegenstand ist für mich als für diesen Besonderen, auch Gegenstand für die Anderen, so wie es für mich ist, so ist es auch für die Anderen. Ich als Bewußtsein verhalte mich als dieser und zugleich als denkend, ich bin verschieden von den Andern, insofern ich mich von den anderen Besonderen unterscheide, aber sie sind auch denkendes Bewußtsein und so sind wir gleich. Diese Allgemeinheit heißt auch Objektivität. Abweichungen giebt es hier zwar auch, aber besonderes nur in der Gefühlswelt, aber sonst hat die Objektivität auch den Sinn daß der Gegenstand wie er für mich ist, auch für die Andern ist.

\+ „Da Ich nicht als der Begriff, sondern als formelle Identität ist, so ist die dialektische Bewegung des Bewußtseins ihm nicht als seine Thätigkeit, sondern sie ist an sich d.h. für dasselbe Veränderung des Objekts. Das Bewußtsein erscheint daher verschieden nach der Verschiedenheit des gegebenen Gegenstandes, und seine Fortbildung als eine Fortbildung des Objekts; die Betrachtung von dessen nothwendigen Veränderung aber, der Begriff, fällt, weil er noch als solcher innerlich ist, in uns.“ Unser gewöhnliches Bewußtsein hat nicht den Begriff seiner selbst, es weiß von den Gegenständen, den Objekten, aber nicht von sich selbst, diese Veränderung geht also bewußtlos für dasselbe vor, es ist Veränderung des Objekts, aber diese ist auch Veränderung des Subjekts.

§ 416

Das Ziel des Geistes als Bewußtseins ist, diese seine Erscheinung mit seinem Wesen identisch zu machen, *die Gewißheit seiner selbst zur Wahrheit* zu erheben. Die *Existenz*, die er im Bewußtsein hat, hat darin ihre Endlichkeit, daß sie die formelle Beziehung auf sich, nur Gewißheit ist; weil das Objekt nur abstrakt als das *Seinige* bestimmt oder er in demselben nur in sich als abstraktes Ich reflektiert ist, so hat diese Existenz noch einen Inhalt, der nicht als der seinige ist.

\+ (277) „Das Ziel des Geistes als Bewußtsein, ist diese seine Erscheinung mit seinem Wesen identisch zu machen, die Gewißheit seiner selbst zur Wahrheit zu erheben.“ Das Bewußtsein ist in der Identität mit seinem Gegenstand Gewißheit, aber es ist darum zu thun diese zur Wahrheit zu erheben oder das Ich, welches hier anfängt objektives Denken zu sein, zum Geiste zu erheben.

(276) Thirdly, however, objectivity has the significance of being the universality of the subjective being of consciousness. I am a singular, there are many such singulars, and objectivity is, then, the universality of this many. In this sense, that which is a general object for me as this particular, is
5 also a general object for the others. As it is for me, so is it also for the others. As consciousness, I relate myself as this particular, and at the same time as a thinking being. I differ from the others in so far as I distinguish myself from other particular beings, but they are also thinking consciousness, and in this respect we are equal. This universality is also called objectivity, and although +
10 there are certain deviations here too, they are particularly prominent only in the world of feeling. Apart from this however, objectivity also has the + significance of the general object's being for me what it also is for the others.

"Since the ego has being not as the Notion, but as formal identity, it has the dialectical motion of consciousness not as its own activity, but as implicit, i.e.
15 for the ego it is an alteration of the object. Consequently, consciousness appears to differ according to the variety of the general object given, and its progressive formation to be a progressive formation of the object; the Notion however, the consideration of its necessary alteration, since as such it is still internal, falls within us." Our ordinary consciousness does not possess the +
20 Notion of itself. It knows of general objects, or objects, but not of itself, so + that this alteration proceeds unconsciously for it. Although this is an alteration of the object, it is also an alteration of the subject.

§ 416

The goal of spirit, as consciousness, is to make this its appearance identical with its essence, to raise *its self-certainty into truth.* Spirit's
25 ***existence* in consciousness is finite in that it is only certainty, formal self-relation. Since the object is only abstractly determined as *belonging*, spirit only being intro-reflected within it as an abstract ego, this existence still has an unappropriated content.** +

(277) "The goal of spirit, as consciousness, is to make this its appearance
30 identical with its essence, to raise its self-certainty into truth." In the identity + with its general object, consciousness is certainty; this has to be raised to truth however, or rather the ego, which here begins to be objective thinking, has to

„Die Existenz, die er im Bewußtsein hat, ist die formelle oder allgemeine als solche; weil das Objekt nur abstrakt als das Seinige bestimmt ist, oder er in demselben nur in sich als abstraktes Ich reflektirt ist, so hat diese Existenz + noch einen Inhalt, der nicht als der Seinige ist." Jede Bewegung des Bewußtseins dieß Anderssein zu vernichten, darum ist es zu thun, damit das Ich 5 konkret und so geistig wird.

§ 417

Die Stufen dieser Erhebung der Gewißheit zur Wahrheit sind, daß er

a) *Bewußtsein* überhaupt ist, welches einen Gegenstand als solchen hat, 10

b) *Selbstbewußtsein*, für welches *Ich* der Gegenstand ist,

c) Einheit des Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins, daß der Geist den Inhalt des Gegenstandes als sich selbst und sich selbst als an und für sich bestimmt anschaut; – *Vernunft, der Begriff des Geistes*.

\+ Bewußtsein haben wir von etwas, von einem Gegenstande überhaupt, von 15 unmittelbaren Gegenständen d.h. von sinnlichen, seienden Gegenständen, oder es wird von der Unmittelbarkeit angefangen und die erste Form des Bewußtseins ist a) das sinnliche Bewußtsein überhaupt, welches einen Gegenstand als solchen hat, weil aber das Ich denkend ist, so ist das sinnliche Bewußtsein Denkbestimmung, es ist das ärmlichste Denken, wenn es sich 20 auch für das reichste hält.* Die zweite Form ist b) das Selbstbewußtsein für welches Ich der Gegenstand ist, so daß der Gegenstand aufgehoben wird nach seiner Äußerlichkeit, negirt, verwandelt in mich, daß ich frei werde, es ist nicht mehr ein Anderes mein Gegenstand, sondern ich selbst, es ist so Freiheit des Bewußtseins, ich bin nicht mehr abhängig. Wie die zweite Stufe immer 25 den Sinn hat die Wahrheit der ersten zu sein, so ist hier das Bewußtsein ein Abstraktum, man hat kein Bewußtsein (278) ohne Selbstbewußtsein, es ist wesentlich Selbstbewußtsein, obgleich es nicht als solches erscheint. Die dritte Form ist c) die Einheit des Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins, daß wovon das Bewußtsein weiß, daß dieß ein Gegenständliches ist und zugleich 30 identisch mit dem Bewußtsein, dieß ist das allgemeine Bewußtsein, daß der Geist den Inhalt des Gegenstands als sich selbst und sich selbst als an und für sich bestimmt anschaut; – Vernunft, der Begriff des Geistes. Der Geist ist vernünftig und hält sich so und es ist nun sein Interesse seine Vernünftigkeit + zu seinem Gegenstand zu machen. 35

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 194: . . . das concreteste und reichste . . .

be raised to spirit. "In consciousness, spirit's existence is form or general existence as such; since the object is only abstractly determined as belonging, spirit only being intro-reflected within it as an abstract ego, this existence still has an unappropriated content." The objective of each movement of consciousness is to annihilate this otherness, so that the ego may become concrete and therefore spiritual.

§ 417

At the stages of this elevation of certitude to truth, spirit is:

a) *consciousness* in general, which has a general object as such,

b) *self-consciousness*, for which *ego* is the general object,

c) unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, in which spirit intuites the content of the general object as its self, and itself as determined in and for itself; – *reason, the Notion of spirit.*

We are conscious of something, of a broad general object, of immediate general objects i.e. of the sensuous being of general objects. Alternatively, one begins with the immediacy, in which case the first form of consciousness is a) sensuous consciousness in general, which has a general object as such. Since the ego thinks however, sensuous consciousness is a thought-determination, it is the poorest kind of thinking, although it regards itself as being the richest.* The second form is b) self-consciousness, for which ego is the general object. Here the general object is sublated in respect of its externality, negated, so transformed into me, that I become free. My general object is no longer an other, but myself. This is the freedom of consciousness, for I am no longer dependent. The second stage always has the significance of being the truth of the first, and here consciousness is an abstraction, there is no consciousness (278) without self-consciousness, consciousness being essentially self-consciousness, although it does not appear as such. The third form is c) the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, that which consciousness knows to be a general objectivity and at the same time identical with consciousness. This is the universal consciousness of spirit's intuiting the content of the general object as its self, and itself as determined in and for itself; – reason, the Notion of spirit. Spirit is rational, and conducts itself as such, and its interest is now to make its rationality into its general object.

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 194: . . . the most concrete and richest . . .

A. *Das Bewußtsein, als solches*

\+ Im Bewußtsein als solchem sind drei Formen enthalten 1) das unmittelbare sinnliche Bewußtsein, 2) die Wahrnehmung des Bewußtseins des Sinnlichen, so daß zugleich das Sinnliche in Beziehung auf den Gedanken gesetzt wird, die Form der Allgemeinheit erhält,* 3) daß für das Bewußtsein der Gedanke 5 selbst zum Gegenstand wird, der konkrete Gedanke, der selbst äußerliche Gedanke und dieß ist in seiner näheren Bestimmung die Lebendigkeit. Was + wir in diesem Ganzen vor uns haben ist die Construktion des Objekts und zwar des gedachten Objekts, denn Ich verhält sich als denkend, der Anfang ist sinnlich und das Denken bestimmt sich so als äußerlich indem es sich dazu 10 verhält und der Gedanke ist als objektiv der Gedanke der Äußerlichkeit, das objektiv Sinnliche, das Allgemeine des Sinnlichen. Aber eben die Fortbewegung ist Fortbestimmung des Gedankens, des Objekts durch das Denken, es ist die Construktion des Objekts durch das Denken, es ist der Gedanke der sich bestimmt, der sich konkret macht, die Sinnlichkeit geht 15 nicht weiter fort (279) es ist der Gedanke. Die Kantsche und Fichtesche Philosophie fängt vom Ich an, dieß unterscheidet sich, setzt das Nichtich sich gegenüber und daran entwickeln sich die weiteren Bestimmungen dieses Verhältnisses und es ist dieß die Entwicklung dessen was das Objekt ist; dieser Versuch ist von Grund aus einseitig und in der Fichteschen Darstellung 20 sind die Gedankenbestimmungen der Fortbildung des Objekts nicht bloß objektiv ausgedrückt, sondern sie sind in der Form subjektiver Thätigkeit. Wir haben es nicht nöthig diese Thätigkeit als besondere auszuzeichnen, und der subjektiven Weise besondere Namen zu geben, es ist das Denken überhaupt, welches bestimmt und in seinen Bestimmungen fortgeht und die 25 absolute Bestimmung des Objekts ist daß die Bestimmungen des Subjektiven und Objektiven identisch sind, betrachten wir daher die Bestimmungen des Objekts, so betrachten wir auch die des Subjekts, wir brauchen sie nicht zu scheiden, sie sind dieselben. Wenn wir dann von der Einbildungskraft sprechen, so ist dieß die Bestimmung des Geistes als 30 solches, ist subjektive Thätigkeit selbst, es ist nicht ein Bestimmen des Objekts, sondern ein Bestimmen des Geistes in ihm selbst, es ist geistige Thätigkeit, der Geist als solcher verhält sich nicht mehr zum Gegenstand, zum Negativen seiner, sondern wesentlich zu sich selbst, er fängt zwar von der unmittelbaren Bestimmtheit an, aber seine Thätigkeit ist sein eigenthümliches 35 Thun das nicht ein Fortbestimmen des Objekts ist. Insofern haben wir hier die Reihe der logischen Entwicklungen vor uns, diese müssen

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 195: Die Wahrnehmung, das Bewußtseins des Sinnlichen, so daß das Sinnliche zugleich in Beziehung des Gedankens versetzt wird, Form der Allgemeinheit erhält; . . .

A. *Consciousness as such*

Consciousness as such contains three forms: 1) immediate sensuous consciousness; 2) perceptive consciousness of what is sensuous, in which what is sensuous is simultaneously set in relation to thoughts, acquires the form of universality;* 3) that of thought itself becoming the general object of consciousness, – concrete and self-external thought, which in its more precise determination is animation. We have before us in this whole the construction of the object, and indeed of the object thought, for the ego relates itself thinkingly. The beginning is sensuous, and thought therefore determines itself as being external in that it relates itself to it. In that it is objective, the thought is that of externality, the objective sensuous being, the universal of what is sensuous. The progressive movement is, however, precisely the progressive determination of thought, of the object, through thought. This is the construction of the object through thought, it being thought which determines itself, makes itself concrete. Although the sensuousness does not progress any further (279), the thought does. The Kantian and Fichtean philosophy begins with the ego, which differentiates itself, posits the non-ego over against itself. The further determinations of this relationship develop themselves from this, and are the development of what constitutes the object. This attempt is basically onesided. In the Fichtean exposition, the thought-determinations of the progressive formation of the object are not merely expressed objectively, but have the form of subjective activity. It is not necessary for us to distinguish this activity as a particularity, and to give particular names to the subjective mode; it is thought in general which determines and progresses in its determinations, the absolute determination of the object being that the determinations of what is subjective and what is objective are identical. If we observe the determinations of the object therefore, we are also observing those of the subject; we do not need to distinguish them, for they are the same. If we then speak of the imagination, this is the determination of spirit as such, subjective activity itself, – not a determining of the object, but a determining of spirit in itself, spiritual activity. Spirit itself no longer relates itself to the general object, to the negation of itself, but essentially to itself. It certainly begins from the immediate determinateness, but its activity is its own act, which is not a progressive determining of the object. To this extent, we have before us here the series of logical develop-

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 195: Perception, the consciousness of what is sensuous, in which what is sensuous, simultaneously transposed in the thought-relation, acquires the form of universality, . . .

aber vorausgesetzt werden und wir haben nur in den Hauptmomenten uns darauf einzulassen, daran zu erinnern.*

+ Im Bewußtsein als solchem sind also diese drei Stufen 1) das sinnliche Objekt, 2) das reflektirte Objekt, 3) das Objekt als ein sich selbst innerliches, als Lebendiges. Am Bewußtsein des Lebens zündet sich das Selbstbewußtsein 5 an, das Leben ist die Idealität des Äußerlichen, des Außereinander, diese Idealität selbst als Objekt ist das Leben, es ist also darin jene Identität des Objektiven und Subjektiven, (280) jener Allgemeinheit.†

Bewußtsein ist in Allem, in Sittlichen, Rechtlichen, Religiösen, hier betrachten wir nur was Bewußtsein, und das Verhältniß des Bewußtseins ist 10 und was nöthig ist daß es sich zum Geist fortbewegen kann. Das Geistige hat wieder das Verhältniß des Bewußtseins an ihm. In der Phänomenologie sind dann auch die konkreten Gestaltungen des Geistes entwickelt, um zu zeigen was das Bewußtsein an ihm ist und damit ist dann auch zugleich der Inhalt entwickelt, hier haben wir uns jedoch streng nur mit dem Bewußtsein und 15 seinen Formen zu beschäftigen.

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α) Das sinnliche Bewußtsein

§ 418

Das Bewußtsein ist zunächst das *unmittelbare*, seine Beziehung auf den Gegenstand daher die einfache unvermittelte Gewißheit desselben; der Gegenstand selbst ist daher ebenso als unmittelbarer, als 20 *seiender* und in sich reflektierter, weiter als unmittelbar *einzelner* bestimmt; – *sinnliches* Bewußtsein.

Das Bewußtsein als Verhältnis enthält nur die dem abstrakten Ich oder formellen Denken angehörigen Kategorien, die ihm Bestimmungen des Objekts sind (§ 415). Das sinnliche Bewußtsein weiß 25

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 196: Indem wir das Objekt, es sich entwickeln lassen, so haben wir die Reihe des Logischen vor uns; diese sind vorausgesetzt, und wir haben uns nicht auf das nähere, entwickeltere einzulassen, sondern nur die Hauptmomente anzugeben.

† *Kehler Ms.* S. 196 . . . ; an dem Bewußtsein des Lebens zündet sich das Selbstbewußtsein an, denn das Leben ist selbst diese Idealität des Äußerlichen, des Außereinander, diese selbst als Objekt ist das Leben, und im Leben ist diese Idealität, und diese Einheit des äußerlichen Gegenstandes, eine Einheit, die befreit von diesem Stoff, diese Äußerlichkeit im Bewußtsein gehabt, ist Selbstbewußtsein. Das fühlende Subjekt überhaupt, was wir auch gehabt haben, nur daß das fühlende Subjekt Seele, an sich zugleich der Geist ist. Wir können auf die Phänomenologie verweisen, führen das Bewußtsein aber nicht so weit; das Bewußtsein ist bei allem, im Sittlichen, Rechtlichen, Religiösen, *hier* betrachten wir . . .

ments; these have to be presupposed however, and we only have to concern ourselves with the main moments to be remembered.* +

In consciousness as such therefore, there are the following three stages: 1) the sensuous object; 2) the reflected object; 3) the object as that which is 5 within itself, as living being. Self-consciousness kindles itself out of consciousness of life, life being the ideality of external being, of extrinsicality. + This ideality itself, as object, is life, which therefore has within it this identity of what is objective and subjective, (280) this universality.† +

Consciousness is in everything, in what is ethical, legal, religious; here, 10 however, we are only considering what consciousness and what the relationship of consciousness is, and what is necessary to its being able to progress to spirit. The relationship of consciousness is exhibited once again in what is spiritual. In the Phenomenology therefore, the concrete formations of spirit are also developed, in order to indicate what consciousness is within spirit, 15 while at the same time the content too is developed. Here, however, we have to confine ourselves strictly to dealing with consciousness and its forms. +

α) Sensuous consciousness

§ 418

Initially, consciousness is *immediate*, and its relation to the general object is therefore the simple unmediated certainty it has of it. 20 Consequently, the general object itself is similarly determined, not only as immediate, as having *being* and as intro-reflected, but also as immediately *singular*, – as *sensuous* consciousness. +

Consciousness, as relationship, contains only those categories pertaining to the abstract ego or formal thinking, and it takes them + 25 to be determinations of the object (§ 415). Of the object therefore,

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 196: In that we allow the object to develop itself, we have before us the series of what is logical; the members of this are presupposed however, and we have simply to specify the main moments, not to concern ourselves with the preciser intricacies of it.

† *Kehler Ms.* p. 196: Self-consciousness kindles itself out of the consciousness of life, for life is itself this ideality of external being, of extrinsicality. This ideality itself, as object, is life, and in life this ideality and this unity of the external general object constitute a unity which, freed from this material, this externality incident to consciousness, is self-consciousness. This is the feeling subject in general, which we have already encountered, although the feeling subject, which is soul, is at the same time implicitly spirit. We may refer to the Phenomenology, although we are not taking consciousness as far as this; everything involves consciousness, what is ethical, legal, religious, *here*, however . . .

daher nur von diesem als einem *Seienden, Etwas, existierenden Dinge, Einzelnem* und so fort. Es erscheint als das reichste an Inhalt, ist aber das ärmste an Gedanken. Jene reiche Erfüllung machen die Gefühlsbestimmungen aus; sie sind der *Stoff* des Bewußtseins (§ 414), das Substantielle und Qualitative, das in der anthropologischen Sphäre die Seele *ist* und *in sich* findet. Diesen Stoff trennt die Reflexion der Seele in sich, Ich, von sich ab und gibt ihm zunächst die Bestimmung des *Seins*. – Die räumliche und zeitliche Einzelnheit, *Hier* und *Jetzt*, wie ich in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* S. 25 ff. den Gegenstand des sinnlichen Bewußtseins bestimmt habe, gehört eigentlich dem Anschauen an. Das Objekt ist hier zunächst nur nach dem Verhältnisse zu nehmen, welches es zu dem *Bewußtsein* hat, nämlich ein demselben *Äußerliches*, noch nicht als an ihm selbst Äußerliches oder als Außersichsein bestimmt zu sein. 5 10 15

\+ 1) *Das sinnliche Bewußtsein*. „Das Bewußtsein ist zunächst das unmittel-
\+ bare, seine Beziehung auf den Gegenstand daher die einfache und unvermittelte Gewißheit desselben; der Gegenstand selbst ist als seiender, aber als in sich reflektirter, weiter als unmittelbar Einzelner bestimmt; – sinnliches Bewußtsein." – Der Gegenstand ist, es ist ein Anderes gegen mich, was er in Beziehung auf mich ist, ist er, er ist aber ein Anderes an ihm selbst, dieß ist er auch was er ist, er ist also das sich selbst Äußerliche, das Andere seiner selbst. Dieß ist die erste Bestimmung des Gegenstandes, beides aber ist verbunden, daß er ist unabhängig von mir, auf sich selbst sich beziehend und auch nicht auf sich beziehend, dieß macht ihn zum unmittelbar einzelnen, er ist das Andere seiner selbst, ein Mannigfaltiges an ihm; dieß sind die Bestimmungen des sinnlichen Gegenstandes. Was das Sinnliche als solches betrifft so ist nun die Frage was ist das was in der Weise des Empfindens ist? Der Sinn selbst, das Empfinden selbst ist etwas Äußerliches, gegen das Denken, es ist die unmittelbare Bestimmtheit, diese ist als mir äußerlich und so als äußerlich an ihm selbst, aber ich bin darin zugleich bestimmt. Diese Äußerlichkeit ist abstrakt, nicht im Subjekt, für sich selbst gesetzt hat sie die Bestimmung sich selbst äußerlich zu sein d.h. sinnlich. Beim (281) Sinnlichen ist nicht vorzustellen daß es in den Sinnen ist, sondern es sind die Gedankenbestimmungen als das Sichäußerlich sein, diese Äußerlichkeit ist unterschieden von der Einzelnheit, von dem Fürsichsein des Gegenstandes von dem Zusammengefaßtsein, von der Einheit desselben, in der Einzelnheit ist so der Gegenstand ein Anderes an ihm selbst, so daß das Andere nicht für sich besteht, sondern es Bestimmungen seiner Einzelnheit sind. Wenn wir zunächst diese Äußerlichkeit für sich nehmen, diese Einzelnheit als solche weil sie das Eins, das Fürsichsein ist aus der Mannigfaltigkeit als in sich 20 25 30 35 40

sensuous consciousness knows only that it is a *being, something*, an *existing thing*, a *singular* etc. Although this consciousness appears as the richest in content, it is the poorest in thought. The wealth with which it is filled consists of the determinations of feeling; they are the *material* of consciousness (§ 414), what is substantial and qualitative, what the soul *is* and finds *in itself* in the anthropological sphere. The ego, the reflection of the soul into itself, separates this material from itself, and in the first instance gives it the determination of *being*. – In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* p. 25 ff. I have determined the general object of sensuous consciousness as spatial and temporal singularity, *here* and *now*. Strictly speaking this belongs to intuition. At this juncture the object is to be taken, in the first instance, only in accordance with the relationship it has with *consciousness*, that is to say, as *external* to it. It is not yet to be determined as in itself external or as being self-external.

1) *Sensuous consciousness.* "Initially, consciousness is immediate, and its relation to the general object is therefore the simple unmediated certainty it has of it; the general object itself is determined as a being, as an intro-reflected and also immediate singular however, – as sensuous consciousness." – The general object is, it is an other over against me. Although it is in relation to me, it is an other in itself, and since this is also what it is, it is what is self-external, the other of itself. This is the initial determination of the general object, although it combines its being independent of me, self-relating, with non-self-relatingness. It is therefore what is immediately singular, the other of itself, a manifoldness in itself. These are the determinations of the sensuous general object. The question of sensuous being as such is now concerned with what has being in the mode of sensing. Sense itself, sensing itself, is something external, opposed to thought; it is the immediate determinateness, having being as external to me and therefore as external in itself, although I am at the same time determined within it. This externality is abstract, and since it is not posited for itself within the subject, it has the determination of being self-external i.e. sensuous. What (281) is sensuous is not to be presented as being in the senses, for the thought-determinations of it are as of a self-externality. This externality is distinct from the singularity, the being-for-self of the general object, from the connectedness, the unity of it. In the singularity therefore, the general object is in itself another, the other not subsisting for itself, but consisting of determinations of its singularity. When we first take this externality for itself, this singularity as such, on account of its being the unit, the being-for-self, reflected out of multiplicity as being-in-

reflektirt, so haben wir das Räumliche und Zeitliche. Zur Sinnlichkeit gehören zwar als Inhalt die Gefühlsbestimmungen, äußerliche oder innerliche, und als Form, das Räumliche und Zeitliche, aber dieses beides gehört dem Geiste in seiner conkreten Form an, seinem Gefühl und Anschauung. Die Anschauung werden wir zu seiner Zeit auf andere Weise genauer 5 bestimmen. Die Anschauung sofern sie dem Geiste angehört, gehört der Totalität des ganzen Objekts an, die Äußerlichkeit als solche ist dagegen richtiger zum Bewußtsein zu nehmen, das Bewußtsein hat ein Negatives sich gegenüber, das Negative des Ich ist als selbstständig gesetzt, beide Seiten sind selbstständig und das Negative macht die unmittelbare Äußerlichkeit aus, 10 diese ist es die wir in der Form von Raum und Zeit vor uns haben; Kant hat es Formen der Anschauung genannt, aber im genauen Sinne hat Kant vor sich gehabt das Bewußtsein als solches nicht den Geist und das Geistige. Kant nennt sie also Formen der Anschauung d.h. sie sind das Abstrakte des Sinnlichen, dieses ist in seiner Abstraktion genommen d.h. das Außerein- 15 ander und das Sinnliche überhaupt ist in seiner einfachen Unmittelbarkeit genommen. Alles Sinnliche ist räumlich und zeitlich und beides zugleich, die Gefühle, Empfindungen u.s.w. sind (282) zeitlich, sie gehören dem fühlenden Subjekt an, also dem welches überhaupt Eins ist und in seiner Empfindung als einfaches bestimmt ist, das Außereinander-sein kann in der 20 Empfindung nur so vorhanden sein daß so eine Empfindung wieder vergeht und nur als Eins im Subjekt sein kann, so ist die Negation dasselbe daß eine andere an ihre Stelle tritt, und wieder eine Andere u.s.w.* Aber auch das Äußerliche ist in der Zeit, das Äußerliche ist auch Einzelnes und die Bestimmung der Einzelnheit als außereinandergesetzt als außer sich selbst ist 25 daß es auch negirt wird und Anderes an die Stelle der Einzelnheit tritt sofern sie als einfache Bestimmung ist, daß so Eins die Grundlage ist welche bleiben soll, aber zugleich daß dies Eins als das Negative ist. Raum und Zeit sind so dies Außereinander ganz in der Gleichheit mit sich selbst oder ganz in der Form der Allgemeinheit. Diese Allgemeinheit ist nun Continuität, der Raum 30 wird nicht unterbrochen durch verschiedenen Inhalt, es ist schlechthin dies Gleiche, diese allgemeine Unmittelbarkeit, es ist was das Sein, das Wesen ist. Der Raum also als nicht gedacht, als äußerlich, die Allgemeinheit des Denkens als nicht gedacht; Quantität, Sein u.s.w. sind Gedanken als solche, aber nicht gedacht, als äußerlich gesetzt, sind sie zunächst Raum, Raum ist 35 dieß Leere was schlechthin passiv ist† und das allenthalben erfüllt werden

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 197: . . . ; das Außersichsein kann in der Empfindung so vorhanden sein, daß die Empfindung vergeht, daß es die Negation der Empfindung ist; . . .

† *Kehler Ms.* S. 198: Raum ist dies Außereinander, ganz aber in Continuität, Gleichheit mit sich selbst, oder ganz in der Form der Allgemeinheit. Diese Allgemeinheit, Continuität, eine verschiedene Erfüllung unterbricht den Raum nicht die schlechthin unterbrochene, allgemeine Unmittelbarkeit; der Raum ist das Sein, reine Quantität, aber als nicht gedacht, die Allgemeinheit des Denkens als nicht gedacht, äußerlich gesetzt. Raum ist mir dies Leere, weil er dies Abstracte ist, das aber schlechthin passiv ist . . .

self, we have what is spatial and temporal. Although the determinations of feeling, external or internal, certainly pertain to sensuousness as content, and to what is spatial and temporal as form, both together pertain to spirit in its concrete form, to its feeling and intuition. In due course we shall determine intuition in another way. In so far as intuition pertains to spirit, it pertains to the totality of the whole object, whereas externality as such is more strictly attributable to consciousness. Consciousness has a negative being over against itself, the negative of the ego being posited as independent; both aspects are independent, and the negative constitutes the immediate externality. It is this that we have before us in the form of space and time; Kant has called it the forms of intuition, but precisely considered he has had before himself not spirit and what is spiritual, but consciousness as such. Kant therefore calls them forms of intuition, the abstract being of what is sensuous, which is taken in its abstraction i.e. the extrinsicality and the sensuous being in general is taken in its simple immediacy. All that is sensuous is spatial and temporal, and both together. Feelings and sensations etc. are (282) temporal, pertain to the feeling subject, and therefore to that which constitutes the unit in general and which is determined in its sensation as a simplicity. Extrinsicality can only be present in sensation in that such a sensation passes away again, and can only have being in the subject as a unit, negation being the taking of its place by another and yet another etc.* The external being is also within time however, also a single being, and the determination of singularity, as posited extrinsicality, as self-externality, also involves its being negated, and another taking the place of the singularity in so far as it is a simple determination. This takes place so that the unit is the basis which should persist, while this unit is at the same time the negative being. Space and time are therefore this extrinsicality, wholly within self-equality, or the form of universality. Since this universality is now continuity, space not being interrupted by a variegated content, we simply have this equality, this universal immediacy, which is what being or essence is. In that space is not thought but external, it is therefore the universality of thought as not thought; quantity, being etc. are thoughts as such, but in that they are not thought, as posited externally, they are initially space. Space is this emptiness, which is simply passive,† and which can be filled everywhere. Like

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 197: Self-externality can be so present in sensation that the sensation passes away, the self-externality constituting the negation of it.

† *Kehler Ms.* p. 198: Space is this extrinsicality, although wholly in continuity, self-equality or wholly in the form of universality. This is universality, continuity, a variegated filling does not interrupt space, which is simply uninterrupted, universal immediacy. In that it is not thought, space is being, pure quantity, the universality of thought posited externally. Since it is this abstraction, space to me is this emptiness, which is simply passive . . .

kann. Eben weil er abstrakt ist kann der Raum nicht für sich sein, ebenso auch nicht die Zeit, der Raum ist dieß Ruhende, weil er diese Gleichheit mit sich ist. Das andere Moment des Begriffs aber ist die Negation ebenso für sich, der Raum war die abstrakte Allgemeinheit, dieß ist nun die abstrakte Einzelnheit, diese auch nicht gedacht sondern unmittelbar gewußt ist die Zeit, die Zeit ist jetzt und indem das Jetzt ist ist es nicht, das Jetzt ist als Punkt vorgestellt, als das Eins das indem es ist ebenso die Ent= (283) wicklung der Negation an ihm hat, es ist unmittelbar negirt und wie es ist so ist auch ein Anderes. Was in der Zeit ist ist nur als das Negative des Anderen und es ist ebenso bestimmt nicht zu sein. Die Zeit ist ebenso continuirlich als der Raum, aber eben das Negiren ist die Continuität, es ist Abstraktum, Zeit ist Eins, Einzelnheit gesetzt als Negation und diese Negation umgekehrt als seiendes Eins, es ist das Umschlagen des Nichtseins in Sein und umgekehrt, das Werden. – Dieß sind die Formen von Raum und Zeit überhaupt, aber sie sind auch erfüllt und diese Erfüllung haben wir schon gehabt. Es ist bemerkt daß der Stoff der Empfindung hinausgesetzt wird, daß das Subjekt sich von ihm absondert, daß es macht daß er in Raum und Zeit gesetzt wird, daß er als Anderes gesetzt ist, wir haben insofern die Erfüllung vorher gehabt, vor dieser Form des Draußen und Außersichseins, aber es ist erst das Bewußtsein, das den Stoff der Empfindung von sich absondert, den in Beziehung von Raum und Zeit die Erfüllung ausmacht, diese Erfüllung ist ein Mannigfaltiges überhaupt und dieß wird ebenso als für sich seiend gesetzt, mit der Bestimmung des Fürsichseins, des ersten Fürsichseins so zu sagen d.h. das Mannigfaltige ist auf einen Punkt bezogen der die Einzelnheit heißt, näher dieses, ein Objekt, ein sinnliches Objekt in Raum und Zeit, Eins mit vielerlei Eigenschaften an ihm, vielerlei Qualitäten, kurz solche sinnliche Bestimmungen die den Inhalt der Empfindung ausmachen. Das Bewußtsein ist insofern thätig vors Erste diese verschiedenen Empfindungen in einen Punkt zusammen zu bringen und wir sehen in Rücksicht auf das Gefühl ist es etwas ganz Anderes. Diese Vereinigung der verschiedenen Empfindugsbestimmungen in einen Punkt und dann die Gegenstände im Raum abzusondern (284) ist hier die Sache.

§ 419

Das *Sinnliche* als Etwas wird ein *Anderes*; die Reflexion des *Etwas* in sich, das *Ding*, hat *viele* Eigenschaften und als Einzelnes in seiner Unmittelbarkeit *mannigfaltige Prädikate*. Das *viele Einzelne* der Sinnlichkeit wird daher ein *Breites*, – eine Mannigfaltigkeit von *Beziehungen, Reflexionsbestimmungen* und *Allgemeinheiten*. – Dies sind

time, and precisely on account of its abstraction, space cannot be for itself, and it is on account of this self-equality that it constitutes this quiescence. The other moment of the Notion however, is also the being-for-self of negation. Whereas space was abstract universality, this is now abstract singularity, and in that it is not thought but known immediately, it is time. Time is now, and in that the now is, it is not. The now is presented as point, as the unit which in that it is, also has the (283) development of negation within it, for it is immediately negated, and in that it has being, so has an other. Whatever is in time has being only as the negative of the other, and is therefore also determined as not-being. Time is just as continuous as space, but it is precisely the negating which constitutes the continuity, the abstraction. Time is one, singularity posited as negation, and, conversely, this negation posited as being one. The negating is the switching of not-being into being and vice versa, which is becoming. – These are the forms of space and time in general, but they are also filled, and we have already dealt with this filling. It has been observed that the material of sensation is posited externally, that the subject separates itself from it, giving rise to its being posited in space and time as an other. To this extent therefore, we have had this filling previously, prior to this form of outwardness and self-externality. Initially, however, it is consciousness which separates from itself the material of sensation constituting the filling in the relation of space and time. This filling is a general manifoldness, also posited as a being-for-self and with the determination of being-for-self, the initial being-for-self so to speak. The manifoldness is therefore related to one point, which is known as singularity, or more precisely as an object, a sensuous object in space and time, at one with its various properties and qualities, in short, with such sensuous determinations as constitute the content of sensation. Initially therefore, consciousness is active in that it brings these various sensations together in one point, and we see that with regard to feeling it is something quite different. The matter under consideration here is this unification of the various determinations of sensation in one point, and then the separation of (284) the general objects in space.

§ 419

That which is *sensuous* becomes an *other* in that it is something. The intro-reflectedness of *something* is the *thing*, which has *many* properties, and which in its immediacy as a singleness has *multiple predicates*. Consequently, the *many single beings* of sensuousness become a *range*, a multiplicity of *relations, reflectional-determinations* and *universalities*. –

logische Bestimmungen, durch das Denkende, d. i. hier durch das Ich gesetzt. Aber *für dasselbe* als erscheinend hat der Gegenstand sich so verändert. Das sinnliche Bewußtsein ist in dieser Bestimmung des Gegenstandes *Wahrnehmen*.

\+ ,,Das Sinnliche als Etwas wird ein Anderes; die Reflexion des Etwas in sich, das Ding hat viele Eigenschaften, und das Einzelne in seiner Unmittelbarkeit mannigfaltige Prädikate. Das viele Einzelne der Sinnlichkeit, wird daher ein Breites, eine Mannigfaltigkeit von Beziehungen, Reflexionsbestimmungen und Allgemeinheiten, und ist auf diese Weise nicht mehr ein unmittelbarer Gegenstand. Da der Gegenstand so verändert ist, so ist das sinnliche Bewußtsein zum Wahrnehmen geworden.'' Die Gegenstände in ihrer Äußerlichkeit, Unmittelbarkeit nehmen ist sinnliches Thun, sie wahrnehmen heißt sie nach der Reflexion nehmen, einzelne Gegenstände wie sie in Beziehung stehen, nicht mehr in der des Raums und der Zeit, dieß Außereinanderfolgen gehört dem sinnlichen Bewußtsein an. Es ist nun der Uebergang von da zur Wahrnehmung oder zur Reflexion, oder logisch aus der Sphäre des Seins in die des Wesens. Es kann bemerkt werden wie dieß schon beim Fühlen geschehen ist, wir haben beim Bewußtsein von Gegenständen als äußerlich zu sprechen, aber das Bewußtsein, wenn auch als innerlich, doch als unmittelbar, ist ebenso sinnliches Bewußtsein, da innere Gegenstände, sie mögen einen Inhalt haben welchen sie wollen, Gemütsbewegungen, Geist, Gott u.s.w. betreffen, können wir auch unmittelbar wissen, es ist dieß auch sinnliches Bewußtsein, wir haben Gewißheit aber es ist nur unmittelbare Beziehung auf solche Gegenstände und es ist eine einzelne Beziehung auf sie, auf einzelne Weise, auf jetzt, hier, aber nicht etwa im Raum jedoch bestimmt als jetzt. Ich bin jetzt dieser Gegenstände bewußt, aber sie verschwinden auch, es kommen andere vor mein Bewußtsein, wie die Form des Gefühls die geringste Form der Seele ist, so ist auch dieß nur unmittelbare Objektiviren durch das Bewußtsein, das unmittelbare Wissen die unterste Stufe des (285) Wissens.* Der Gegenstand ist so für mich, wie, weiß ich nicht, ebenso auch nicht wo er herkommt, sondern ich finde beides so, die Gegenstände sind mir gegeben mit solchem und solchem Inhalt. Es kommt dieß Wissen allerdings durch meinen Geist zu Stande aber ob er in diesem Produzieren sich richtig verhält, darüber ist nichts bestimmt, es kann auch träumerischen, gedankenlosen Geist geben; ich weiß von diesem Gegenstande und weiß daß ich von ihm weiß, ich habe Gewißheit, aber ob der Gegenstand auch wahr ist, ist etwas ganz anderes, ich habe nur die

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 199: Wie die Form des Gefühls die geringste Form ist, in der ein Gegenstand sein kann, ist dies unmittelbare Objektive, unmittelbares Hinaussetzen, Wissen von den Gegenständen die unterste Stufe des Wissens.

These are logical determinations, posited by that which thinks, i.e. at this juncture by the ego. *For* the appearing *ego* however, the general object has therefore changed. In this determination of the general object sensuous consciousness constitutes *perceiving*.

5 "That which is sensuous becomes an other in that it is something. The intro-reflectedness of something is the thing, which has many properties, and singleness in its immediacy has multiple predicates. Consequently, the many single beings of sensuousness become a range, a multiplicity of relations, reflectional determinations and universalities, and on account of this no 10 longer constitute an immediate general object. In that the general object is altered in this way, sensuous consciousness has become perceiving." To seize general objects in their externality and immediacy is a sensuous act; to perceive them is to seize them in accordance with reflection, as single general objects which stand in relation, although no longer in the relation of space 15 and time, a sequence which pertains to sensuous consciousness. This is the transition from sensuous consciousness to perception or reflection, logically, from the sphere of being to that of essence. It may be observed that this has already taken place in respect of feeling. In respect of consciousness we have + to speak of general objects as being external, for consciousness is internal and 20 immediate. It is also sensuous consciousness however, for regardless of the content of internal general objects, be they dispositions, spirit, God etc., they may also be known to us immediately, and this is also sensuous consciousness. We have certainty, but it is only an immediate relation to such general objects, and it is a single relation to them, in a single manner, to now and 25 here, maybe not in space, but determined as now. Although I am now conscious of these general objects, they also disappear, others come before my consciousness. Just as the form of feeling is the most insignificant form of + the soul, so this simply immediate objective knowing by means of consciousness, immediate knowledge, is the lowest level of (285) knowledge.* + 30 The general object therefore has being for me, I do not know how, nor do I know where it comes from, but I find both to be so, the general objects being given to me with such and such a content. This knowledge certainly comes about on account of my spirit, but it is not certain that spirit relates itself correctly within this producing, for spirit can also be dreamlike and thought-35 less. I know of this general object and I know that I know of it, I have + certainty, but whether or not the general object is also true is quite another matter, for I am only certain that I possess this general object. In that they are

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 199: Just as the form of feeling is the most insignificant form in which a general object can have being, so this immediate objective being, immediate positing externally, knowledge of general objects, is the lowest level of knowledge.

Gewißheit daß ich diesen Gegenstand habe. Als inneres setzen die Gegenstände die Vermittlung voraus, beim Wissen vom Recht, vom Gotte u.s.w. ist vorausgesetzt daß ich aus dieser äußerlichen Unmittelbarkeit in mich zurückgegangen bin, daß ich auch gedacht habe, es ist ein Erzeugniß meines Denkens als Denkens, Produckt der Vernunft. Diese Gegenstände enthalten 5 unmittelbar die Vermittelung, sie sind ihrer Natur nach innerlich, setzen also das Aufheben des Sinnlichen voraus, Gott, Recht, Sittlichkeit ist seiner Natur nach allgemein, das Allgemeine ist mir so Gegenstand, und es ist dieß also nicht das erste, unmittelbare Einzelne.* Es ist also sogleich vorhanden die Unangemessenheit des mir unmittelbaren Wissens von solchem Inhalte der 10 wesentlich bestimmt ist, also ein nicht unmittelbarer ist, sondern nur ein aus der Vermittelung, und dem Denken Hervorgegangenes, das unmittelbare Wissen ist insofern eine ganz unbedeutende Form solcher Gegenstände. Ich weiß daß ich wohl die Gewißheit habe, aber ebenso gut daß diese sich ändern kann, daß mein Wissen sich ändern kann weiß ich auch vielmehr bei inneren 15 Gegenständen, denn dieß sind Gegenstände die ihrer Natur nach nicht dem unmittelbaren Wissen als solchen angehören. Bei den äußerlichen Gegenständen haben wir die Gewißheit, bei den innerlichen Gegenständen können wir dessen was sie sind und daß sie sind nicht gewiß sein, sie sind als solche bestimmt die nur durch die Vermittlung für uns hervorgehen. Dieß weiß 20 man sehr gut, ich bin jetzt (286) hiervon, daran überzeugt, aber ob ich es über's Jahr noch sein werde, weiß ich nicht.

Das sinnliche Bewußtsein ist das erste, äußerliche; das unmittelbare Bewußtsein ist zugleich eine dem Allgemeinen widersprechende Form. Wir wissen unmittelbar etwas, dieß ist, aber es verändert sich, das Gewisse 25 entflieht, wir wissen gewiß jetzt ist es Tag, aber wenn ich den Satz aufschreibe und das Papier in die Tasche stecke, so kann der Satz hernach falsch sein, kann heißen müssen jetzt ist es Nacht. Dieß ist das Uebergehen des Sinnlichen und seine Veränderung überhaupt, die weitere konkrete Veränderung aber ist daß das Einzelne wesentlich nicht als Einzelnes bleibt, 30 + es tritt in mannigfaltige Beziehungen mit Anderem; wird ein Breites, abhängig von Anderem, gilt durch Anderes, oder es ist ein Vermitteltes, so hat es Bestimmung durch ein Anderes, es ist ein Anderes in ihm, ein Anderes an ihm und dieß ist das reflektierende oder wahrnehmende Bewußtsein.

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 199: . . . der Inhalt von Recht, Sittlichkeit, Gott, ist seiner Natur nach ein allgemeiner, das allgemeine ist mir darin Gegenstand, nicht das erste unmittelbare, das einzelne . . .

internal, general objects presuppose mediation. Knowledge of right, of God etc. presupposes that I have returned into myself out of this external immediacy, that I have also thought, knowledge being engendered of thought as thought, being a product of reason. These general objects contain mediation immediately, being by their nature internal, and therefore presupposing the sublating of what is sensuous. Since the nature of God, right, + ethicality is universal, the universal is a general object to me, not the initial, immediate singular.* Present at the same time therefore, is the inadequacy of what is to me the immediate knowledge of such content, which is essentially determined, and is therefore not immediate, but has only proceeded forth from mediation and from thought. This immediate knowledge is therefore a wholly insignificant form of such general objects. I know that I certainly have + certainty, but I know equally well that this certainty can alter. I also know, predominantly on account of internal general objects, that my knowledge + can alter, for it is not in the nature of such general objects to pertain to immediate knowledge. We have certainty in respect of external general objects, but in respect of internal general objects we can be certain neither of + what they are nor that they are, for as such they are determined as only proceeding forth for us by means of mediation. It is well known that I can be convinced at present (286) of this or that, without knowing if I shall still be convinced in a year's time.

Sensuous consciousness is primary, external; immediate consciousness is at the same time a form which contradicts the universal. We know something immediately, – it is; it alters however, the certainty passes away. We know for certain now that it is day, but if I write the sentence down and put it in my pocket, it may subsequently be incorrect, for we may have to note that it is night. Here we have the transmutation of what is sensuous, its general + alteration. The further concrete alteration is however that the singular does not remain as essentially a singular, but enters into multifarious relations with an other, becoming a range, dependent upon an other, having validity on account of another. As such it is mediated, and is therefore determined by means of an other. This other, which is within it and of it, is reflecting or perceptive consciousness.

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 199: The nature of the content of right, ethicality, God is universal, the universal there being a general object to me, not the primary immediate being, the singular.

β) Das Wahrnehmen

§ 420

Das Bewußtsein, das über die Sinnlichkeit hinausgegangen, will den Gegenstand in seiner *Wahrheit nehmen*, nicht als bloß unmittelbaren, sondern als vermittelten, in sich reflektierten und allgemeinen. Er ist somit eine Verbindung von sinnlichen und von erweiterten Gedankenbestimmungen konkreter Verhältnisse und Zusammenhänge. Damit ist die Identität des Bewußtseins mit dem Gegenstand nicht mehr die abstrakte der *Gewißheit*, sondern die *bestimmte*, ein *Wissen*. 5

Die nähere Stufe des Bewußtseins, auf welcher die *Kantische Philosophie* den Geist auffaßt, ist *das Wahrnehmen*, welches überhaupt der Standpunkt unsers *gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins* und mehr oder weniger der *Wissenschaften* ist. Es wird von sinnlichen Gewißheiten einzelner Apperzeptionen oder Beobachtungen ausgegangen, die dadurch zur Wahrheit erhoben werden sollen, daß sie in ihrer Beziehung betrachtet, über sie reflektiert, überhaupt daß sie nach bestimmten Kategorien zugleich zu etwas Notwendigem und Allgemeinem, zu *Erfahrungen*, werden. 10 15

\+ 2) *Das wahrnehmende Bewußtsein.* „Das Bewußtsein, das über die Sinnlichkeit hinausgegangen, will den Gegenstand in seiner Wahrheit nehmen, nicht als bloß unmittelbaren, sondern in sich vermittelten, und in sich reflektirten." Das unmittelbare Bewußtsein ist das was keine Wahrheit giebt, 20
\+ heutigen Tages weiß jeder gesunde Menschenverstand, daß das nur Unmittelbare nicht wahrhaft ist, und daß dieß nicht der Weg ist das Wahrhafte zu wissen.* Wahrnehmendes Bewußtsein heißt den Gegenstand nehmen, nicht mehr unmittelbar, sondern als vermittelt und als in der Vermittelung sich auf sich beziehend, dadurch entsteht eine Vermittlung von sinnlichen und Gedankenbestimmungen. In der Beziehung treten die Gedanken, die Kathegorien hervor, das Beziehen von Mannigfaltigen als solchen gehört der Einheit als Ich an und diese Beziehungen sind Kathegorien, Gedankenbe= (287) stimmungen überhaupt; wir haben also sinnliche Bestimmungen und Gedankenbestimmungen. 25 30

Das Objekt ist hier nicht mehr das unmittelbare, sondern das Reflexions

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 200: Daß das unmittelbare Wissen uns keine Wahrheit gibt, weiß der gesunde Menschenverstand, das *nur* unmittelbare ist nicht das Wahrhafte, und die Weise, die nur unmittelbares zu wissen, nicht die Weise ist, das Wahre zu wissen . . .

β) *Perceiving* +

§ 420

Having superseded sensuousness, consciousness wants to *seize* the general object not merely in its immediacy, but in the *truth* of its being mediated, intro-reflected and universal. As such, the general object is a combination of sensuous thought-determinations and of the extended thought-determinations of concrete relationships and connections. The identity of consciousness with the general object is therefore no longer the abstract identity of *certainty*, but is *determinate* and constitutes *knowledge*. +

The precise stage of consciousness at which the *Kantian philosophy* grasps spirit is *perceiving*, which is in general the standpoint of our *ordinary consciousness* and to a greater or lesser extent of the *sciences*. It starts with the sensuous certainties of single apperceptions or observations, which are supposed to be raised into truth by being considered in their connection, reflected upon, and at the same time, turned by means of certain categories into something necessary and universal, i.e. *experiences*. +

2) *Perceiving consciousness*. "Having superseded sensuousness, consciousness wants to seize the general object not merely in its immediacy, but in the truth of its being internally mediated and intro-reflected." Immediate consciousness is that which yields no truth. Nowadays, every sound human understanding knows that that which is merely immediate is not true, and does not open the way to knowledge of what is true.* Perceiving consciousness involves seizing the general object, no longer immediately, but as mediated and as self-relating in the mediation. Through this there is a mediation of what is sensuous and of thought-determinations, and the thoughts, the categories emerge in the relation. The relating of that which as such is a manifold pertains to the unity of the ego, and these relations are categories, thought-(287) determinations in general. We have, therefore, sensuous determinations and thought-determinations. +

The object here is no longer immediate but reflected. This is more precisely

* *Kehler Ms*. p. 200: Sound human understanding knows that immediate knowledge does not provide us with truth. What is *merely* immediate is not what is true, and the mode of knowing only what is immediate is not that of knowing what is true.

Objekt, das Objekt das im logischen Theile des Wesens näher beleuchtet wird; das Objekt als vermittelt und die Verhältnisse darin sind die Unmittelbarkeit des Seins, die Einzelnheit und andererseits die Allgemeinheit. Die weitere Fortbildung der Reflexion ist hier voraus zusetzen.

§ 421

Diese Verknüpfung des Einzelnen und Allgemeinen ist Vermischung, weil das Einzelne zum *Grunde* liegendes Sein und fest gegen das Allgemeine bleibt, auf welches es zugleich bezogen ist. Sie ist daher der vielseitige Widerspruch, – überhaupt der *einzelnen* Dinge der sinnlichen Apperzeption, die *den Grund* der allgemeinen Erfahrung ausmachen sollen, und der *Allgemeinheit*, die vielmehr das Wesen und der Grund sein soll, – der *Einzelnheit*, welche die *Selbständigkeit* in ihrem konkreten Inhalte genommen, ausmacht, und der mannigfaltigen *Eigenschaften*, die vielmehr frei von diesem negativen Bande und von einander, selbständige *allgemeine Materien* sind (s. § 123 ff.) usf. Es fällt hierin eigentlich der Widerspruch des Endlichen durch alle Formen der logischen Sphären, am konkretesten, insofern das Etwas als *Objekt* bestimmt ist (§ 194 ff.).

\+ „Diese Verknüpfung des Einzelnen und Allgemeinen ist Vermischung, weil das Einzelne zum Grunde liegendes Sein, aber das Allgemeine dagegen in sich reflektirt ist. Sie ist daher der vielseitige Widerspruch, – überhaupt der einzelnen Dinge der sinnlichen Apperception, die den Grund der allgemeinen Erfahrung ausmachen sollen, und der Allgemeinheit, die vielmehr das Wesen und der Grund sein soll, – und die der Einzelheit der Dinge selbst, welche deren Selbstständigkeit ausmacht, und der mannigfaltigen Eigenschaften, die vielmehr frei von diesem negativen Bande und von einander, selbstständige allgemeine Materien sind." Es ist das Ding, der Gegenstand, das einzelne Ding überhaupt mit seinen mannigfaltigen Eigenschaften und ein in sich Reflektirtes, welchem die Bestimmungen der Empfindung, die unmittelbaren Bestimmungen, die Gefühlsbestimmungen zugehören und dieß sind die Eigenschaften bezogen auf ein Inneres, auf ein in sich Reflektirtes.

γ) Der Verstand

§ 422

Die nächste *Wahrheit* das Wahrnehmens ist, daß der Gegenstand

elucidated in the logical part of essence. The mediated object and the relationships within this constitute the immediacy of being, singularity, and on the other hand universality. At this juncture, the further formation of reflection is to be presupposed.

§ 421

This linking of singular and universal is a mixture, for what is singular remains the *basic* being, firmly opposed to the universal, to which it is at the same time related. It is therefore the many-sided contradiction between the *single* things of sensuous apperception, which are supposed to constitute *the ground* of general experience, and the *universality* which has a higher claim to be the essence and the ground, – between the *singularity* consisting of *independence* taken in its concrete content, and the multiple *properties* which, free as they are from this negative bond and from one another, have more the nature of independent, *universal matters* (see § 123ff.) It is precisely here, in so far as something is determined as *object*, that the contradiction of the finite throughout all forms of logical spheres is at its most concrete (§ 194ff.).

"This linking of singular and universal is a mixture, for what is basic to the singular is being, while the universal is intro-reflected. It is therefore the many-sided contradiction between the single things of sensuous apperception, which are supposed to constitute the ground of general experience, and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and the ground, – and that of the singularity of things themselves, which constitutes their independence, and the multiple properties which, free as they are from this negative bond and from one another, have more the nature of independent, universal matters." In that the determinations of sensation, the immediate determinations of feeling, belong to the thing, the general object, the single thing in general, with its multifarious properties and its intro-reflectedness, they are properties related to an inwardness, an intro-reflectedness.

γ) *Understanding*

§ 422

The proximate *truth* of perceiving is that the general object is,

vielmehr *Erscheinung* und seine Reflexion-in-sich ein dagegen für sich seiendes *Inneres* und Allgemeines ist. Das Bewußtsein dieses Gegenstandes ist der *Verstand*. – Jenes *Innere* ist einerseits die *aufgehobene Mannigfaltigkeit* des Sinnlichen und auf diese Weise die abstrakte Identität, aber andererseits enthält es deswegen die Mannigfaltigkeit auch, aber als *innern einfachen Unterschied*, welcher in dem Wechsel der Erscheinung mit sich identisch bleibt. Dieser einfache Unterschied ist das Reich *der Gesetze* der Erscheinung, ihr ruhiges allgemeines Abbild.

\+ „Die Wahrheit des Wahrnehmens, welches statt der Identität des einzelnen Objekts und der Allgemeinheit des Bewußtseins, oder der Einzelnheit des Objekts selbst und seiner Allgemeinheit, vielmehr der Widerspruch ist, ist daher, daß der Gegenstand vielmehr Erscheinung und seine Reflexion in sich ein dagegen für sich seiendes Inneres ist. Das Bewußtsein, welches diesen Ge= (288) genstand erhält, in den das Objekt der Wahrnehmung übergegangen ist, ist der Verstand." – Der unmittelbare Gegenstand mit seinen Eigenschaften ist nur Erscheinung, das Innere, die Grundlage der Gefühlsbestimmungen, Eigenschaften ist so gesetzt daß er nur ein Scheiden ist und das Wesentliche die Reflexion in sich, so ist dann der Gegenstand als Erscheinung gesetzt.* Das Resultat der Erscheinung ist die Nothwendigkeit, die unmittelbar wirkliche Existenz die zugleich insofern sie Wirklichkeit ist doch zugleich ein Vermitteltes ist. Die Nothwendigkeit vereint beide Bestimmungen, die unmittelbare, gegenwärtige, vorhandene Existenz und daß sie nothwendig ist, ist daß sie das Vermitteltsein, Gesetztsein schlechthin in sich enthält. Die Nothwendigkeit ist das absolute Verhältniß.†

\+ Der Verstand. „Dem Verstande gelten die Dinge der Wahrnehmung als Erscheinungen; das Innere derselben, das er zum Gegenstande hat, ist einerseits die aufgehobene Mannigfaltigkeit derselben, und auf diese Weise die abstrakte Identität, aber andererseits enthält es deswegen auch die Mannigfaltigkeit, aber als inneren einfachen Unterschied, welcher in dem Wechsel der Erscheinung mit sich identisch bleibt." Das Innere ist die aufgehobene Mannigfaltigkeit der Dinge, so wäre es nur abstrakte Identität, aber es ist auch dirimirt und der Unterschied des Inneren ist innerer Unterschied der gehalten wird durch die Identität, dieß ist dann Nothwendigkeit. Insofern wir sie als inneren Zusammenhang auffassen, so lassen wir die Form

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 200: Die Eigenschaften des Dings in ihrer Unmittelbarkeit gesetzt sind, daß sie nur ein Scheinendes sind, und das Wesentliche die Dingheit, so ist der Gegenstand als Erscheinung gesetzt.

† *Kehler Ms.* S. 201: Die Nothwendigkeit vereint die Bestimmungen von Unmittelbarem, und doch Vermitteltsein, Gesetztsein.

rather, an *appearance*, while its intro-reflectedness is, on the contrary, an *internality* which is for itself and a universal. Consciousness of this general object constitutes *understanding*. – One aspect of this *internality* is that it constitutes abstract identity in that it is the *sublated multiplicity* of what is sensuous, but its other aspect is that on account of this it also contains multiplicity. It contains it however as an *internal* and *simple difference*, which in the vicissitude of appearance remains self-identical. This simple difference is the realm of *the laws* of appearance, their quiescent and universal likeness.

"Since perceiving is the contradiction and not the identity of the single object and the universality of consciousness, or of the singularity of the object itself and its universality, its truth is rather that the general object is appearance, while its intro-reflection is the being-for-self of an internality. Consciousness which maintains this (288) general object into which the object of perception has passed over, is the understanding." – The immediate general object, with its properties, is only appearance. The internality, which is the basis of the determinations of feeling, the properties, is so posited that it is only a separation; since the intro-reflectedness is what is essential, the general object is posited as an appearance.* The result of appearance is necessity, the immediately actual existence which, in so far as it is actuality, is at the same time still a mediated being. Necessity unifies both determinations, the immediate presence of the existence to hand, and that this is necessary, which derives from its simply holding mediated or posited being within itself. Necessity is the absolute relationship.†

Understanding. "To the understanding, the things of perception have the status of appearance; one aspect of their internality, which the understanding has as its general object, since it is their sublated multiplicity, constitutes abstract identity, but its other aspect is that on account of this it also contains multiplicity. It contains it however as an internal and simple difference, which in the vicissitude of appearance remains self-identical." The internality is the sublated multiplicity of things. As such it would be only abstract identity, but it is also dirempted, and the difference of the internality is an internal difference maintained by the identity i.e. necessity. In so far as we conceive of necessity as inner connectedness, we are omitting the form of

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 200: The properties of the thing, posited in their immediacy, are only an apparency, the thinghood being what is essential, so that the general object is posited as an appearance.

† *Kehler Ms.* p. 201: Necessity unites the determinations of what is immediate and yet mediated, posited.

der Unmittelbarkeit weg, wenn wir dieß thun, so haben wir den Zusammenhang von Unterschieden die insofern innere Unterschiede sind und diese Einheit in ihren Unterschieden ist das Gesetz der Nothwendigkeit. Es ist eigentlich ein pleonastischer Ausdruck. In der Nothwendigkeit gelten zwei Wirklichkeiten als unmittelbar die aber im inneren Zusammenhange sind 5 und so daß ihre Wirklich= (289) keit nur ist durch diesen Zusammenhang. Die Nothwendigkeit ist selbst dieser Zusammenhang, so daß die Seite des Zusammenhangs auch nur in der Form der Innerlichkeit genommen ist + „dieser einfache Unterschied ist zunächst das Reich der Gesetze der Erscheinungen, ihr ruhiges allgemeines Abbild." Es ist insofern das Objekt 10 zunächst noch unmittelbar, aber vermischt mit den Reflexions Bestimmungen, mit der Vermittlung, wird dieser Zusammenhang weiter ausgebildet, so haben wir Nothwendigkeit und so das Objekt als im Zusammenhange der Nothwendigkeit und diesen selbst unterschieden von der äußeren Erscheinung, von dem äußeren Dasein, so ist es ein Reich der 15 Gesetze, und das verständige Bewußtsein hat so die Welt zum Gegenstand als ein Reich von Gesetzen. Die Gesetze oder das Innere, der Zusammenhang der Nothwendigkeit hat das Sinnliche abgestreift, es ist ein bestimmtes Gesetz, insofern es herkommt aus der Wahrnehmung, so hat das Gesetz das Sinnliche abgestreift aber nicht nur dieß sondern auch die Bestimmung als absolute 20 Bestimmtheit, als Einzelnheit oder Subjektivität. Das Gesetz ist bestimmt in sich, ohne dieß ist es nicht, Raum und Zeit bei dem Umlauf der Planeten, diese Qualitäten sind im Unterschiede, die Pole eines Magnets sind Identität und Verschiedenheit, das Gesetz ist so bestimmtes Gesetz; aber die Bestimmtheit des Gesetzes als Gesetz geht nicht fort zur Subjektivität, 25 Einzelnheit, negative Beziehung auf sich, absolute Negativität ist nicht gesetzt, denn die beiden Seiten sind nur im Zusammenhang des Gesetzes, also ist so auch Identität vorhanden aber auch nicht als Beziehung auf sich als Individualität, als Negativität gesetzt. Die Gesetze existiren zwar in Einzelnheiten, aber dieß ist nur die unmittelbare Einzelnheit, nicht die Subjektivität 30 als diese Idealität der Seite des Gesetzes selbst. (290)

§ 423

Das Gesetz, zunächst das Verhältnis allgemeiner, bleibender Bestimmungen, hat, insofern sein Unterschied der innere ist, seine Notwendigkeit an ihm selbst; die eine der Bestimmungen, als nicht äußerlich von der andern unterschieden, liegt unmittelbar selbst in 35 **der andern. Der innere Unterschied ist aber auf diese Weise, was er in Wahrheit ist, der Unterschied an ihm selbst, oder *der Unterschied, der keiner ist.* – In dieser Formbestimmung überhaupt ist *an sich* das Bewußtsein, welches als solches die *Selbständigkeit* des Subjekts und**

immediacy, and in that we do so, the connectedness is that of differences which to this extent are inner differences, this unity within their differences constituting the law of necessity. Strictly speaking, this is a pleonastic expression. In necessity, two actualities have the status of being immediate, but are so connected inwardly, that their actuality (289) only has being through this connection. Necessity is itself this connection, so that the aspect of connectedness is also taken only in the form of internality. "Initially, this simple difference is the realm of the laws of appearances, their quiescent and universal likeness." This realm has being in so far as the object in the first instance is still immediate. Mixed with reflectional determinations or mediation however, this connectedness is developed further, so that we have necessity, and, therefore, the object within the connectedness of necessity, as well as necessity itself distinguished from external appearance, external determinate being. This is a realm of laws, and for the understanding consciousness the world is therefore a general object consisting of such a realm of laws. The laws, or the internality, the connectedness of necessity, has cast off what is sensuous, it is a determinate law, and in so far as it derives from perception the law has therefore cast off what is sensuous, not only what is sensuous moreover, but also determination as an absolute determinateness, as singularity or subjectivity. If law is not internally determined, it is not law. In the revolution of the planets, space and time are qualities within difference; the poles of a magnet are identity and variety; here, therefore, law is determinate. The determinateness of law as law does not progress into subjectivity, singularity, negative self-relation however; there is no positing of absolute negativity, for the two aspects only have being within the connectedness of the law. Although identity is also present therefore, it is not posited as self-relation, individuality, negativity. Laws certainly exist within singularities, but this is merely immediate singularity, not subjectivity as this ideality of the aspect of law itself. (290).

§ 423

Initially, law is the relationship between universal and permanent determinations. In so far as its difference is internal to it, it possesses its own necessity, one of the determinations being immediately present within the other in that it is not externally different from it. It is thus that the inner difference constitutes the truth of what it is, difference in itself, or rather *difference which is no difference*. – In this general determination of form there is an *implicit* disappearance of that which maintains the mutual *independence* of subject and object i.e. of

Objekts gegeneinander enthält, verschwunden; Ich hat als urteilend einen Gegenstand, der nicht von ihm unterschieden ist, – *sich selbst*; – *Selbstbewußtsein*.

\+ „Das Gesetz zunächst das Verhältniß allgemeiner, bleibender Bestimmungen, hat, insofern sein Unterschied der innere ist, seine Nothwendigkeit 5 an ihm selbst; die eine der Bestimmungen, als nicht äußerlich von der andern unterschieden, liegt unmittelbar selbst in der Andern. Der innere Unterschied ist aber auf diese Weise was er in Wahrheit ist, der Unterschied an ihm selbst, oder der Unterschied, der keiner ist." Der Unterschied im Gesetze ist ein Unterschied in der Identität d.h. ein Unterschied der in Wahrheit kein 10 Unterschied ist, der als ideell schlechthin gesetzt ist; diese Idealität macht die Subjektivität überhaupt aus und diese ist die 3te Form des Bewußtseins oder die dritte Bestimmung des Objekts für das Bewußtsein. Das was so eben erläutert worden ist fällt mehr in den Uebergang, es ist mehr die letzte Spitze der 2ten Form und der Ausgangspunkt für die dritte. 15

Von der Nothwendigkeit wird übergegangen zur 3) *Subjektivität* oder was an sich Idee ist, zur *Lebendigkeit*. Das sinnliche Objekt war das Erste, das Zweite war das Objekt für die Wahrnehmung, wie es in den Reflexionsverhältnissen ist, die Spitze ist die Nothwendigkeit, sie ist das Wahre des Zusammenhangs und das Innere desselben ist das Gesetz. Das Höhere ist nun 20 das Lebendige, es ist einzeln, unmittelbar, so ist es zufällig nicht bedingt durch den Zusammenhang, aber es ist Quell der Thätigkeit, der Bewegung in sich,* es ist nicht im Zusammenhang der Nothwendigkeit, ist frei für sich. Es enthält zweitens die Nothwendigkeit in sich, ist Diremtion in sich, unterscheidet sich in sich in seine Systeme, in die Momente seiner Lebendigkeit 25 und ist zugleich die absolute Idealität, Einheit dieser Unterschiede, ist einzeln, nicht als sinnlich Einzelnes, sondern als Subjekt, es ist das Resumiren der Unterschiede in sich. Es hebt sie auf, durchdringt sie und dieß ist das dritte des Lebendigen, das Bewußtsein des Lebens. Das Bewußtsein der unmittelbaren Gegenstände war das erste (291) das der reflektirten Gegen- 30 stände, das zweite, das dritte ist das Verhältniß des unmittelbaren das in sich aber die gesetzte Einheit ist, dieß ist an sich der Begriff, der Begriff aber selbst als Objekt existirend d.h. in der Weise der Äußerlichkeit ist das Leben, das dritte Bewußtsein ist so das des Lebens, der Lebendigkeit.

\+ „Am Bewußtsein des Lebens aber zündet sich das Selbstbewußtsein an; 35 denn als Bewußtsein hat es einen Gegenstand, als ein von ihm unterschiedenes; aber, gerade dieß im Leben, daß der Unterschied kein Unterschied

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 202: Das Lebendige ist unmittelbar, für sich, einzeln, insofern zufällig, als es nicht bedingt ist durch den Zusammenhang, sondern Quell der Bewegung, Thätigkeit, in sich selbst ist . . .

consciousness as such. In that it judges, the ego has a general object from which it is not distinguished. It has *itself*, – it is *self-consciousness*.

"Initially, law is the relationship between universal and permanent determinations. In so far as its difference is internal to it, it possesses its own necessity, one of the determinations being immediately present within the other in that it is not externally different from it. It is thus that the inner difference constitutes the truth of what it is, difference in itself, or rather difference which is no difference." The difference within a law is a difference within identity i.e. a difference which in truth is not a difference, which is simply posited as of an ideal nature. This ideality constitutes subjectivity in general, which is the third form of consciousness, or the third determination of the object for consciousness. That which has just been explicated tends to fall into the transition, being rather the final point of the second form and the point of departure for the third.

The transition is made from necessity to 3) *subjectivity*, or what is implicitly Idea, *animation*. The sensuous object was first, secondly there was the object of perception as it is in the relationship of reflection, the point here being necessity, which is what is true in the connectedness, the internality of which is law. The higher factor is now the living being, which is single, immediate, and therefore contingent. It is not determined by the connectedness, but is the inner source of activity, of motion,* being above the connectedness of necessity, free for itself. Secondly, it holds necessity within itself, is inner diremption, distinguishes itself within itself in its systems, in the moments of its animation, and is at the same time absolute ideality, the unity of these differences, single, not as a single sensuous being, but as a subject. Within itself it is the resumption of the differences, which it sublates and permeates, and it therefore constitutes the third moment of animation, consciousness of life. The first was consciousness of immediate general objects (291), the second that of reflected general objects. The third is the relationship of the immediate being which, although it is in itself, is the posited unity. This is the implicit Notion, the Notion itself however, existing as object i.e. in the mode of externality, is life. The third consciousness is therefore that of life, animation.

"Self-consciousness kindles itself out of consciousness of life however; for although as consciousness it has a general object as being distinct from it, it is precisely in life that difference is no difference." Living subjectivity is this

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 202: Living being is immediate, for itself, single, contingent in so far as it is not determined by the connectedness, but is within itself the source of motion, activity . . .

ist," Die lebendige Subjektivität ist diese Kraft des Subjekts, diese durchdringende Einheit, dieser Puls, dieser Idealität des Besonderen, das sich Aufheben der Unterschiede, damit wird das bisherige Verhältniß wodurch Bewußtsein Bewußtsein ist aufgehoben. Bewußtsein ist Ich und der Gegenstand der von mir unterschieden ist, aber im Leben habe ich die 5 Idealität, die Negation der Unterschiede vor mir. Im Leben fallen die gewöhnlichen Verhältnisse von Ursach und Wirkung, Einwirken, die chemischen, mechanischen u.s.w. Verhältnisse weg, das Leben erhält sich selbst, ist die eigene Explikation seiner Körperlichkeit, es ist das im Kampfe Siegen die Unterschiede, die äußerlichen Einflüsse nicht zu Ursachen in ihm 10 werden zu lassen, nicht in sich geltend werden lassen, sich immer identisch mit sich zu setzen. Es ist so die Negation der Differenzen hier Gegenstand + des Bewußtseins. – „Die Unmittelbarkeit, in der das lebendige Objekt des Bewußtseins ist, ist aber dieß zur Erscheinung oder zur Negation herabgesetzte Moment, die nun als innerer Unterschied, oder Begriff, die 15 Negation ihrer selbst gegen das Bewußtsein ist . . ." Das Leben negirt die Unmittelbarkeit immer und es schaut an, hat zum Gegenstand diese Negation der Unmittelbarkeit des Prinzips, was das Bewußtsein zu solchem macht. (292).

power pertaining to the subject, this pervading unity, this pulse, this ideality of particular being, the self-sublation of differences, so that the previous relationship, whereby consciousness is consciousness, is sublated. Consciousness is ego and the general object which differs from me, but in life I have before me the ideality, the negation of differences. In life, the ordinary relationships of cause and effect, operation, the chemical and mechanical relationships etc., fall away. Life is self-sustaining, is its own explication of its corporeality, the victorious struggle not to allow the differences, the external influences, to become causes within it, to become effective there, – always to be positing its self-identity. It is therefore the negation of the differentials which here constitutes the general object of consciousness. – "The immediacy in which the living object of consciousness has being, is however this moment which has been reduced to appearance or negation. It now has being as inner difference or Notion, self-negation in the face of consciousness." Life always negates immediacy, and it intuites, has as its general object the negation of the immediacy of the principle which makes consciousness what it is. (292)

B. *Das Selbstbewußtsein*

§ 424

Die Wahrheit des Bewußtseins ist das *Selbstbewußtsein*, und dieses der Grund von jenem, so daß in der Existenz alles Bewußtsein eines andern Gegenstandes Selbstbewußtsein ist; Ich weiß von dem Gegenstande als dem Meinigen (er ist meine Vorstellung), Ich weiß daher darin von mir. – Der Ausdruck vom Selbstbewußtsein ist Ich = Ich; – *abstrakte Freiheit*, reine Idealität. – So ist es ohne Realität, denn es selbst, das *Gegenstand* seiner ist, ist nicht ein solcher, da kein Unterschied desselben und seiner vorhanden ist.

\+ „Die Wahrheit des Bewußtseins ist das Selbstbewußtsein, und dieses der Grund von jenem, so daß auch alles Bewußtsein eines andern Gegenstandes zugleich Selbstbewußtsein ist. Der Ausdruck von diesem ist Ich = Ich." – Es ist vorhanden Bewußtsein irgend eines Gegenstandes, die Lebendigkeit, ich verhalte mich zu einem Lebendigen, Ich bin nun das Denkende, indem es sich zur Lebendigkeit als denkend verhält wird ihm darin die Subjektivität, die Lebendigkeit als solche. Das Lebendige will die Unmittelbarkeit abthun aber es bleibt auch darin, fällt zurück obgleich es sie immer negirt, fällt zurück in die Triebe u.s.w. das Blut diese Idealität ist ebenso in der Unmittelbarkeit. Ansich ist das Lebendige diese Idealität, für uns, das Ansich ist aber auch für das Ich des Bewußtseins vorhanden, denn es ist als Ich denkend. Indem es also als Ich sich verhält zur Lebendigkeit* und zwar als denkend so wird Ich der Gegenstand der Subjektivität als solcher, der Subjektivität als denkender, abstrahirter von der Unmittelbarkeit in der die Subjektivität selbst noch erscheint, und indem nun Ich die Subjektivität als solche, die abstrakte Subjektivität zum Gegenstande hat, hat es sich zum Gegenstande, Ich ist selbst lebendig, macht seine Lebendigkeit zum Gegenstand und so ist es Selbstbewußtsein. Es kann kein Bewußtsein geben ohne Selbstbewußtsein. Ich weiß von etwas, das wovon ich weiß habe ich in der Gewißheit meiner selbst, sonst wüßte ich nichts davon, der Gegenstand ist der meinige, er ist ein Anderes und zugleich das Meinige, und nach dieser Seite verhalte ich mich zu mir. Der Gegenstand hat zwei Seiten, einerseits ist er das Negative meiner, andererseits ist er das Meinige, ist mein Objekt, ich verhalte mich darin zu

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 203: Die zweite Stufe. Wir können auch sagen: Bewußtsein irgend eines Gegenstandes, sinnlich, reflektirt, und Bewußtsein der Lebendigkeit; ich verhalte mich zu einem Lebendigen; Ich ist das Denkende, indem es sich zur Lebendigkeit verhält, und als Denkendes, so wird in dem lebendigen Gegenstand die Subjektivität die Lebendigkeit als solcher. Das Bewußtsein ist denkendes, diese reine Thätigkeit als Ich, indem er als Ich sich verhält zur Lebendigkeit, so . . .

B. *Self-consciousness*

§ 424

***Self-consciousness* is the truth of consciousness, and since it is also its ground, within existence, all consciousness of another general object is self-consciousness. I know of the general object as its being mine, + and since it is my presentation, I know of myself within it. – Ego = + ego expresses self-consciousness, *abstract freedom*, pure ideality. – Self- + consciousness is therefore without reality, for since it is itself its own *general object* this is not a general object, there being present no difference between this and itself. +**

"Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness, and since it is also its ground, all consciousness of another general object is at the same time self-consciousness. Ego = ego is the expression of this." – Consciousness of a certain general object is present, animation, I relate myself to a living being. + I am now what thinks, and in that the ego relates itself thinkingly to animation, subjectivity or animation comes into being for it there. Although living being wants to discard immediacy, it also remains within it, and although it is constantly negating it, it relapses into drives etc., the immediacy also containing the blood of this ideality. Implicitly, living being is this ideality, being + for us. The implicitness is also present for the ego of consciousness however, for as ego it thinks. In that it relates itself to animation as ego therefore,* and what is more in that it does so thinkingly, ego becomes the general object of subjectivity as such, subjectivity as that which thinks abstracted from the immediacy in which subjectivity itself still appears. And in that ego now has subjectivity as such, abstract subjectivity, as a general object, it has itself as general object, is itself animated, makes a general object of its animation and is therefore self-consciousness. There can be no consciousness without self-consciousness. I know of something, and if I did not have that which I know within the certainty of myself, I should know nothing of it. Since it is an other and at the same time my own, the general object is mine, and in accordance with this aspect I am self-relating. The general object has two aspects: on one side it is the negative of what is mine, while on the other side it is mine, my

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 203: We can call this second stage stage consciousness of a certain general object, sensuous, reflected, and consciousness of animation, – I relate myself to a living being. Ego is what thinks, and in that it relates itself to animation as a thinking being, subjectivity or animation as such comes into being in the living general object. Consciousness is what thinks, this pure activity as ego. In that it relates itself to animation as ego therefore, . . .

mir; ich bin im Bewußtsein *auch* Selbstbewußtsein, aber nur auch, denn der Gegenstand hat eine Seite an sich die nicht die meinige ist. (293) Selbstbewußtsein ist daß der Inhalt auch Ich bin. Der Gegenstand ist im Bewußtsein der meinige überhaupt, leer, abstrakt, der Inhalt erscheint mir als gegeben, unmittelbar, zufällig, jetzt in der Fortbildung des Bewußtseins hat sich das Subjekt zum Ich, zur Subjektivität überhaupt, zur abstrakten Subjektivität, zur freien fürsichseienden Subjektivität erhoben und diese ist nun der Inhalt des Bewußtseins, der früher nur sinnlich war. Ich verhalte mich zu mir, Ich ist gleich Ich und das zweite Ich ist der Inhalt selbst, wir hatten Ich = Ich auch im Bewußtsein, da ist aber das gegenständliche Ich auch unmittelbarer Inhalt, hier ist Ich der Inhalt selbst. Im Selbstbewußtsein bin ich frei, verhalte mich nicht zu einem Anderen, bin bei mir selbst, es ist das Prinzip der Wahrheit, der Freiheit daß sich Subjekt und Gegenstand gleich sind, Begriff und seine Realität, Subjektivität und Objektivität.* Es ist so hier Wahrheit, Freiheit aber nur noch abstrakt, es fehlt hier was im Bewußtsein zu viel war, in diesem war das Ueberwiegende der Unterschied, der Inhalt der anders ist als Ich, Selbstbewußtsein ist die andere Bestimmung die vorherrschende, Ich gleich Ich, der Unterschied fehlt ganz, ich bin nur meiner bewußt, weiß von mir, die Identität ist zu stark, so daß der Unterschied fehlt, und deshalb ist das Selbstbewußtsein nicht konkret ist abstrakte Identität.

§ 425

Das abstrakte Selbstbewußtsein ist die *erste* Negation des Bewußtseins, daher auch behaftet mit einem äußerlichen Objekt, formell mit der Negation seiner; es ist somit zugleich die vorhergehende Stufe, Bewußtsein, und ist der Widerspruch seiner als Selbstbewußtseins und seiner als Bewußtseins. Indem letzteres und die Negation überhaupt im Ich = Ich an sich schon aufgehoben ist, ist es als diese Gewißheit

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 203: . . . ich . . . bin also im Bewußtsein auch Selbstbewußtsein, aber nur *auch*, der Gegenstand ist der meinige, aber auch gegen mich, das unmittelbare, und hat eine Seite zu mir, die nicht die meinige ist; das Selbstbewußtsein ist dies, daß die Bestimmtheit des meinigen, die leer ist, abstract ist, und der Inhalt als ein unmittelbares, zufälliges erscheint, sich zum Ich bestimmt, zur Subjektivität überhaupt, zur abstracten Subjektivität, freie fürsichseienden Subjektivität, und das ist die Erfüllung dieses Raums, der Inhalt dieses Raums, der nur das unmittelbar Sinnliche war. Ich = Ich, so daß das zweite Ich, als Prädicat, der Inhalt selbst ist, Ich = Ich bin ich auch als Bewußtsein, aber da ist der Gegenstand des Ich auch ein unmittelbarer Inhalt, hier ist Ich der Inhalt selbst. Selbstbewußtsein hat 3 Stufen, es ist die Wahrheit, aber abstracte Wahrheit, ich habe es nicht mit anderem zu thun, bei mir Selbst, frei, es ist Prinzip, daß Subjekt und Gegenstand sich adäquat sind . . .

object, within which I am self-relating. In consciousness I am *also* self-consciousness, simply also however, for the general object has an implicit aspect which is not mine. (293) Self-consciousness is that the content is also the ego. Within consciousness the general object is mine in general, empty, 5 abstract, the content appearing to me to be given, immediate, contingent. The subject has now raised itself in the progressive formation of consciousness, to ego, subjectivity in general, abstract subjectivity, free subjectivity which is for itself, so that consciousness, which was formerly merely sensuous, now has this as its content. I am self-relating, ego equals ego, and 10 the second ego is the content itself. We also had ego = ego in consciousness, but whereas there the generally objective ego is also the immediate content, here the ego is the content itself. I am free in self-consciousness, and do not relate myself to an other: I am with myself, it being the principle of truth and freedom that there should be equality between the subject and the general 15 object, the Notion and its reality, subjectivity and objectivity.* Consequently, although there is truth and freedom here, they are still merely abstract. What is lacking here is what there was too much of in consciousness, + in which there was a preponderance of difference, of content which is other than the ego. The other determination predominates in self-consciousness, 20 ego equals ego, difference is entirely absent, I am conscious only of what is mine, know of myself. Since identity is too strong, difference is lacking, and + self-consciousness is therefore abstract, not concrete identity. +

§ 425

Since abstract self-consciousness is the *initial* negation of consciousness, it is still burdened with an external object, with the formal 25 negation of what pertains to it. At the same time it is therefore also + consciousness, the preceding stage, and is the contradiction of itself as both consciousness and self-consciousness. In ego = ego however, + consciousness and negation in general are already implicitly sublated.

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 203: In consciousness I am also self-consciousness therefore, simply *also* however, the general object being mine and yet also opposed to me, immediate, and with an aspect in respect of me which is not mine. Self-consciousness consists of the determinateness of what is mine, which is empty and abstract, while the content, which appears as an immediate and contingent being, determines itself as ego, as subjectivity in general, abstract subjectivity, free subjectivity which is for itself. This is the filling, the content of this space, a content which was merely immediate sensuous being. This is ego = ego, in which the second ego, as predicate, is the content itself. I am also ego = ego as consciousness, but in this case the general objectivity of the ego is also an immediate content, whereas here ego is the content itself. Self-consciousness has three stages: it is truth, but since I have nothing to do with the other, being with myself, free, it is abstract truth, the principle of the mutual adequacy of subject and general object; . . .

seiner selbst gegen das Objekt der *Trieb*, das zu setzen, was es an sich ist, – d. i. dem abstrakten Wissen von sich Inhalt und Objektivität zu geben und umgekehrt sich von seiner Sinnlichkeit zu befreien, die gegebene Objektivität aufzuheben und mit sich identisch zu setzen; beides ist ein und dasselbe; – die Identifizierung seines Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins. 5

\+ „So aber ist es noch ohne Realität, denn es selbst, das Gegenstand seiner ist, ist nicht ein solcher, denn es hat keinen Unterschied; Ich aber, der Begriff selbst, ist die absolute Diremtion des Urtheils; hiermit ist das Selbstbewußtsein für sich der Trieb, seine Subjektivität aufzuheben und sich zu 10 realisiren." Der Gegenstand ist nicht verschieden von mir, so habe ich in der That noch keinen Gegenstand, Ich ist noch nicht als gegenständlich zugleich bestimmt und dieß ist so hier der Mangel der Realität, des Daseins. Dieser Mangel kann auch so ausgesprochen werden daß das Selbstbewußtsein (294) zunächst ganz abstrakt ist, Ich = Ich, Ich bin für mich, der Mangel ist daß das 15 Selbstbewußtsein ganz abstrakt ist und dieser sein Mangel hat jetzt weitere Formen die nun zu betrachten sind. Nämlich das Selbstbewußtsein so abstrakt ist nur subjektives Selbstbewußtsein, nur subjectives gesetztes Selbstbewußtsein, noch nicht seiendes Selbstbewußtsein, nicht daseiendes. Die Abstraktion hat aber auch die andere Seite, nämlich die Bedeutung der 20 Unmittelbarkeit, daß das Selbstbewußtsein so also nur unmittelbar ist.

Die Abstraktion hat also zweierlei Bestimmungen, die der Subjektivität und der Unmittelbarkeit, der Unmittelbarkeit daß sie sich in sich reflektirt mit Aufhebung der ersten Unmittelbarkeit; das Sein diese Unmittelbarkeit ist negirt, aber weil ich so nur abstrakt bei mir selbst bin ist diese Einheit 25 selbst wieder die Unmittelbarkeit, ich bin in diese Bestimmung zurückgefallen. Die zweite Bestimmung ist die der Subjektivität. Beide sind entgegengesetzte Bestimmungen, aber beide sind in der Abstraktion vorhanden, gehalten, sie spaltet sich in die abstrakte Vermittelung, Ich = Ich als Vermittelung mit mir, und in die Unmittelbarkeit, die aber nicht als erste 30 Bestimmung erscheint, sondern wesentlich bezogen ist auf das Gesetzte.* Wir treffen das Selbstbewußtsein so an, es sind dem Begriffe nach seine Bestimmungen. Ich setze mich als Selbstbewußtsein, unterscheide mich von mir und so müssen die Unterschiede eine unterscheidende Bestimmtheit gegeneinander haben. Die eine Seite ist bestimmt und die unterschiedenen 35 Bestimmtheiten die beiden Seiten zukommen sind die Bestimmungen der Subjektivität und des Seins. Das Selbstbewußtsein ist deswegen unmittelbar

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 204: . . . sondern als wesentlich bezogen auf die andere, das Gesetztsein.

As this self-certainty with regard to the object, abstract self-consciousness therefore constitutes the *drive* to posit what it is implicitly i.e. to give content and objectivity to the abstract knowledge of itself, and conversely, to free itself from its sensuousness, to sublate the given objectivity, and to posit the identity of this objectivity with itself. These two moments are one and the same, and constitute the identification of the consciousness and self-consciousness of abstract self-consciousness.

"As such, however, it is still without reality, for although it is itself the general object of its own, since it has no difference, it is not so. Ego, however, the Notion itself, is the absolute diremption of the judgement, so that self-consciousness for itself is the drive to sublate its subjectivity and realize itself." Since the general object does not differ from me, I have in fact no general object. Since the ego here is still not determined at the same time as being generally objective, there is a lack of reality, of determinate being. This deficiency may also be said to be the initially wholly abstract (294) nature of self-consciousness, of ego = ego, of my being for myself. The deficiency here consists of self-consciousness, the further forms of which now have to be considered, being wholly abstract. Such abstract self-consciousness is merely subjective, posited merely subjectively, still without being, not being the determinate being of self-consciousness. There is, however, the other side to the abstraction, that of the significance of the immediacy, of the mere immediacy of such self-consciousness.

The abstraction, therefore, has two determinations, that of subjectivity and that of immediacy, the immediacy of its being intro-reflected in the sublation of the initial immediacy. The being of this immediacy is negated, but since I am only with myself abstractly on account of this, the unity is once more an immediacy. I have fallen back into this determination. The second determination is that of subjectivity. Although these determinations are mutually opposed, they are both present in the abstraction, which contains them in that it divides itself into the abstract mediation of ego = ego as self-mediation, and into immediacy. The latter does not appear as the first determination however, but is essentially related to the positedness.* It is thus that we reach self-consciousness, and this is the Notion of its determinations. Since I posit myself as self-consciousness, distinguish myself from myself, the differences must have a distinguishing determinateness in respect of one another. The one side is determined, the different determinatenesses communicated to both sides being those of subjective being, (295) and as

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 204: but as essentially related to the other, the being posited.

gesetzt als ein subjektives (295) und als ein nur subjektives d.h. dessen Form ein nur Subjektives zu sein seiner Idealität, der absoluten Identität der Formen widerspricht.* Das Selbstbewußtsein hat seine Form aufgehoben, der Unterschied ist selbst für das Selbstbewußtsein ein solcher der nicht sein soll, es ist absolute Idealität der Formbestimmung. Als Bewußtsein ist es unter- 5 schieden aber der Unterschied ist zugleich gesetzt als ein unwahrhafter, es ist nicht bloß Uebergang einer Bestimmung in die andere, sondern das Selbstbewußtsein ist selbst die Thätigkeit diese seine einseitige Bestimmung nur subjektiv zu sein aufzuheben, diesen Widerspruch seiner Idealität wodurch es schlechthin frei ist, es hat die Gewißheit seiner Identität mit sich, seiner 10 Freiheit in sich und so die Gewißheit daß die subjektive Form ein Nichtiges sei. Ebenso ist die andere Seite bestimmt, es ist die Unmittelbarkeit aber nicht die erste, sondern die Unmittelbarkeit zugleich auch gesetzt daß sie nicht an sich sei, nichts Wahrhaftes. Selbstbewußtsein ist absolute Gewißheit seiner selbst, so ist das Objekt ihm ein Nichtiges, das nicht gegen seine absolute 15 Idealität aushält, oder die Unmittelbarkeit des Objekts gilt ihm nur für seine gesetzte. Also für uns oder an sich ist diese Diremtion des Selbstbewußtseins, nicht für dasselbe selbst, es findet sich subjektives und gegen die Objekte, aber für dasselbe ist jetzt selbst daß diese Bestimmungen, diese Unterschiede nicht wahrhaft sind, was für uns durch den Begriff gesetzt ist. Das Objekt ist 20 also unmittelbar und zugleich aber ein Nichtiges, es ist damit ein Verhältniß gesetzt von mir dem Subjekt zum Objekt, ein Verhältniß das zunächst ist wie das des Bewußtsein, aber gegen dieß ist auch die freie Gewißheit des Selbstbewußtseins von (296) sich selbst gegenüberstehend dem Verhältnisse des Selbstbewußtseins zum Objekt. Insofern ist zu sagen daß der nächste 25 Gegenstand des Selbstbewußtseins das Bewußtsein ist, das Bewußtsein d.h. die Beziehung seiner auf ein Objekt als ein Seiendes, aber so daß er nur Beziehung sei, nur relative Bestimmung. Dieß ist also der Standpunkt des Selbstbewußtseins.

Das Selbstbewußtsein ist diese Freiheit für welche das keine Wahrheit hat 30 was als Bewußtsein auf ein Objekt bezogen ist, seine Wahrheit ist ihm vielmehr seine Freiheit, nicht seine Abhängigkeit, seine Beziehung auf ein Anderes. Dieß ist dann der Trieb seine Subjektivität aufzuheben und sich zu realisieren, aller Trieb fängt an vom Widerspruch, dieser ist aufzulösen und die Nothwendigkeit hiervon liegt hier in der Freiheit, welcher jenes 35 Verhältniß entgegen ist, das Selbstbewußtsein ist selbst das Aufhebende dieses Gegensatzes, es ist selbst diese Idealität der Unterschiede.

\+ „Da das abstrakte Selbstbewußtsein das Unmittelbare und die erste Negation des Bewußtseins ist, so ist es an ihm selbst seiendes und sinnlich konkretes." Die erste Negation ist nicht die absolute, ist selbst nur die 40

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 204: d.h. dessen Form ein subjektives zu sein widerspricht der absoluten Idealität der Formen überhaupt.

nothing more than this, i.e. being a merely subjective being, its form contradicts its ideality, the absolute identity of forms.* Yet difference itself is + something which ought to have no being for self-consciousness, which has sublated its own form, and is the absolute ideality of the determination of 5 form. Although it has difference as consciousness, it is a difference which is posited at the same time as lacking in truth. Self-consciousness is not merely + the transition of one determination into the other, but is itself the activity of sublating this its onesided determination of being merely subjective, this contradiction of its ideality, whereby it is simply free. It has within itself the 10 certainty of its self-identity, its freedom, and therefore the certainty that the subjective form is a nullity. Although the other aspect is determined in the same way, and constitutes immediacy, it is not the initial immediacy, for it is at the same time also posited as not being implicit, and lacking in truth. For + self-consciousness, since it is absolute self-certainty, the object is a nullity 15 which is unable to endure its absolute ideality, the immediacy of the object having validity for it only as a posited being. This diremption of self-consciousness has being for us therefore, or implicitly, not for self-consciousness itself. There is subjective being, and it is opposed to objects, but for self-consciousness itself, at this juncture, these determinations or differ- 20 ences lack the truth which is posited for us through the Notion. While the + object is immediate, it is also a nullity therefore, so that initially a relationship like that of consciousness is posited from me the subject to the object. Now, + however, there is the further factor of the free self-certainty of self-consciousness (296) standing over against the relationship of self-conscious- 25 ness to the object. In that it does so, it may be said that the proximate general object of self-consciousness is consciousness, consciousness being the relation of what is its own to an object as to a being, the relation here being merely a relation, a relative determination. This, therefore, is the standpoint of self-consciousness. +

30 Self-consciousness is this freedom, for which that which is related to an object as consciousness has no truth. For itself, its truth is its freedom rather than its dependence, its relation to an other, and this is then the drive to sublate its subjectivity and to realize itself. All drive begins from the proposed resolution of a contradiction, and at this juncture the necessity of this resolu- 35 tion lies in the freedom which is opposed to this relationship. Self-conscious- + ness is itself the sublating of this opposition, this ideality of the differences.

"Since abstract self-consciousness is what is immediate, and the initial negation of consciousness, it has being in itself and is sensuously concrete." + The initial is not the absolute negation, being in itself only the negation of

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 204: i.e. its form of being subjective contradicts the absolute ideality of forms in general.

Negation des Unmittelbaren, setzt dieß voraus, hat es nöthig, ist nicht ohne dasselbe, so ist es nicht das freie Negative, die Freiheit ist nur abstrakt, soll nur sein. ,,Die Selbstbestimmung ist daher einestheils die Negation als sein von ihm in sich gesetztes Moment, anderestheils als ein äußerliches Objekt.'' Die Bestimmung des Begriffs die vorhanden ist, ist einerseits die Subjek- 5 tivität des Selbstbewußtseins oder daß es eine Abstraktion ist, nicht mit sich vereinigt hat, das Bewußtsein, ihm gegenüber steht die Weise im Verhältniß zu sein, dem Subjekt steht gegenüber das Objekt, die Unmittelbarkeit in der Beziehung auf das Subjekt. ,,Oder das Ganze, was (297) sein Gegenstand ist, ist die vorhergehende Stufe, das Bewußtsein, und es selbst ist dieß noch.'' 10

\+ ,,Der Trieb des Selbstbewußtseins ist daher überhaupt seine Subjektivität aufzuheben; näher dem abstrakten Wissen von sich Inhalt und Objektivität zu geben, und umgekehrt sich von seiner Sinnlichkeit zu befreien, die Objektivität als gegebene aufzuheben und mit sich identisch zu setzen, oder sein Bewußtsein seinem Selbstbewußtsein gleich zu machen. – Beides ist ein und 15 dasselbe.'' – Ich = Ich, da ist dieß Ich noch nicht reell, insofern in ihm der Unterschied anfängt ist es bezogen auf ein Objekt das zunächst gesetzt ist als unmittelbar, das Ich ist noch nicht als selbstständig gesetzt. Es bekommt den Inhalt daß es affirmativ sich in sich bestimmt, zunächst ist es in sich nur negativ bestimmt, ist als subjektiv mangelhaft, aber seine Bestimmung soll 20 Affirmation werden, dieß ist seine Objektivität. Sich objektivieren heißt das nur unmittelbar gegebene Objekt aufheben, das als selbstständig erscheinende, daseiende Objekt zu negiren. Oder dem Selbstbewußtsein soll sein Bewußtsein gleich gemacht werden, nicht nur abstrakt, sondern in der Form der Objektivität, als erfüllt; die höchste Form desselben* ist dann die der 25 Allgemeinheit, daß ich im Selbstbewußtsein meiner zugleich das Andere frei weiß, oder daß das Bewußtsein, Bewußtsein der Freiheit, der Sittlichkeit, des Rechts ist. Dieß ist nicht die Freiheit des diesen, der einzeln ist, sondern es ist allgemeine Freiheit, an und für sich, diese ist nun die Objektivität, diese ist von mir als diesen unterschieden und zugleich ist es meine Vernunft, meine 30 Freiheit, weil es Freiheit als allgemeine ist; ich bin darin erhalten als dieser, und zugleich ist sie unterschieden von mir als diesen. Dieß ist die Realität des Selbstbewußtseins, das Ziel des= (298) selben ist die Vernunft, das Bewußtsein der Vernünftigkeit, Bewußtsein meiner als in seiner an und für sich seienden Allgemeinheit, Bewußtsein der Vernünftigkeit, nicht mehr 35 beschränkt auf sinnliche unmittelbare Weise.†

Es sind drei Stufen in dieser Realisierung, Objektivirung meines Selbst-

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 206: . . . die höchste Form dieser Objektivität ist dann die Allgemeinheit, . . .

† *Kehler Ms.* S. 206: In diesem ist die Realisierung des Selbstbewußtseins, das Ziel der Realisierung des Etwas ist die Vernunft, Vernünftigkeit, Bewußtsein meiner in seiner an und für sich seienden Allgemeinheit, Bewußtsein der Wesentlichkeit, dem Geistigen als an und fürsichseienden, nicht mehr beschränkt auf sinnliche unmittelbare Weise.

what is immediate, which it presupposes and finds necessary. Since it has no + being without this, it is not freely negative being, the freedom being merely abstract, merely what ought to be. "One part of the self-determination is therefore negation, the moment of self-consciousness, posited by it, within 5 itself, the other part being an external object." On the one hand, the deter- + mination of the Notion present is the subjectivity of self-consciousness, its abstraction, its not having united with itself, – consciousness. Over against this stands the mode of its being in relationship, of the subject standing over against the object, of the immediacy being in relation to the subject. 10 "Consequently, the whole (297) of its general object consists of the preceding stage of consciousness, and it is itself still consciousness."

"Self-consciousness therefore drives toward the general sublation of its subjectivity. More precisely defined, it is the provision of content and objectivity for its abstract self-knowledge, and, conversely, its freeing itself 15 from its sensuousness, the sublation of objectivity as given, and the positing of its self-identity i.e. the equating of its consciousness with its self-consciousness. – Both are one and the same," – ego = ego, in which the ego + is not yet of a real nature. In so far as there is an initiation of difference within + it, the ego is related to an object posited primarily as being immediate, and 20 not yet as being independent. Although it acquires the content of determining itself within itself affirmatively, initially its internal determination is only negative. In that it is subjective it is defective, but its determination should be an affirmation, and it is this that constitutes its objectivity. Self-objectification involves the sublation of the object as merely given imme- 25 diately, the negation of its apparently independent determinate being. Self- + consciousness ought to be made the equal of its consciousness therefore, and not merely abstractly but in the form of being objectively fulfilled. The highest form of objectivity* is then the universality of my knowing self-consciously that what is mine, as well as the other, is free, or that conscious- 30 ness is consciousness of freedom, ethicality, right. This is not the freedom of + this particular singularity, but universal freedom, which is in and for itself. This is now objectivity, which is distinguished from me, and yet at the same time, since it is universal freedom, my reason, my freedom. I am contained within it as this being, while it is distinguished from me as such. This is the 35 reality of self-consciousness, the goal of (298) which is reason, consciousness of rationality, of what is mine in the being in and for self of its universality, of rationality, which is no longer limited in a sensuously immediate manner.† +

There are three stages to this realization, the objectification of my self- +

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 206: The highest form of this objectivity is then the universality . . .

† *Kehler Ms.* p. 206: The realization of self-consciousness is within this. This goal of the realization of something is reason, rationality, – consciousness of what is mine in the being in and for self of its universality, of essentiality, of what is spiritual as being in and for itself, and no longer limited in a sensuously immediate manner.

bewußtseins, in diesem Aufheben der Schranke, die mein unmittelbares Selbstbewußtsein noch ist. 1) Das unmittelbare Selbstbewußtsein, Ich, dieser, meine Triebe, Begierden u.s.w. danach verhalte ich mich zum unmittelbar äußeren Objekt. 2) Ich verhält sich zu einem Objekt das auch ein anderes ist, aber auch Selbstbewußtsein, Verhalten eines Selbstbewußtsein zu einem anderen Selbstbewußtsein, dieß Andere ist auch Ich, ich habe darin mein Selbstbewußtsein, aber zugleich ist es schlechthin spröde, selbstständig, es ist eine Vereinigung des Objektiven und Subjektiven, beide sind Ich, aber es ist auch absolute Trennung, Widerspruch, denn beide sind identisch, Ich, frei, sind nicht unterschieden und doch ist jedes für sich spröde Persönlichkeit die an sich hält, das Andere ausschließt, absolute Identität und absolute Diremtion. 3) Die Stufe des allgemeinen Selbstbewußtseins, wie es sich verhält zu anderem Selbstbewußtsein, aber in diesem Verhalten es selbst ist und als allgemein ist, die Freiheit des Anderen weiß, sein Selbst, sein Recht weiß in der Selbstständigkeit des Anderen.

+ ## *α) Die Begierde*

§ 426

Das Selbstbewußtsein in seiner Unmittelbarkeit ist *Einzelnes* und *Begierde*, – der Widerspruch seiner Abstraktion, welche objektiv sein soll, oder seiner Unmittelbarkeit, welche die Gestalt eines äußern Objekts hat und subjektiv sein soll. Für die aus dem Aufheben des Bewußtseins hervorgegangene Gewißheit seiner selbst ist das Objekt, und für die Beziehung des Selbstbewußtseins auf das Objekt ist seine abstrakte Idealität ebenso als ein Nichtiges bestimmt.

+ 1) *Das unmittelbare, einzelne Selbstbewußtsein.* ,,Das Selbstbewußtsein in seiner Unmittelbarkeit ist Einzelnes und Begierde, der Widerspruch seiner Abstraktion, welche objektiv, oder seiner Unmittelbarkeit, welche subjektiv sein soll, gegen Ich = Ich, den Begriff, der an sich die Idee, Einheit seiner selbst und der Realität ist.“ Es ist Begierde, es ist ganz abstrakt in sich, der Widerspruch ist so der seiner Abstraktion und seiner Unmittelbarkeit gegen Ich = Ich, daß an sich die Idee, Einheit seiner selbst und des Objekts ist. (299)
+ ,,Seine Unmittelbarkeit, die als das Aufzuhebende bestimmt ist, hat zugleich die Gestalt eines äußern Objekts, nach welcher das Selbstbewußtsein Bewußtsein ist.“ Das Bewußtsein das die Gewißheit seiner selbst ist, ist mit einer Negation in sich behaftet, diese heißen wir Schranke, Mangel. Nur für

consciousness, this sublation of the limit which still constitutes my immediate self-consciousness: 1) Immediate self-consciousness, ego, this being, my drives, desires etc., in accordance with which I relate myself to the immediately external object. 2) Ego relating itself to an object which is also another, but which is self-consciousness too, the relatedness of one self-consciousness to another. This other is also ego, but although I have my self-consciousness within it, it is at the same time simply unyielding, independent, a unification of what is objective and subjective. Both are ego, but there is also absolute division, contradiction, for both aspects are identical, both are ego and both are free. Although they are not distinguished, each for itself is an unyielding personality which keeps to itself and excludes the other, – absolute identity and absolute diremption. 3) The stage of universal self-consciousness, as it relates itself to the other self-consciousness. Within this relatedness it is both itself and universal however, – knowing the freedom of the other, and its self, its right, in the independence of the other.

α) Desire

§ 426

Self-consciousness in its immediacy is *singular*, and constitutes *desire*. This is the contradiction of its abstraction, which should be objective, or of its immediacy, which has the shape of an external object and should be subjective. The object is determined as a nullity for the self-certainty which has proceeded from the sublation of consciousness, just as the abstract ideality of self-consciousness is determined as a nullity for the relation of self-consciousness to the object. +

1) *The immediate singularity of self-consciousness.* "Self-consciousness in its immediacy is singular, and constitutes desire. This is the contradiction of its + abstraction, which should be objective, or of its immediacy, which should be subjective in respect of ego = ego, the Notion, which is implicitly the Idea, the unity of itself and of reality." Since self-consciousness is desire, and in itself is wholly abstract, the contradiction is therefore that of its abstraction and its immediacy in respect of ego = ego, which is implicitly the Idea, the unity of itself and of the object. (299) "Its immediacy, which is determined as + that which is to be sublated, has at the same time the shape of an external object, in accordance with which self-consciousness is consciousness." Consciousness as self-certainty is affected internally with a negation, which we refer to as a limit or deficiency. It is only for that which is beyond the

das ist eine Schranke welches darüber hinaus ist, in welchem sie an sich aufgehoben ist, für den Stein ist seine Endlichkeit keine Schranke, nur für das was darüber hinaus ist, ist sie vorhanden, das Bewußtsein der Schranke drückt die Unendlichkeit aus. Das Bedürfniß, der Mangel, das Negative mit der absoluten Gewißheit der Nichtigkeit derselben ist der Trieb, die Thätigkeit das Bedürfniß aufzuheben, den Frieden wieder herzustellen, + damit die Entzweiung, der Unterschied nicht mehr sei. „Aber das Objekt ist als an sich Nichtiges für die aus dem Aufheben des Bewußtseins hervorgegangene Gewißheit seiner selbst bestimmt." Das Objekt ist nichtig, unmittelbar, aber für das Bewußtsein nicht nur unmittelbar, sondern es ist an sich das Nichtige, das Selbstbewußtsein weiß daher daß nichts an dem Gegenstande ist. Die Thiere sind nicht so dumm wie mancher Realist, der nicht zugiebt daß die Gegenstände keine Wirklichkeit haben, das Thier frißt sie auf. Der Gegenstand ist so dem Triebe gemäß und nur das ist Gegenstand des Triebes was ihm gemäß ist und daß die Gegenstände den Trieben gemäß sind kommt von dem Triebe des Selbstbewußtseins her, die Fähigkeit den + Trieb zu befriedigen ist diese Identität, diese Negativität. „Das Selbstbewußtsein ist sich daher an sich im Gegenstande, der auf diese Weise dem Triebe gemäß, und in der Negativität, als der eigenen Thätigkeit des Ich, wird für dasselbe diese Identität."

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Das Selbstbewußtsein ist sich daher *an sich* im Gegenstande, der in dieser Beziehung dem Triebe gemäß ist. In der Negation der beiden einseitigen Momente, als der eigenen Tätigkeit des Ich, wird *für* dasselbe diese Identität. Der Gegenstand kann dieser Tätigkeit keinen Widerstand leisten, als an sich und für das Selbstbewußtsein das Selbstlose; die Dialektik, welche seine Natur ist, sich aufzuheben, existiert hier als jene Tätigkeit des Ich. Das gegebene Objekt wird hierin ebenso subjektiv gesetzt, als die Subjektivität sich ihrer Einseitigkeit entäußert und sich objektiv wird.

+ „Der Gegenstand kann dieser Thätigkeit keinen Widerstand leisten, weil (300) er an sich und für dasselbe das Selbstlose ist; die Dialektik, welche seine Natur ist, sich aufzuheben, ist hier als jene Thätigkeit, die Ich hiermit zugleich als äußerliche anschaut. Das gegebene Objekt wird hierin ebenso subjektiv, als die Subjektivität sich entäußert und sich objektiv wird." Das Selbstbewußtsein ist thätig, die Dialektik des Gegenstandes ist gesetzt beim Bewußtsein, es ist die Natur des Objekts nicht für sich zu bestehen und die letzte Wahrheit des Objekts ist Lebendigkeit, da ist die Idealität des Objekts

limit, in which it is implicitly sublated, that there is a limit. It is not for the stone itself that its finitude is a limit: the limit is present only for that which is beyond it, consciousness of limit expressing infinitude. Need, deficiency, the + negative, with the absolute certainty of the nullity of this, constitutes the 5 drive, the activity of sublating the need, the re-establishing of the tranquillity in which there is no longer any variance or difference. "For the self-certainty + which has proceeded forth from the sublating of consciousness, the object is, however, determined as being implicitly a nullity." The object is a nullity, immediate. For consciousness however, it is not only immediate but im- 10 plicitly that which is null, so that self-consciousness knows that there is nothing to the general object. The animals are not so stupid as many a realist, for whereas the realist will not admit that general objects have no actuality, the animal will eat them up. The general object is therefore adequate to the + drive, and only that which is adequate to a drive is its general object. The 15 adequacy of the general objects in respect of the drives derives from the drive of self-consciousness, the aptitude for satisfying the drive being this identity, this negativity. "Self-consciousness is therefore implicitly itself in the general + object, which in this way is adequate to the drive, and this identity comes to have being for self-consciousness in the negativity, as the ego's own 20 activity."

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Self-consciousness is therefore *implicitly* itself in the general object, which in this relation is adequate to the drive. This identity comes to + be *for* the ego in that the negation of both onesided moments is the ego's own activity. In that it is implicitly selfless and has being for + 25 self-consciousness as such, the general object can offer no resistance to this activity; the dialectic of its self-sublating nature exists here as the activity of the ego. Thus, the given object is posited as subjective to + the extent that subjectivity externalizes its onesidedness and becomes objective to itself.

30 "Since it is implicitly selfless and has being for self-consciousness as such, + (300) the general object can offer no resistance to this activity; the dialectic of its self-sublating nature has being here as this activity, which at the same time intuites the ego as being external. Thus, the given object becomes subjective to the extent that subjectivity externalizes itself and becomes objective to 35 itself." Self-consciousness is active, the dialectic of the general object being posited in consciousness. It is in the nature of the object not to subsist for itself, and its final truth is animation, in which there is already a positing of its

schon gesetzt. Jetzt ist das Selbstbewußtsein diese Dialektik, der Begriff vollbringt diesen Uebergang an den weltlichen Dingen, das Selbstbewußt-
\+ sein ist die subjektive Thätigkeit, Exekution gegen das Objekt, das Subjekt aber hätte keine Gewalt über das Objekt, wenn dieß nicht an und für sich selbstlos wäre. Es schaut nun diese Thätigkeit als sein Thun an, zugleich als 5 ein äußerliches, das Selbstbewußtsein so als unmittelbar als Begierde hat einen äußerlichen Gegenstand vor sich und muß sich so äußerlich verhalten, muß zugreifen. Seine Thätigkeit ist so erscheinend als äußerlich, was das Subjekt vollbringt ist nicht mehr nur Subjekt zu sein, sondern das Objektive subjektiv gemacht zu haben und das Subjektive objektiv. Das Subjekt setzt 10 die Objektivität identisch mit sich, macht die Subjektivität selbst objektiv dieß ist die Begierde, das Objekt ist noch das erste unmittelbare Objekt; in der nächsten Stufe wird das Selbstbewußtsein zum Objekt.

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Das Produkt dieses Prozesses ist, daß Ich sich mit sich selbst zusammenschließt und hiedurch *für sich* befriedigt, Wirkliches ist. 15 **Nach der äußerlichen Seite bleibt es in dieser Rückkehr zunächst als *Einzelnes* bestimmt und hat sich als solches erhalten, weil es sich auf das selbstlose Objekt nur negativ bezieht, dieses insofern nur aufgezehrt wird. Die Begierde ist so in ihrer Befriedigung überhaupt *zerstörend*, wie ihrem Inhalte nach *selbstsüchtig*, und da die Befrie-** 20 **digung nur im Einzelnen geschehen, dieses aber vorübergehend ist, so erzeugt sich in der Befriedigung wieder die Begierde.**

\+ „Das Product dieses Prozesses ist, daß Ich in dieser Realität sich mit sich selbst zusammenschließt; aber in dieser Rückkehr sich zunächst nur als Einzelnes Dasein giebt, weil es sich auf das selbstlose Objekt nur negativ 25 bezieht, und daß dieses nur aufgezehrt wird; die Begierde ist daher in ihrer Befriedigung überhaupt zerstörend und selbstsüchtig." Das Selbstbewußtsein ist hier in seiner unmittelbaren Einzelnheit, Fürsichseiendes, Sichbestimmendes, nur als dieses (301) sich Dasein gebend. Das so bewährte Selbstbewußtsein ist wieder Bewußtsein aber mit der Bestimmung daß die 30 Objektivität identisch ist mit dem Selbstbewußtsein, indem es aber wieder Bewußtsein ist oder Urtheil, so ist der Gegenstand nicht mehr so bestimmt als auf dem Standpunkte wo es Begierde, unmittelbar einzelnes Bewußtsein war, sondern der Gegenstand ist identisch mit ihm gesetzt, er ist Bewußtsein unterschieden durch ein Anderes von sich, aber dieß Andere ist selbst 35 bestimmt als Selbstbewußtsein.

ideality. Self-consciousness is now this dialectic, the Notion bringing about this transition in respect of the things of the world. Self-consciousness is subjective activity, effectiveness in respect of the object, although if the object were not in and for itself selfless, the subject would have no power over it. It now intuites this activity as being its act, and at the same time as an externality. In its immediacy as desire therefore, self-consciousness has before it an external general object, and it therefore has to conduct itself externally and lay hold of this object, so that its activity appears externally. What is brought about by the subject is no longer merely being a subject, but objective being made subjective and subjective being made objective. The subject posits objectivity as being identical with itself, making subjectivity itself objective, and it is this that constitutes desire. The object is still primary and immediate, but at the next stage it will be self-consciousness.

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The product of this process is the ego's self-integration, by means of which *its* satisfaction is achieved, its actuality established. Returning thus, the ego in its external aspect is still determined as a *singleness*, and it has maintained itself as such in that it has only related itself negatively to the selfless object, which is therefore merely absorbed. Desire is therefore generally *destructive* in its satisfaction, just as it is generally *self-seeking* in respect of its content, and since the satisfaction has only been achieved in singleness, which is transient, it gives rise to further desire.

"The product of this process is the ego's self-integration within this reality; returning thus however, it renders itself initially only as a single determinate being, since it only relates itself negatively to the selfless object, which is simply consumed. The satisfaction of desire is therefore generally destructive and self-seeking." Self-consciousness at this juncture is an immediate singularity, a being-for-self, a self-determination, and it is only as such that it gives itself (301) determinate being. Self-consciousness so proved is consciousness again, although with the determination of the objectivity's being identical with self-consciousness. In that it is once more consciousness or judgement however, the general object is no longer determined as it was at the standpoint at which self-consciousness was desire, the immediate singularity of consciousness, but is posited as being identical with self-consciousness; although it is consciousness distinguished from itself by another, this other is itself determined as self-consciousness.

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\+ **Aber das Selbstgefühl, das ihm in der Befriedigung wird, bleibt nach der innern Seite oder *an sich* nicht im abstrakten *Fürsichsein* oder nur seiner Einzelnheit, sondern als die Negation der *Unmittelbarkeit* und der Einzelnheit enthält das Resultat die Bestimmung der *Allgemeinheit* und der *Identität* des Selbstbewußtseins mit seinem Gegenstande. Das Urtheil oder die Diremtion dieses Selbstbewußtseins ist das Bewußtsein eines *freien* Objekts, in welchem Ich das Wissen seiner als Ich hat, das aber auch noch außer ihm ist.** 5

\+ „Aber das Selbstbewußtsein hat an sich schon die Gewißheit seiner in dem unmittelbaren Gegenstande; das Selbstgefühl, das ihm in der Befriedigung 10 wird, ist daher nicht das abstrakte seines Fürsichseins oder nur seiner Einzelnheit, sondern ein Objektives; die Befriedigung ist die Negation seiner eigenen Unmittelbarkeit, und die Diremtion derselben daher in das Bewußtsein eines freien Objekts, in welchem Ich das Wissen seiner als Ich hat."

β) Das anerkennende Selbstbewußtsein 15

§ 430

Es ist ein Selbstbewußtsein für ein Selbstbewußtsein, zunächst *unmittelbar* als ein Anderes für ein *Anderes*. Ich schaue in ihm als Ich unmittelbar mich selbst an, aber auch darin ein unmittelbar daseiendes, als Ich absolut gegen mich selbständiges anderes Objekt. Das Aufheben der *Einzelnheit* des Selbstbewußtseins war das erste 20 **Aufheben; es ist damit nur als *besonderes* bestimmt. – Dieser Widerspruch gibt den Trieb, sich als freies Selbst zu *zeigen* und für den Andern als solches *da* zu sein, – den Prozeß des *Anerkennens*.**

\+ 2) *Verhalten eines Selbstbewußtseins zu einem anderen Selbstbewußtsein.* „Es ist ein Selbstbewußtsein für ein Selbstbewußtsein, zunächst unmittelbar, als ein 25 Anderes für ein Anderes." Das Selbstbewußtsein hat also einen Gegenstand, ein Anderes, Äußerliches, aber dieser Gegenstand ist nicht mehr Objekt sondern es hat die Bestimmung der Subjektivität, des Ichs an ihm selbst; das Selbstbewußtsein setzt sich ein Anderes entgegen, aber indem es sich in der Objektivität bewährt hat, indem es sich unterscheidet ist es darin als Selbst- 30
\+ bewußtsein bei sich. „Ich schaue im Ich unmittelbar mich selbst an, aber auch

§ 429

Yet in its interior aspect, or *implicitly*, the self-awareness self-consciousness achieves in satisfaction does not remain in the abstract *being-for-self* or the mere singularity of self-consciousness. As the negation of *immediacy* and of singularity, the result contains the determination of *universality* and of the *identity* of self-consciousness with its general object. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is the consciousness of a *free* object, in which ego has knowledge of itself as an ego, which, however, is also still outside it.

"Self-consciousness already has the implicit certainty of what is its own in the immediate general object however, so that the self-awareness it achieves in satisfaction is not the abstract self-awareness of its being-for-self or of its mere singularity, but is an objective being. Since satisfaction is the negation of self-consciousness's own immediacy, it is the diremption of it into the consciousness of a free object in which ego has knowledge of itself as an ego."

β) Recognitive self-consciousness

§ 430

This is one self-consciousness which is for another, at first *immediately*, as one other is for *another*. Within the other as ego, I have not only an immediate intuition of myself, but also of the immediacy of a determinate being which as ego is for me an absolutely opposed and independently distinct object. The initial sublation was that of the *singularity* of self-consciousness, by which self-consciousness is merely determined as being *particular*. – Through this contradiction, self-consciousness acquires the drive to *display* itself as a free self, and to be *there* as such for the other. This is the process of *recognition*.

2) *The relatedness of one self-consciousness to another*. "One self-consciousness is for another, at first immediately, as one other is for an other." Self-consciousness has a general object therefore, an other, an external being. This general object is no longer an object however, but has in itself the determination of subjectivity, of the ego. Self-consciousness posits an other over against itself, but in that it has proved itself within objectivity, in that it distinguishes itself, within this other, it is with itself as self-consciousness. "Within the ego, I have not only an immediate intuition of myself, but also of

darin ein unmittelbar daseiendes, als Ich absolut selbstständiges anderes Objekt." Dieß ist der Standpunkt überhaupt, die absolute Identität beider, diese absolute Allgemeinheit. Der andere Mensch ist ebenso gut Ich als ich, da ist nichts zu unterscheiden, nach dem reinen Selbst des Bewußtseins nach dieser Wurzel der Subjektivität ist da eine Identität, er ist die Identität beider Selbstbewußtsein, ich habe im Anderen, was ich an mir selbst habe. (302) Aber zweitens sind auch diese Ich unterschieden, das Ich ist auch ein Besonderes und die Frage ist, wie dieser Unterschied bestimmt ist. Diese + Unterschiedenheit beider ist so bestimmt daß sie sich finden, so sind sie frei, jedes ein Selbstbewußtsein,* der Mensch hat das ganz abstrakte Selbstbewußtsein vor sich, indem sie sich so finden, sind beide seiende gegen einander und es ist damit der höchste Widerspruch gesetzt, einerseits die klare Identität beider und andererseits wider diese vollkommene Selbstständigkeit eines Jeden. Jedes ist besonderes Subjekt, leiblicher Gegenstand, so erscheinen sie mir als zwei gegen einander, so gut als ich vom Baum, vom Stein u.s.w. unterschieden bin, so gut ist von mir das Andere unterschieden, es ist also die vollkommene Gleichheit beider, ihre einfache absolute Identität und ihr höchster Widerspruch. Dieß ist nun der höchste Standpunkt wie sie sich zu einander verhalten. Das Bewußtsein war das Aufheben des äußerlich Objektiven als ein nicht Selbstständiges gegen mich, da habe ich mich bewährt in dieser Äußerlichkeit, das Andere ist äußerliche Objektivität, sie ist darin begründet daß die Selbstständigkeit des Anderen, hier eine Selbstständigkeit des Ich ist, darin liegt sein Anderssein. Diese Körperlichkeit gehört einem Ich an, es ist ein organischer Leib, der nun die Leiblichkeit eines Ich führt, diese hat gegen mich eine absolute Selbstständigkeit, weil sie einem anderen Ich angehört.† Ich schaue mich darin unmittelbar selbst an und zugleich darin unmittelbar Anderes als ich bin und zwar ist diese Äußerlichkeit noch von ganz anderer Sproedigkeit. Das Objekt ist Ich in sich, es ist mir gleich und ein absolut Anderes, dieß ist das Verhältniß und die Frage ist + nun wie dieser Widerspruch sich auflöst.

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 208: Diese Verschiedenheit ist so bestimmt, daß sie sich finden, und wie sie sich finden, sind sie zwar frei, jeder ist selbst . . .

† *Kehler Ms.* SS. 208–209: Im Bewußtsein haben wir gesehen das Aufheben des äußerlich unmittelbaren, in der Begierde ist das Object auch ein äußerliches, aber gegen mich herabgesetzt, idealisirt, negirt, hier ist das andere wieder ein äußerlich objectiver, aber diese für mich äußerliche Gegenständlichkeit ist darum noch spröder gemacht, daß die Selbständigkeit des anderen zugleich Ich ist; die Körperlichkeit, mir gegenüber, gehört einem Ich an, ist idealisirt, Instrument einer Seele, aber gegen mich hat dies Anderssein eine absolute Selbständigkeit, überhaupt sie angehört (209) einem anderen Ich . . .

the immediacy of a determinate being, which as ego is an absolutely independent and distinct object." It is the absolute identity of both, this absolute universality, which constitutes the general standpoint at this juncture. Since the other person is as much an ego as I am, there is no distinction to be drawn in this respect. There is identity on account of the pure self of consciousness, this root of subjectivity, the self constituting the identity of both self-consciousnesses. I have in the other what I have in myself. (302) Secondly, however, these egos are distinguished, for the ego is also a particular being. The question is how this difference is determined. It is so determined that they find themselves and are therefore free, each as a self-consciousness.* The man has before himself a self-consciousness which is wholly abstract, and in that they find themselves as such, these beings are mutually opposed. There is, therefore, a positing of the highest contradiction, – that between the clear identity of both on one side and the complete independence of each on the other. Since each is a particular subject, a general corporeal object, they appear to me as being mutually opposed. The other differs from me as I differ from the tree, the stone etc. Between the two there is therefore the complete parity of their simple and absolute identity and their supreme contradiction, and this is now the highest standpoint of their interrelatedness. Consciousness was the sublating of the external objective being as not being independent of me: I proved myself there within this externality. Here, the other is external objectivity, founded in the other's independence being that of the ego, within which its otherness lies. This corporeality belongs to an ego and is an organic body. The body now bears the corporeality of an ego, and since it belongs to another ego, this corporeality has an absolute independence of me.† Within it I have an immediate intuition of myself, and at the same time of something other than I am, so that this externality is still a wholly distinct unyieldingness. The object is in itself ego, it is my equal and an absolute other. This is the relationship and the question is now how this contradiction resolves itself.

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 208: This variety is so determined that they find themselves, and they are certainly free as they do so, each being a self.

† *Kehler Ms.* pp. 208–209: In consciousness, we have seen the sublating of external immediacy. In desire, the object is also an external being, but it is relegated beneath me, idealized, negated. Here, the other is once more an external and objective being, but what for me is an external general objectivity, is made still more unyielding in that the independence of the other is at the same time an ego. The corporeality over against me belongs to an ego, is idealized, the instrument of a soul, and yet in respect of me this otherness has an absolute independence, being the general possession (209) of another ego.

§ 431

Er ist ein *Kampf*; denn Ich kann mich im Anderen nicht als mich selbst wissen, insofern das Andere ein unmittelbares anderes Dasein für mich ist; Ich bin daher auf die Aufhebung dieser seiner Unmittelbarkeit gerichtet. Ebensosehr kann Ich nicht als Unmittelbares anerkannt werden, sondern nur insofern Ich an mir selbst die Un- 5 mittelbarkeit aufhebe und dadurch meiner Freiheit Dasein gebe. Aber diese Unmittelbarkeit ist zugleich die Leiblichkeit des Selbstbewußtseins, in welcher es als in seinem Zeichen und Werkzeug sein eignes *Selbstgefühl* und sein Sein *für Andere* und seine es mit ihnen vermittelnde Beziehung hat. 10

\+ Dieß ist nun im folgendem § enthalten und vorgestellt als ein Kampf des Anerkennens der sich auflöst zunächst in das Verhältniß der Herrschaft und Knechtschaft.* Es ist also ein Widerspruch, für uns nicht nur, sondern auch für die die im Verhältnisse sind, im Ich ist die für sich bewährte Identität des Subjekts und die Idealität des Objektiven welches hier nun auch Ich ist, es ist 15 nicht nur für uns dieser Mangel son= (303) dern Ich ist diese absolute Selbstständigkeit beider gegeneinander, es ist damit gesetzt das Bedürfniß diesen Widerspruch aufzuheben und dieser Trieb enthält die Bestimmung in sich daß ich anerkannt werde vom Andern, daß er meine Vorstellungen, mein Bewußtsein als frei gelten lasse, anerkenne d.h. mich als frei erkenne, 20 mich gelten lasse als einen solchen, daß er mich zum Gegenstande habe und ich ihn als einen freien. Näher enthält diese Pflicht des Anerkennens daß ich mir als solchen freien ein Dasein gebe, nicht im äußerlichen Objekt, sondern in dem jetzigen Gegenstand der ein Bewußtsein ist, das Bewußtsein des Andern ist jetzt der Boden, das Material, der Raum in dem ich mich 25 realisiere. So haben wir zweierlei, Ich als Ich, als sich auf sich beziehendes Selbstbewußtsein und ich als Bewußtsein meiner, mein Bewußtsein als solches das ist ein Dasein überhaupt, ich bin freies Selbstbewußtsein in mir, aber als Ich bin ich ebenso Bewußtsein von vielerlei Zwecken, Interessen, dieß ist aber die Seite des Daseins für das Selbstbewußtsein. In diesem 30 meinem Dasein ist es daß das Andere gelten soll, wie nun dieß zunächst gesetzt ist, so ist im Selbstbewußtsein hier noch nicht beides von einander unterschieden gesetzt oder vielmehr können wir sagen es ist verschieden, es ist das Bewußtsein meiner, mein Zweck, meine Besonderheit, meine Begierde u.s.w. alles dieß ist noch nicht in der Bestimmung der Allgemein- 35 heit, ist noch in der Form der unmittelbaren Einzelnheit, hier gilt noch indem

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 209: Dieser Widerspruch löst sich auf: ist als Kampf des Anerkennens vorzustellen, der sich auflöst im Verhältnis der Herrschaft und Knechtschaft.

§ 431

The process of recognition is a *struggle*, for in so far as another is an immediate and distinct existence for me, I am unable to know myself as myself within this other, and am therefore committed to the sublation of this its immediacy. Conversely, it is only in so far as I sublate the immediacy I involve, and so give determinate being to my freedom, that I can be recognized as an immediacy. The immediacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness however, in which, as in its sign and instrument, it has its own *self-awareness*, as well as its being *for others* and its mediating relation with them.

The § which follows deals with the resolution of this contradiction. In it, it is presented as a struggle for recognition which resolves itself initially in the relationship of mastery and servitude.* It is therefore not only a contradiction for us, but also for those within the relationship. Within the ego there is the identity of the subject, which has been proved for itself, and the ideality of the objective being, which at this juncture is also ego. This deficiency is not only for us. (303) Ego is this absolute mutual independence of both, and there is therefore the positing of the need to sublate this contradiction. This drive holds within itself the determination of my being recognized by another, who allows validity to or recognizes the freedom of my presentations, my consciousness i.e. who recognizes that I am free and allows me validity as such, both of us respecting the other as a free general object. More precisely, this duty of recognition involves my rendering the determinate being of such freedom to myself not in the external object, but in the present general object, which is a consciousness. The consciousness of the other is now the basis, the material, the space in which I realize myself. We therefore have two factors, ego as ego, as self-relating self-consciousness, and ego as consciousness of what is mine. My consciousness as such is a general determinate being, within myself I am free self-consciousness, but as ego I am also conscious of various purposes and interests. This, however, for self-consciousness, is the aspect of determinate being. It is within my determinate being that the other has to have validity. In the way that this is now posited initially, there is as yet, in self-consciousness, no positing of any difference between the two, so that we might rather say that the other is different, being the consciousness of what is mine, my purpose, my particularity, my desire etc. All this still lacks the determination of universality, since it still has the form of immediate

* *Kehler Ms*. p. 209: This contradiction resolves itself: it is to be presented as a struggle for recognition which resolves itself in the relationship of mastery and servitude.

ich einen als frei anerkenne, so bin ich dadurch unfrei. Wir müssen hier auf dem Standpunkte wo wir sind die Verhältnisse die wir gewohnt sind zu denken ganz vergessen, sprechen wir von Recht, Sittlichkeit, Liebe, so wissen wir indem wir die Andern anerkennen daß ich ihre persönliche, vollkommene Selbstständigkeit anerkenne und wir wissen daß ich dadurch nicht leide sondern als frei gelte, wir wissen daß indem die Andern Rechte haben ich auch Rechte habe, oder mein Recht ist wesentlich auch das des Andern d.h. ich bin freie Person, damit ist wesentlich identisch daß auch die Andern rechtliche Personen sind. Im Wohl= (304) wollen, in der Liebe geht meine Persönlichkeit nicht zu Grunde, hier aber ist ein solches Verhältniß noch nicht, sondern nach einer Seite ist die Bestimmung die daß ich als freies Selbstbewußtsein zugleich noch unmittelbar einzelnes Selbstbewußtsein bin, die unmittelbare Einzelnheit meines Selbstbewußtseins und meine Freiheit sind noch nicht von einander geschieden und insofern kann ich von meiner Besonderheit nichts aufgeben, ohne meine freie Selbstständigkeit aufzugeben. Im rechtlichen Verhältniß weiß ich, daß wenn ich das Eigenthum des Anderen respektire ich dadurch nicht nur nicht leide, sondern daß das Recht auch mein Recht in sich enthält, ich habe da verzichtet auf das was das Eigenthum des Anderen ist. Hier ist hingegen das Selbstbewußtsein noch unmittelbar einzelnes, dieß hat von seiner eigenen Einzelnheit noch nicht abstrahirt, sondern es herrscht noch die Begierde, was also Andere besitzen ist dem Selbstbewußtsein eine Beschränkung seiner Freiheit insofern es irgend ein Interesse, eine Begierde hat. Oder nach der anderen Seite, dem folgenden Standpunkte gemäß bin ich freies Selbstbewußtsein, auf das sich andere Interessen beziehen und dieß macht die Besonderheit aus, auf diese Besonderheit habe ich noch nicht verzichtet, habe sie noch nicht von mir unterschieden, noch nicht abgesondert, andere haben Eigenthum dieß könnte mir nützen nach meiner Besonderheit, ich nehme es daher; dieß habe ich noch nicht abgethan und habe das Selbstbewußtsein meiner Freiheit noch nicht zum allgemeinen Selbstbewußtsein erhoben. Der Standpunkt ist daß ich als Selbst noch unmittelbar einzeln bin, meine Besonderheit noch die ist die auf sich nicht Verzicht gethan ist,* nach ihrer Begierde sich bestimmt, nun aber ist die Forderung meiner Anerkennung daß ich im Bewußtsein des Anderen gelte als ein Freies. Die Begierde bezieht sich nur auf sich, die Forderung ist in seinem Bewußtsein ein Anderes aufzunehmen, es nicht (305) als ideell zu wissen und vor sich zu haben widersprechend dem freien Selbstbewußtsein, das Bedürfniß ist im Allgemeinen das Realisieren, das Gelten in einem Andern, dieß widerspricht dem Selbstbewußtsein auf diesem Standpunkte und das Selbstbewußtsein muß sich dagegen wehren ein Anderes als freies anzuerkennen, so wie auf der anderen Seite jedes darauf los gehen muß

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 211: Ich als Selbstbewußtsein bin noch unmittelbar einzelnes, das hier seine Besonderheit noch nicht auf sich verzichtet hat.

singularity. It is still the case that in that I recognize another as being free, I lose my freedom. At this present standpoint we have to completely forget the relationships we are used to thinking about. If we speak of right, ethicality, love, we know that in that we recognize the others, I recognize their complete personal independence. We know too that I do not suffer on this account, but have validity as a free being, that in that the others have rights I have them too, or that my right is also essentially that of the other i.e. that I am a free person, and that this is essentially the same as the others' also being persons with rights. Benevolence (304) or love does not involve the submergence of my personality. Here, however, there is as yet no such relationship, for one aspect of the determination is that of my still being, as a free self-consciousness, an immediate and single one. In so far as the immediate singularity of my self-consciousness and my freedom are not yet separated, I am unable to surrender anything of my particularity without surrendering my free independence. Within the legal relationship, I know that if I respect the other's property I am not only at no disadvantage, but that the right also contains my right, which involves my not claiming the other's property. The self-consciousness here is still immediate and singular however, for it has not yet abstracted from its singularity. Desire is still predominant, and in so far as self-consciousness has any interest or desire, it takes what others possess to be a limitation on its freedom. On the other hand moreover, in accordance with the following standpoint I am free self-consciousness, the centre of other interests. This constitutes the particularity which I have not yet renounced, not yet distinguished from myself, not yet divided off. Others have property which might be of use to me as a particularity, and I therefore appropriate it. I have not yet discarded this particularity, not yet raised the self-consciousness of my freedom into universal self-consciousness. The standpoint is that of my still being immediately singular as a self, of my particularity being that which has not renounced itself,* of its determining itself in accordance with its desire. However, my recognition now demands that I should have validity in the consciousness of the other as a free being. Desire relates itself only to itself, and what is now demanded is that the ego should take up another into its consciousness, not (305) know it as being of an ideal nature and have it before itself in contradiction of free self-consciousness. Within the universal, need constitutes realization, being effective within an other. This contradicts self-consciousness at this standpoint, and it must resist recognizing an other as a free being, just as, on the other hand, each must concern itself with

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 211: As self-consciousness I am still an immediate singularity which has not yet renounced its particularity.

von dem Anderen zu verlangen in seinem Selbstbewußtsein anerkannt zu werden, gesetzt zu sein als ein Selbstständiges. – Wir haben hier bloß einzelne Selbstbewußtsein gegeneinander, die könnten einander ruhig gehen lassen und friedlich mit einander ruhen nach idealischer und idyllischer Weise, denn Herrschbegierde ist ein böser Trieb, er mag herkommen woher er will 5 u.s.w.* Aber das wahrhafte Verhältniß ist daß das einzelne Selbst es nicht ertragen kann, daß das Andere gegen ihn als selbstständig sei, sie müssen daher nothwendig in einen Kampf gerathen. Die Selbstständigkeit des Andern macht die Forderung an mich daß in meinem Selbstbewußtsein ein Anderes für mich als selbstständig sei, dieß ist der Trieb der Herrschsucht 10 und dieß ist die höhere, absolute Nothwendigkeit vom Anderen anerkannt zu werden, es ist der Trieb daß das Selbstbewußtsein sich realisire und zwar in dem Boden der der wahrhafte Boden seines Daseins ist, der des Bewußtseins.† Dieß ist dann widersprechend, denn eben ich auf diesem Standpunkte bin als einzeln Selbstständiges und als Ich mit dieser seiner Unmittelbarkeit 15 noch ganz identisch; es ist so die Idee der Freiheit des Selbstbewußtseins was die Quelle dessen ausmacht was wir Herrschsucht und dergleichen nennen, geltend kann ich mich machen eben noch nicht bejahen die Selbstständigkeit im Bewußtsein eines Anderen, weil dieß Bejahtsein die Negation der freien Selbstständigkeit eines Anderen ist, weil sein Bewußtsein noch nicht un- 20 mittelbar identisch ist mit der (306) Freiheit einander anzuerkennen. Als Selbstständige wäre nach dieser unmittelbaren Identität eins unterworfen unter das Andere, aber in dem gesitteten Zustande besonders der Familie, der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, des Staats anerkenne ich jeden und bin anerkannt, ganz ohne Kampf, da ist sittliches, rechtliches Verhältniß vorhanden, hier 25 aber kann dieß noch nicht der Fall sein. Diese Anerkennung geht nicht bloß auf die Ehre, auf das Anerkennen in der Vorstellung des Anderen, so wenig als die unmittelbare Einzelnheit sich abgetrennt hat von der Selbstständigkeit, ebenso wenig hat es die Vorstellung gethan, sondern der Mensch muß in der ganzen Existenz anerkannt werden. Aber das Anerkanntwerden betrifft 30 hier nur das Verhältniß daß ich der Herr bin und er der Knecht, er muß mir so dienen.‡ Die Nothwendigkeit des Selbstbewußtseins ist sich Dasein zu geben in einem anderen Bewußtsein d.h. anerkannt zu werden von einem Anderen, aber sie sind beide nur unmittelbar daseiende gegen einander, damit ist das Anerkennen des anderen Selbstbewußtseins das Aufheben meiner Selbst- 35 ständigkeit, meiner Freiheit, weil ich noch als dieser gesetzt bin so kann ich noch nicht meinen partikulären einzelnen Willen aufheben, dieß ist die

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 211: Die könnten einander ruhig gehen lassen, friedlich neben einander wohnen; Herrschbegierde ist ein böser Trieb, mag herkommen, wo er will . . .

† *Kehler Ms.* S. 212: . . .; das Selbstbewußtsein will sich Realität geben in dem wahrhaften Boden seiner Realität, seines Daseins, des Bewußtseins eines anderen.

‡ *Kehler Ms.* SS. 212–213: . . ., denn indem ich in seiner Vorstellung anerkannt werde, muß ich in seiner ganzen Existenz anerkannt werden, er ist noch (213) ein ganzes, er muß mir dienen . . .

eliciting recognition within the other's self-consciousness, being posited as an independent being. – We have here simply single and mutually opposed self-consciousnesses, which could allow one another to move undisturbedly and rest peacefully together in an ideal and idyllic manner, for imperiousness is an evil drive, whatever its origin etc.* The true relationship is however that of the single self's not being able to bear the other's being independent of it, so that they necessarily drift into a struggle. The independence of the other demands of me that another should have being for me as an independent being, within my self-consciousness. This is the drive of imperiousness, and this is the higher and absolute necessity of being recognized by the other. The drive is that of the self-realization of self-consciousness, – on the basis of consciousness moreover, which is the true basis of its determinate being.† This is then contradictory, for at this standpoint it is precisely I who am as a single independent being, and as ego I am still completely identical with this its immediacy. It is therefore the Idea of the freedom of self-consciousness which constitutes the source of what we call imperiousness etc. I am just able to assert myself. I am not yet able to affirm the independence, in consciousness, of another however, for this affirmed being is the negation of the free independence of an other, consciousness of which is not yet immediately identical with the (306) freedom of mutual recognition. As an independent being, one would be subordinate to the other in accordance with this immediate identity, but in the civilized milieu of the family, civil society, the state, I recognize and am recognized by everyone, without any struggle. There, the ethical and legal relationship is present, but here this cannot yet be so. This recognition is not only a matter of honour, of being presentatively recognized by the other, for since presentation has no more divided itself off from independence than immediate singularity has, the whole existence of the person has to be recognized. Here, however, being recognized only involves the relationship of my being the master and he the servant, and of his therefore having to serve me.‡ It is necessary to self-consciousness that it should give itself determinate being in another consciousness i.e. be recognized by another. Since they are both merely immediate determinate beings in respect of one another however, the recognition of the other self-consciousness constitutes the sublation of my independence, my freedom. The immediate determination is that on account of my still being posited as independent, I am still unable to sublate the particular singularity of my will.

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 211: They could allow one another to move undisturbedly, dwell peacefully together; imperiousness is an evil drive, whatever its origin.

† *Kehler Ms.* p. 212: Self-consciousness wants to give itself reality on the true basis of its reality, its determinate being, that of consciousness of another.

‡ *Kehler Ms.* pp. 212–213: . . . for in that I am presentatively recognized by him, I have to be recognized within his whole existence, he is still (213) a whole, he has to serve me.

nächste Bestimmung. Hier kann das Anerkanntwerden des Einen durch den Anderen nicht statt finden weil jedes seine Selbstständigkeit behauptet, so kann jedes das Andere in sich nicht anerkennen um seiner eigenen Freiheit willen, aber es kann auch nicht anerkannt werden von dem Andern, wegen der Weise wie es für das Andere ist. Einmal kann diese Anerkennung nicht 5 statt finden um der unmittelbaren Einzelnheit des Selbstbewußtseins willen, aber auch insofern jedes für das Andere ist erscheint es dem Andern in einer Gestalt, in einer Weise in der das Andere es nicht anerkennen kann, denn es erscheint als unmittelbar einzelnes, äußerliches Dasein, nicht als freies, bloß als unmittelbar Lebendiges, als abstraktes Ich, aber nicht wirklich frei in 10 seinem Dasein und da= (307) mit ist der Widerspruch gesetzt dessen Auflösung der gegenseitige Zwang, Kampf ist.

§ 432

Der Kampf des Anerkennens geht also auf Leben und Tod; jedes der beiden Selbstbewußtsein bringt das Leben des Andern in *Gefahr* und begibt sich selbst darein, aber nur als *in Gefahr*, denn ebenso ist jedes 15 auf die Erhaltung seines Lebens als des Daseins seiner Freiheit gerichtet. Der Tod des Einen, der den Widerspruch nach einer Seite auflöst, durch die abstrakte, daher rohe Negation der Unmittelbarkeit, ist so nach der wesentlichen Seite, dem Dasein des Anerkennens, welches darin zugleich aufgehoben wird, ein neuer 20 Widerspruch, und der höhere als der erste.

Das Selbstbewußtsein ist auf das Realisiren getrieben und die Anerkennung kann von jedem nicht durch seine Freiheit geschehen, es ist also in der Nothwendigkeit der Forderung des Anerkennens die Weise der Thätigkeit die entritt Kampf, Gewalt, Zwang, es wendet sich jedes an das 25 Physische, an das physische Dasein des Anderen und gebraucht Gewalt dagegen. Damit ist ein neuer Widerspruch, der freie Mensch ist nicht zu zwingen, gezwungen kann er nicht werden, so ist also eine andere Form des Widerspruchs und mit diesem Zwang den jeder gegen den Andern ausübt, das Dasein des Andern angreift, damit ist verbunden daß jeder sich in die 30 Gefahr setzt gezwungen zu werden, sein Dasein, sein Leben in Gefahr bringt. Zunächst gefährdet er nur das Dasein des Anderen aber um der ursprünglichen Identität willen ist jedes was er gegen das Andere thut auch gegen sich selbst gethan, er bringt so auch sein eigenes Dasein in Gefahr. Dieß ist nun die Einleitung zum nächsten Standpunkt, daß jeder sich und den Andern in 35 Gefahr bringt und mittelst der Gewalt die er gegen den Andern versucht wird ein Widerspruch begangen, er will den Andern zwingen ihn anzuerkennen,

At this juncture there can be no recognition of the one by the other, since both assert their independence. What is more, each is unable to recognize the other within itself, on account of its own freedom, and on account of the mode of its being for the other, its being recognized by it. This recognition cannot
5 take place, partly on account of the immediate singularity of the self-consciousness, but also in so far as the being of each appears for the other in a + shape or mode in which it is unable to recognize it because of its appearing as an immediate, singular and external determinate being, – not as a free, but merely as an immediate living being, – as abstract ego, but not actually free in
10 its determinate being. It is (307) this that posits the contradiction which is resolved by mutual coercion, struggle. +

§ 432

The struggle for recognition is therefore a matter of life and death. Each self-consciousness *imperils* not only the life of the other but also itself. It merely *imperils* itself however, for each is equally committed
15 to the preservation of its life, in that this constitutes the existence of its freedom. One aspect of the contradiction is resolved through the abstract and consequently crude negation of immediacy, the death of one of the contestants. Yet since this simultaneously sublates the essential aspect, the determinate being of recognition, it gives rise to a
20 new and higher contradiction. +

Self-consciousness is driven towards realization. Since recognition cannot + come about through the freedom of each, the mode of activity, the occurrence of struggle, force, coercion, is intrinsic to the necessity for the demand for recognition. Each has recourse to what is physical, to the physical
25 determinate being of the other, and uses force, which gives rise to a new contradiction. Since the free person is not to be coerced, and cannot be, + contradiction takes on a new form. Involved in this force which each applies to the other in order to assail his determinate being, is the factor of each opening himself to the danger of being coerced, risking his determinate
30 being, his life. At first he only endangers the determinate being of the other, but on account of the original identity, everything he does to the other is also done to himself so that he also endangers his own determinate being. This is + now the initiation of the next standpoint, which is that of each endangering himself and the other. By means of the force each attempts to use on the
35 other, a contradiction arises, for while each wants to coerce the other into

da er doch nicht gezwungen werden kann und er selbst anerkannt sein will vom freien Selbstbewußtsein des Andern während er ihm doch Gewalt anthut. Damit daß jeder sich in das Verhältniß setzt Gewalt zu leiden vom Anderen, beweist jeder zugleich die Gleichgültigkeit gegen sein Dasein, gegen seine Freiheit die er in ihrem Dasein in Gefahr bringt. Jeder übt Gewalt aus gegen den Andern und bringt sich in Gefahr selbst Gewalt zu leiden, als unfrei behandelt zu werden, es ist selbst darin enthalten die negative Bestimmung gegen sein Dasein indem er es in Gefahr bringt und indem er seine Gleichgültigkeit gegen sein Dasein setzt behauptet er es auch. (308) Abstrakt consequent wäre um sein Leben zu behaupten es nicht in Gefahr zu bringen, aber von jeder Bestimmung ist auch das Entgegengesetzte vorhanden. Das Ende ist die Auflösung des Widerspruchs aber auf unvollkommene Weise, nach der Grundbestimmung daß die Anerkennung nicht geschehen kann außer durch Unterwerfung des Andern, Aufheben der freien Selbstständigkeit des Andern. Das Anerkannt werden des Andern muß zu Stande kommen und zunächst unmittelbar so daß das Eine seinen Willen unterwirft, die Selbstständigkeit seines Willens aufgiebt, eine Auflösung des Widerspruchs die wieder Widerspruch in sich ist. So ist das Verhältniß von Herrschaft und Knechtschaft gesetzt, der welcher das Leben vorzieht ist der Unterworfne, der Diener.*

§ 433

Indem das Leben so wesentlich als die Freiheit ist, so endigt sich der Kampf zunächst als *einseitige* Negation mit der Ungleichheit, daß das Eine der Kämpfenden das Leben vorzieht, sich als einzelnes Selbstbewußtsein erhält, sein Anerkanntsein aber aufgibt, das Andere aber + an seiner Beziehung auf sich selbst [fest] hält und vom Ersten als dem Unterworfenen anerkannt wird: – das *Verhältnis* der *Herrschaft* und *Knechtschaft*.

Der Kampf des Anerkennens und die Unterwerfung unter einen Herrn ist die *Erscheinung*, in welcher das Zusammenleben der Menschen, als ein Beginnen der *Staaten*, hervorgegangen ist. Die *Gewalt*, welche in dieser Erscheinung Grund ist, ist darum nicht Grund des *Rechts*, obgleich das *notwendige* und *berechtigte* Moment im Übergange des *Zustandes* des in die Begierde und Einzelnheit versenkten Selbstbewußtseins in den Zustand des allgemeinen

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 214: Der das Leben vorzieht vor Selbständigkeit, sich zwingen läßt, ist der Unterworfene, Gehorchende, Diener.

recognizing him, he cannot be coerced, and he himself wants to be recognized by the free self-consciousness of the other against whom he is using force. In that each enters into the relationship of suffering force from the other, each at the same time shows indifference to his own determinate being, to his own freedom, the determinate being of which he is setting at risk. Each uses force on the other, and opens himself to the danger of suffering force, as not being treated as being free. Each, in that he endangers this being, contains in himself the negative determination opposed to his determinate being, and in that he posits his indifference to it, also asserts it. (308) It would be abstractly consistent of each to assert his life and not to endanger it, but the opposite of every determination is also present, and the end here is the resolution of the contradiction. It is, however, an imperfect resolution, involving the basic determination of the recognition's not being able to occur without the subjection of the other, the sublation of the other's free independence. There has to be recognition of the other, and it must come about initially in an immediate manner, so that the one subjects and surrenders the independence of his will, a resolution of the contradiction which is in itself a further contradiction. It is thus that the relationship of master and servant is posited; he who prefers to live being the subject, the one who serves.* +

§ 433

Since life is as essential as freedom, the initial outcome of the struggle, as a *onesided* negation, is inequality. While one of the combatants prefers life, and gives up being recognized in order to preserve himself as a single self-consciousness, the other holds fast to his self-relation and is recognized by the former as his superior. This is the *relationship* of *mastery* and *servitude*.

It is through the *appearance* of this struggle for recognition and submission to a master, that *states* have been initiated out of the social life of men. Consequently, the *force* which is the foundation of this appearance is not the basis of *right*, although it does constitute the *necesary* and *justified* moment by which self-consciousness makes the transition from the *condition* of being immersed in desire and singularity into that of its universality. This transitional self- +

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 214: He who prefers life to independence, who allows himself to be coerced, is the subject, the one who obeys, who serves.

Selbstbewußtseins. Es ist der äußerliche oder *erscheinende Anfang* der Staaten, nicht ihr *substantielles Prinzip*.

\+ Aber das Leben ist ein ebenso wesentliches Moment als das Selbstbewußtsein, die Freiheit des Daseins kann nur erreicht werden im Leben eines Menschen, dies ist wesentliches Moment. Der Kampf des Anerkennens und 5 die Unterwerfung unter einen Herrn ist die Erscheinung, in welcher das Zusammenleben der Menschen, als ein Beginnen der Staaten, hervorgegangen ist. Einerseits ist die Entstehung der Staaten patriarchalisch, + andererseits entstehen sie durch Gewalt, Zwang, indem viele Einzelne einem + Willen, einem Herrscher unterworfen werden. Die Gewalt, welche in dieser 10 Erscheinung Grund ist, ist darum nicht Grund des Rechts; obgleich das nothwendige und berechtigte Moment im Uebergange des Zustandes des in die Begierde und Einzelnheit versenkten Selbstbewußtseins in den Zustand des allgemeinen Selbstbewußtseins. Gewalt, Herrschsucht ist die Form in der das Anerkanntwerden des Selbstbewußtseins durch ein anderes Selbst- 15 bewußtsein allein zu Stande kommen kann. Wir nennen solche Völker Barbaren insofern sie im Allgemeinen noch in dem Fürsichsein der Begierde fest sind, das Rohe ist sofern der Mensch auf seine Begierde als Einzelnes geneigt (309) ist, Selbstsucht u.s.w. Hier ist nun Gewalt nothwendig und berechtigt, Heroen haben diese Gewalt gebraucht und so Staaten gestiftet.* 20

§ 434

Dies Verhältnis ist einerseits, da das Mittel der Herrschaft, der Knecht, in seinem Leben gleichfalls erhalten werden muß, *Gemeinsamkeit* des Bedürfnisses und der Sorge für dessen Befriedigung. An die Stelle der rohen Zerstörung des unmittelbaren Objekts tritt die Erwerbung, Erhaltung und Formieren desselben als des Vermit- 25 telnden, worin die beiden Extreme der Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit sich zusammenschließen; – die Form der Allgemeinheit in Befriedigung des Bedürfnisses ist ein *daurendes* Mittel und eine die Zukunft berücksichtigende und sichernde Vorsorge.

\+ „Das Verhältnis der Herrschaft und Knechtschaft ist erstens nach seiner 30 Identität eine Gemeinsamkeit des Bedürfnisses der Begierde und der Sorge für ihre Befriedigung, und an die Stelle der rohen Zerstörung des unmittel-

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 214: Die Heroen sind es, die diese Gewalt gebraucht, und eine Vereinigung gestiftet haben.

consciousness is not the *substantial principle*, but the external or *apparent beginning* of states. +

Life, however, is just as essential a moment as self-consciousness, a person's life being an essential moment in that the freedom of the determinate
5 being can only be attained within it. It is through the appearance of this + struggle for recognition and submission to a master, that states have been initiated out of the social life of men. On the one hand, their emergence is patriarchal, while on the other hand they have their origin in the force and coercion by means of which numerous single beings are subjected to the will
10 of one master. Consequently, the force which is the foundation of this appearance is not the basis of right, although it does constitute the necessary and justified moment by which self-consciousness makes the transition from the condition of being immersed in desire and singularity into that of its universality. The only form in which the recognition of one self-conscious-
15 ness by another can be brought about is that of force, imperiousness. Those peoples who in general are still fixed in the being-for-self of desire, are said to be barbarous. This raw state exists in so far as man is bent upon his desire as a single being, (309) is self-seeking etc. Force is then necessary and justified, and heroes have founded states by using it.* +

§ 434

20 **Since the means of mastery, the servant, has also to be kept alive, one aspect of this relationship consists of *community* of need and + concern for its satisfaction. Crude destruction of the immediate object is therefore replaced by the acquisition, conservation and formation of it, and the object is treated as the mediating factor**
25 **within which the two extremes of independence and dependence unite themselves. The form of universality in the satisfying of need is a *perpetuating* means, a provision which takes the future into account and secures it.** +

"Initially, in accordance with its identity, the relationship of mastery and
30 servitude consists of a community of need deriving from desire, and of concern for the satisfaction of it. Crude destruction of the immediate object is +

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 214: It is the heroes who have used this force and created a unity.

baren Objekts, tritt die Erwerbung, Erhaltung und Formirung desselben als des Vermittelnden, worin die beiden Extreme der Selbstständigkeit und Unselbstständigkeit sich zusammenschließen."

§ 435

Zweitens nach dem Unterschiede hat der Herr in dem Knechte und dessen Dienste die Anschauung des Geltens seines *einzelnen* Fürsich- 5 seins; und zwar vermittelst der Aufhebung des unmittelbaren Fürsichseins, welche aber in einen Andern fällt. – Dieser, der Knecht, aber arbeitet sich im Dienste des Herrn seinen Einzel- und Eigenwillen ab, hebt die innere Unmittelbarkeit der Begierde auf und macht in dieser Entäußerung und der Furcht des Herrn den Anfang 10 der Weisheit, – den Übergang zum *allgemeinen Selbstbewußtsein.*

\+ „Zweitens, nach seinem Unterschiede hat der Herr in dem Knechte und dessen Dienste die Anschauung der Objektivität seines einzelnen Fürsichseins, in der Aufhebung desselben, aber insofern es einem Andern angehört. – Der Knecht aber arbeitet sich im Dienste des Herrn seinen Einzel= oder 15 Eigenwillen ab, hebt seine innere Unmittelbarkeit auf; und macht durch diese Entäußerung und die Furcht des Herrn den Anfang der Weisheit, – den Uebergang zum allgemeinen Selbstbewußtsein." – Der Wille des Herrn gilt und nicht der des Dieners, es ist ein Wille und dieser ist schon ein allgemeiner, es ist nicht nur der Wille dieses Selbsts, es ist ein breiter gewordener Wille. 20 Der Knecht hat zu arbeiten für die Begierde des Herrn, sie mag Gestalt haben wie sie will, aber zugleich ist die Allgemeinheit vorhanden, der Wille, der subjektive Wille, die Begierde ist erweitert, der Herr ist Wille in diesem Bewußtsein und auch im Bewußtsein des Knechts. Indem nun jetzt nur ein Wille, der des Herrn ist, so ist dieser Wille zugleich selbstständiger Wille, ist 25 auf seine Begierden gerichtet, der Knecht ist insofern Instrument, nicht Zweck an sich, aber dieß Instrument ist zugleich auch (310) Bewußtsein, wenigstens der Möglichkeit nach, es ist die Möglichkeit des freien Willens darin. Der Unterworfene kann so seinen eigenen Willen wieder an sich nehmen, er kann sich jeden Augenblick empören, das Prinzip ist das ganz 30 abstrakte Ich, das sich von seiner Verbindlichkeit los sagen kann, zumal da sie nicht rechtlich ist, der Sklave hat keine Pflichten wie keine Rechte. Das Instrument dient dem Herrn daher auch mit Willen, bleibt an sich freies Selbstbewußtsein und dieser Wille des Knechts muß dem Herrn geneigt gemacht werden, er muß für den Knecht als Lebendiges sorgen, ihn schonen 35 als an sich freien Willen, so wird der Knecht in die Gemeinsamkeit der

therefore replaced by the acquisition, conservation and formation of it, and the object is treated as the mediating factor within which the two extremes of independence and dependence unite themselves."

§ 435

The second factor in the difference is that in the servant and his services the master has an intuition of the supremacy of his *single* being-for-self. But although he certainly has this through the sublation of immediate being-for-self, it is a sublation which occurs within another. – The servant, on the contrary, works off the singularity and egoism of his will in the service of the master, sublates the inner immediacy of desire, and in this privation and fear of the Lord makes, – and it is the beginning of wisdom, – the transition to *universal self-consciousness*.

"The second factor in the difference is that in the servant and his services, the master has an intuition of the objectivity of his single being-for-self in its sublation, although only in so far as this being-for-self belongs to another. – The servant, on the contrary, works off the singularity and egoism of his will in the service of the master, sublates his inner immediacy, and through his privation and fear of the Lord makes, – and it is the beginning of wisdom, – the transition to universal self-consciousness." – It is the will of the master which prevails, not that of he who serves. It is one will, and it is already universal, a will which has broadened out, not merely the will of a single self. Although the servant has to work in accordance with the desire of the master regardless of what this desire is, there is at the same time a universality present, for will, subjective will, desire, is extended, the master being the will within his own consciousness as well as within that of the servant. In that there is now only one will, that of the master, it is at the same time independent, directed in accordance with his desires, and to this extent the servant is an instrument, having no purpose of his own. This instrument is at the same time also (310) consciousness however, or at least has the possibility of being it, and therefore contains the possibility of free will. He who has been subjected can reassert his own will, can rebel at any moment, the principle here being that of the wholly abstract ego, which can renounce its obligation, especially if it is unjustified. The slave has no duties, just as he has no rights. The instrument also serves the master willingly therefore, being implicitly free self-consciousness, and the servant's will therefore has to be made favourably inclined toward the master, who has to care for him as a living being, take care of him as an implicitly free will. By this means, the servant is

Vorsorge aufgenommen, so wird er auch Zweck, er gilt, er hat seine Ehre, ist Glied der Familie. Der Sklave kann keine Ehre haben, der Knecht hat seine Ehre in der Treue. Es ist so Gemeinsamkeit der Vorsorge für die Befriedigung der Begierde, damit ist Formirung des Objekts vorhanden, das Objekt muß im Bewußtsein genommen werden, dieß ist Sorge für die Zukunft und dieß ist eine Verallgemeinerung in Rücksicht auf die Befriedigung der Bedürfnisse. Ich habe ein Bedürfniß immer nur jetzt, durch die Sorge wird es verallgemeinert. Die andere Seite ist daß durch das Dienen der eigene Wille abgearbeitet wird, es ist zu thun um das Negative des einzelnen selbstischen Willens, mehr eigentlich um die Aufhebung der Einzelnheit des Selbstbewußtseins, denn es ist hier vom wahrhaften Willen noch nicht die Rede. Diese Selbstständigkeit, des Selbstbewußtseins ist aufgegeben, der Knecht dient, gehorcht und in dem Dienen wird es realisirt, wird zur Gewohnheit auf seinen eigenen Willen zu verzichten, der Begierde nicht freien Lauf zu lassen, er macht durch die (311) Furcht des Herrn den Anfang zur Weisheit. Jeder Mensch muß gehorchen lernen und wer befehlen soll muß gehorcht haben + und gehorchen gelernt haben d.h. nicht nach seinem unmittelbar einzelnen Willen, der selbstsüchtigen Begierde gehen. Wer befehlen will muß vernünftig befehlen, nur wer vernünftig befiehlt dem wird gehorcht, das Rechte ist das Allgemeine, dieß ist das worin nicht der Inhalt selbstsüchtige Begierde ist, es wird gehorcht dem der das Rechte hat zu befehlen d.h. die Menschen gehorchen dem was sie von selbst geneigt sind zu thun und dieß ist das an und für sich Allgemeine. Zum Befehlen gehört Verstand um nichts albernes Abgeschmaktes vorzubringen, und um das Allgemeine zu wissen muß verzichtet sein auf die Einzelnheit des Selbstbewußtseins. Dieß Moment kommt im Leben jedes Menschen vor, verzogene Menschen denen man ihren Willen in Allem gelassen hat sind hernach die schwächlichsten, sie sind unfähig zu wahrhaften Zwecken, Interessen, Geschäften für echte Zwecke. Die Geschichte der Staaten stellt diesen Durchgangspunkt vor. Zuerst ist ein Zustand in dem der Wille des Einzelnen, die Begierde gebändigt ist durch den Willen des Herrschers, das Volk ist so noch roh, wie z.B. bei den Griechen, dann erklären sie sich frei, sind aber der Gemeinsamkeit nicht fähig, können die subjektiven Zwecke nicht auf die Seite werfen. Solon gab den Atheniensern Gesetze und entfernte sich sodann, unmittelbar darauf macht sich Pisistratus zum Tyrannen auf, er machte sich mit Recht zum Herrscher aber er ließ die solonischen Gesetze gelten und dadurch sind die Athenienser an dieselben gewöhnt, und wie sie ihnen zur Sitte geworden waren wurden die Herrscher überflüssig, Pisistratus Söhne wurden daher verjagt. – Dieß ist nun der Uebergang (312) vom einzelnen Selbstbewußtsein der Begierde zum Allgemeinen, was durch das Verhältniß zu Stande kommt ist das allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein überhaupt.

brought into the community of providing, so that he also has a purpose, counts, is to be honoured, is a member of the family. The slave cannot be honoured, but the servant has his honour in trust. This gives rise to communal provision for the satisfaction of desire, which involves the forming of the object in hand. The object has to be consciously assimilated, the future has to be provided for, and this constitutes a universalization in respect of the satisfying of needs. A need is always only a present matter, but through making provision for it, it is universalized. The other aspect is that of one's own will being worked off through service. This involves the negative of the single will of the self, or rather the sublation of the singularity of self-consciousness, for at this juncture we are not yet speaking of the true will. This independence, this self-consciousness, is abandoned, the servant attends, obeys, and in this service there is a realization of self-consciousness, which acquires the habit of renouncing its own will, of not allowing a free rein to desire. For the servant, (311) fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Everyone has to learn to obey, and he who is to command must have obeyed and learnt to obey i.e. must not follow his immediate and single will, his egoistic desire. – Whoever wants to command must do so reasonably, for only he who commands reasonably will be obeyed. What is right is what is universal, and its content is not egoistic desire. He who has the right to command will be obeyed i.e. people will do obediently that which they themselves are inclined to, which is what is universal in and for itself. Command involves understanding how to avoid what is preposterous and absurd, and knowing what is universal involves the renunciation of the singularity of self-consciousness. This is a moment which occurs in the life of everyone, and persons who have been spoiled, who have had no curb put upon their will, are subsequently the weakest, being incapable of true purposes and interests, of acting in a genuinely purposeful manner. This point of transition is to be found in the history of states. The primary condition is that in which the will of the single person, desire, is restrained, – through the will of the ruler. As was the case with the Greeks, the population is still raw therefore; they then declare themselves to be free, but are incapable of forming a community, unable to centre upon anything but subjective purposes. Solon gave the Athenians laws and then retired. Immediately afterwards Pisistratus established his tyranny, and he was justified in assuming power. He allowed Solon's laws to remain in force however, and as the Athenians got used to them and they became customary, the rulers became superfluous and the sons of Pisistratus were therefore driven out. – This is now the transition (312) from the single self-consciousness of desire to what is universal. In general, the relationship brings about universal self-consciousness.

γ) *Das allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein*

§ 436

Das allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein ist das affirmative Wissen seiner selbst im andern Selbst, deren jedes als freie Einzelnheit _absolute Selbständigkeit_ hat, aber, vermöge der Negation seiner Unmittelbarkeit oder Begierde, sich nicht vom Andern unterscheidet, 5 Allgemeines und objektiv ist und die reelle Allgemeinheit als Gegenseitigkeit so hat, als es im freien Andern sich anerkannt weiß und dies weiß, insofern es das Andere anerkennt und es frei weiß.

Dies allgemeine Widerscheinen des Selbstbewußtseins, der Begriff, der sich in seiner Objektivität als mit sich identische 10 Subjektivität und darum allgemein weiß, ist die Form des Bewußtseins der _Substanz_ jeder wesentlichen Geistigkeit, der Familie, des Vaterlandes, des Staats; sowie aller Tugenden, der Liebe, Freundschaft, Tapferkeit, der Ehre, des Ruhms. Aber dies _Erscheinen_ des Substantiellen kann auch vom Substantiellen 15 getrennt und für sich in gehaltleerer Ehre, eitlem Ruhm usf. festgehalten werden.

\+ 3) „*Das allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein* ist das positive Wissen seiner selbst im anderen Selbst, deren jedes als freie Einzelnheit absolute Selbstständigkeit hat, aber durch die Negation seiner Unmittelbarkeit sich nicht vom andern 20 unterscheidet, allgemeines und objektiv ist und die reelle Allgemeinheit so hat, als es im freien Andern sich anerkannt weiß, und dieß weiß, insofern es das Andere anerkennt und es frei weiß.“ Dieß ist das Selbstbewußtsein als allgemeines, das Ichselbst ist das Sprödeste, aber durch die Bildung ist dieß Ichselbst das an sich die freie Allgemeinheit ist reell, in seinem Dasein dieser 25 seiner Allgemeinheit gleich gemacht.* Es ist sich selbst zu wissen, seine Freiheit, seine Selbstständigkeit darin zu wissen daß ich das Andere frei weiß, also mein freies Selbstbewußtsein habe in der Freiheit des Selbstbewußtsein \+ der Anderen. Dieß allgemeine Wiederscheinen des Selbstbewußtseins, der Begriff, der sich in seiner Objektivität als mit sich identische Subjektivität 30 und darum allgemein weiß, ist die Substanz jeder wesentlichen Geistigkeit;

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 216: Ich selbst, spröderes gibt es nicht, aber durch die *Bildung* überhaupt ist dies Ich selbst, an sich die freie Allgemeinheit, reell nach seinem Dasein, seinen Bestimmungen dieser seiner Allgemeinheit gleichgemacht.

γ) *Universal self-consciousness*

§ 436

***Universal self-consciousness* is the affirmative knowing of one's self in the other self. Each self has *absolute independence* as a free singularity, but on account of the negation of its immediacy or desire, does not differentiate itself from the other. Each is therefore universal and objective, and possesses the real nature of universality as reciprocity, in that it knows itself to be recognized by its free counterpart, and knows that it knows this in so far as it recognizes the other and knows it to be free.**

This universal reflectedness of self-consciousness is the Notion, which since it knows itself to be in its objectivity as subjectivity identical with itself, knows itself to be universal. This form of consciousness constitutes not only the *substance* of all the essential spirituality of the family, the native country, the state, but also of all virtues, – of love, friendship, valour, honour, fame. However, this *appearance* of what is substantial may also be divorced from substantiality and cultivated for its own sake, as affected honour, idle fame etc.

3) "*Universal self-consciousness* is the positive knowing of one's self in the other self. Each has absolute independence as a free singularity, but does not differentiate itself from the other through the negation of its immediacy. Each is therefore universal and objective, and possesses the real nature of universality in that it knows itself to be recognized by its free counterpart, and knows that it knows this in so far as it recognizes the other and knows it to be free." This is self-consciousness in its universality. Although the ego itself is what is most unyielding, in that it is formed, it is the equal of its universality in its determinate being, and is therefore implicitly free universality, of a real nature.* Such self-consciousness is self-knowledge, and knows of its freedom or independence in that the ego knows the other to be free. It is thus that I have my free self-consciousness in the freedom of the others' self-consciousness. This universal reflectedness of self-consciousness is the Notion, which since it knows itself to be in its objectivity as subjectivity identical with itself, knows itself to be universal. It is not only the substance

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 216: Although there is nothing more unyielding than the ego itself, in that it is generally trained, its determinations are the equal of this its universality, and it is therefore implicitly free universality, of a real nature in its determinate being.

der Familie, des Vaterlandes, des Rechts; so wie alle Tugenden, – der Liebe, Freundschaft, Tapferkeit, der Ehre, des Ruhms. Alle diese Verhältnisse haben zur substantiellen Grundlage das wiederscheinende Selbstbewußtsein, + ich bin und scheine dieß und dieser Schein ist im Anderen, das Dasein als Anderes ist nur ein Schein, sie sind dasselbe was ich bin und ich bin so nur im Schein des Anderen. Jedes ist im Anderen seiner selbst bewußt. Selbstbewußtsein ist zunächst Ichselbst (313) ich für mich. Die Realisirung des Selbstbewußtseins ist daß ich Dasein habe dieß Dasein ist mein Selbstbewußtsein als anerkennend die Andern und alle sind die Andern.

§ 437

Diese Einheit des Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins enthält zunächst die Einzelnen als ineinander scheinende. Aber ihr Unterschied ist in dieser Identität die ganz unbestimmte Verschiedenheit oder vielmehr ein Unterschied, der keiner ist. Ihre Wahrheit ist daher die an und für sich seiende Allgemeinheit und Objektivität des Selbstbewußtseins, – die *Vernunft*.

Die Vernunft als die *Idee* (§ 213) erscheint hier in der Bestimmung, daß der Gegensatz des Begriffs und der Realität überhaupt, deren Einheit sie ist, hier die nähere Form des für sich existierenden Begriffs, des Bewußtseins und des demselben gegenüber äußerlich vorhandenen Objektes gehabt hat.

+ „Diese Einheit des Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins hat zunächst die Einzelnen als für sich seiende gegeneinander bestehen." Was in der Allgemeinheit des Selbstbewußtseins noch ist, an sich aber schon aufgehoben ist ist die Unmittelbarkeit der Individuen, wir sprechen vom Ich als diesen und von dem Andern, diese unmittelbare Selbstständigkeit ist schon verschwunden, die unmittelbare Einzelnheit hat sich aufgehoben um sich zu gewinnen, ist mit sich selbst zusammengeflossen vermittelst der Negation der Unmittelbarkeit. Die Formen gehen uns nichts an, es sind die Formen des Gefühls, Neigung, Wohlwollen, Liebe, Freundschaft, da ist diese Identität und sie ist + die einfache Substanz dieser Gefühle. „Aber ihr Unterschied (der des Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins) ist in dieser Identität die ganz unbestimmte Verschiedenheit, oder vielmehr ein Unterschied, der keiner ist. Ihre Wahrheit ist daher die an und für sich seiende, unvermittelte Allgemeinheit und Objektivität des Selbstbewußtseins, – die Vernunft" und Vernunft als sich Dasein gebend als Bewußtsein ist die Geistigkeit. Die

of all the essential spirituality of the family, the native country, the law, but also of all virtues, – of love, friendship, valour, honour, fame. Inter-reflecting self-consciousness is the substantial basis of all these relationships. I am, and I appear as such, and this apparency has being within the other, the determinate being, as an other, being merely an apparency. They are the same as I am, and I am what I am only in the apparency of the other. Each is conscious of himself in the other. Initially, self-consciousness is the ego itself, (313) I for myself. Self-consciousness is realized in that I have determinate being, and this determinate being is the self-consciousness of my recognizing the others, all of whom are others.

§ 437

Initially, it is as they appear within each other that these single beings are held within the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness. In this identity however, their difference is a wholly indeterminate variety, or rather a difference which is not a difference. Their truth is therefore the being in and for self of the universality and objectivity of self-consciousness, – ***reason*****.**

As the ***Idea*** **(§ 213), reason appears here in the determination of its constituting the unity of the general opposition between the Notion and reality, an opposition which at this juncture has had the preciser form in which the Notion exists for itself, i.e. in which consciousness is confronted externally by the object.**

"Initially, this unity of consciousness and self-consciousness has the single beings subsisting over against it as a being-for-self." That which still has being in the universality of self-consciousness, implicitly although sublated, is the immediacy of the individuals. We speak of this ego and of the other being. This immediate independence has already disappeared, the immediate singularity has sublated itself in order to acquire itself, has merged with itself by means of the negation of immediacy. The forms, which are those of feeling, inclination, benevolence, love, friendship, do not concern us, – this is the identity constituting the simple substance of these feelings. "In this identity however, the difference (between consciousness and self-consciousness) is a wholly indeterminate variety, or rather a difference which is not a difference. Their truth is therefore the being in and for self of the unmediated universality and objectivity of self-consciousness, – reason", and as that which gives itself determinate being, as consciousness, reason is spirituality.

Tugenden sind die Individuen als solche, diese sind die subjektive Weise in der das Substantielle seine Existenz hat, so daß es scheint als ob in das Individuum als solches die Subjektivität, die Freiheit fiele und damit das Bestimmen des Allgemeinen, Substantiellen, dieß ist aber ebenso die Subjektivität an sich selbst und das Sichbestimmen kommt nicht dem 5 Subjekt, dem einzel= (314) nen Selbstbewußtsein zu, sondern diese Subjektivität, dieß Sichselbstbestimmen, dieß Anundfürsichsein ist Moment, ist Inhalt, Bestimmung des Allgemeinen selbst und die unmittelbare Einzelnheit in der diese Subjektivität erscheint ist nur eine Form, die Form der Unmittelbarkeit die erst in die Explikation, Diremtion hineintritt, 10 welche das Substantielle selbst ist, und dieß ist dann die Vernunft.

The virtues are the individuals as such, which are the subjective mode in which the substantial being has its existence. It seems, therefore, as though + subjectivity or freedom, and, therefore, the determining of what is universal and substantial, might fall within the individual as such. In its implicit self + 5 however, what is universal and substantial is also subjectivity, so that the self-determining does not pertain to the subject, the single (314) self-consciousness. This subjectivity, this self-determining, this being in and for self, is a moment, being the content or determination of what is itself universal. The immediate singularity within which this subjectivity appears + 10 is merely a form. This is the form of immediacy which first occurs in explication or diremption, which is itself what is substantial, and this is then reason. +

C. *Die Vernunft*

§ 438

Die an und für sich seiende Wahrheit, welche die Vernunft ist, ist die einfache *Identität* der *Subjektivität* des Begriffs und seiner *Objektivität* und Allgemeinheit. Die Allgemeinheit der Vernunft hat daher ebensosehr die Bedeutung des im Bewußtsein als solchem nur gegebenen, aber nun selbst *allgemeinen*, das Ich durchdringenden und befassenden *Objekts*, als des reinen *Ich*, der über das Objekt übergreifenden und es in sich befassenden reinen Form.

+ ,,Die an und für sich seiende Wahrheit, welche die Vernunft ist, ist die einfache Identität der Subjektivität des Begriffs und seiner Objektivität und Allgemeinheit." Wahrheit ist der Begriff, wir können sagen das was wir die absolute Subjektivität geheißen haben, so daß darin Realität, Objektivität, Allgemeinheit schlechthin identisch ist mit dieser Subjektivität, sie ist das Bestimmende, das Unterscheiden des Allgemeinen, es ist die Form, Wissen das weder subjektiv noch objektiv gesetzt ist, das Unterscheiden, diese Thätigkeit. Der Begriff ist insofern Subjektivität, Idealität und die Allgemeinheit ist der Boden in dem die Bestimmungen, die Formen des Objektiven Bestehen finden, des Objektiven im gewöhnlichen Sinn genommen.* Zu dieser Objektivität gehört auch das einzelne Selbstbewußtsein, es ist das Materielle, die Existenz, die Realität indem der Begriff sich einen Unterschied setzt und bis zum Unterschied des Einzelnen fortgeht. Aber die Allgemeinheit ist daß der Begriff, (315) die Subjektivität in der Unterschiedenheit schlechthin identisch mit sich bleibt. + ,,Die Allgemeinheit der Vernunft hat daher ebenso sehr die Bedeutung des im Bewußtsein gegebenen Objekts, als des Ich im Selbstbewußtsein." Diese Bedeutung hat auch andere Formen, des Dirimirens der Subjektivität, der unendlichen Form, des Begriffs, es wird unterschieden Ich im Selbstbewußtsein und andererseits das Objekt das für das Ich ist, es sind viele Ichselbst und dieß ist was wir vorhin Realität des Begriffs genannt haben die sich zu diesem Unterschied entschließt, der bestimmte Unterschied sind die vielen Ichselbst und gegenüber das Objekt, die Vernunft in der Form des Fürsichseins und in der Form des Gediegenen, Zusammenhängenden, Form der Äußerlichkeit. Wir

* *Kehler Ms.* SS. 217–218: Die Vernunft ist die an und für sich seiende Wahrheit. Wahrheit it der Begriff, so daß das, was wir Realität, Objektivität, Allgemeinheit heißen, identisch ist mit dieser Subjektivität; die Subjektivität ist überhaupt das Bestimmende, Unterscheidende des Allgemeinen, und ebenso das in Einssehen des Unterschiedenen, diese Form, die eben diese Thätigkeit ist. Die Allgemeinheit ist so zu sagen der Boden, (218) in welchem die Bestimmungen, Unterschiede der Form Bestehen gewinnen.

C. *Reason*

§ 438

The truth constituted by reason is in and for itself, the simple *identity* of the *subjectivity* of the Notion with its *objectivity* and universality. Consequently, to the extent that the universality of reason signifies the object, which is merely given as such in consciousness, but which, since it is itself *universal*, now pervades and encompasses the ego, it also signifies the pure *ego*, the pure form which includes and encompasses the *object* within itself.

"The truth constituted by reason is in and for itself, the simple identity of the subjectivity of the Notion with its objectivity and universality." Truth is the Notion, within which, since we may say that it is what we have called absolute subjectivity, – reality, objectivity, universality is simply identical with this subjectivity, which is the determining and distinguishing factor of the universal. The universal is the form, the distinguishing, this activity, knowledge posited neither subjectively nor objectively. To this extent, the Notion is subjectivity, ideality, and universality is the foundation within which the determinations find the forms of subsisting objectively, of being objective in the ordinary sense.* This objectivity also involves the single self-consciousness, – material being, existence, reality, – in that the Notion posits a difference for itself and progresses into the difference of singularity. Universality however, consists of the Notion (315) or subjectivity remaining simply self-identical within difference. "Consequently, to the extent that the universality of reason signifies the object given in consciousness, it also signifies the ego in self-consciousness." This significance also has other forms, those of the dirempting of subjectivity, of infinite form, of the Notion. The ego in self-consciousness on the one hand, is distinguished from the object which has being for the ego on the other. The many egos or selves are what we referred to previously as the reality of the Notion, which resolves itself into this difference. These egos or selves constitute determinate difference, and in respect of the object, reason in the form of being-for-self and of what is soundly coherent, in the form of externality. It is thus that we

* *Kehler Ms.* pp. 217–218: Reason is truth which is in and for itself. Since truth is the Notion, what we call reality, objectivity, universality, is identical with this subjectivity; subjectivity is the general determining and distinguishing factor of the universal, just as it is the seen unity of what is distinguished, being this form, which is precisely this activity. The universality is, so to speak, the foundation, (218) within which the determinations or differences of form gain subsistence.

sind so vom Bewußtsein aus zur Vernunft gekommen, wir sind dabei ausgegangen vom Gegensatz des Bewußtseins, oder des Objekts und des Selbstbewußtseins, Objekt heißt hier was als seiend gilt, von diesem Gegensatze sind wir zur Vernunft gekommen, zu dieser Einheit und dieß macht die Bestimmung der Vernunft selbst aus. Sie ist aber nicht die Einheit 5 des Objekts wie es im Bewußtsein ist und des Bewußtseins wie es als Selbstbewußtsein ist, sie ist die Idee, die thätige wirkende Idee, damit Einheit des Begriffs überhaupt und der Objektivitat,* das Selbstbewußtsein ist wie der Begriff für sich ist als freier Begriff, dieß ist Ich das für sich ist, Ich ist der Begriff, aber nicht wie der der Sonne, des Thiers der Pflanze, der inne- 10 wohnend ist in der Pflanze, untrennbar von der äußerlichen Realität, hingegen wie der Begriff im Selbstbewußtsein ist, ist der Begriff mein, abstrakt für sich und die Realität gegen das Selbstbewußtsein ist das Bewußt= (316) sein, Ich als sich verhaltend gegen ein Objekt, hier haben wir die Einheit des Bewußtseins als Objektivität d.h. der Begriff als Selbst- 15 bewußtsein, Ich das im Verhältniß ist zu einem Objekt als ihm äußerlich, gegeben. Vernunft überhaupt ist die Idee, die Idee ist die Vernunft, die Idee haben nicht wir, sie hat uns, so hat auch die Vernunft uns, sie ist unsere Substanz. Wenn wir sagen die Idee ist vernünftig, so ist vernünftig das Prädikat und Idee erscheint noch als selbstständig, aber sie ist das Geltende, 20 das Mächtige. Indem wir so die Vernunft betrachten müssen wir wissen daß sie das Substantielle ist, die Thätigkeit, die unendliche Form, das auch sich Sichbestimmende, dieß ist auch die Idee, sie ist nicht so ein Gemeintes, Erworbenes. Wir stellen uns vor Idee sei ein Gedachtes und Vernunft mehr an und für sich selbst, aber diese Formen müssen wir weglassen und so ist Idee 25 und Vernunft identisch. Vernunft und Idee hat so nicht bloß hier ihre Stelle daß sie hervortritt, sie tritt auch im Begreifen hervor, es ist ein Punkt wo die Idee zu ihrer Wahrheit kommt, das Andere sich zu seiner Wahrheit erhebt das seine Idee ist; Intelligenz, – später vernünftiges Wissen ist auch Vernunft.† Hier hat Vernunft die bestimmte Bedeutung von dem Gegensatze wovon sie 30 herkommt und wie die Form der Subjektivität in ihr bestimmt ist. Hier ist also in der Vernunft die Subjektivität, die Form ist bestimmt als absolute Subjektivität, die Wissen ist und die allerdings Ich ist, Persönlichkeit, in näherer Bestimmung für sich seiende Einzelnheit.

Wenn wir sagen von der Natur, der Welt sie ist vernünftig so hat (317) dieß 35

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 218: . . ., Vernunft ist aber nicht bloß die Einheit des Objekts, wie sie im Bewußtsein ist, und das Selbstbewußtsein, als Subjekt, sondern überhaupt die Thätigkeit, vorhanden, wirkliche Idee, damit Einheit des Geistes und des Objekts . . .

† *Kehler Ms.* S. 218: Wenn wir von Vernunft sprechen, so hat sie nicht bloß hier ihre Stelle, daß sie hervorkommt, sondern im Begriff kommt ein Punkt, wo sie als Resultat ist, wenn das andere sich zu seiner Wahrheit erhoben hat, welches die Idee ist. Später werden wir von der Intelligenz zum vernünftigen Wissen kommen.

have progressed from consciousness to reason, our point of departure being the contradiction of consciousness, or of the object and self-consciousness, the object at this juncture signifying that which passes for being. The determination of reason itself consists of the progression we have made from this opposition to reason, to this unity. Reason is not the unity of the object which occurs in consciousness however, nor is it the unity of consciousness which occurs in self-consciousness, it is the Idea, the actively effective Idea, and it is therefore the unity of the Notion in general with objectivity.* Self-consciousness is as the Notion which is for itself, as free Notion, which is ego as it is for itself. The ego is the Notion, although not as the indwelling Notion of the Sun, the animal, the plant, which is inseparable from the external reality. In self-consciousness the Notion is mine, abstractly for itself, and the reality opposed to self-consciousness is consciousness (316), ego as relating itself to an object. We have here the unity of consciousness as objectivity i.e. the Notion within reality as self-consciousness. At this juncture, reality is self-consciousness, ego in relationship with an object presented to it externally. Reason in general is the Idea, for the Idea is reason: we do not possess the Idea, it possesses us, so that reason also possesses us, being our substance. When we say that the Idea is rational, rational is the predicate, and the Idea, although it is what matters and has power, still appears to be independent. In that we have to regard reason in this way, we know it to be that which is substantial, activity, infinite form, that which determines itself from out of itself i.e. the Idea, which is neither fabricated nor acquired. We present the Idea to ourselves as being what is thought, and reason as being more in and for itself, but we must discard these forms and take the Idea and reason to be identical. Reason or Idea does not only have its place where it comes forth here, for it also comes forth in Notional comprehension, which is a point at which the Idea attains to its truth, at which the other raises itself to its truth, its Idea. Intelligence, which is a subsequent rational form of knowledge, is also reason.† Here, reason has the specific significance of the opposition out of which it arises, and the way in which the form of subjectivity is determined within it. At this juncture therefore, there is subjectivity in reason, the form being determined as absolute subjectivity, which is knowledge, and certainly ego, personality, – more closely determined, the being-for-self of singularity.

When we say that nature or the world is rational, this (317) has another

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 218: Reason, however, is not simply the unity of the object as it occurs in consciousness, and self-consciousness as subject, but activity in general, the actually present Idea, and, therefore, the unity of spirit and of the object.

† *Kehler Ms.* p. 218: When we speak of reason, it is not only here where it comes forth that it has its place, for when the other has raised itself to its truth which is the Idea, there is a point within the Notion at which reason has being as a result. We shall subsequently reach rational knowledge from intelligence.

einen andern Sinn nach der Seite daß die Subjektivität anders darin bestimmt ist, weniger applizirt.* Die Natur ist vernünftig d.h. sie ist Idee d.h. sie ist Darstellung, Realität des sich objektivierenden Begriffs, ihr Centrum ist der Begriff und dieß ist hier bei dieser Vernunft ebenso nur daß in der Natur so wie im† Bewußtsein noch nicht diese Subjektivität also absolut identisch mit ihrer Realität, Objektivität ist. Wenn man so bei der Natur von Begriff spricht, so ist dieß nur der Begriff als solcher nicht der für sich seiende Begriff; hier hat der Begriff die Bestimmung Begriff für sich selbst zu sein, der frei für sich existirt und diese Existenz des Begriffs für sich ist das was wir im Bewußtsein und eigentlich im Selbstbewußtsein haben. Selbstbewußtsein ist so die für sich noch einseitig existierende Form, ohne ihre absolute Objektivität, die Objektivität wie wir sie hier hatten ist die Seele, Vernunft ist hier so näher die Gewißheit seiner selbst und der Seele.

§ 439

Das Selbstbewußtsein so die Gewißheit, daß seine Bestimmungen ebensosehr gegenständlich, Bestimmungen des Wesens der Dinge, als seine eigenen Gedanken sind, ist die Vernunft, welche als diese Identität nicht nur die absolute *Substanz*, sondern die *Wahrheit* als Wissen ist. Denn sie hat hier zur eigentümlichen *Bestimmtheit*, zur immanenten Form den für sich selbst existierenden reinen Begriff, Ich, die Gewißheit seiner selbst als unendliche Allgemeinheit. – Diese wissende Wahrheit ist der *Geist*.

\+ „Die Vernunft ist daher als reine Einzelnheit der Subjektivität an und für sich bestimmt, und daher die Gewißheit, daß die Bestimmungen des Selbstbewußtseins eben so sehr gegenständlich, Bestimmungen des Wesens der Dinge, als seine eigenen Gedanken sind." Die Vernunft ist so meine Einzelnheit, allgemeine Einzelnheit nicht unmittelbar und bestimmt sich an und für sich selbst, ist Gewißheit; in der Natur ist der Begriff nicht Gewißheit, der ist nicht Wissen, hier hingegen ist Form der Vernunft. Von hier an haben wir die Vernunft und in der Form von wissender Vernunft, Vernunft die wissend ist, ihren Unterschied in sich setzt, dieß ist geistiges Bewußtsein, Selbstbewußtsein, vernünftiges Selbstbewußtsein, (318) dieß ist geistig, ist Thun des Geistes. Wir haben so Selbstbewußtsein mit der Bestimmung daß das was der Geist ist auch die Dinge sind, der Geist will wissen und indem er wissen will

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 219: Sagen wir die Welt, Natur ist vernünftig, so hat dies eine andere Seite, daß die Vernunft darin weniger expliciert ist.

† *Kehler Ms.* S. 219: . . . nur daß in der Natur, wie in der Seele, im Bewußtsein . . .

meaning in respect of subjectivity, implying that it is determined within it in another way, less applied.* Nature is rational i.e. Idea, the representation, reality, of the self-objectifying Notion. Its centre is the Notion, and this is also the case with reason at this juncture, although in nature, as in† consciousness, it is not yet this subjectivity, and so absolutely identical with its reality, objectivity. When one speaks of the Notion in respect of nature therefore, this Notion is only the Notion as such, not the Notion which is for itself. At this juncture, the Notion has the determination of being for itself, of existing freely for itself, and it is this existence of the Notion for itself that we have in consciousness, and especially in self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is therefore the still onesidedly existent form which is for itself and lacks its absolute objectivity. Objectivity as dealt with here is the soul, so that more precisely considered, reason here is the certainty of itself and of the soul.

§ 439

As the certainty that its determinations are not only its own thoughts, but to the same extent generally objective, determinations of the essence of things, self-consciousness constitutes reason, which as this identity, is not only the absolute *substance*, but *truth* as knowledge. For at this juncture the peculiar *determinateness*, the immanent form of reason is the pure Notion existing for itself, ego, self-certainty as infinite universality. – This knowing, this truth, is *spirit*.

"As the pure singularity of subjectivity, reason is therefore determined in and for itself, and is therefore the certainty that the determinations of self-consciousness are generally objective, determinations of the essence of things, to the extent that they are its own thoughts." Reason is therefore my singularity: it is not immediate but universal singularity, and determines itself in and for itself, constitutes certainty. In nature, the Notion is not certainty, nor is it knowledge, but at this juncture it is the form of reason. From here on we have reason, and in the form of knowing reason, or reason which knows, positing its difference within itself. This is spiritual consciousness, self-consciousness, rational self-consciousness. (318) Since it is spiritual, the activity of spirit, we have self-consciousness with the determination that what spirit is, things are also. Spirit wants to know, and on account of

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 219: When we say that nature or the world is rational, this has the other side to it of reason's being less explicated within the world.

† *Kehler Ms.* p. 219: . . . although in nature, the soul and consciousness . . .

hat er die Voraussetzung der Vernunft d.h. die Voraussetzung daß die Gegenstände, die Dinge an sich Bestimmungen der Vernunft sind die er selbst ist, daß so das Wahrhafte der Dinge für ihn ist. Der Geist will wissen, will denken, hat die Gewißheit daß indem er sich mit Dingen beschäftigt er sie kennen lernt, durch die Stufen der Anschauung, Vorstellung und des Denkens beschäftigt er sich mit ihnen und lernt sie so kennen. Der Geist hat + keine Angst an den Dingen, sich mit Dingen zu beschäftigen, er geht von der Gewißheit der Vernunft aus, daß die Dinge wie sie an sich sind nicht undurchdringlich für ihn sind und daß wie er sie kennen lernt sie so an sich sind und er so zur Wahrheit gelangt. – Dieß ist der Standpunkt des Geistes.

+ „Die Vernunft ist als diese Identität die absolute Substanz, welche die Wahrheit ist." Substantielles Wissen ist ihre Form, diese unterscheidet selbst wissendes Subjekt und Gegenstand, aber weil es innerhalb der Substanz geschieht so ist auf der Seite des Wissenden die Gewißheit daß der Gegenstand an sich nicht wahrhaft fremd für dasselbe ist, sondern seine Bestimmung das ist was der Geist an sich ist, vernünftig. Geist an sich ist die Vernunft, es ist also Vernunft die sich zur Vernunft verhält und es ist die + Gewißheit der Vernunft daß sie sich zu Vernünftigen verhalte. „Die eigenthümliche Bestimmtheit, welche sie hier hat, nachdem das gegen Ich vorausgesetzte Objekt, so wie das gegen das Objekt selbstische Ich seine Einseitigkeit aufgehoben hat, – ist die sub= (319) stantielle Wahrheit, deren Bestimmtheit der für sich seiende reine Begriff, Ich, – die Gewißheit seiner selbst als unendliche Allgemeinheit, ist. Diese wissende Wahrheit ist der Geist." – Das Bewußtsein ist noch geistlos und es ist der Standpunkt von dem aus man jetzt so viel schwatzen hört, daß man viel wisse, aber doch die Wahrheit nicht erkennen könne u.s.w. dieß ist geistlos, der wahre Standpunkt ist daß kein Abgrund ist zwischen dem Objekt, und der wissenden Subjektivität und dieß ist auch im wissenden Subjekt, im Menschen. Die Menschen mühen sich die Welt kennen zu lernen und sind überzeugt daß sie dahinterkommen können, daß keine Scheidewand ist die sie nicht durchdringen könnten. Das Bewußtsein hat es zunächst mit Äußerlichen zu thun, die eine bestimmte letzte Selbstständigkeit für sich haben, es weiß vom Objekt, aber auch daß es das Negative seiner ist, das Andere seiner.* Hingegen der Geist weiß daß die Identität die Grundlage ist, der Glauben, das Zutrauen zu diesem Verhalten ist daß ich die Dinge erkennen kann, sie sich nicht verbergen, daß sie so sind wie ich sie erkenne, daß sie so sind wie ich sie durch die Thätigkeit meines Geistes im Nachdenken bestimme, daß ich darin nicht subjektiv bleibe, sondern mich vollkommen objektiv darin verhalte, d.h. zum Innern der Dinge komme und die Gegenstände erfasse wie sie sind.

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 219: . . .; das Bewußtsein weiß von den Objecten, aber auch, daß das Object nur das Negative seiner ist, ein anderes überhaupt ist, andere Wesenheiten haben könnte, als das Subject . . .

this presupposes reason i.e. that general objects, things in themselves, are determinations of reason, which is what it is itself, – that things are true in that they have being for it. Spirit wants to know, to think, is certain that in + that it concerns itself with things, it gets to know them. It does this through 5 the stages of intuition, presentation and thought, by concerning itself with them. Spirit is not afraid of things, diffident about concerning itself with + them. It proceeds from the certainty of reason, the certainty that things as they are implicitly are not able to resist it, that they are implicitly what it knows them to be, and in this way it reaches truth. This is the standpoint of 10 spirit. +

"As this identity, reason is the absolute substance, which is truth." + Substantial knowledge is the form of reason. This form distinguishes the self-knowing subject and the general object, but since this takes place within + the substance, there is the certainty on the side of that which knows, that the 15 general object is not truly alien to it, and that its determination is what spirit is implicitly i.e. rational. Since spirit is implicitly reason, it is reason relating + itself to reason, the certainty of reason consisting of its relating itself to what is rational. "The peculiar determinateness of reason at this juncture, – subse- + quent to the self-sublated onesidedness of the presupposed object opposed to 20 the ego and of the selfhood of the ego opposed to the object, – is the (319) substantial truth which has as its determinateness the being-for-self of the pure Notion, the ego, – the self-certainty of infinite universality. This + knowing truth is spirit." – Consciousness is still spiritless, and constitutes the standpoint from which a lot of the present-day prattle about knowing much 25 and yet being incapable of knowing truth etc. originates. This is not spiritual. + The true standpoint is that of there being no abyss between the object and knowing subjectivity, and it also occurs in the knowing subject, in man. Men take the trouble to get to know the world, and are convinced that they can do so, that there is no impenetrable barrier. Although consciousness is mainly + 30 concerned with external beings, which have a certain final independence of their own, it also knows of the object that it is the negative of its own, its other.* Spirit, however, knows the basis to be identity, within which + relatedness there is the belief and trust that I am able to cognize things, that they are not able to conceal themselves, that they are as I cognize them to be, 35 as I determine them through the spiritual activity of my thinking them over, – that I do not remain subjective in this, but relate myself wholly objectively, penetrating to the inwardness of things and apprehending general objects as they are. Lack of belief in this identity of knowledge and object is spiritless, +

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 219: Although consciousness knows of objects, it also knows that the object is only the negative of its own, a general other, that it could have other essentialities than the subject.

Das Geistlose ist der Unglauben an diese Identität des Wissens und der Objekte, es bleibt auf dem Standpunkte des sinnlichen Bewußtseins stehen, des Verstandes der das Sinnliche festhält, da ist dann die Scheidewand das Letzte, die Dinge sind mir das Äußerliche dabei bleibt der Verstand stehen, der Geist hingegen ist die absolute Einigkeit und die Gewißheit (320) der Einigkeit seiner mit sich selbst, darin ist das Bewußtsein, er ist aber ebenso über den Standpunkt des Bewußtseins hinaus, es ist ihm ideell, er ist im Bewußtsein der Einigkeit mit sich d.h. der Einigkeit dessen was die Natur, das Leben der Dinge ist mit seinem Wesen, dieß ist die Vernunft und Geist ist die Gewißheit dieser Vernünftigkeit. Dieß ist der Begriff, die Natur des Geistes überhaupt. – Der Geist geht also frei von sich aus, ist nicht wie das Bewußtsein abhängig vom Anderen, nicht wie das Selbstbewußtsein nur auf sich beschränkt, abstrakt nur mit sich identisch als Subjekt. Der Geist ist frei in der Welt, hat die Gewißheit der Vernünftigkeit, das Andere ist geistlos, die Seele als solche ist geistlos, weil sie noch nicht wissende ist, das Bewußtsein ist geistlos weil es wissend ist, aber mit einem Anderssein behaftet, das Selbstbewußtsein mit der Subjektivität hat den Mangel der Bestimmung des Anderssein ist das Bestimmungslose, In oder Fürsichsein. Der Geist ist wissend, ist die Gewißheit in sich die Totalität zu sein die die Vernunft ist und daß das was für ihn als Gegenstand erscheint nicht Gegenstand ist im Sinn des Bewußtseins, sondern Gegenstand der vernünftig ist. Im Selbstbewußtsein haben wir den Anfang der Freiheit gesehen, der Geist ist konkret frei, der Geist wird euch in alle Wahrheit leiten, sagt Christus, er ist nicht bloß formell frei, wie das Selbstbewußtsein, sondern er geht in alle Wahrheit hinein, will nichts als die Wahrheit, will sie weil er Vernunft an sich ist und die Gewißheit ist daß nichts ist als Vernunft.*

* *Kehler Ms.* S. 220: Christus sagt: der Geist wird euch in alle Wahrheit leiten, frei machen, in ihm ist die concrete Befreiung, nicht die formelle, abstract, die im Selbstbewußtsein ist. Der Geist geht in alle Wahrheit hinein, und will nichts, als die Wahreit, will sie, weil er die Vernunft insich ist, auch weil er die Gewißheit hat, daß nichts ist, als die Vernunft.

and this lack of spirit remains at the standpoint of sensuous consciousness, of the understanding, at which there is a holding fast to what is sensuous. The + barrier is then final, things are external to me, and the understanding gets no further than this. Spirit is the absolute unity however, and the certainty (320)
5 of the unity of its own with itself. Although consciousness is within this + unity, it also supersedes the standpoint of consciousness, which is of an ideal nature to it. Within consciousness it is self-unity, i.e. the unity of that which + the nature and life of things constitutes with the essence of consciousness. This is reason, and spirit is the certainty of this rationality. This is the Notion,
10 the general nature of spirit. – Spirit therefore proceeds freely forth from out + of itself, and is neither dependent upon the other as is consciousness, nor limited only to itself, merely a subject which is abstractedly self-identical, as is self-consciousness. Spirit is free in the world, having the certainty of + rationality, whereas the other and the soul as such, since they do not yet have
15 knowledge, are spiritless. Consciousness is spiritless because although it has + knowledge, it is encumbered with an otherness. The subjectivity of self-consciousness has the defect of the determination of otherness, being the being-in-or-for-self which is without determination. Spirit has knowledge, + it is the certainty of being in itself the totality which constitutes reason, the
20 certainty that that which appears for it as a general object is not a general object such as that of consciousness, but a rational one. In self-consciousness + we saw the beginning of freedom, but spirit is concretely free, "The Spirit will guide you into all truth", says Christ. Spirit is not merely formally free, + as is self-consciousness, but enters into all truth, and since it is implicitly
25 reason, and the certainty that there is nothing but reason, it seeks nothing but truth.*

* *Kehler Ms.* p. 220: "The Spirit will guide you into all truth, make you free", says Christ. Within it there is concrete liberation, not the formal, abstract liberation of self-consciousness. Spirit enters into all truth and seeks nothing but truth, since it is in itself reason, and has the certainty that there is nothing but reason.

NOTES

2, 1

This title was first inserted in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia. In Heid. Enc. the section was simply headed 'Consciousness', and even after 1827 Hegel continued to announce his lectures on the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit as 'Anthropology and Psychology' ('Berliner Schriften' pp. 747/8). This should not, however, be taken to indicate that there was ever any doubt in his mind about the placing of Phenomenology *within* the Encyclopaedia. It is evident from the numerous references to consciousness throughout the Anthropology and the Psychology that the Phenomenology was a clearly conceived and integral part of the overall exposition of Subjective Spirit, and the history of the development of the sphere gives evidence of nothing but complete consistency in Hegel's assessment of its subject-matter.

2, 16

Heid. Enc. § 329.

2, 17

Griesheim (262, 2) wrote 'des des Geistes'. Approximately the first ten minutes of the lecture delivered on Thursday, July 28th 1825 were devoted to rounding off the consideration of the preceding sphere of Anthropology (Enc. §§ 388–412).

3,8

The earliest evidence we have of Hegel's beginning his systematic exposition of the levels of consciousness with such a characterization of the *ego* is to be found in Bew. (1809) § 7. In Bew. (1808/9) § 7, as in Jena Phen. (§§ 90–99), an analysis of sense-certainty precedes the examination of the way in which the ego co-ordinates and sublates sense-data. In the mature system, the significance of sense-data is assessed within the Anthropology (§§ 399–402), and sense-certainty is treated as *presupposing* the ego (§§ 414, 418, 419).

In the earlier Jena writings, Hegel's systematic assessment of the ego bears even less resemblance to that accorded to it here in the Berlin Phen. In 1803/4 for example, there is a direct transition from animal being to consciousness (Jen. Syst. I.274), and nothing corresponding to the later Anthropology, the systematic exposition of the sub-conscious. In 1805/6 the transition is more

carefully considered, but not in respect of the *presuppositions* of consciousness (Jen. Syst. III.190–192).

3, 15
Boumann's Addition (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.9) clarifies this analogy better than the present text: "Just as light is the manifestation of itself and of its other, that which is dark, and can only reveal itself by revealing that other, so too with the ego, which is only revealed to itself in so far as its other is revealed to it in the shape of something independent of it." Light has the same systematic placing within the Phil. Nat. as the ego has within the Phil. Sub. Sp., and Hegel also refers to the analogy in Phil. Nat. II.13.

3, 16
Beginning of the lecture, Thursday, July 28th 1825.

3, 22
Hegel took the literal meaning of the German word for judgement (Urtheil) to be 'primary component' or 'basic division': Enc. § 166; Phil. Sub. Sp. I.*143*. It was only natural therefore, that he should refer to it here, when dealing with the distinction and relationship between the ego and that of which it is conscious. Just as the consciousness of the ego involves the primary components of subjectivity and objectivity, so the unity of the judgement involves the basic division between subject and predicate. It is apparent from Sub. Sp. Notes 35 and from the treatment of the topic in L. Logic 95, that in referring to the 'self-repulsion' of the ego, he has in mind the exposition of this in Fichte's 'Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre' (Leipzig, 1794): cf. Hist. Phil. III.484–488.

The observation that this conception of unity in diversity is "a logical determination" is by no means fortuitous, since he makes good use of the self-repulsion of the ego in *illustrating* the nature of being, which he classifies as the most basic and abstract of all logical categories (L. Logic. 95; Enc. §§ 86–88). The various forms of judgement are given their systematic exposition in an entirely different sphere of the Logic (L. Logic 623–663; Enc. §§ 166–180).

Unlike Kant therefore (Critique of Pure Reason A 69; B 94), Hegel does not treat all logical categories as being essentially the correlates of judgements. By referring here to the judgement when defining the ego, he is not implying that this, or, indeed, any other logical category is *simply* the outcome of the subject-object antithesis implicit in consciousness. Cf. Enc. §§ 42, 415; note 11, 38.

4, 2
Heid. Enc. § 329.

4, 30
Griesheim (265, 3) omitted the 'wir' after 'haben'.

5, 13
Increasing congruence of subject and predicate is the basic theme of the systematic exposition of the various forms of judgement in Enc. §§ 166–180. In such a qualitative judgement (Enc. § 172) as "The rose is red" for example, subject and predicate coincide only on account of the copula. The rose is not only red but also fragrant, corrolate etc., and red can be predicated of many other things. In an apodictic judgement however, – "The rose must be beautiful, for it is red" (Enc. § 179), subject and predicate each constitute the whole judgement. "The universal is *itself* and contains itself through *its opposite* and is universal only as *unity* with this opposite" (L. Logic 662). As such, the judgement is on the point of passing over into syllogistic inference (Enc. §§ 181–193). Cf. note 99, 20.

5, 14
For Kant and Fichte, as for Descartes, it was the *theoretical* as distinct from the *natural* ego which constituted the basic or axiomatic principle of all well-founded philosophizing. Although Kant certainly distinguished between the theoretical and the natural aspects of subjectivity however, he also tended to treat the transcendental ego and the conscious unity of apperception as simply two closely inter-related aspects of knowledge (Critique of Pure Reason A 107; B 143; B 407/8). Hegel criticizes him severely for this in Hist. Phil. III.430–431, cf. Enc. §§ 42–43. Within the whole Hegelian system, the *transcendental* unity of apperception, the focal point of Kant's categories, reappears as the teleologically unifying principle of subjectivity in the Logic (Enc. §§ 163–165), and the *conscious* unity of apperception, the focal point of Kant's subjective cognition, as the ego of the Phenomenology (Enc. §§ 413–439).

This *systematic* distinction between the theoretical or logical and the natural or phenomenological aspects of knowledge enabled Hegel to take the great step forward of characterizing the *natural* ego as being potentially aware of the 'non-ego' not only as an objectivity *but also as the presupposition of consciousness*. Since the natural ego, as so characterized or defined, presupposes not only the sub-conscious states dealt with in the Anthropology (Enc. §§ 388–412), but also the biological and physical foundations of consciousness (Enc. §§ 245–376), it cannot be identified in anything but an empirical or pragmatic sense with Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, and can certainly not be regarded as involving the *basic* or axiomatic foundation of all philosophizing. In referring to it as "having a world within itself and knowing of it", Hegel is calling attention to its sublation of these presuppositions, and to the

potentiality it has of being conscious of them in the variety of ways now to be systematically surveyed in the Phenomenology. Cf. note 19, 9.

As early as 1801, in his first university lectures, Hegel was characterizing philosophy as 'an organic whole'. It is possible, therefore, that this treatment of the natural ego was the direct outcome of his having compared it with the animal, which is related to the natural world not only as to an objectivity *but also as the presupposition of its own existence* (cf. Jena Phen. § 109; Berlin Phen. p. 67). It seems more likely, however, that he was encouraged to develop his ideas along these lines on account of Schelling's 'System des transcendentalen Idealismus' (Tübingen, 1800). In this work a beginning is made with Fichte's *theoretical* ego, and by indicating the logical necessity of a common ground for both the ego and the non-ego, a fairly satisfactory sketch of the general systematic context of the natural ego as presupposing the unconscious, feeling, the natural world etc., and being the presupposition of the various epochs of the general history of consciousness, is worked out.

In Hist. Phil. III, Hegel praises it as one of Schelling's "most carefully thought-out works" (515), and sums up its strengths and weaknesses as follows: "These two separate processes are as a whole very clearly expressed: the process which leads from nature to the subject, and that leading from the ego to the object. But the true process could only be traced out by means of logic, for it contains pure thoughts; but the logical point of view was what Schelling never arrived at in his presentation of things." (518).

5, 26

We have here a series of references to the preceeding sphere of Anthropology (Enc. §§ 388–412), the general lay-out of which constitutes a progression from the objectivity of psychic states closely dependent upon physical factors such as natural environment, to the subjectivity of the ego, which excludes from itself all such involvement with nature. The extremely diverse subject-matter of the sphere is classified by Hegel under the general term of the 'soul' (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.431). The hypothetical 'world soul' (§ 391) and the psychic characteristics of nations (§ 393) are assessed as being very closely dependent upon natural environment. The 'feeling soul' (§§ 403–410) was finally treated as being more inwardly co-ordinated than 'sensation' (§§ 399–402), but Hegel did not fully clarify his conception of it until after 1827. The mature exposition of it included extremely detailed and extensive treatments of somnambulism (§ 406) and mental derangement (§ 408), in the course of which reference was frequently made to sensation (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.261, 291) and to consciousness (II.327, 349, 363). Since it is consciousness which is now being discussed, and since the systematic progression has defined it as being the sublation or *truth* of all that is merely soul-like, somnambulism and derangement many not be regarded as states appearing *within* consciousness.

6, 17
Heid. Enc. § 330.

7, 13
For Hegel, a 'relation' (Beziehung) is *any* connection, correspondence or association which can be conceived as naturally existing between things (Phil. Nat. I.170). A 'relationship' (Verhältnis) however, is more complex, – in illustrating the category he refers to a whole and its parts, a living body and its limbs, force and its expression etc. (Enc. §§ 135–141).

7, 15
It should be remembered that although Hegel's Anthropology and Phenomenology constitute the first two major spheres of his Philosophy of Spirit, it is only with his Psychology that he enters upon the Philosophy of Spirit as such. Spirit as dealt with in the Anthropology, "is as yet not with itself, not free but still involved in nature, related to its corporeity". As dealt with in the Phenomenology, it is, "still completely empty, an entirely abstract subjectivity, which posits the entire content of immediate spirit as external to itself and relates itself to it as to a world which it finds before it." (Phil. Sub. Sp. I.85)
In this sentence he is attempting to bring out spirit's more general significance at the phenomenological level by referring to certain categories, which have already been defined in the Logic. *Essence* (Enc. §§ 112–159) involves inwardness and intro-reflectedness (§ 112). Reality involves being no longer inner and subjective but possessed of determinate being (§ 91). This determinate being (§ 89) is 'of an ideal nature' in that it is a homogeneous unification of what is subjective and what is objective (Phil. Nat. I.164). In that it is simply essential however (§ 112), the objectivity of spirit to which it gives rise is only an *appearance* (§ 131), a sub-category of which is *relationship* (see the previous note).

7, 21
In the printed text of the Heid. Enc. (§ 330), this passage follows the remark that the ego is, "the *light* which manifests another as well as itself" (note 3, 15). The analogy with which Hegel is working is drawn from the Philosophy of Nature, and involves equating the sphere of Anthropology with that of Mechanics (Enc. §§ 254–271) and the sphere of Phenomenology with that of Physics (Enc. §§ 272–336). Gravity is taken to be the culmination of the sphere of mechanics (§ 271) in that it involves matter's having "attained implicit determinateness of form" (Phil. Nat. I.282). Light is taken to be the initiation of the sphere of physics (§ 275) in that through its "independent self-relation", its being "the possibility of confluxing with everything", it gives rise to "universal interrelation" (Phil. Nat. II.12–13). Similarly,

"*habitual* sentience and *concrete* self-awareness" are taken to be the culmination of Anthropology (§ 412) in that they involve the soul's being "inwardly *recollected* and infinitely self-related" (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.425). The ego is taken to be the initiation of the sphere of phenomenology (§ 414) in that through its "subjective intro-reflection", it "constitutes the contradiction of the independence" of things.

In the later editions of the Encyclopaedia, Hegel replaced this analogy with the complicated reference to the logical categories dealt with in note 7, 15.

7, 22

The *actual* resolution takes place through the subsequent levels of the Philosophy of Spirit. Psychology (Enc. §§ 440–482), for example, presupposes the sublation of the contradiction between subjective and objective knowledge (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.79).

7, 36

Cf. Enc. § 42 Add. 1: "The reality of the world has to be crushed so to speak i.e. idealized."

9, 2

The evident unconcern with which Hegel equates 'we', 'I' and 'ego' in developing the train of this argument is the result of his having assumed the *universal* significance of the ego. To have raised an 'other minds' problem in this context would have involved entering a field of enquiry more properly located in the Anthropology (§ 408).

9, 10

Cf. Hegel's analysis of the subjectivism of Kant, Jacobi and Fichte in 'Glauben und Wissen' (1802). In Enc. § 63 he distinguishes sharply between Christian faith which includes an ecclesiastical authority, "a copious body of objective truth, a system of knowledge and doctrine", and the subjective revealed faith of the individual philosopher, which "equally admits a belief in the divinity of the Dalai-lama, the ox, or the monkey." Cf. note 87, 11.

In his treatment of mental derangement in the Anthropology (§ 408), he discusses in some detail cases in which persons regarded themselves as Mahomet, or the Holy Ghost, or as possessed of glass legs etc. (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.377–387). Such persons are to be treated as deranged for the same reason that such a philosopher is to be regarded as inadequate to his calling: "There is no resolution of the contradiction subsisting between the *abstract universal* being of the unmediated ego, and a presentation *singularized* by being disconnected from the totality of actuality." (op. cit. II.345–347).

Hegel observes that even commonsense "the mere *sensation* of the *healthy* soul" (II.347), is superior to this lack of understanding. Commonsense is,

however, inferior in coherence to the "scientific or rational knowledge" worked out in the Encyclopaedia.

9, 21

Descartes 'A Discourse on Method' (Leiden, 1637) pt. IV. In Enc. § 64, Hegel comments as follows upon the famous maxim: "The proposition of the indivisibility of my thinking and being, of this connection's being given and implied in the *simple intuition* of consciousness, of its being the absolutely primary principle, that which is most certain and evident, to such a degree that no scepticism can be conceived so monstrous as not to admit it, – all this language is so vivid and distinct, that the modern statements concerning this immediate connection made by Jacobi and others can only be regarded as needless repetitions."

9, 26

Cf. note 9, 2. Hegel's exposition of mental derangement is in many respects a reproduction at the psychic level of his treatment of bodily disease at the organic level (Phil. Nat. III.193–209). Just as in bodily disease one part of the organism establishes itself in opposition to the activity of the whole, so in mental disease, "the subject which has developed an understanding consciousness is still subject to disease in that it remains engrossed in a particularity of its self-awareness which it is unable to work up into ideality and overcome." (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.327). Cf. D. von Engelhardt, 'Hegels philosophisches Verständnis der Krankheit' ('Sudhoffs Archiv', vol. 59 no. 3. pp. 225–246, 1975).

9, 33

Hegel denies that our being *able* to destroy ourselves gives us the *right* to do so, since an individual does not constitute a legal authority, and cannot, therefore, pass judgement on himself (Phil. Right § 70). Here in the Phenomenology, however, he is not dealing with the legal or social significance of suicide. He was of the curious opinion that animals, unlike men, are unable to maim or destroy themselves (Phil. Right § 47). He deals with the motivation for Cato's suicide as closely related to that which gives rise to our pining away at the loss of a beloved relative or friend (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.247).

10, 5

Griesheim wrote 'heutiges'.

11, 6

The irony of this example becomes apparent if we remember that the significance of Kant's 'Copernican revolution' is being discussed. Copernicus' 'De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium' was conceived as early

as 1512 and published in 1543. As late as 1715, as informed and intelligent a mathematician and natural scientist as Bernard Nieuwentijt (1654–1718) published an extremely popular work which called in question the certainty of the heliocentric motion of the Earth: 'Het regt gebruik der Wereltbeschouwingen' (Amsterdam, 1715, 1759[7]: French tr. 1726, 1760[3]: English tr. 1718, 1745[4]: Germ. tr. 1722, 1747[2]) pp. 904–916.

11, 13
Beginning of the lecture, Friday, July 29th 1825.

11, 19
In Enc. § 43, Hegel points out that *logical categories* are, "merely unities of subjective consciousness, conditioned by the material provided, in themselves empty and having their application and use only within experience." The subjective certainty of formal identity being dealt with here is however, not that of logical categories, but of the *ego* or subjective consciousness, which is as yet certain of nothing but itself. Cf. § 416 (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.13–15) and the analogous transition from morality to ethical life in Phil. Right § 141.

11, 23
See Enc. §§ 79–82. If the ego were the principle of 'speculative or positive reason' (§ 82), it would grasp the levels, hierarchies and spheres of the Phenomenology in the way that they are expounded within the Encyclopaedia. It would be not 'ordinary' but 'comprehending' consciousness (note 17, 21), conscious of the various subject-object relationships ranged within the *overall systematic exposition*. If it were a matter of the understanding (§ 80), it would have a firm and accurate grasp of the *specific empirical problems* involved in getting to grips with the actual or pragmatic significance of the basic subject-object dichotomy of the Phenomenology, but no comprehensive conception of the systematic interrelationship between these problems. The 'formal identity' of the ego places it between these two levels. It is 'dialectical' (§ 81), in that as the focal point of absolute self-certainty (9, 19), it is conscious of the contingency of the understanding, of the way in which "finite determinations sublate themselves and pass into their opposites", but it does not yet comprehend this sublation as anything but an alteration of what is objective to it. Cf. Jena Phen. §§ 83–88.

11, 27
'Logical' in the sense of 'systematic'. The systematic treatment of universal categories (Enc. §§ 84–244) is more completely 'logical' than the systematic treatment of consciousness, since it is concerned with the interrelationships between abstractions (Enc. §§ 43, 44, 237).

11, 33

It is certainly significant that this criticism of the Kantian philosophy should have no equivalent in the corresponding section of the Jena Phen. (§ 89), or in the introductory expositions of consciousness in Bew. (1808/9) and Bew. (1809). The way in which it is formulated in the Heid. Enc. is very similar to this final version of it, although the earlier text (§ 332) does not contain any reference to the criticism of Kant in the general Introduction (§§ 27–35; cf. Enc. §§ 40–60). In the Heid. Enc. this introductory criticism of Kant led on into an assessment (§ 36) of the significance of the Jena Phen., corresponding to that in Enc. § 25.

A crucial change in Hegel's conception of the connection between Kantianism and Phenomenology must, therefore, have taken place between 1809 and 1817. Although it was certainly due in part to the development of his conception of the anthropological presuppositions of the conscious ego (note 5, 14; Phil. Sub. Sp. I.*47–66*), his criticism of Kant in the text now under consideration depends mainly upon his consideration of the difference between the *phenomenology* and the *philosophy* of spirit.

Largely on account of the uncompromising distinction Kant drew between the subjective unity of apperception and the thing-in-itself, he committed himself, in respect of the rational understanding of objectivity, to developing a *dialectic* of *consciousness* (note 11, 23), to doing no more than bringing to light his "antinomies of pure reason". On account of his insisting upon the unavoidability of this dualism, he was unable to attain to the *spiritual* standpoint which accepts the constantly diversifying emergence of such 'antinomies' as a matter of course, recognizing them as the natural outcome of the analytical and synthetic procedures employed in the systematic exposition of "*all* general objects or species, *all* presentations, notions and ideas" (Enc. § 48).

In calling attention to how Kant's performance might be improved upon, it is therefore essential that 'ordinary' should not be confused with 'comprehending' consciousness (note 17, 21), that is to say, that one should not lose sight of this fundamental difference between the *phenomenology* and the *philosophy* of spirit. Their methods of procedure are, indeed, radically different. In developing a *phenomenology* of spirit, 'ordinary' consciousness simply takes the ego or the conscious unity of apperception as its base or starting point, and then carries out a *random* dialectical survey of 'everyday' consciousness, of the 'antinomies' or contradictions subsisting between being conscious of objectivity through the senses, perception, the understanding, desire, struggle etc. (note 17, 21). The conscious unity of apperception from which these apparently mutually exclusive modes are being surveyed is taken to be the only basic connection between them.

In the philosophy of spirit however, while it is recognized that the ego or the unity of apperception is basic to all consciousness (§ 413), the overriding

concern is to make explicit the presuppositional relationships subsisting between the various levels of this general sphere of consciousness. It is essential, therefore, that the understanding should already have carried out the task of distinguishing between being conscious of objectivity through the senses, perception etc., and that the phenomenological approach should already have attempted to establish an overall interconnectedness (note 11, 23). Speculative reason or philosophy completes this preliminary work by indicating the inherent interrelationships between the various levels.

In an advertisement put out by the publishers in 1807, Hegel summarized the significance of the Jena Phen. as follows: "It includes the various shapes of spirit within itself as stages in the progress through which spirit becomes pure knowledge or absolute spirit" ('Intelligenzblatt der Jenaischen Allgemeinen Litteraturzeitung' Oct. 28th 1807). In the light of his subsequent distinction, one would therefore have to regard the work, in intention at least, not as a phenomenology, but as a philosophy of spirit. It is apparent from § 89 however, that when he wrote it he had not yet grasped the full implications of the difference, since he takes it to be the task of *consciousness* to comprehend: "nothing less than the entire system of consciousness, or the entire realm of the truth of Spirit."

In the first part of the Jena Phen. (§§ 90–239), Hegel is indeed engaged in working out a *philosophy* of consciousness, in much the same way as he is in the Encyclopaedia (§§ 413–439). In the latter part of Jena work however (§§ 240–808), he lapses into a procedure which, even if it cannot be said to be identical with that of a Kantian phenomenologist, differs very considerably from that of the later Encyclopaedia. The broad sequence of the subject-matter of the latter Philosophy of Spirit (§§ 440–577) is already apparent, but it is presented in an extraordinarily impressionistic and slapdash manner, with none of the careful consideration of the accomplishments of the understanding which contributes so much to the systematic coherence and specific relevance of the mature exposition.

11, 38

Kant's distinction between the subjective ego and the objective world was intimately involved with his analysis of the epistemological significance of the judgement (note 3, 22). He points out ('Critique of Pure Reason' A 69; B 94), that all judgements involve conceptions which are of more *general* applicability than the *particular* phenomena under consideration. In such a judgement as "all bodies are divisible" for example, the general conception of divisibility is applicable not only to bodies, but also to entities, chemical compounds, estates etc. The conclusion he draws from this is that: "All judgements are functions of unity in our representations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate, a higher representation, which comprises this and various others, is used for our cognition of the object, and thereby many

possible cognitions are collected into one." By examining the various logical types or forms of judgement, he is then able to draw up a list of *a priori* concepts of the understanding, or logical categories (A 80; B 106).

Hegel is referring here not to the theoretical but to the *natural* aspect of Kant's subjective unity of apperception (note 5, 14), although he is also calling attention to one facet of its *logical* significance, – the reflective's (Enc. § 174) being more complex than the qualitative (Enc. § 172) judgement. Instead of "The rose is red", in which subject and predicate coincide in only one respect (note 5, 13), the reflective judgement involves such statements as "The rose is health-giving", the subject in this case being regarded as connected through its predicate with something else, i.e. the malady the rose cures. Thus, "in existence the subject is no longer immediately qualitative, but in *relationship* and *connection with an other*, with an external world" (§ 174).

13, 5

Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758–1823), in his 'Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungvermögens' (Prague and Jena, 1789; 2nd ed. 1795; reprinted Darmstadt, 1968), explored the implications of Kant's distinction between sensation and understanding in the 'Critique of Pure Reason', and like Fichte, attempted to grasp the *basic* principle of these two aspects of cognition. Fully aware that the presentative faculty central to cognition can be neither wholly receptive (Locke) nor wholly 'formative' or generative (Leibniz), he came to the conclusion that it was the outcome of the ego, of consciousness, – that just as sight as such is basic to both the object seen and the eye that sees it, so consciousness is basic to both the objectivity presented and the subject which *presents itself* as presenting it (op. cit. p. 195 et seq.). The relationship between consciousness (Enc. §§ 413–438) and presentation (Enc. §§ 451–464) in Hegel's system (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.3–229) seems to indicate that he shared some common ground with Reinhold, but he could not of course agree with him in regarding the treatment of the faculty of presentation as a matter of consciousness as the basic or 'elementary' discipline of all philosophical enquiry.

In a letter to Schelling dating from 1795 ('Briefe' I.16), we find Hegel expressing the view that he can afford to neglect Reinhold's interpretation of Kant, since it is only an advance in respect of theoretical reason, and is devoid of "greater applicability to concepts of more general usefulness." Cf. H. Girndt 'Hegel und Reinhold' in R. Lauth 'Philosophie aus einem Prinzip' (Bonn, 1974) pp. 202–224.

13, 8

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), "Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre' (Leipzig, 1794) §§ 1–3. Hegel levels the same criticism at the work in Enc. § 60 and in the Hist. Phil. III.479–506, and would appear to be

fully justified in doing so. The best exposition of Fichte's thought in English is still to be found in Robert Adamson's (1852–1902) 'Fichte' (Edinburgh and London, 1881).

13, 16

Hegel took the scepticism of Hume, and Kant's critical subjectivism to be the essential break with the philosophy of the period immediately following the death of Spinoza (Enc. §§ 39–40; Hist. Phil. III.361–8). His interpretation of this historical development was evidently influenced by the systematic considerations determining the transition from the categories of actuality to those of the subjective Notion (Enc. §§ 142–193). When criticizing Kant, however, he goes out of his way to defend Spinoza against the charge of atheism (Enc. § 50).

For a fuller exposition of the way in which he is criticizing Spinoza here, see Hist. Phil. III.268–270: "This means that the same substance, under the attribute of thought, is the intelligible world, and under the attribute of extension, is nature; nature and thought thus both express the same Essence of God . . . But Spinoza does not demonstrate how these two are evolved from the one substance, nor does he prove why there can be only two of them . . . When he passes on to individual things, especially to self-consciousness, to the freedom of the 'I', he expresses himself in such a way as rather to lead back all limitations to substance than to maintain a firm grasp of the individual".

13, 17

This sentence originates in the Heid. Enc. § 332. In Heid. Enc. § 331 Hegel dealt with the nature of the *object in relation to the ego*, and evidently treated this as the third moment of a triad, the first two levels of which were concerned with the subjective and objective presuppositions of such a relation (Sub. Sp. Notes 36). In the printed text of the Heid. Enc. he made reference to the reflective judgement (note 11, 38) at this juncture, but there is no evidence of his having done so in his lectures. It is almost certainly the case, therefore, that the dropping of § 331 from the Phenomenology was the result of the development of his ideas on the significance of Kantianism (note 11, 33). He may have had second thoughts about dealing with objectivity at this level (note 31, 22).

13, 28

Cf. note 11, 33. Within the Encyclopaedia, reason constitutes the culmination of Phenomenology (§§ 438–9), thought the culmination of intelligence (§§ 465–8), and abstract categories are given their systematic assessment in the Logic (§§ 84–244). In the light of this analysis, Kant's interpretation of reason and thought predominantly in terms of logical categories, may be seen

as involving the *confusion* of vastly different levels of complexity, and the *reduction* of reason and thought to mere logical abstractions.

13, 32

Kant 'Kritik der praktischen Vernunft' (Riga, 1788). It is evident from Hist. Phil. III.457–464, that Hegel consulted the fourth edition (Riga, 1797) when preparing his lectures on Kant's ethics. His criticism of this part of the Kantian philosophy is the direct outcome of his general characterization of it as "the consciousness of thought in its subjectivity" (op. cit. III.423).

In the analysis of the nature and limitations of knowledge carried out in the 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft' (Riga, 1781; 1787^2), Kant postulated a beyond, an objectivity, a thing-in-itself, with which mere knowledge can never become identical. In his work on practical reason he seemed to be adopting the same general approach in that he took the moral significance of an action to lie in the *principle* in accordance with which it is decided upon, not the purpose to be attained by it. His main objective was, however, to bring out the significance of morality as the capacity to *act*, to emphasize that it is from the extent to which it enables the rational individual to influence and form what is inaccessible to mere knowledge, that it derives its broader significance. For Kant, therefore, morality constituted the most philosophically significant and theoretically well-founded of the various spheres of contact between subjectivity and objectivity.

Despite this greater theoretical involvement with objectivity in Kant's ethics, Hegel criticizes both parts of his philosophy in much the same way. He points out that just as the epistemology displays a strong tendency to *reduce* the richness, complexity and pragmatic effectiveness of intellectual activity to a sequence of formal logical abstractions, so in the ethics there is an equally strong tendency to reduce the obligations, predicaments and concrete developments arising in the family, society and the state to *nothing more* than matters of individual responsibility. See Enc. §§ 53–54; Phil. Right § 135.

13, 36

See Hegel's criticism (Enc. § 48) of the way in which Kant dealt with his four antinomies: "Employing what has subsequently become the generally preferred approach, he simply placed the general object under an already formulated rubric instead of deducing its determinations from the Notion." In any treatment of space, time, matter, freedom, causality etc. which has any pretension to being reasonably exhaustive, the analytical and synthetic procedures involved in this 'deduction' would, of course, bring to light many more than these four 'antinomies'.

14, 10

Griesheim wrote 'Prinzip'.

15, 2

Hegel (Hist. Phil. III.432) refers to the 'Critique of Pure Reason' as the 'theoretical' part of Kant's philosophy, and begins his criticism of it by noting that it involves: "setting to work in a psychological manner; certainly describing sensuousness, understanding, reason, the main stages in theoretical consciousness, but doing so by simply narrating, accepting it all empirically, not by developing it from the Notion or proceedings by necessity."

His specific criticism here is that Kant's treatment of the ego as "the originally synthetical unity of apperception" ('Critique of Pure Reason' A 95–110; B 130–150), combines and confuses certain radically distinct levels of enquiry, and therefore gives rise to inconsistencies in his philosophy. The subjective categories of the judgement for example, which presuppose the logical categories of being and essence and are therefore dealt with by Hegel in Enc. §§ 166–180, are not to be confused with the subjectivity of consciousness being dealt with here in the Phenomenology (Enc. §§ 413–439), and certainly not with the subjectivity of morality as distinct from the objectivity of social ethics, dealt with in the Philosophy of Right §§ 105–141.

Hegel's treatment of the ego here in the Phenomenology quite evidently owes much more to the lucid and radical exposition accorded to it in Fichte's 'Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre' (Leipzig, 1794) §§ 1–3 than it does to the work of Kant (Hist. Phil. III.479–507).

15, 11

Kant's injunction, "Act from maxims which are capable of becoming universal laws" ('Kritik der praktischen Vernunft' pp. 54, 58) is criticized by Hegel (Hist. Phil. III.460) on account of its abstraction, its "coming to no determination", its lack of any specific content: "The universal, the non-contradiction of self, is something which comes to be reality in the practical sphere just as little as in the theoretical." He concludes, therefore, that in defining duty, Kant is simply telling us that it is duty, that is to say, making use of the so-called law of identity, an exposition of the logical significance of which is provided in Enc. § 115: "To say that a planet is a planet, magnetism magnetism, spirit a spirit, is quite rightly regarded as silly; this is certainly a matter of general experience. School is the only place in which such laws have validity, and together with its logic, which propounds them in all seriousness, it has long since lost credibility with both sound commonsense and rationality."

15, 19

Both the 'Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre' (Leipzig, 1794), which includes expositions of theoretical knowledge and practical activity, and the 'Science of Rights' (1796), which includes expositions of the organization of the state, property, penal law, marriage, the nature of animals

etc. etc., begin with a definition of first principles which has as its absolute foundation the exposition of the ego in terms of the logical law of identity. All these expositions turn, in one way or another, upon the fundamental ego = non-ego antithesis. Cf. R. Lauth 'Philosophie aus einem Prinzip' (Bonn, 1974).

Hegel's first acknowledged publication, "Differenz der Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Philosophie" (Jena, 1801; Eng. tr. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf, New York, 1977) is largely concerned with criticizing Fichte's system as, "a consistent product of the understanding, a mass of finitudes, which the original identity cannot draw together into the focus of totality or to its absolute self-intuition" (p. 155). In his treatment of Fichte in the Hist. Phil. (III.479–507), he praises him for realizing that philosophy must be a science derived from one supreme principle, but also notes that in taking the ego to be this absolute principle he developed his system onesidedly: "It is from the very beginning subjective, conditioned by an opposite, and its realization is a continual rushing onward in finitude, a looking back at what has gone before. The form in which it is presented also has the disadvantage, and indeed the real drawback, of bringing the empirical ego ever before one's eyes, which is absurd, and quite distracting to one's point of view."

15, 32
Note 11, 33.

16, 32
Griesheim wrote 'Einwede'.

17, 12
Note 9, 2.

17, 15
Hegel has already made clear his *objections* to the conclusions drawn by Kant and Fichte from their postulation of the philosophical significance of the ego. The next step is, of course, to bring out what he takes to be the true significance of their accomplishment. Cf. note 9, 21.

17, 21
In order to clarify the precise significance of this distinction between comprehending and empirical consciousness, it will be useful to draw an analogy with Hegel's 'Notional' treatment of a clearly empirically based field such as chemistry.

The empirical chemists of his time had discovered what appeared to be a satisfactory definition of an element (Lavoisier). They had investigated the nature of chemical combinations in great detail, and knew that electricity played an important part in bringing them about (Berzelius). By artificially

preparing urea they had gained an important insight into the links between inorganic and organic compounds (Wöhler). By and large, however, they had not concerned themselves with the elucidation of the *presuppositional relationships* subsisting between these various aspects of chemistry, or with the fact that all the levels established by empirical research were presupposed by or *sublated in* self-sustaining chemical processes, and that such processes can, therefore, reasonably be regarded as the fundamental characteristic or presupposition of the subject-matter of the organic sciences (Enc. §§ 326–336). This sublation of the presuppositional *levels* brought to light by empiricism within the whole *sphere* of chemistry, once it has been grasped as a *hierarchy* or systematic progression from the most basic to the most complex, is what Hegel refers to as the *Notion* of the subject (§ 336). The grasping of this Notion is, therefore, the prerequisite of any fully satisfactory philosophical exposition of chemistry. It should be noted, moreover, that although it is not essential for the empirical investigators to grasp this Notion in order to carry out their work effectively and efficiently, it is essential that a philosopher engaged in expounding the Notion of such a discipline should have a good general grasp of its empirical foundations (Enc. § 80).

The relationship between empiricism and Notional comprehension is precisely the same here in the Phenomenology. Empirical investigation had led to the discovery that the ego is conscious of the spatiality and temporality of sensuous impressions (§ 418), of the internal connectedness of natural laws (§ 422), of the consciousness of others (§ 430). By and large, however, it had not concerned itself with the elucidation of the *presuppositional relationships* subsisting between these various aspects of consciousness, or with the fact that all the levels established by empirical research were presupposed by or *sublated in* being conscious of the rationality pervading both subjectivity and objectivity, and that such rationality can, therefore, reasonably be regarded as the fundamental characteristic or presupposition of the subject-matter of the psychological sciences (Enc. §§ 438–439).

Together with the similarities, it is worth considering the implications of the differences and interrelationships between the *subject-matters* in these two cases. The empirical consciousness of Lavoisier, Berzelius and Wöhler was concerned with elements, electricity, chemical compounds etc., and it was this inorganic subject-matter, not their consciousness of it, that Hegel structured in accordance with the Notion in his philosophical chemistry. Similarly, the empirical consciousness of those investigating consciousness was concerned with the ego and what it is conscious of, and it was *this* subject-matter, not their consciousness of it, that Hegel structured in accordance with the Notion in his philosophical phenomenology. Within the *general* structure of the Notion therefore, a circularity of presuppositions becomes apparent. There could be no empirical chemistry to structure without the presupposition of empirical consciousness. On the other hand,

there could be no empirical consciousness without the presupposition of organics, and, therefore, of self-sustaining chemical processes etc.

In order to make the distinction between the Notion of consciousness and empirical consciousness perfectly clear, Hegel should, therefore, have called attention to the fact that in this version of the Phenomenology he is dealing with *four* kinds of consciousness: the *everyday* variety, in which we are conscious of sensations, laws, other conscious beings etc.; the *empirical* variety, which analyzes everyday consciousness into its constituent aspects; the *ordinary* variety, evident in the Kantian critique of empiricism (note 11, 33); the *comprehending* variety, which structures the findings of empiricism in accordance with the Notion.

17, 26

See Fichte's 'Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre' (2nd ed. Jena and Leipzig, 1798), foreword. Cf. Hegel's 'Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy' (1801; Eng. tr. New York, 1977) p. 82: "The most obvious symptoms of an epoch-making system are the misunderstandings and the awkward conduct of its adversaries."

17, 32

It is interesting to note that it is nearly always easier to make empirical consciousness aware of its relativity by calling its attention to the *presuppositions* of the everyday consciousness it is dealing with, than it is to make it aware of that of which this everyday consciousness is the presupposition. If an empiricist were concerning himself with the way in which everyday consciousness grasps and formulates the laws of astronomy and physics for example (§ 422), he would be more likely to listen to someone who argued that the formulation of such laws would be impossible without the presupposition of sense-data (§ 418), than to someone who pointed out that physics is the presupposition of organics (§ 423).

17, 39

Hegel (Enc. § 377) begins his Philosophy of Spirit with Thales' famous injunction "Know thyself" (Phil. Sub. Sp. I.3.). Cf. note 99, 18.

19, 4

The *subject-matter* of the Phenomenology, that is to say, the ego of everyday conscious, is now under discussion (note 17, 21).

19, 9

Hegel is referring here to various levels of the preceding sphere of Anthropology: the natural soul §§ 391–402, sensation §§ 399–402, feeling §§ 403–410. Cf. notes 5, 14; 5, 26. He only clarified the distinction between

sensation and feeling at the very end of his teaching career, and the persistent lack of precision in his treatment of it is apparent, to some extent, in the terminology he is employing here in the Phenomenology. On his final analysis, sensation is more exclusively involved with objectivity by means of the senses, whereas feeling, on account of its greater degree of inwardness or subjectivity, is a distinct adumbration of consciousness (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.494).

19, 15

The immediate presupposition of the Phenomenology, that is to say, the precise nature of the transition from feeling to the ego (Enc. §§ 409–412), is rather more complicated and very much more interesting than might appear from this summary account of it. It includes a treatment of habit, deportment, gesture etc. (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.397–429).

When he says that ego, "Proceeds from nowhere but the sphere of feeling", what Hegel means is that his analytical work has brought feeling to light as the immediate presupposition of the ego. He might also have said that the ego *sublates* feeling, and it should be noted that in this context, as throughout his works, *negation* is synonymous with sublation. Cf. note 49, 25.

19, 19

On the infinite judgement, see Enc. § 173. Cf. note 3, 22. The *being*, that is, the initial, basic, fundamental, absolute abstraction of the ego, is simply that it is "no non-ego".

19, 25

The natural ego's non-ego, that is, the object or world it has before it, is its own presupposition. Cf. note 5, 14.

19, 26

This is 'entered into' in the Philosophy of Nature (Enc. §§ 245–376) and the Anthropology (Enc. §§ 388–412).

19, 35

Spirit is the ideality of nature in that although is has it as its natural precondition, it is also capable of comprehending it (Enc. §§ 245–376). In the macrocosm of nature, the motions of the planets (§ 270), the course of the seasons (§ 287), the variability of the climate (§ 288), physical geography (§ 339), the constitution of the body (§ 354), the stages of life (§ 374) etc. have a free existence of their own. Once the ego or the microcosm has asserted itself as a distinct subjectivity however (§§ 413–439), these free existences become part of "the general objectivity of the world." See Phil. Sub. Sp. II.27.

21, 7

Cf. note 19, 26. The philosophies of Nature and Anthropology constitute the systematic explication of this 'positing'.

21, 13

Enc. § 98. Hegel had no very high conception of atomistic metaphysics in any context: Phil. Nat. II.213; Hist. Phil. I.300–310; II. 288–290.

21, 15

The full significance of such 'thinking', which Hegel sometimes distinguishes as being 'formal' (31, 24), would have been much easier to grasp had he had at his disposal a word which would have allowed him to distinguish between what is now under discussion, the natural ego's assimilation of its objectivity, the *intuition* basic to intelligence (Enc. §§ 446–450), and the thinking which involves memory, language, phantasy etc. (Enc. §§ 465–468). Cf. notes 69, 5; 87, 5.

21, 21

The mentally deranged also relate themselves to what is objective, but their subjectivity is a matter of feeling, not of consciousness, and what they think of objectivity is therefore distorted. Cf. notes 9, 2; 9, 26.

21, 25

Hegel probably has in mind the various reactions to Hume's famous observation, 'A Treatise of Human Nature' (1739/40; ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1978) p. 252: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." Cf. Hist. Phil. III. 369–379.

21, 34

Cf. note 17, 21.

21, 36

It is 'everyday' consciousness that 'raises itself' in that it involves both abstract thinking (§ 418) and reason (§ 438). It is 'empirical' consciousness that analyzes this 'raising' into its constituents, and 'comprehending' consciousness that structures this analysis in accordance with the Notion. Cf. notes 17, 21; 59, 6.

21, 37

Beginning of the lecture, Monday, August 1st 1825.

23, 3
Cf. note 11, 33.

23,9
Hence Kant's postulation of the thing-in-itself.

23, 14
On the identity of thought and being, see Enc. § 465 (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.219).

23, 15
Sub. Sp. Notes 36 throw an interesting light on how Hegel criticized Fichte in some of his earlier lectures on Phenomenology: "Fichte, – man creates his coat by putting it on." Although his treatment of subjective idealism in Hist. Phil. III.423–507 was generally appreciative, he concludes it by observing that: "the content which the ego reaches in the philosophy of Fichte, the complete absence of spirituality, the woodenness, and, to put it bluntly, the utter foolishness (Albernheit) of which it gives evidence, strike us too forcibly to allow us to remain at his standpoint."

23, 27
Chemistry, for example, is not simply a coherent objectivity, imperfectly known to us on account of our only being able to co-ordinate *sense-data* into natural laws etc., it is a highly complex and differentiated sphere of physical reality, which under analysis breaks down into elements, electricity, compounds etc., in exactly the same way as consciousness breaks down into the ego, sense-data, the formulation of laws, etc. Cf. note 17, 21.

23, 31
It says little for the standard of philosophical insight fostered by Hegel scholarship, that so many revivals of interest in his works should have eventualy lapsed into one form or other of neo-Kantianism. This state of affairs may well have been due, in part at least, to the fact that the full text of the Berlin Phen. has not previously been available.

For an analysis of the difference between Kant's and Hegel's conceptions of space and time, see Phil. Nat. I.315–317. Cf. Phil. Sub. Sp. III.135, 149.

23, 38
Cf. note 17, 21.

24, 13
Heid. Enc. § 332.

24, 31
Heid. Enc. § 333. This § has equivalents in Bew. (1808/9) § 5 and Bew. (1809) § 8.

25,9
Cf. note 9, 2.

25, 11
The subconscious sphere of 'The feeling soul' (Enc. §§ 403–410) is one of the most elaborately researched of the whole Encyclopaedia. It contains extensive analyses of dreaming, sleep-walking, second sight, hypnotism, mental derangement, habit etc. (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.215–409).

25, 19
See p. 11. The differences are due to this being a quotation from the Heid. Enc. (§ 332). Cf. note 11, 23.

25, 20
A 'general object' is what is general, unspecified, undifferentiated. An 'object' is what is particular, specific, distinct. See Phil. Sub. Sp. I.*134*, *139*; III.362.

25, 28
The main point of this § is to bring out the significance of the preceding exposition in terms of general logical categories. At this stage, the ego constitutes only the *appearance* of spirit (Enc. §§ 131–141), for like force and the things which it forces, it is not yet its own *essence* (§§ 112–159) or self-identity. In that it is reflected in the object, it may be said to *exist* rather than simply have being (§§ 123–124), but since it has not yet fully assimilated the object, this existence is *finite* (§ 94), and there is, therefore, still something *self-related* or atomistic about it (§§ 96–98). Cf. note 7, 15.

25, 30
The nature of the *self-certainty* of consciousness has already been elucidated (§ 413). Hegel takes the *truth* of anything to be the unity within which it is sublated or included. In the case of the syllogism for example, the conclusion is the truth of its premises. It is therefore relative to the particular context under consideration, in which case Hegel speaks of a *proximate* truth, and absolute in the sense that spirit includes logic and nature within itself. The analysis of complexity relationships is, therefore, an essential preliminary to the recognition of truth, in this case, the analysis of the levels of *consciousness* subsumed within the dissolution of the subject-object disparity in reason (Enc. §§ 438–439).

26, 4

Griesheim inserted a semi-colon after 'Inhalt'.

26, 15

Heid. Enc. § 334. This § has equivalents in Bew. (1808/9) § 9 and Bew. (1809) § 9. The three stages are also to be found in the Jena Phen.: consciousness §§ 90–165, self-consciousness §§ 166–230, reason §§ 231–239.

26, 35

Griesheim (278, 9) wrote 'seinen Gegenstand'.

27, 1

Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.15) publishes an extremely useful explanation of this point, which he probably derived from the lectures on 'Anthropology and Psychology' delivered during the Winter Terms of 1827/8 or 1829/30: "Mere *presentation* does not distinguish between *certainty* and *truth*. It will say that what it is *certain* of, the subjective factor it regards as being in keeping with the object, is *true* – regardless of how insignificant and poor the content of this subjective factor may be. Philosophy on the contrary has to draw the essential distinction between *mere certitude* and the Notion of *truth*; for from the standpoint of mere consciousness, since at this juncture spirit has, as well as the abstract certainty of being *with itself*, the directly opposed certainty of relating itself to what is essentially *other* than and opposed to it, the self-certainty of spirit is still somewhat *lacking in truth*, somewhat *self-contradictory*. This contradiction has to be sublated, and has within it the drive to resolve itself. Subjective certainty ought to retain no limitation deriving from the object, it must achieve true objectivity. Conversely, the general object must for its part become *mine*, not merely in an *abstract* manner, but in accordance with all aspects of its *concrete* nature. This goal is already divined in that reason has *faith* in itself, but it is only reached by *knowledge* of *reason*, by *comprehending cognition*."

27, 4

Still unappropriated by everyday consciousness of course, *comprehending* consciousness must have appropriated it in order to carry out the overall systematic exposition contained within the Phenomenology. Cf. note 17, 21.

27, 6

On the nature of this 'movement', see notes 17, 21 and 21, 36. Sub. Sp. Notes 37 gives a good impression of the way in which Hegel summarized the initial characterization of consciousness in his earlier lectures: "The identity of the ego with itself is formal, *without content*. The ego is a determinateness present within its self-certainty, *external to another*, involves infinite

contradiction, but since it is a formal and infinite self-relation, it is not deranged.

Consciousness is the *most universal* level on account of its being the most abstract, – formal spirit. It constitutes the middle between soul and spirit. It is complete in that a) for me ego is the principle of spirit, but b) it is so immediately, a moment constituting the all-inclusiveness of spirit."

27, 14

Cf. note 25, 20.

27, 19

Cf. Jena Phen. § 91: "Because of its concrete content, sense-certainty immediately appears as the *richest* kind of knowledge, indeed a knowledge of infinite wealth for which no bounds can be found."

27, 24

Cf. note 25, 30.

27, 31

Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.19) publishes the following commentary on this, which he probably derived from the 1827/8 or 1829/30 lectures (note 27, 1): "It is hardly necessary to observe that *reason*, which in our exposition appears as being *third* and *last*, is not simply a *final* term, a result proceeding from that which is somewhat alien to it. It is of course *primary*, since it is that which *lies at the basis* of *consciousness* and *self-consciousness*, and through the sublation of both these onesided forms shows itself to be their *original unity* and their *truth*." Cf. notes 99, 12; 101, 16.

27, 32

Reason, or the Notion of spirit (note 17, 21) includes the ego, the initial level of the general sphere of consciousness, and in a very real sense therefore, the systematic exposition of this sphere carried out in the Phenomenology is 'conducted' by this Notion. Hegel is evidently using the word 'interest' with its literal meaning, 'to be between', in mind. Cf. Phil. Nat. III.210.

28, 2

Griesheim (278, 11) wrote 'als solchen'.

28, 8

Griesheim (278, 16) wrote 'Ganze'.

29, 15

Cf. note 17, 21.

29, 22
Cf. notes 11, 23 and 11, 33.

29, 25
Cf. note 21, 15.

29, 33
As defined by Hegel, imagination (Enc. §§ 455–460) and thought (§§ 465–468) certainly presuppose the sublation of the subject-object antithesis in the Phenomenology, for they are treated as levels of the Psychology (§§ 440–482). Since they are, however, part of the subject-matter of the Psychology, they are themselves structured in accordance with the Notion by 'comprehending consciousness' or spirit. Judging from the way in which they are referred to here, one might easily assume that they are simply identical with 'comprehending consciousness'.

These comments on the lack of any essential subject-object disparity in spirit, are, therefore, to be understood as arising out of the reference to the 'onesidedness' of the ordinary or phenomenological consciousness developed by Kant and Fichte. Hegel is not referring here to his Psychology, but contrasting the 'ordinary' and the 'comprehending' approach to consciousness.

29, 35
The 'everyday' consciousness which constitutes the *subject-matter* of this sphere of the Phenomenology senses objectivity (§§ 418–419), *perceives* connections between the various determinations of this sense-data (§§ 420–421), and is capable of *understanding* the laws inherent within these connections (§§ 422–423). Its activity is, therefore, a progressive determining of the object.

'Comprehending' consciousness begins by considering sensuous consciousness, and then makes the systematic progression in degree of complexity to consideration of perception and understanding. In doing this, it is making use of the 'empirical' consciousness which has already analyzed 'everyday' consciousness into its constituent aspects. It is structuring a subject-object relationship, but is not involved in one itself, and the full significance of the 'progressive' determining of the object which it brings to light, though it is in fact carried out by 'everyday' consciousness, can only be grasped or comprehended from the speculative or spiritual standpoint.

30, 3
Griesheim (279, 22) wrote 'als solchen'.

30, 17

This heading was first inserted in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia (1830).

31, 2

Cf. note 3, 22. This is a 'logical' development in that it is purely universal. The categories structured in Enc. §§ 84–244 have no material content, and the relationships between them brought to light through their being grasped or comprehended from the speculative or spiritual standpoint, are, therefore, more clearly 'logical' or universal than any of the corresponding relationships brought to light by this procedure in the Philosophies of Nature (Enc. §§ 245–376) and Spirit (Enc. §§ 377–577).

31, 5

These are the *objective correlates* of the three levels of *consciousness* already distinguished.

31, 8

On this identification of fire with life, see Berlin Phen. 51, 34 and the discusson of the self-sustaining chemical process in Phil. Nat. II.222: "The moments of that which subsists are themselves raised into this ideality, and do not fall back into limited subsistence, but have their being solely within it. It is thus that we have objective time, an imperishable fire, the fire of life. *Heraclitus* also said that the soul was of fire, and that dry souls are the best."

Life's involving both the *objectivity* of the physical world and the *subjectivity* of the organism is so easily grasped and such a commonplace, that at this juncture it is not necessary to indicate specific sources or instances. The philosophical importance attached to it by *Kant* ought, however, be taken into consideration when assessing the various ways and contexts in which Hegel makes use of it: "Scientists who dissect plants and animals, seeking to investigate their structure and to see into the reasons why and the end for which they are provided with such and such parts . . . are, in fact, quite as unable to free themselves from this teleological principle as from that of general physical science . . . Indeed this conception leads reason into an order of things entirely different from that of a mere mechanism of nature, which *mere mechanism* no longer proves adequate in this domain." – 'Critique of Judgement' (1790; tr. J. C. Meredith, Oxford, 1978) § 66. Cf. note 51, 28.

31, 16

The progress of the subject-object relationship of consciousness to spirit, is dealt with in the Berlin Phen., Enc. §§ 413–439; what is legal is dealt with in §§ 488–502, what is ethical in §§ 513–552 and what is religious in §§ 564–571. These are all sub-divisions of the mature Philosophy of Spirit (§§ 377–577),

and their *content* is *fully* developed in special series of lectures, the standard editions of which have now all been translated into English: Phil. Sub. Sp., Phil. Right, Phil. Hist., Aesthetics, Phil. Rel., Hist. Phil. These lectures involve the *systematic* treatment of the *subject-matter* of these spheres in accordance with the Notion or 'comprehending' consciousness (note 17, 21).

Just as, in the Phil. Nat., *chemistry* is not only the immediate presupposition of living being (II.220), but also has to be taken into consideration as a distinct aspect of more complicated fields of enquiry such as mineralogy (III.30), botany (III.87), animal nutrition (III.156), therapy (III.207) etc., so, in the Philosophy of Spirit, *consciousness* is not only the immediate presupposition of psychology (Enc. § 440), but also has to be taken into consideration as a distinct aspect of more complicated fields of enquiry such as public opinion (Phil. Right § 317), social anthropology (World Hist. 183), dramatic poetry (Aesthetics 1209), religion (Enc. § 564) etc.

In the first part of the Jena Phen. (§§ 90–239), Hegel deals with the progress of the subject-object relationship to spirit in much the same way as he does in the Berlin Phen. In comparison with the Encyclopaedia, however, the second part of the Jena work involves much less attention to the systematic treatment of the 'content' or subject-matter of the Philosophy of Spirit, and much more emphasis upon the arbitrary, impressionistic, mercurial role of *consciousness* within the more complicated spheres of *spirit*. Since the broad outlines of the mature Philosophy of Spirit had already been worked out in the earlier Jena writings (Jen. Syst. I. 265–331: III.185–287), it is not surprising to find them reproduced in a fairly recognizable form, §§ 240–437 corresponding roughly to the mature Psychology (Enc. §§ 440–482), §§ 438–483 to the Phil. Right (Enc. §§ 483–547), §§ 484–671 to the cultural and moral aspects of World History (Enc. §§ 548–552), §§ 672–747 to the Aesthetics (Enc. §§ 556–563), §§ 748–787 to the Philosophy of Religion (Enc. §§ 564–571), and §§ 788–808 to the assessment of Philosophy (Enc. §§ 572–577). There is, however, no attempt to justify the formulation of this broadly Notional or systematic sequence with reference to the concrete analytical work on these spheres carried out by the understanding (note 11, 33). Cf. L. Logic 781, Phil. Right § 35, Enc. § 25.

31, 22

Since each of the subjective levels of consciousness has its objective correlate in an aspect of the general object (p. 29), "consciousness appears to be differently determined according to the variety of the general object given, and its progressive formation to be an alteration of the determinations of its object" (11, 23).

31, 24

On the significance of this 'formal thinking', see note 21, 15.

32, 16
Heid. Enc. § 335. Cf. Bew. (1808/9) § 7, Bew. (1809) § 12.

32, 17
Griesheim wrote 'seine, Beziehung'.

33, 2
For the systematic treatment of the logical categories being invoked here, see, principally, Enc. § 123–130.

33, 3
Cf. Jena Phen. § 91.

33, 9
In Heid. Enc. § 335 Hegel referred to 'the determinations of feeling' when attempting to define 'sensuous consciousness', but it was only in the third edition of the Encylopaedia (1830) that he inserted this reference to the *Anthropology* (Enc. §§ 388–412), and this characterization of the relationship in which the ego stands to it (notes 3, 8 and 5, 14).

33, 11
Jena Phen. §§ 95–98. In this work (§ 99), we find sense-certainty treated as the equivalent of 'being', the most basic and abstract of all logical categories (Enc. §§ 86–88), but no reference to its having its immediate presupposition in what is anthropological. The elaborate and reiterative treatment of the *here* and *now* is almost entirely absent from the corresponding section of the Berlin Phen. (see p. 41).

33, 12
In the mature Encyclopaedia (§§ 446–450), intuition constitutes the initial level of the Psychology. In § 448 Hegel deals with the way in which "intelligence determines the content of sensation as being self-external, projecting it into the forms of space and time, within which intelligence is intuitive" (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.123–135).

33, 16
Beginning of the lecture, Tuesday, August 2nd 1825.

33, 24
Since it is the 'initial' determination, one might have expected it to exhibit more of the characteristics of the completely universal, undifferentiated and abstract category of being (note 33, 11).

33, 25

As defined in Enc. § 163, singularity necessarily implies universality and particularity, that is to say, cannot be thought of in separation from them. In this case, the *singularity* of the sensuous general object cannot be thought of as separated from the universality of its being related to the ego and the *particularity* of its own self-relatedness.

33, 34

The five senses give rise to a stream of sensations in which what is external to subjectivity is as yet entirely unco-ordinated, that is to say, self-external or sensuous: "The subjectivity of the sentient soul is so immediate, so underdeveloped, so minimal in its self-determination and differentiation, that in so far as it *merely* senses, the soul is not yet aware of itself as a subjective confronting an objective being." (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.159).

35, 1

Because we know of it through the sequence or flow of sensations. Until we have identified unified objectivity within this stream, we can have no conception of *what* is spatial and temporal.

35, 10

At this juncture, the *subjectivity* of the ego is only aware of spatiality and temporality in the sequence of sensations by means of which it is *conscious* of an *objectivity* (cf. note 33, 34). In that intuition endows the spatiality and temporality of this objectivity "with the rational determination of being the other of itself" (Enc. § 448), it has to be regarded as a *spiritual* subjectivity, since it is no longer fixed within the rigid subject-object antithesis of consciousness.

35, 15

For Kant, human knowledge was basically a subject-object dichotomy, mediated by intuition: "In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear, that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them, is by means of intuition." After making the point, he proceeds to: "take away from this intuition all that belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain but pure intuition, and the mere form of phenomena, which is all that the sensibility can afford *a priori*." He then concludes that: "there are two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge *a priori*, namely, space and time." ('Critique of Pure Reason' A 19–22, B 33–36).

Although Hegel is unable to accept Kant's dichotomy as being *basic* in any very meaningful sense (note 5, 14), he does approve of his procedure and his conclusion as being a valid approach to and statement of the way in which the

natural ego is *conscious* of what is spatial and temporal. Reconstructed as a progression in degree of complexity, what Kant had grasped is the 'matter' of the ego's involvement with sensations, its being conscious of the 'form' of 'immediate externality' or the 'being-in-itself', and the analytical significance of breaking this form down into the components of space and time.

Since Hegel has good grounds for regarding it as essential that a distinction should be drawn between being *conscious* of an *objectivity* and *intuiting* objectivity as the *other of itself* (note 35, 10), he is obliged to classify Kant's enquiry as concerned with consciousness, not intuition. In Phil. Nat. I.223–236 (Enc. §§ 254–259), he treats space and time as basic to the general sphere of mechanics, and as the immediate presuppositions of motion (§ 260), inertia (§ 263), impact (§ 265) etc. It is, therefore, only in a very restricted sense that he accepts Kant's assertion that space and time involve the difference between objectivity and a distinct subjective consciousness, and in the Hist. Phil. (III.435) he criticizes him severely for implying that this is so: "Kant maintains that there are things-in-themselves outside, but devoid of time and space; consciousness now comes, and it has time and space beforehand present in it as the possibility of experience, just as in order to eat it has mouth and teeth, etc., as conditions necessary for eating. The things which are eaten have not the mouth and teeth, and as eating is brought to bear on things, so space and time are also brought to bear on them; just as things are placed in the mouth and between the teeth, so is it with space and time." Cf. 'Critique of Pure Reason' B 178, A 139 – B 179, A 140.

35, 18

Enc. §§ 403–410; cf. note 5, 25.

35, 26

In the systematic treatment of sensation (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.157), it is pointed out that: "Since what is unmediated is a singularization, everything sensed has the form of a *singularity*." In the systematic treatment of space and time (Phil. Nat. I.235) it is pointed out that: "The dimensions of time complete that which is determinate in intuition in that they posit for intuition the totality or reality of the Notion of time, which is becoming. This reality consists of the abstract moments of the unity which constitute becoming, each being posited for itself as a whole, although under opposite determinations. Each of these two determinations is therefore in itself the unity of being and nothing; but they are also different. This difference can only be that of arising and passing away."

35, 33

The categories of being (Enc. §§ 86–98) and quality (§§ 99–106) have roughly the same systematic placing within the Logic (§§ 84–244), as space

(§§ 254–256), time (§§257–259) and motion (§§ 262–267) have within the *Phil. Nat.* (§§ 245–376), and as sensuous consciousness (§§ 418–419) has within the *Phenomenology*.

37, 15

Phil. Nat. I.229–236; 314–319.

37, 18

The subject-matter systematically analyzed in the Phil. Nat. (Enc. §§ 245–376) and the Anthropology (§§ 388–412), the immediate presupposition of the natural ego (note 5, 14).

37, 21

See the basic characterization of the natural ego in § 413: "The being-for-self of pure and abstract freedom lets its determinateness, the natural life of the soul, go forth from itself as being equally free, as independent object, and in that it first knows of this object as being external to it, ego is consciousness."

37, 23

Enc. § 96: "The readiest instance of being-for-self is to be found in the ego. We know ourselves as determinate being, distinguished in the first place from other determinate beings, and related to them. Yet we also come to know this breadth of determinate being as culminating, as it were, in the simple form of being-for-self. In that we say "I", we give expression to self-relatedness which is infinite, and at the same time negative."

37, 29

Feeling is characterized in the Anthropology (Enc. §§ 403–410) as a level of *sub-consciousness*, still fairly closely dependent upon what is physical. It is treated as being more inwardly co-ordinated than sensation (§§ 399–402), but as not yet having excluded from itself all that is physical or natural, and as therefore falling short of the ego in degree of inner co-ordination (notes 5,26 and 19, 9).

37, 35

In Enc. §§ 123–130, *thing, matter* and *form* are treated as categories closely related to existence. In § 124 Kant's 'thing-in-itself' is discussed, and treated as what is merely *implicit*, (an sich), what still has to be grasped in its full complexity: "If no progression is made beyond the mere implicitness of general objects, they are conceived of not in their truth, but in the onesided form of mere abstraction." The "thing which has many properties" therefore constitutes a clear progression beyond the *general object* dealt with in § 418.

37, 37

The categories of *reflection*, – identity, difference, diversity, positive and negative, ground and existence etc. are systematically analyzed within the general sphere of essence (Enc. §§ 112–159). Hegel is here calling attention to the fact that they presuppose and are therefore more complex than the categories of *being*, which predominate in the subject-matter dealt with in § 418 (note 35, 33).

38, 5

Heid. Enc. § 336.

39, 18

This is probably a reference to the transition from sensation to feeling (Enc. §§ 401–404), see note 37, 29. It could, however, be a reference to the transition *within* the general sphere of the feeling soul from magnetic somnambulism to self-awareness (Enc. §§ 406–407). Cf. Phil. Sub. Sp. III.159–323.

39, 27

The emphasis here is quite evidently upon 'form', not 'insignificant'. Psychic *levels* more insignificant than feeling are dealt with in Enc. §§ 388–402. Cf. § 403 "In that it feels, the soul is inwardly and no longer merely naturally individualized; this *being-for-self* of the soul, which in the merely substantial totality is at first formal, has to be made independent and liberated."

39, 29

See Hegel's criticism (Hist. Phil. III.421) of F. H. Jacobi (1743–1819), who maintained that we *know* things-in-themselves by means of an *immediate* certainty which requires neither proof nor demonstration: "If philosophy were to result in this it would be a poor affair; these determinations are merely forms, none of which has intrinsic truth. The form into which philosophy has in Jacobi's case finally fallen, which is that immediacy is grasped as absolute, manifests a lack of all critical faculty, of all logic." Cf. Enc. §§ 61–78, 178.

39, 35

Enc. § 398: "In order to know the difference between dreaming and waking one has only to bear in mind the Kantian distinction between the *objectivity* of presentation (its being determined through categories) and its *subjectivity*, and to be aware that what is actually present in spirit, because it is so present, need not be explicitly posited in its consciousness; just as there is no need for spirit to stand before consciousness in the form of proofs

of God's existence when it somehow feels itself to be exalted to God, although these proofs only serve to express the capacity and content of this feeling."

40, 31
Griesheim wrote 'Anderes', deleted the s, but failed to correct the declension.

41, 6
Unlike the subject-matter of the natural sciences, which is only mediated in this way through our knowledge of it (note 17, 21).

41, 12
Religion (Enc. §§ 564–571), social ethics (§§ 513–552), abstract right or law (§§ 488–502) etc. already involve a wealth of inner awareness, a vast complexity of experience and thought. Within the Philosophy of Spirit (§§ 377–577), the attempt is made to think it through systematically, giving due consideration not only to its broad outlines, but also to its details, to the widely variegated analytical work of the empiricists (note 17, 21). It is not surprising, therefore, that Hegel should have been acutely aware of the shortcomings of those claiming philosophical significance for their *immediate* knowledge of "such general objects" (cf. note 39, 29).

41, 14
God, right, ethicality are examples of such "internal general objects." Religious, legal, ethical attitudes change.

41, 17
To say that we have "*a great deal more* certainty in respect of external general objects" would be more accurate. Hegel's Phil. Nat., for example, is based almost exclusively upon the empirical sciences *of his day*. It therefore stands up quite well to analysis in the light of present-day scientific knowledge, but its empirical basis is, of course, dated (cf. notes 11, 6; 101, 16).

41, 27
Cf. Jena Phen. § 95, Sub. Sp. Notes 38. Hegel derived this illustrative instance of the way in which "immediate consciousness contradicts the universal" from Sextus Empiricus (fl. c. 200 A.D.), the codifier of Greek scepticism: see 'Against the Logicians' (tr. R. G. Bury, Loeb, 1935 vol. 2 p. 291) II.103: "Furthermore, when they say that the proposition "It is day" is at present true but "It is night" false, and "It is not day" false but "It is not night" true, one will ponder how a negative, which is one and the same, when attached to things true makes them false, and attached to things false makes them true." Cf. Enc. § 39; Hist. Phil. II.333–334; Klaus Düsing "Die

Bedeutung des Antiken Skeptizismus für Hegels Kritik der Sinnlichen Gewissheit" (Hegel-Studien' vol. 8 pp. 119–130, 1973).

42, 18
Heid. Enc. § 337.

42, 22
Griesheim wrote 'heutiges Tages'.

43, 1
This heading was first inserted in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia (1830).

43, 3
The implication here (cf. Sub. Sp. Notes 38) is that the literal meaning of the German word for perception is '*seize* in *truth*'. This is apparently plausible and philosophically useful, but etymologically erroneous. Its original meaning was 'to seize *visually*' or 'be *aware* of'.

43, 8
Empirical, not systematic knowledge. One might, for example, have a thorough and detailed knowledge of the chemistry of animal nutrition (Phil. Nat. III.156), but no idea of the systematic relationship in which it stands to chemistry in general, or to the chemical aspects of mineralogy, botany, therapy etc. (note 31, 16).

Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.29) publishes an extremely useful explanation of this point, which he probably derived from the lectures on 'Anthropology and Psychology' delivered during the Winter Terms of 1827/8 or 1829/30: "*Simple sensuous* consciousness merely *knows* things, simply indicates them in their immediacy. *Perception* grasps their connection however, and by showing that the presence of certain conditions has a certain consequence, begins to *demonstrate* the *truth* of things. This *demonstration* is not final however, but still deficient. Since that by means of which something is here supposed to be demonstrated is *presupposed*, it is itself in *need of demonstration*. In this field one therefore enters into the *infinite progression* of moving from *presuppositions* to *presuppositions*. – This is the standpoint of *experience*. Everything has to be *experienced*. If this is to be a matter of *philosophy* however, one has to raise oneself above the demonstrations of empiricism, which remain bound to presuppositions, into proof of the *absolute necessity* of things."

The fairly extensive treatment of perception in the Jena Phen. (§§ 111–131) arises directly out of the 'here and now' problem dealt with in the preceding section on sense-certainty (§§ 90–110), which Hegel subsequently classified as pertaining not to phenomenology but to psychology (notes 33, 12 and 35, 10). In the Heid. Enc. (§ 337), this earlier treatment is replaced by the

assessment of Kant's philosophy. The final emphasis upon the importance of taking presuppositions into consideration when assessing the significance of perception, though evidently a marked feature of the later Berlin lectures, is not yet apparent in 1825, and was never incorporated into the printed text of the Encyclopaedia.

43, 16

It is apparent from Hist. Phil. III.439–441 (cf. Enc. §§ 42–43), that the particular part of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' Hegel has in mind here is that in which Kant puts forward his conception of the way in which "experience gives rise to the objective reality of our *a priori* cognitions" (A 131, B 170 – A 226, B 274). This assessment of Kant's philosophy first appeared in the Heid. Enc. (§ 337). It remained unaltered in the second (1827) and third (1830) editions (§ 420), apart from the substitution of 'certain categories' for 'determinations of the understanding' and the insertion of 'necessary' into the same phrase. It looks as though this alteration was probably due to a closer reading of the following passage (A 159, B 198): "Even the laws of nature, if they are contemplated as principles of the empirical use of the understanding, possess also a characteristic of necessity, and we may therefore at least expect them to be determined upon grounds which are valid *a priori* and antecedent to all experience. But all laws of nature, without distinction, are subject to higher principles of the understanding, inasmuch as the former are merely applications of the latter to particular cases of experience. These higher principles alone therefore give the conception, which contains the necessary condition, and, as it were, the exponent of a rule; experience on the other hand, gives the case which comes under the rule."

Kant proceeds (A 160, B 199 – A 226, B 274) to enumerate the "principles of the pure understanding", which he conceives of as the rules for the objective employment of the logical categories: 1) *axioms of intuition*, the principle of which is that all intuitions are extensive quantities; 2) *anticipations of perception*, the principle of which is that in all phenomena, that which is real, an object of sensation, has intensive quantity, a degree; 3) *analogies of experience*, the principle of which is that experience is only possible through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions; 4) *the postulates of empirical thought*: a) that which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition and conception) of experience is *possible*; b) that which coheres with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is *real*; c) that is *necessary*, the coherence of which with the real is determined according to universal conditions of experience.

It is evidently these 'principles' that Hegel regards as constituting "the standpoint of our ordinary consciousness and to a greater or lesser extent of the sciences" (cf. note 17, 21). In the Hist. Phil. (III.441), he praises the connecting of logical categories and sensuous perception as "one of the most

attractive aspects of the Kantian philosophy", but then goes on to criticize Kant for not having grasped the full implications of this unification of both aspects of knowledge: "Knowledge itself is in fact the unity and truth of both moments; but with Kant the thinking understanding and sensuousness are both something particular, and they are united in an external, superficial way, just as a piece of wood and a leg might be bound together by a cord".

43, 17
Beginning of the lecture, Thursday, August 4th 1825.

43,20
In that nothing is subsumed under anything else (§ 418; note 33, 34). Hegel takes the 'truth' of anything to be the unity within which it is sublated or included (Phil. Sub. Sp. I. *146*).

43, 22
Hegel is quite evidently of the opinion that his criticism of F. H. Jacobi's manner of thinking (note 39, 29) had been very largely successful.

43, 29
In *practice* therefore, the 'seizing of the general object' by means of perception precedes the 'emergence of the categories'. The practical basis or foundation of the sciences is empiricism. *Systematically* considered, however, the treatment of logical categories (Enc. §§ 84–244) precedes the treatment of the natural sciences (§§ 245–376), which, in turn, precedes the philosophy of spirit (§§ 377–577). Yet the same system pervades the whole, and does not imply that any one of these three main divisions can be regarded as playing a regulative role in determining the structure of the other two.

44, 18
Heid. Enc. § 338.

45, 4
The logical categories predominating in perceptive consciousness, in the sciences, are those of *essence* (Enc. §§ 112–159), – identity and difference, content and form, cause and effect etc., – most of which are explanatory. The categories of being (§§ 84–111) are predominantly *descriptive*, those of the Notion (§§ 160–244), predominantly *self-explanatory*.

45, 14
By referring to this linking of singular and universal as a 'mixture', and calling attention to universality's having a better claim than single things to being the essence and ground of perception, Hegel is criticizing the Kantian conception of the matter (note 43, 16) from the standpoint of the Notion,

which demands a *systematic* exposition of the levels of complexity implicit in knowledge of this kind (note 43, 22).

45, 17

This last sentence was first included in the third edition of the Encylopaedia (1830). It is evident from the scantiness of the jottings relating to this § in Sub. Sp. Notes 39, as well as the fact that even when taken together, Griesheim and Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.31) fail to provide much additional material, that Hegel must have tended to overlook it in the lecture-room. He probably felt that entering too deeply into the merits and demerits of the basically Kantian conception of perception he was classifying, would have involved an unwarranted digression from the main theme of analyzing and expounding *consciousness*.

This neglect in the lecture-room probably accounts for the inclusion of this sentence in 1830. Enc. §§ 123–130 are concerned with the general categories employed when *things* such as chemical compounds, minerals, living bodies etc. are analyzed into their components. Enc. §§ 194–212 are concerned with the general categories employed when the *object* is treated both analytically and as a concrete totality. It is pointed out that the ostensibly 'contradictory' categories of mechanism, chemism, teleology will all 'emerge' as aspects of the object in the course of such a treatment.

45, 29

Cf. note 45, 14. Bew. (1808/9) §§ 8–10 and Bew. (1809) §§ 13–16 contain concise but comprehensive statements of the mature treatment of perception, but no reference to Kant.

45, 30

This heading was first inserted in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia (1830). The § was formed by combining §§ 339 and 340 of the Heid. Enc., the first of which constituted the completion of an attempt to treat perception triadically. The only addition to the original text is the second word. Any succeeding level might be characterized as the 'truth' of perception (note 43, 20), but since it is the *immediate presupposition* (note 43, 8) of the understanding, the understanding is its *proximate* truth.

46, 10

Heid. Enc. § 339.

46, 26

Heid. Enc. § 340.

47, 2

The categories of *appearance*, – content and form, the whole and its parts, force and its expression, interior and exterior, – are dealt with in Enc. §§ 131–141. Hegel comments as follows upon their general significance (§ 131 Add.): "Appearance is in every way a very important stage of the logical Idea, and it can be said that philosophy distinguishes itself from ordinary consciousness in that it regards as mere appearance what the latter takes to be a self-subsistent being . . . In the history of modern philosophy, *Kant* has the merit of having first rehabilitated this distinction between ordinary and philosophic consciousness. In so far as he only conceived of appearance in a subjective sense however, and fixed the abstract essence outside it as the *thing-in-itself* which is inaccessible to our cognition, he stopped half-way."

47, 3

Cf. §§ 418–421.

47, 9

Perception, as characterized by Kant (note 43, 16), provides the immediate presupposition for the cognition of these laws.

47, 12

Cf. note 45, 30.

47, 19

Cf. note 47, 2.

47, 24

To say that the 'result' of appearance is necessity and to enlarge upon the statement by referring to actuality etc., is to invoke the sequence of categorial relationships worked out in the Logic – appearance (Enc. §§ 131–141), actuality (§§ 142–159), necessity (§§ 147–149). It does not imply, however, that the perception-understanding relationship in question is being interpreted *solely* in accordance with the Logic. The logical sequence indicates the *universal significance* of the phenomenological one, it does not *predetermine, regulate* or provide the *basis* for the interpretation of it. Both sequences were formulated as the result of analytical and synthetic work on their particular contexts.

47, 32

Analogous in this to the ego (§§ 413–415), which sublates the multiplicity of levels systematically expounded in the Anthropology (note 5, 25).

48, 9
Heid. Enc. § 340.

49, 1
Hegel distinguishes (L. Logic 546–550) between *immediate* or formal and *determinate* or real necessity: "The necessity which has resulted is *formal* because its moments are formal; that is, they are simple determinations which are a totality only as an immediate unity or as an immediate conversion of the one into the other, and thus do not have the shape of self-subsistence . . . Real necessity is *determinate* necessity; formal necessity does not yet possess any content and determinateness. The *determinateness* of necessity consists in its negation, contingency, within itself."

49, 11
The object is "mixed with reflectional determinations" through being thought of by the ego (cf. § 419).

49, 14
Distinguished from what the ego knows of necessity.

49, 17
A determinate or real law as distinct from the general, immediate or formal law of necessity (note 49, 1).

49, 21
This point is clarified in Jena Phen. §§ 150–151. Basing itself upon sensuousness and perception, the understanding becomes conscious of a multiplicity of specific laws, which it then allows to collapse into one law: "just as, for example, the law by which a stone falls, and the law by which the heavenly bodies move, have been grasped as one law" (Phil. Nat. I.272). Both specific laws and law as such have to be transcended however: "The pure Notion of law as universal attraction must, to get its true meaning, be grasped in such a way that in it, as what is absolutely simple or unitary, the differences present in law as such themselves return again *into the inner world as a simple unity*. This unity is the inner *necessity* of the law."

49, 23
Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.33) publishes material which makes this point more clearly: "The essence of a law, be it of external nature or of the ethical world order, consists of an *indivisible unity*, an *internal* and *necessary connection* between *different* determinations. It is through law therefore, that *crime* is necessarily bound up with *punishment*. To the criminal this is something that may well appear to be alien, but as its opposite, punishment is essential to the

Notion of crime. The same applies to external nature. For example, the well-known law of planetary motion according to which the squares of the times of the revolution are as the cubes of the distances, also has to be grasped as an internal and necessary unity of different determinations. It is true that this unity is first grasped by *reason*, by speculative thinking, but it is the *understanding* consciousness which first discovers it in the multiplicity of appearances."

For a fuller treatment of the specific instances he cites, see: Phil. Nat. I.271, – it is probably the case that none of Kepler's laws would have been discovered had he not had the observations of Tycho Brahe at his disposal; Phil. Nat. II. 99–112 (magnetism); Phil. Right §§ 209–229 (the administration of justice).

49, 25

One is not violating any essential aspect of Hegel's thought or language if one takes negation to be synonymous with sublation (note 19, 15). The conclusion of the syllogism sublates or negates its premises for example (Enc. § 192), the organism sublates or negates the mechanical, physical or chemical factors into which it can be analyzed (Enc. § 337), the soul sublates or negates the natural world (Phil. Sub. Sp. I.131) etc. *Absolute* negativity is, therefore, the complete sublation of all presuppositions. Spirit, for example: "is *absolute negativity*, for the Notion has its complete external objectivity in nature, and has become identical with itself in that this its externalization has been sublated' (Enc. § 381). Cf. Phil. Sub. Sp. I.*31–32*; II.5; III.93; 221; 223; 271: Enc. § 204.

49, 29

Cf. note 49, 21.

49, 35

The 'initial' is the most *basic, simple* or *general* form of law. Sub. Sp. Notes 39–40 show that Hegel drew attention to the way in which irrelevant particularities are eventually resolved within an all-embracing generalization, and that nearly all his examples of this were drawn from the natural sciences: Newton's law of gravitation, "every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force that varies inversely as the squares of the distances between them and directly as the products of their masses," removed the need for separate considerations of the movements and relative positions involved in mechanical motion (cf. Phil. Nat. I.260). Kepler's law that, "the planets move about the sun in ellipses, in one focus of which is the sun", removed the need for separate consideration of the movements and relative positions involved in planetary motion (cf. Phil. Nat. I.263). Coulomb's law of magnetic action, "the force of attraction or repulsion

between two poles varies inversely as the squares of the distance between them", removed the need for further random experimentation (cf. Phil. Nat. II.99). According to Hegel, Goethe's law that colour results from the imposition of brightness upon darkness or vice versa, removed the need for postulating the composite nature of white light (cf. Phil. Nat. II.135). Dufay's law that, "positive and negative electricities repel themselves and attract each other" removed the need for attempting to discover the nature of electricity by investigating the electrical properties of such substances as glass, crystal, wood, amber, silk, paper etc. (cf. Phil. Nat. II.167).

50, 4
Heid. Enc. § 341.

50, 35
Heid. Enc. § 343.

51, 2
The first part of this § is identical with Heid. Enc. § 341. It is evident from the fact that the last two sentences replace Heid. Enc. §§ 342 and 343, that a significant development in the exposition of the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness took place after 1825. The material published by Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.35–37) seems to indicate that this development involved further *clarification* of the significance of the difference between being conscious of inorganic laws and being conscious of other conscious beings: "In the Paragraph above, the *inner difference* constituting the essence of *law* is said to be a *difference* which is *no difference*. The same is true of the difference existing in the self-confronting *ego*. Law is differentiated not merely with regard to something *else* but *within itself*; it is self-identical in its difference. So also is the ego, which by knowing of itself has itself as general object. Consequently, since it is as *understanding* that consciousness knows of *laws*, it relates itself to a general object in which the ego recovers the counterpart of its own self, and is therefore on the point of developing into *self-consciousness as such*."

On the 'judging' of the ego, see note 3, 22. The 'disappearance' of that which maintains this division is as yet only to be regarded as 'implicit' (abstract, basic), since its various levels of increasing complexity have not yet been systematically expounded (§§ 424–438).

51, 10
That is to say that it is *homogeneously unified* with that from which it differs (note 49, 35).

51, 12

Cf. § 415: "Consequently, consciousness appears to be differently determined according to the variety of the general object given, and its progressive formation to be an alteration of the determinations of its object."

51, 14

Being conscious of laws is the highest accomplishment of perception (§ 421), and constitutes the point of departure for the progression within the general sphere of the understanding (§§ 422, 423) from consciousness of inorganic laws to consciousness of organic laws and consciousness.

51, 28

On the philosophical significance of the organism, see notes 5, 14, 31, 8 and 49, 25. Kant ('Critique of Judgement' II.22, 24) had pointed out that: "An organized being is not a mere machine. For a machine has solely *motive power*, whereas an organized being possesses inherent *formative* power, and such, moreover, as it can impart to material devoid of it – material which it organizes . . . Organisms are, therefore, the only beings in nature that, considered in their separate existence and apart from any relation to other things, cannot be thought possible except as ends of nature. It is they, then, that first afford objective reality to the conception of an *end* that is an end of *nature* and not a practical end."

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of this insight for the whole of Hegel's central philosophical development. See Enc. § 204 (cf. L. Logic 734–740): "By end however we must not at once, nor must we ever merely, think of the form which it has in consciousness as a mode of mere mental representation. By means of the notion of *inner* design Kant has resuscitated the Idea in general and particularly the idea of life. Aristotle's definition of life virtually implies inner design, and is thus far in advance of the notion of design in modern teleology, which had in view *finite* and *outward* design only."

51, 32

The organism (Enc. § 161) provided Hegel with the natural model for the logical category of the Notion: "The movement of the Notion is *development*: by which that only is explicit which is already implicitly present. In the world of nature it is organic life that corresponds to the stage of the Notion."

51, 34

Cf. note 31, 8.

51, 36

The precise nature of the central idea here, the ego's recognizing an already

well-delineated adumbration of itself in the organism, is more accurately expressed in § 423 (note 51, 2).

52, 13
Heid. Enc. § 343.

53, 4
§ 413.

53, 11
On the basic significance of this for the systematic exposition of the *organic sciences*, see Enc. § 337 (Phil. Nat. III). The systematic significance of the generalized *logical category* of life is dealt with in Enc. §§ 216–222.

53, 15
The second and last sentence of Heid. Enc. § 343. The transition *to the following sphere of self-consciousness* is more effectively formulated by the observation (§ 423) that: "In this general determination of form there is an *implicit* disappearance of that which maintains the mutual *independence* of subject and object."

53, 17
On intuition and immediacy, see notes 35, 10 and 49, 1.

A significant development is apparent in Hegel's conception of the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness by means of the understanding. In the Jena Phen. (§§ 132–163) he was concerned primarily with the understanding and co-ordination of physical laws by means of the concept of force, which he subsequently classified as a category of essence (Enc. §§ 136–137; cf. note 49, 21). The subject was given a comparatively extensive treatment in Bew. (1808/9) §§ 11–17 and Bew. (1809) §§ 17–21, and once again, the main emphasis was upon force and the understanding of the laws of *physics*, which provide the understanding with insight into "the inwardness of things."

In the Heid. Enc. (§§ 342–343) we find the earliest evidence of his having taken up the significance of the organism as the sublation of physical laws at this juncture. It is evident from Sub. Sp. Notes 39–41 however, that although he broadened his terms of reference when lecturing on the subject at Heidelberg and during the early Berlin period, he continued to illustrate the main thrust of his argument by means of the laws of physics (note 49, 35). It is not easy to date the change in his conception very precisely, but in these 1825 lectures the understanding of physical laws (p. 49) is clearly subordinate to the understanding of the organism (p. 51), and the significance attached to

this relationship was subsequently expressed more satisfactorily by condensing Heid. Enc. §§ 342–343 into Enc. § 423 (note 51, 2).

It is difficult to see why the formulation of this mature conception should have been so long delayed, for many exactly analogous transitions, the great majority of which were already firmly grasped at the beginning of Hegel's academic career, are to be found throughout the Encyclopaedia.

54, 10

Heid. Enc. § 344.

55, 4

The meaning of this sentence hinges upon the definitions of 'ground' and 'existence' provided in the Logic (Enc. §§ 121–124).

'Ground' (§ 121) is the unity of identity and difference, "the intro-reflectedness which to the same extent is extro-reflectedness and vice versa." As the preceding exposition (§§ 413–423) has made clear, self-consciousness is the unity of the intro-reflectedness of the ego and the extro-reflectedness of what was at first (§ 418) simply its general object, but which is now (§ 423) indistinguishable from it.

'Existence' (§ 124) is the immediate outcome of ground, so that, "what exists includes relativity and its own multiple connectedness with other existents." In this case, self-consciousness includes the relativity of consciousness and is inter-connected with what is indistinguishable from or identical with it.

Within the 'truth' (note 27, 31) of self-consciousness therefore, the disparity between the ego and its general object characteristic of consciousness has to be regarded as sublated.

55, 5

This sentence was first included in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia (1830).

55, 6

On the meaning attached to 'pure ideality' here, see Enc. § 95 and L. Logic 149–150. The antithesis between the ego and its general object, dealt with under the heading of consciousness (§§ 413–423), involves the 'realities' which, while not completely surrendering their mutual independence, now inter-relate within the 'ideality' of self-consciousness. This ideality is 'pure' in that it is not yet complicated by the further determinations now to be systematically expounded within the general sphere of self-consciousness (§§ 424–437).

Hegel's characterization of the ego = ego of self-consciousness as a matter of 'abstract freedom' is almost certainly related to his criticism of the *ethical*

and political philosophy of the Kantians, especially Fichte (notes 13, 32; 15, 11; 15, 19). In Fichte's 'Science of Rights', the attempt is made to deduce ethical, legal and political relationships from the basic principle: "that the practical ego is the ego of original self-consciousness; that a rational being perceives itself immediately only in willing, and that it would not perceive itself, and hence would also not perceive the world, and that it would therefore not be intelligence, if it were not a practical being" (p. 36). In his treatment of self-consciousness, and especially in his treatment of recognitive self-consciousness (§§ 430–435), Hegel ascribes significance to Fichte's enterprise as an excellent didactic illustration of certain modes or levels of inter-subjectivity. He was, however, too aware of the shortcomings of his confused (note 15, 2) and simplistic (note 5, 14) conception of the ego, as well as the complexity of the factors involved in legal, ethical and social relationships (Phil. Right; Enc. §§ 483–552), to take him at all seriously as a philosopher of anything but 'abstract' freedom.

55, 9

Enc. § 91: "Quality, as determinateness which is, as contrasted with the *negation* which is involved in but distinguished from it, is *reality*." In this case, since self-consciousness is its own general object, there is no 'contrast' between what is and its negation, and, therefore, no 'reality'.

Cf. Konrad Cramer 'Bewusstsein und Selbstbewusstsein' in D. Henrich (ed.) 'Hegels philosophische Psychologie' (Bonn, 1979) pp. 215–225.

55, 13

Cf. note 21, 15.

55, 18

The moments involved in 'immediacy' are: "simple determinations which are a totality only as an immediate unity or as an immediate conversion of the one into the other, and thus do not have the shape of self-subsistence" (L. Logic 546; note 49, 1). Living being is an 'ideality' in that it co-ordinates or 'discards' this immediacy: "the single members of the body are what they are only by and in relation to their unity. A hand, for example, when severed from the body is, as Aristotle has observed, a hand in name only, not in fact" (Enc. § 216).

In what is fully and truly alive, this immediacy is constantly controlled within the ideality, just as the blood is constantly controlled within the body. In what is diseased, however, the immediacy is no longer fully integrated: "When an organism is healthy all its vital functions are maintained within the ideality of its health; however, when its blood is diseased for example, an activity of its own is developed, and it becomes heated and inflamed" (Phil.

Nat. III.195). On sub-conscious drives and inclinations, see Phil. Sub. Sp. II.273, 307, 325.

57, 6

The 'subject' and not the object, only in the sense that: "consciousness appears to be differently determined according to the variety of the general object given, and its progressive formation to be an alteration of the determinations of its object" (§ 415). On its having 'raised itself', see notes 21, 36 and 17, 21.

57, 17

Cf. note 55, 6.

57, 21

Cf. note 55, 9.

57, 22

Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.39) publishes material, probably derived from the lectures on 'Anthropology and Psychology' delivered during the Winter Terms of 1827/8 or 1829/30, in which the full significance of this point is brought out by distinguishing between 'everyday' and 'comprehending' consciousness (note 17, 21): "This unity of the ego and the object constitutes the principle of spirit. In the first instance it is however only present in *immediate* self-consciousness in an *abstract* manner, and is still cognised only by *us* who consider it, not by self-consciousness itself. The general object of immediate self-consciousness is still merely the ego, not ego = ego. This self-consciousness is therefore not *free for itself* but only *for us*. It still knows nothing of its freedom, and has within itself only the *basis* of it. Truly *actual* freedom is still alien to it."

Cf. the criticism of Fichte's practical philosophy in Hist. Phil. III.499: "Fichte does not attain to the idea of reason as the perfected, real unity of subject and object, or of ego and non-ego; it is only, as with Kant, represented as the thought of a union in a belief or faith."

57, 25

On 'formal negation', see notes 49, 1 and 49, 25.

57, 27

Like the ego (note 5, 14), self-consciousness presupposes and includes its own general object.

58, 7

Heid. Enc. § 345.

59, 6

In the first instance, the sensuousness (§§ 418, 419), perception (§§ 420, 421) and understanding (§§ 422, 423) systematically expounded by comprehending consciousness within the general sphere of consciousness as such, were distinguished from one another by empirical consciousness' analyzing everyday consciousness into its constituent aspects (note 17, 21). This analytical and systematic work is also basic to the exposition of the desire (§§ 426–429), recognition (§§ 430–435) and universality (§§ 436–437) expounded within the general sphere of self-consciousness. Since Hegel is now dealing with a sphere which has as its background not Kantian speculation concerning the nature of *cognition*, but Fichtean speculation concerning the nature of ethical *activity* (note 55, 6), there is justification enough for making the systematic sequence easier to grasp by presenting it in the form of a *psychologically* motivated development, – hence this reference to the two main aspects of this 'drive'.

The drama into which the psychological 'motivation' develops, especially in §§ 430–435, should not cause us to overlook the analytical and systematic work on which this section of the Phenomenology is based, or the significance of its *systematic* structure.

59, 9

Beginning of the lecture, Friday, August 5th 1825. Heid. Enc. § 345 has no equivalent in the later editions of the Encyclopaedia, although a condensed summary of the lectures based upon it (Sub. Sp. Notes 41–42) was subsequently included in Enc. § 425. The text of § 425 as published here, also includes material from Heid. Enc. §§ 346–347.

59, 11

Cf. note 3, 22.

59, 21

Determinate being is only slightly more complex than *being* (Enc. §§ 86–95). If self-consciousness is not determinate it is simply consciousness, and it has, therefore, no being as *self*-consciousness.

59, 23

On the immediacy Hegel has in mind here, see note 55, 18.

59, 32

Cf. the first part of note 55, 6.

59, 33

Cf. note 59, 21. These are simply two ways of saying that self-conscious-

ness is self-consciousness: the former with reference to its general object, this with reference to its immediate presupposition. Since its general object is its immediate presupposition (notes 57, 27), the difference between them is all but negligible.

60, 38
Heid. Enc. § 346.

61, 2
Cf. notes 55, 6 and 55, 18.

61, 6
Cf. note 25, 30.

61, 13
This is an advance upon the almost completely tautologous definitions of self-consciousness noticed in note 59, 33.

61, 20
It is *comprehending* consciousness which grasps the diremption here and *ordinary* consciousness which does not (note 17, 21).

61, 22
From me as *everyday* consciousness. Cf. §§ 413–415.

61, 29
Within consciousness (§§ 418–423), the general object of the ego progressed into being its equal. Consciousness will now (§§ 424–437) progress into being the equal of self-consciousness.

61, 35
Cf. note 59, 6. On animal drives and instinct, see Enc. §§ 359–363. "The drive is completely determinate in particular animals; each animal has as its own only a restricted range of inorganic nature, which is its own domain, and which it must seek out by instinct from its complex environment. The mere sight of the object does not arouse the lion's desire for a deer, nor the eagle's desire for a hare, nor the desire of other animals for corn, rice, grass, oats etc. Yet these animals have no choice, for the drive is immanent in such a way, that this specific determinateness of the grass, and indeed of this grass, and this corn etc., is present in the animal itself, and it is simply unconscious of the presence of anything else. As the universal thinking animal, man has a widely extended range, and can treat everything as his inorganic nature, and as the object of his knowledge" (Phil. Nat. III.147).

61, 38
Cf. note 49, 25.

62, 11
Heid. Enc. § 347.

63, 1
Cf. notes 57, 27 and 5, 14.

63,5
Consciousness (cf. note 61, 29).

63, 17
See § 425.

63, 18
That which is 'of an ideal nature' is homogeneously unified with that from which it differs (note 49, 35). That which is 'of a real nature', on account of its reality, is distinct from and yet an aspect of a homogeneous unity (Phil. Nat. I.165). In this case, ego = ego is a homogeneous unity devoid, as yet, of any *real* aspect. Cf. L. Logic 149.

63, 25
Cf. §§ 418–423.

63, 30
Only an 'abstract freedom', the equivalent of that postulated in Fichte's work on natural law (note 55, 6), is achieved by consciousness. The spheres of theoretical (Enc. §§ 445–468) and practical (§§ 469–480) psychology, then lay the foundations for the realization (§§ 481–482) of the legal, ethical and social freedom of 'objective spirit' (Enc. §§ 483–552), analyzed and structured in such elaborate detail in the Phil. Right. The *comprehending* consciousness which grasps the relationships between these levels of realization is not to be confused with the *ordinary* consciousness involved in mutual coercion (§ 431), the handling of servants (§ 435) etc. (note 17, 21).

63, 37
The general theme of the whole Berlin Phen. is the progression from *sensuous* (§§ 418–419) to *rational* (§§ 438–439) consciousness.

63, 38
In Sub. Sp. Notes 42, these three 'stages' are referred to as 'processes', and reference is made to the three analogous processes (formative, assimilative,

generic) of the organism (Phil. Nat. III). This may account for the three stages of 'development' mentioned in Boumann's text (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.43).

64, 16
This heading was first inserted in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia (1830).

64, 24
Heid. Enc. § 348.

64, 31
Heid. Enc. § 348.

65, 24
The self-consciousness (ego = ego) developed out of consciousness (§§ 418–423) is confronted not with its equal, but with a mere objectivity. The stages by which the objectivity progresses to equality with self-consciousness have now to be traced.

65, 26
This exposition of 'desire' is quite evidently determined by the particular relationship between self-consciousness and its objectivity now under consideration. In any case, it is certainly not to be confused with the expositions of the animal's *instinctive* drive to satisfy need (note 61, 35), the *practical intelligence* of impulse (Enc. § 473) or the *social acquisitiveness* which gives rise to property (Phil. Right §§ 54–58). See Phil. Sub. Sp. III.249: "In § 426 we have seen that as *desire* belongs to *self-consciousness*, it occupies the standpoint of the as yet *unresolved* opposition between what is subjective and what is objective. It is something *single*, and only seeks what is *single*, for a *single*, momentary satisfaction. *Impulse* on the contrary, since it is a form of *volitional intelligence*, goes forth from the *sublated* opposition of what is subjective and what is objective, and as it embraces a *series* of satisfactions, is something of a *whole*, a *universal*."

In the Jena Phen. §§ 174–175, desire is used to *illustrate* the relationship between self-consciousness and its object without any attention being paid to its systematic derivation: "Self-consciousness is desire. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it explicitly affirms that this nothingness is *for it* the truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a *trüe* certainty, a certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself *in an objective manner*." In Bew. (1808/9) § 24, and especially in Bew. (1809) §§ 25–28, we find an attempt to provide desire with some systematic significance at this juncture by presenting it as the equivalent of the feeling involved in sensuous consciousness. Cf. Jena Syst. I.299;

III.203, 219. To some extent, therefore, this treatment of desire in the Berlin Phen. is evidently a leftover from the period preceding the full development of the mature Encyclopaedia.

65, 32

The Idea (Enc. §§ 236–244) is the most complex and comprehensive of all the categories assessed within the Logic, the immediate sublation of such clearly 'organic' categories (notes 5, 14; 51, 28) as life, cognition, volition (cf. note 93, 21).

66, 7

Heid. Enc. § 348.

66, 17

Heid. Enc. § 348 corresponds to § 426 of the later editions of the Encyclopaedia, but this sentence was subsequently included in § 427.

66, 30

Heid. Enc. § 349.

67, 3

Enc. § 60: "The things of nature are limited and are natural things only to such extent as they are not aware of their universal limit, or to such extent as their mode or quality is a limit from our point of view, and not from their own. No one knows, or even feels, that anything is a limit or defect, until he is at the same time above and beyond it." Cf. Enc. §§ 49, 92, 359; Phil. Sub. Sp. I.75.

Hegel is not denying the *possibility* of an unknown, but merely of our being aware of it. To know a limit could be to know no more than what is not beyond it. He is not saying that we can *actually* do away with the limits simply by being aware of them.

Comprehending consciousness must, of course, be *conscious* of the limits of the various levels of *everyday* consciousness. What Hegel is saying here, is that although consciousness itself is not aware of its negation or limit, comprehending consciousness is (note 17, 21).

67, 6

Comprehending consciousness transcends the limitations of self-consciousness by grasping it in its systematic context. Self-consciousness transcends its own limitation by drive and activity (note 59, 6).

67, 13

In the Jena Phen. § 109, this is associated with "the ancient Eleusinian

Mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus" and with the Eucharist: "He who is initiated into these Mysteries not only comes to doubt the being of sensuous things, but to despair of it . . . Even the animals show themselves to be most profoundly initiated into this wisdom, for they do not just stand idly in front of sensuous things, as if these possessed intrinsic being, but, despairing of their reality, and completely assured of their nothingness, they fall to without ceremony and eat them up." Cf. Phil. Nat. I.200; Hist. Phil. III. 455, where the animals, in this respect, are said to be less stupid than metaphysicians who postulate an unknowable thing-in-itself.

67, 17

For a more complete characterization of this adequacy, see note 65, 26.

67, 22

The subsequent progression in self-consciousness (§§ 428–437) consists of this *implicitness* becoming the *completed* identity of consciousness and self-consciousness (cf. note 65, 24).

67, 24

Part of this sentence was only added in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia, which may account for Boumann's Addition (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.47–49) throwing more light upon it that Griesheim's text: "The self-conscious subject knows itself to be *implicitly identical* with the general object external to it. It knows that since this general object contains the *possibility* of satisfying desire, it is *adequate* to the desire, and that this is precisely why the desire is stimulated by it. The relation with the object is therefore necessary to the subject. The subject intuities its *own deficiency*, its own onesidedness, in the object; it sees there something which, although it belongs to its own essence, it lacks. Since self-consciousness is not being but absolute activity, it is capable of sublating this contradiction, and it does so in that it appropriates the general object, which, as it were, merely pretends to be independent, in that it satisfies itself by consuming it, and since it is its own purpose, in that it maintains itself in this process."

67, 27

Since at this stage the general object is *implicitly* self-consciousness, the activity of self-consciousness in sublating it is its self-sublation. More precisely considered, this self-sublation is the way in which the general object, by exhibiting its limitations, the extent to which it remains a singularity opposed to the potential *universality* of self-consciousness (note 65, 26), progresses towards completing its identity with it: "Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything is finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable

and transient: and this is exactly what we mean by that dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite" (Enc. § 81).

It is not this *ordinary* consciousness, but *comprehending* consciousness which structures this finitude into the progression made explicit in Hegel's systematic exposition of the Phenomenology.

67, 30
Beginning of the lecture, Monday, August 8th 1825.

68, 3
Griesheim (300, 10) wrote 'zugegen das Objekt'.

68, 23
Heid. Enc. § 350.

69, 1
Cf. notes 49, 25 and 51, 28.

69, 3
Cf. note 67, 27.

69, 5
Cf. §§ 436, 437.

69, 6
This self-conscious 'intuition' is not to be confused with the 'formal thinking' of consciousness (note 21, 15) or the intuition basic to intelligence (Enc. §§ 446–450).

69, 12
Cf. notes 55,6, 59, 6, 65, 26, 67, 13.

69, 15
The model in mind here (note 63, 38) is evidently that of the *processes* of the organism which constitute the broad framework for the structuring of the organic sciences in Phil. Nat. III. The animal, for example, is an internally *formative* process of osseous, nervous, cardiac, digestive etc. systems (Enc. §§ 353–356), it functions both internally and externally in an assimilative process with light, air, food etc. (§§ 357–366), and it finds its fulfilment within the generic process of self-reproduction (§§ 367–376), which presupposes the other two.

Within the sphere of self-consciousness, the ego is initially the inwardly formative process of desire (§§ 426–429), it functions both internally and externally in the *recognitive* process with another self-consciousness (§§ 430–435), and it finds its fulfilment within the universal rationality and freedom of the process of *mutual recognition* (§§ 436–437), which presupposes the other two. Cf. note 67, 13.

69, 18

Cf. notes 65, 26 and 67, 27.

69, 22

The last part of this sentence, from 'in respect', was first published in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia (1830).

Just as the animal, in the assimilative process, is constantly seeking and devouring food, so desiring self-consciousness is constantly seeking new forms of self-satisfaction (note 69, 15). The logical category illustrated by such situations is that of the spurious infinite (Enc. §§ 93–94; L. Logic 138–143). Cf. the treatment of the pursuit of pleasure and the system of eudemonism in Enc. §§ 478–480 (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.259–265).

69, 31

Cf. note 61, 29.

69, 32

Cf. note 3, 22.

69, 36

In the unified self-consciousness of desire, the object was determined as a nullity (§ 426). Now, however, as a more complex level of being-for-self than the ego, self-consciousness reassumes the *basic dividedness* of consciousness (note 3, 22), and the general object is, therefore, no longer a nullity, but another self-consciousness.

70, 1

Boumann (Jub. 10.280) took the 'ihm' here to be the ego, but the 1827 text makes it quite clear that Hegel is referring to self-consciousness.

70, 9

Heid. Enc. § 351.

70, 24

Heid. Enc. § 352.

70, 31
Heid. Enc. § 352.

71, 2
As has already been noticed (note 65, 26), an attempt was made in Bew. (1808/9) and Bew. (1809) to provide desire with some systematic significance at this juncture by presenting it as the equivalent of the *feeling* involved in sensuous consciousness (note 19, 15). *Self-awareness* constitutes an important level (Enc. §§ 407–408) within the general sphere of the feeling soul (§§ 403–410) dealt with in the Anthropology (§§ 388–412), the immediate presupposition of the Phenomenology. Cf. Bew. (1809) § 28.

71, 4
The *immediacy* of the general object (note 49, 1) and the *singularity* of self-consciousness.

71, 6
Cf. Enc. § 163 and note 33, 25.

71, 8
Cf. note 69, 36.

71, 14
Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III. 53) publishes the following elucidation of this §, which he probably derived from the lectures on 'Anthropology and Psychology' delivered during the Winter Terms of 1827/8 or 1829/30: "In its *interior* aspect, or in accordance with the *Notion*, self-consciousness has negated its own immediacy, the standpoint of desire, by the sublation of both its subjectivity and the general external object. It has posited itself, with the determination of otherness, in opposition to itself. It has filled the *other* with the *ego*. i.e. *freed* what was *without self* as an objective *self-hood*, another ego. It is thus that it has placed itself over against itself as a *distinct ego*, and so raised itself above the selfishness of simply destructive desire."

Although the § was neglected during the 1825 lectures, it was carefully revised in both the second (1827) and the third (1830) editions of the Encyclopaedia, and the following material relating to it in Sub. Sp. Notes 44, shows that Hegel must have dealt with it carefully and extensively in his earlier series of lectures:

"a) Self-consciousness has desire; the satisfying *of desire* is its sublation; – in the Notion or in general. Sublation of the *immediate singularity*, whereupon the object of desire is merely the immediate *external – general object of consciousness* – an other – and at the same time intro-reflected – as in perception.

Object posited as what it is *implicitly*.

b) or a determinateness is posited in the pure self-consciousness of ego = ego. This is a true basic division, self-separation, itself *posited* through its activity – given a general determinate being. The other being posited *in self*, itself *as* the other, the difference between the object's being and the ego being sublated. The first activity yields determinateness, sublates the subjectivity, has produced itself – within the other.

Impenetrable matter – mediated idealism – not ego activity, dialectic – but the ego itself is this dialectic.

Origin of society in respect of consciousness."

71, 22

On the singularity of self-consciousness, see § 426 and note 71, 4. This sentence was first published in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia (1830).

71, 24

For other 'drives', with which this is not to be confused, see notes 61, 35 and 65, 26. Hegel was almost certainly led to postulate this kind of drive in this kind of context by his critical consideration of the significance attached to the *willing* of the ego in Fichte's 'Science of Rights', see note 55, 6.

71, 31

Cf. note 69, 36.

72, 9

Griesheim (302, 2) wrote 'daß sich finden'.

72, 30

Griesheim wrote ". . . auflöst, dieß ist nun . . .", see note 74, 11.

73, 7

Cf. note 9, 2.

73, 15

Cf. Fichte's deduction of the legal relationship in the 'Science of Rights' (p. 77): "I posit myself as individual, in opposition to another individual, by ascribing to *myself* a sphere for my freedom, from which I exclude the other, and by ascribing to *him* a sphere, from which I exclude myself – of course, only in the thinking of a fact and by virtue of this fact. Hence, I have posited myself as free a side of him without danger to the possibility of his freedom. Through this positing of my freedom I have *determined* myself; to be free constitutes my essential character."

73, 17

The natural ego is aware of the non-ego not only as an objectivity, but also as the *presupposition* of consciousness (note 5, 14). Within the sphere of consciousness as such (§§ 418–423), it is the material or bodily nature of the corresponding objectivity, and hence of the presupposition, which is systematically reconstructed (note 53, 17). It is consistent with the rest of the Phenomenology, therefore, that the process of recognition should begin with recognition of a bodily presence. Cf. Enc. § 410 (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.405): "I must not neglect what is due to the body. I must look after it, keep it healthy and strong, and I must therefore not fight it or treat it with disrespect. It is indeed precisely the neglecting and most certainly the mishandling of my body which would bring me into the dependent relationship of the external necessity of my connection with it; for by so treating it I would make something *negative* and therefore *hostile* of it, in spite of its being identical with me, and force it to rebel, to take revenge upon my spirit."

73, 27

Cf. note 69, 5.

73, 30

It is evident from Sub. Sp. Notes 44, that Hegel brought out this point not only with reference to the bodily nature of the objective being (note 73, 17): "Difference between the French and German character, – the former only respects a person in so far as he has shown his paces (sich bewiesen gesetzt hat); the latter is obliged (soll) to honour the abstract person in a person." Such national characteristics are dealt with in some detail in Enc. § 394 (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.65–83).

74, 11

Heid. Enc. § 353. Griesheim did not begin a new paragraph or a new sentence here (note 72, 30).

75, 4

Not, however, of the determinacy (note 49, 1) of its "absolute independence as a free singularity" (§ 436).

75, 6

I therefore gain recognition for *my* immediacy by sublating that of the *other*.

75, 9

In the Heid. Enc. (§ 353), this was the *second* sentence of the §, followed by

that which here precedes it. It is worth noting that 'corporeity' (note 73, 17) replaces 'universality' in the original.

75, 13

Those within the relationship constitute the *everyday* consciousness involved. We constitute the *comprehending* consciousness, which is expounding systematically what has been analyzed into its constituents by *empirical* consciousness (note 17, 21).

In § 430 Hegel tells us that what he is dealing with *is* the process of recognition, and in § 431 that it *is* a struggle. Both Griesheim and Kehler indicate, however, that in the lectures he observed that it was also *presented* as such, that is to say, that one had also to be aware of the distinction between everyday and comprehending consciousness when interpreting this 'process' (notes 59, 6; 69, 15 and 81, 32).

75, 15

On the 'ideality' of the objective being, see note 55, 18. The identity of the subject is also an ideality (note 5, 14).

75, 21

Cf. note 73, 15.

75, 24

Cf. note 73, 17.

77, 1

The operative word here being 'immediate' (note 33, 25).

77, 10

The ordinary social relationships "we are used to thinking about" are those which constitute the subject-matter of the Phil. Right (Enc. §§ 483–552).

The earliest appearance of Hegel's master-servant dialectic is in the 'System der Sittlichkeit' (1802; 1913 ed. pp. 445–447), where it is expounded in the context of such *economic* and *social* relationships as are dealt with later in Phil. Right §§ 189–208. In Jen. Syst. I.307–314 and Jen. Syst. III.218–222, it is given a rather more extended treatment in much the same sort of context. In each of these early instances therefore, it is evidently conceived of as an *analysis* of the *actual personal* relationships that subsist within society.

In the Jena Phen. §§ 178–196 however, as in Bew. (1808/9) §§ 27–30, Bew. (1809) §§ 29–37, Heid. Enc. §§ 352–357 and Berlin Phen. §§ 430–435, it is introduced as a level of self-consciousness, with consciousness as its major presupposition and reason as its major sequent. It is, therefore, used primarily in order to *illustrate* a level of *consciousness*, and so loses its analytical

character and much of the plausibility of the direct prescriptiveness implicit in the earlier expositions (note 59, 6).

77, 17

Phil. Right § 36: "The imperative of right is: 'Be a person and respect others as persons'."

77, 32

Determines the object as a nullity (§ 426).

77, 33

If the other ego *itself* is known as 'of an ideal nature', that is to say, homogeneously unified, this ego cannot have fully assimilated it (cf. note 9, 2).

79, 5

In the Aesthetics 1091, Hegel discusses idyllic poetry, with special reference to Theocritus, Virgil and Salomon Gessner (1730–1788), the Swiss Shenstone, and notes that: "it disregards all the deeper general interests of the spiritual and moral life and portrays mankind in its state of innocence." He attached no positive importance to the myth of the golden age (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.231, 498).

79, 10

Other immediate alternatives – stoicism, scepticism, the unhappy consciousness, are passed under review in Jena Phen. §§ 197–230, before finding their universal resolution in reason (§ 231 et seq.)

79, 12

Cf. note 61, 29.

79, 16

In order to expound the findings of empirical consciousness as a *progression*, comprehending consciousness has to begin by grasping them within their context. In this case, desire and recognition have to be comprehended as having their fulfilment in the freedom of self-consciousness. In that everyday consciousness is vaguely or instinctively aware of this fulfilment, it is assertive and imperious rather than analytical or comprehending.

79, 25

Cf. note 77, 10.

79, 28

Cf. § 435. Those involved in mutual recognition have to be conscious of the more basic master-servant relationship before they can honour one another.

79, 34

Beginning of the lecture, Thursday, August 11th 1825.

81, 6

Cf. note 77, 1.

81, 11

Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.57) publishes material, probably derived from the lectures on 'Anthropology and Psychology' delivered during the Winter Terms of 1827/8 ir 1829/30, which develops this general line of argument into a more forceful point: "Men must want to rediscover themselves in one another. This want cannot arise so long as they are confined to their immediacy, their naturality however, for it is precisely this that cuts them off from one another and impares their mutual freedom. Freedom therefore demands of the self-conscious subject that it should neither allow its own naturality to subsist, nor tolerate that of others, but that it should be indifferent to existence in that in its immediate and individual dealings it stakes its own life and that of others in order to achieve freedom. Thus, freedom has to be *struggled* for; merely to assert that one is free is not enough. At this juncture man only displays his capacity for it in that he brings himself, as he brings others, into *peril* of *death*."

In that death involves the dissolution of the *single* individual, it exhibits the supremacy of the genus or the *universal* (Enc. §§ 216–222; 375–376). This idea lies behind the important transition from Nature to Spirit (§§ 375–384), and evidently motivated the dramatization of Hegel's analysis of consciousness at this juncture.

81, 20

In Heid. Enc. § 354, this contradiction was simply said to be "greater", a concept which provided no clear indication of any systematic progression. The material published in Boumann's Addition to § 432 (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.59) clarifies what Hegel had in mind: "No recognition is established when one of the two contestants struggling for mutual recognition simply perishes, for the existence of the survivor is then as little recognized as that of the deceased. Consequently, death gives rise to the new and greater contradiction, in which those who have struggled and proved their inner freedom nevertheless fail to achieve the recognition of its existence."

81, 21

In what follows, Hegel explains this opening statement in terms of the necessary *psychological motivation* of the everyday consciousness involved. The other factor determining this ascription of essential passivity to self-consciousness is the overriding necessity of the *systematic exposition* being worked out by comprehending consciousness.

There is no evidence that Hegel had any *direct* knowledge of the works of Giambattista Vico (1688–1744), but see the 'Scienza Nuova' (1744; tr. T. S. Bergin and M. H. Fisch, Cornell Univ. Press, 1975) § 1108: "It is true that men have themselves made this world of nations . . . but this world without doubt has issued from a mind often diverse, at times quite contrary, and always superior to the particular ends men had proposed to themselves . . . Men mean to gratify their bestial lust and . . . families arise. The fathers mean to exercise without restraint their paternal power . . . and cities arise. The reigning orders of nobles mean to abuse their lordly power over the plebeians, and they are obliged to submit to the laws which establish popular liberty . . . That which did all this was mind, for men did it with intelligence; it was not fate, for they did it by choice; not chance, for the results of their always so acting are perpetually the same."

81, 26

Cf. note 73, 17.

81, 32

This would not necessarily be the case if Hegel were thinking solely of a *concrete* situation (note 75, 13).

82, 25

"seiner Beziehung auf sich selbst" was first added in the second edition of the Enc. Boumann first added "fest".

83, 19

The material included by Boumann in the Addition to § 432 (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.59–63) is extremely well documented in Sub. Sp. Notes 44–47, but was evidently omitted from these 1825 lectures. Two important points are absent from the present text.

The first concerns the *state of nature*: "In order to avoid eventual misunderstandings of the point of view just presented, it has also to be observed that the struggle for recognition in the extreme form in which it is here presented can occur only in the *state of nature*, in which men are simply *singular* beings. It remains alien to both civil society and the state, within which the recognition constituting the result of this struggle is already present." By 'the state of nature' Hegel evidently means the corporeal (note 73, 17) and anthropo-

logical (notes 5, 14, 5, 26, 73, 30) context of self-consciousness. He can hardly have been totally unaware of the use made of the concept in political theory however, and one can only assume that he regarded his students as able to distinguish between the systematic structure and the didactic or illustrative material of his expositions. Ludwig Siep, 'Der Kampf um Anerkennung. Zu Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit Hobbes in den Jenaer Schriften' ('Hegel-Studien' 9.155–207, 1975), has shown how difficult it is to interpret even Hegel's earlier treatment of the struggle for recognition (note 77, 10) as having predominantly political implications.

The second concerns the *nature of the duel*: "This struggle for recognition, which constitutes a necessary moment in the development of the human spirit, is in no way to be confused with the *duel*. Unlike this struggle, the duel belongs not to men in the state of nature, but to a form of civil society and of the state which is more or less developed. The duel has its proper historical context in the feudal system, which was supposed to be a juridical order, but which was so to only a very limited extent. Irrespective of what he might have done, the knight wanted to pass as without blame and free from blemish. The duel was supposed to prove that he had done so."

Duelling was forbidden in the German armies of the time, and it was common enough to condemn it as a means of settling differences. Hegel's attitude to it is probably also to be accounted for from the fact that in its organized form it played such an important part in the daily life of the often politically radical student associations of the time (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.375); note 91, 18.

83, 28

There is no mention of the socio-historical significance of mastery and servitude in Jena Phen. § 189, Bew. (1808/9) § 26 or Bew. (1809) § 34. The insertion of this reference in the Heid. Enc. § 355 is, therefore, a partial return to the original conception of the relationship (note 77, 10).

83, 32

Right, for Hegel (Enc. §§ 488–502; Phil. Right §§ 34–104), as for the Utilitarians, has as its immediate presupposition the reflective or rational pursuit of happiness (Enc. § 479; Phil. Sub. Sp. III.261). It also involves the possession of property, the capability of entering into contract, the possibility of committing crimes and undergoing punishment etc., and is, therefore, a far more complex level of human activity than the mere employment of force.

In the second part of this sentence, Hegel is referring back to the transition from desire to recognition (§§ 429–430).

84, 3
Heid. Enc. § 355.

84, 9
Griesheim wrote (308, 17) 'viele Einzelnen'.

84, 10
Heid. Enc. § 355.

84, 30
Heid. Enc. § 356.

85, 2
This final sentence was added in the later editions of the Encyclopaedia, probably in order to correct misunderstandings which had arisen on account of having apparently returned to the original socio-historical conception of the master-servant relationship (note 83, 28). Cf. Sub. Sp. Notes 47: "Natural relationships in the raw state of nature, forcing the woman. *Force* is not the basis of right, *right* is the basis of force. The right here is the freedom of the free self-consciousness which gives itself determinate being i.e. is recognised by others. Being recognised is the *determinate being* of the personality in the state in general."

85, 5
Cf. note 73, 17.

85, 19
According to Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.65), Hegel made reference here to his general conception of world history (Enc. §§ 548–552) as a progression in degrees of freedom: "It can be observed here with regard to the historical aspect of the relationship under discussion, that the peoples of antiquity, the *Greeks* and *Romans*, had not yet raised themselves to the Notion of *absolute* freedom, since they did not recognize that *man as such*, as this *universal ego*, as *rational* self-consciousness, is entitled to be free. Amongst these peoples man was only considered to be free if he was free*born*, so that freedom among them still had the determination of *naturality*. This is why there was slavery in their free states, and why, among the Romans, there were bloody wars in which slaves attempted to free themselves, – to achieve recognition of their eternal human rights." Cf. Phil. Hist. pts. I and III (pp. 223–340); Enc. § 482; and, on the significance of heroes (Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon etc.) in world history, World Hist. 82–89.

This historical material has its *systematic* placing elsewhere in the Hegelian system, and at this juncture cannot be regarded as anything but *illustrative* of the level of *self-consciousness* under discussion. In Bew. (1809) § 35, Hegel

brings out the point he is making with reference to Robinson Crusoe and Man Friday. Cf. the German translation of Defoe's classic by M. Vischer (Hamburg, 1720).

85, 21

The first part of this opening sentence was inserted in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia (1827). Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.63–65) publishes material, probably derived from the lectures on 'Anthropology and Psychology' delivered during the Winter Terms of 1827/8 or 1829/30, which throws light upon the reasons for the addition: "The relationship of mastery and servitude only contains a *relative* sublation of the contradiction between *intro-reflected particularity* and the *reciprocal identity* of various self-conscious subjects, for in the first instance the immediacy of particular self-consciousness is preserved in this relationship in the aspect of the master, and is sublated only in that of the servant. The naturality of life persists in both these aspects, but the self-will of the servant surrenders to the will of the master and adopts as its content the purpose of the lord. The lord for his part is self-consciously concerned not with the will of the servant, but simply with what is involved in his naturality, in keeping him alive. In this relationship therefore, the *posited* identity of the self-consciousness of mutually related subjects is only established in a *onesided* manner."

Cf. notes 73, 17 and 73, 30. To be concerned only with the *naturality* of the servant, with keeping him alive, is to be concerned only with his *bodily* or *anthropological* nature, not with his conscious being. As a matter of consciousness, such a relationship is therefore onesided, and so initiates its own sublation.

85, 28

This sentence was first published in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia (1830).

This satisfying of need involves more than simply keeping the servant alive. It consciously incorporates what is corporeal or anthropological, and so prepares the way for the rational resolution of divided consciousness which initiates the transition from Phenomenology to Psychology (Enc. §§ 438–444). Hegel's revision of Heid. Enc. § 356 and § 434 (1827) was evidently motivated by the desire to bring out the significance of this dialectical pattern.

Cf. Fichte's 'Science of Rights' 290: "The person, in acting, always presupposes his own future existence; the object of his present acting always lies in the future; and he is a cause in the sensuous world only in so far as he proceeds from the present to the future moment. Freedom and continued existence are essentially united, and he who guarantees the one necessarily guarantees the other. *Present activity includes the future.*"

85, 31

Sub. Sp. Notes 47 throw further light upon the way in which this theme was dealt with, probably during the earlier Berlin period: "In general, desire and need give rise to what is communal. This is the object of desire and is therefore a *universal*, not something which only has being for the being-for-self of the single person. Although the other self-consciousness, which is a moment here, is only a means, it is at the same time also purpose, – at a more comprehensive level. This is the syllogism of the mediation of satisfying desire, – the family as understood by the ancients, recognized within the state since the state is the extension of it."

86, 12

Heid. Enc. § 357. Griesheim wrote 'Zweitens, Nach'.

87, 5

The words Hegel has at his disposal for referring to the equivalents of this 'intuition' throughout the various levels of the Phenomenology have to be carefully considered with regard to the contexts in which they are used. The master's 'intuition' of his supremacy is by no means identical with the 'formal thinking' of consciousness (note 21, 15) or the 'intuition' of self-consciousness (note 69, 5), and Hegel can only be speaking by anticipation of the 'intuition' basic to intelligence (Enc. §§ 465–468).

87, 9

Will, as defined in Hegel's Psychology, presupposes thought and constitutes the transition from mere intelligence to practicality (Enc. § 468). It is, therefore, only by anticipation that he can refer to it here (note 89, 12). This presents us with no problems if we remember that mastery and servitude are being used in order to *illustrate* the dialectic of self-consciousness, that the prime objective is not to give them their *systematic placing* at this level (note 59, 6).

87, 11

Psalm CXI.10: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom: a good understanding have all they that do his commandments: his praise endureth for ever." Cf. Proverbs I.7; Jena Phen. § 195; Bew. (1809) § 36.

See the characterization of the worship involved in Judaism in Phil. Rel. II.206–207: "Since, then, self-consciousness, as distinguished from its object, which is pure thought and can only be grasped in thought, is empty, formal self-consciousness, naked and devoid of specific character in itself, and since, further, all real concrete specification belongs to power only, in this absolute contrast the pure freedom of self-consciousness is turned into absolute absence of freedom, or, in other words, self-consciousness is the self-

consciousness of a servant in relation to a master. The fear of the Lord is the fundamental characteristic of the relation which here exists . . . And this fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, which consists in not allowing the particular, the finite by itself, to have a valid existence as something independent . . . This wise fear is the one essential moment of freedom, and consists of being freed from all that is particular, in breaking away from all accidental interests, and in general, in the feeling on man's part of the negativity of all that is particular."

On the relationship between Hegel's early theological writings and the master-servant dialectic, see P. Asveld 'La pensée religieuse du jeune Hegel' (Louvain, 1951) 148–152; J. Navickas 'Consciousness and Reality' (The Hague, 1976) 81–130. Cf. notes 9, 10 and 105, 23.

87, 25

Cf. note 87, 9.

87, 29

Cf. note 85, 21.

87, 32

The way in which Hegel now goes on to *illustrate* this "principle of the wholly abstract ego" should not lead us to overlook his radical distinction between self-consciousness as such and the subject-matter of the Phil. Right (note 77, 10).

87, 33

Cf. Phil. Right § 261. The point is made that in the state *duty* and *right* are united in one and the same relation, but that: "In the spheres of personal rights and morality, the necessary bearing of right and duty on one another falls short of actualization; and hence there is at that point only an abstract similarity of content between them, i.e. in those abstract spheres, what is one man's right ought also to be another's, and what is one man's duty ought also to be another's. The absolute identity of right and duty in the state is present in these spheres not as a genuine identity but only as a similarity of content, because in them this content is determined as quite general and is simply the fundamental principle of both right and duty, i.e. the principle that men, as persons, are free. Slaves, therefore, have no duties because they have no rights, and vice versa."

87, 37

Not only with the well-being of his *body* (note 85, 21).

88, 17
Griesheim (311, 3) wrote 'nach seinen'.

89, 2
Cf. note 85, 31.

89, 8
§ 434.

89, 12
Cf. note 87, 9; Phil. Right §§ 5–32.

89, 16
Cf. note 87, 11.

89, 25
Cf. Phil. Right § 318: "Public opinion therefore deserves to be as much respected as despised – despised for its concrete expression and for the concrete consciousness it expresses, respected for its essential basis, a basis which only glimmers more or less dimly in that concrete expression. But in itself it has no criterion of discrimination, nor has it the ability to extract the substantive element it contains and raise it to precise knowledge. Thus to be independent of public opinion is the first formal condition of achieving anything great or rational whether in life or in science."

89, 28
See the assessment of education in the section on the stages of life in the Anthropology (Phil. Sub. Sp. II.113): "It has also to be observed, with regard to the *disciplined conduct* constituting one aspect of education, that the boy is not to be allowed to abandon himself to his own inclination. He must obey if he is to learn to command. Obedience is the beginning of all wisdom, for it is by means of it that the will which does not yet recognize and take as its purpose that which is true, objective, and which is therefore still defective rather than truly independent and free, will tolerate within itself the rational will which comes to it from without, and gradually appropriate it."

89, 38
Cf. Hist. Phil. I.158–163. Hegel's sources for the history of sixth century Athens were evidently Thucydides, and Diogenes Laertius' account of Solon. It is interesting to compare his interpretation of the developments he mentions with the popular account by Oliver Goldsmith (1728–1774) in 'The Grecian History' (2 vols. London, 1774) vol. I ch. 3. For a modern version, see A. Andrews 'The Greek Tyrants' (Cambridge, 1956).

90, 18
Heid. Enc. § 358.

90, 29
Heid. Enc. § 359.

91, 1
In the Jena Phen. §§ 197–230, stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness constitute the immediate resolution of the master-servant dialectic. In Bew. (1808/9) §§ 31–32 and Bew. (1809) §§ 38–39 however, they are already replaced by 'universal self-consciousness'.

91, 5
On negation see notes 19, 15 and 49, 25; on immediacy, note 49, 1. Just as life negates the immediacy of what is inorganic (p. 51), just as the ego negates the immediacy of the soul (§§ 414, 418), just as self-consciousness negates the immediacy of living being (§ 424), so now, 'universal self-consciousness' negates the desire which motivates the development of the master-servant relationship.

Although the structural pattern, the work of the comprehending consciousness, is the same in all these cases, the subject-matter or content, the everyday consciousness being analyzed, differs in degree of complexity. The 'universal self-consciousness' now under consideration may not yet constitute the *actual* complexity of activity and organization dealt with in Enc. §§ 483–552 and the Phil. Right, but its context within the Phenomenology clearly implies that it has at least some very broad and general relevance to the systematic consideration of the law, social ethics and politics.

Much of the Anthropology (Enc. §§ 388–412) is concerned with inter-subjectivity at a *sub-conscious* level. The intuition, language, pursuit of happiness etc. dealt with in the Psychology (§§ 440–482), are, looked at from a systematic point of view, quite clearly necessary pre-conditions for the legal, moral and social organization structured within the Phil. Right. Hegel had good reasons for not attaching too much significance to the political philosophy of the Kantians (notes 13, 32 and 55, 6). He is not likely to have been entirely insensitive to their attempt to influence social and political activity by means of their brand of ethical idealism however, and he was certainly aware of the extent to which their *practical* thinking constituted an attempt to establish a philosophically viable theory of *inter-subjectivity* (notes 15, 11 and 15, 19). There are, therefore, very good reasons for regarding this treatment of 'universal self-consciousness' as constituting the systematic assessment of what Hegel considered to be the intrinsic significance of the ethical and social philosophy of the Kantians.

91, 6

See note 63, 18 and Enc. §§ 155–159: "The determinations which are retained as distinct in reciprocal action are a) implicitly the same; the one side is cause, primary, active, passive etc., just as the other is." The categories of reciprocity conclude essence (§§ 112–159), the second main sphere of the Logic.

91, 12

See the previous note, and Enc. § 160: "The Notion is the *principle of freedom* as the substantial power which has being-for-self. It is *totality*, in that *each* of the moments is *the whole* which the *Notion* is, and is posited as in undivided unity with it. In its self-identity, it is therefore that which is *determinate in and for itself.*"

91, 15

Cf. note 91, 5.

91, 18

This last sentence was first added in the third edition of the Encyclopaedia (1830). The criticism of duelling (§ 432) was dropped from the 1825 lectures, and may well have been absent from the 1827/8 and 1829/30 series. This would account for the insertion. Since Hegel associated duelling with political radicalism (note 83, 19), the criticism of the political views of the Kantian (note 91, 5) J. F. Fries (1773–1843), in Phil. Right (preface), ought not to be overlooked when considering what Hegel had in mind here: "A ring-leader of these hosts of superficiality, of these self-styled 'philosophers', Herr *Fries*, did not blush, on the occasion of a public festival which has become notorious, to express the following ideas in a speech on 'The state and the constitution': "In the people ruled by a genuine communal spirit, life for the discharge of all business would *come from below, from the people itself; living* associations, indissolubly united *by the holy chain of friendship*, would be dedicated to every single project of popular education and popular service', and so on. – This is the quintessence of shallow thinking, to base philosophic science not on the development of thought and the Notion but on immediate sense-perception and the play of fancy; to take the rich inward articulation of ethical life, i.e. the state, the architectonic of that life's rationality – which sets determinate limits to the different circles of public life and their rights, uses the strict accuracy of measurement which holds together every pillar, arch and buttress and thereby produces the strength of the whole out of the harmony of the parts – to take this structure and confound the completed fabric in the broth of 'heart, friendship and inspiration'."

Cf. Sub. Sp. Notes 49 (§ 358, Remark).

91, 28

At the beginning of the Phenomenology (§ 413), the non-ego was 'impenetrable' for the being-for-self of the ego. In recognitive self-consciousness (§ 430), the other self-consciousness was 'unyielding' for self-consciousness. This impenetrability or unyieldingness persists at this level, but the component egos are now so 'formed' that the mutual exclusiveness it involves is maintained within an all-embracing unity. Consequently, we are now considering a level of effective inter-subjectivity, the subjective components of which have already assimilated objectivity (§§ 413–423).

Sub. Sp. Notes 49 indicate that Hegel paid great attention to formulating the significance of this point clearly and succinctly. Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.71–73) publishes a useful exposition of it: "It is therefore through the sublation of their *unequally particular singularity* that the interrelated self-conscious subjects have raised themselves to this standpoint, to consciousness of *the real nature* of the *universality*, of the *freedom* belonging to *all*, and so to intuition of their *determinately reciprocal identity*. The master who confronted the servant was not yet truly free, for he was not yet fully aware of himself in the other. Consequently, the freeing of the servant also initiates the completion of the master's freedom. In this state of general freedom, in that I am *intro*-reflecting I am immediately reflected in the *other*. Conversely, by relating myself to the *other*, I immediately relate myself to *myself*. Here, therefore, we have the mighty diremption of spirit into various selves, which in and for themselves and for one another are completely free, independent, absolutely rigid, resistant, – but which are at the same time identical with one another, and hence not independent and impenetrable, but confluent as it were."

92, 4

Griesheim (312, 22) wrote 'die-scher Schein'.

92, 21

Heid. Enc. § 359.

92, 30

Heid. Enc. § 359.

93, 6

See the definition of the Notion in Enc. § 160 (note 91, 12), and Sub. Sp. Notes 49: "Reflectedness. a) *Being posited* through itself. b) *Implicit* being, being posited through the free other – not like a show of essence – reflection."

Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.73) publishes the following exposition of the same point: "This is a relationship of a thoroughly *speculative* kind. If one is of the opinion that what is speculative is somewhat distant and incomprehen-

sible, one has only to consider the content of this relationship in order to convince oneself that this opinion is unfounded. What is speculative, or rational and true, subsists in the unity of the Notion, of what is subjective with objectivity, and this unity is clearly present at the standpoint in question."

93, 13

It is, therefore, this level of universal *self-consciousness* which *in fact* sublates the preceding spheres of consciousness (§§ 418–423) and self-consciousness (§§ 424–437). It should not be forgotten, however, that these levels of everyday consciousness are also being brought within their *systematic* interconnection by comprehending consciousness (note 17, 21).

93, 14

Cf. note 91, 28.

93, 16

Cf. note 25, 30.

93, 21

Cf. note 65, 32. In Enc. § 213, Hegel points out that: "in the Idea it is not a matter of this, or of presentations or of external things", that is to say that the Idea is not *simply* a matter of the correctness of any of the conceptions I might happen to entertain concerning the things about me. It is the final category of the Logic, sublating the *subjectivity* of judgements and syllogisms and the *objectivity* of mechanical, chemical and teleological or organic structures: "The Idea is what is *true in and for itself, the absolute unity of the Notion and objectivity*. The ideal nature of its content is none other than the Notion in its determinations: the real nature of its content is merely the way in which the Notion represents itself in the form of external determinate being, and by enclosing this shape within its ideality or power, maintains itself within it."

"At this juncture" therefore, the Idea is the fulfilment of the Notion in that comprehending (i.e. Notional) consciousness has succeeded in exhibiting the *subjectivity* of sensuousness and perceiving etc. (§§ 418–423), and the *objectivity* of desire, struggle, recognition etc. (§§ 424–437), as systematically structured or sublated within reason.

93, 22

Beginning of the lecture, Friday, August 12th 1825.

93, 28

Cf. note 91, 28.

93, 29
Since we are only concerned with Phenomenology or the dialectic of consciousness (notes 91, 5 and 91, 18).

95, 2
Individuals functioning in legal, ethical, social and political contexts (Enc. §§ 483–552; Phil. Right), and, therefore, presupposing a whole complexity of *psychological* factors such as intuition, imagination, wilfulness, the pursuit of happiness etc. (Enc. §§ 440–482; Phil. Sub. Sp. III.79–269).

95, 4
The first principle of Fichte's 'Science of Rights' (p. 31) is that: "If a rational being is to posit itself as such, it must ascribe to itself an activity which shall have its last ground in itself." Cf. note 91, 5.

95, 9
§ 436.

95, 12
The singularity of this subjectivity is therefore the immediate presupposition of the universality of reason. Boumann (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.75–77) publishes a useful exposition of the point: "At this juncture, the word '*reason*' merely signifies the unity of self-consciousness with its object. In the first instance, this unity is still *abstract* or *formal*; it is the foundation of what one has to call simple *correctness*, which is to be sharply distinguished from what is *true*. My presentation is correct in that it simply corresponds to the general object, even when this general object, on account of its being so inadequate to its Notion, is almost entirely devoid of truth. It is only when I am considering the *true* content that my intelligence assumes the significance of *reason* in a *concrete* sense. Reason of this kind will have to be considered at the end of the development of theoretical spirit (Enc. § 467), where we shall advance from an opposition between the subjective and objective more developed than any here, into recognizing reason as the *containing* unity of this opposition."
Sub. Sp. Notes 49 indicate that Hegel went on to consider the whole logic, nature, spirit division of the Encyclopaedia at this juncture:
"*All* that is objective is *implicitly* rational.
What is logical is *reason* in its simplicity.
Nature is *implicitly* rational."
It is certainly worth noting therefore, that in Bew. (1808/9) §§ 33–35, the reason which concludes the Phenomenology is treated as the immediate presupposition of the Logic.

96, 9
Heid. Enc. § 360.

96, 23
Heid. Enc. § 360.

97, 4
As is observed in § 437, this is in fact the Idea (note 93, 21). Comprehending consciousness exhibits the 'truth' of reason (note 25, 30) by indicating the precise relationships involved in the sublation of subjectivity (§§ 418–423) and objectivity (§§ 424–437) within reason (§§ 438–439).

97, 5
To sensuous consciousness (§ 418), this is still a 'general object', that is to say, general, unspecified, undifferentiated. To desire however (§ 426), it is already an 'object', in that it has a specific shape and stimulates drive, struggle, recognition etc.

97, 8
The precise form of this 'including' and 'encompassing' has already been specified in § 436. It constitutes a return to the pure ego's being "*one* aspect of the relationship and the *whole* relationship, – the *light* which manifests another as well as itself" (§ 413), the difference being that at this level the 'object' is not simply an undifferentiated objectivity, but has been analyzed into its constituent levels and systematically reconstructed by comprehending consciousness.

97, 15
Cf. note 97, 4.

97, 18
Hegel is evidently referring to the Kantian distinction between subjective awareness and the thing-in-itself (note 11, 33). Comprehending consciousness has now systematically reconstructed not only the subjective but also the *objective* aspects of Kant's dichotony (note 35, 15).

97, 20
§ 415.

97, 24
On the development of "the object given in consciousness" see §§ 418–423; on that of "the ego in self-consciousness" §§ 424–437.

97, 26

On "the dirempting of subjectivity" see § 424; on "infinite form" Enc. § 440 (Phil. Sub. Sp. III. 79–81): "*Spirit* has determined itself into the truth of the simple immediate totality of the soul and of consciousness. The latter is knowledge, which is now infinite form; as such it is not related to the content as to a general object, and is therefore not limited by it, for it is knowledge of the substantial totality, which is neither subjective nor objective."

97, 27

§§ 424–425.

97, 31

In the treatment of desire (§§ 426–429) and recognition (§§ 430–435) the basic relationship was that between *one* self-consciousness and *another*. The community of need (§§434–435) involved *multiple* inter-subjectivity however, and in universal self-consciousness, since what was being considered was: "the *substance* of all the essential spirituality of the family, the native country, the state" (§ 436), a progression had quite clearly been made into the field of "determinate difference."

99, 5

The reason now under consideration is therefore the full realization of the *comprehending consciousness* which has been expounding the various levels of *everyday* consciousness in their systematic connection throughout the Phenomenology (note 17, 21).

99, 7

§§ 423 and 436, notes 51, 2 and 91, 28.

99, 8

Cf. note 93, 21.

99, 10

§ 415 (note 11, 23); §§ 423–424 (note 57, 22).

99, 12

The subjectivity under consideration in the Phenomenology is that of the *natural* ego (note 5, 14). Although the precise nature of its development into the Notion and reason has now been traced, this natural ego remains part of the *everyday* consciousness systematically reconstructed by the *comprehending* consciousness (note 17, 21), which also has to deal with the solar system (Enc. §§ 269–271), the vegetable (§§ 343–349) and animal (§§ 350–376) organisms etc.

What is being dealt with here is therefore simply the natural, phenomenological or systematic origin, the most basic, abstract and general form of the reason which *motivates* the expositions of the whole Encyclopaedia. These expositions involve acquaintance with empirical disciplines which are, as yet, quite beyond the *scope* of the embryonic rationality now under consideration. They are not, however, beyond its competence. The systematic significance Hegel attaches to the reason now being dealt with might, therefore, be compared to that he ascribes to the ethical and social philosophy of the Kantians (note 91, 5).

He is careful to emphasize that the reason under consideration is indeed *Notional* however (note 99, 5), and the Sub. Sp. Notes 49–50 indicate quite clearly that at least in the earlier series of lectures, he made a point of bringing out its significance for the whole system:

"a) Soul, identity. b) Consciousness, concrete; moment of difference.

All that is objective is implicitly rational.

What is logical is *reason* in its simplicity.

Nature is *implicitly* rational.

Here we have reason which *is for itself*. – Since soul (implicitly reason) has the significance of substance, it is in consciousness and self-consciousness that we have this *ideality*.

The appearance of reason is universal self-consciousness i.e. in universal self-consciousness, love etc., ordinary consciousness has consciousness of a general object, of absolute subjectivity and objective subsistence.

Ego is not an other and absolute other – appearance in which the general object is only ego, only in this case. In reason the case is universal, although for us here the subjectivity is that of consciousness.

From this standpoint there are no longer any external objects, only not yet insight.

Significance for us, in our reflection."

99, 14

§§ 424–437.

99, 17

Just as, for the natural ego, the 'non ego' is not only an objectivity but also the presupposition of consciousness (note 5, 14), so for reason (note 97, 8), reality is its immediate presupposition, – self-consciousness.

99, 18

See note 93, 21. The idea 'possesses' us in that it involves a systematic reconstruction of what we are, as natural (Enc. §§ 245–376) and spiritual (§§ 377–577) beings. Cf. note 17, 39.

99, 20
Cf. note 5, 13.

99, 26
Cf. note 99, 5; Enc. §§ 236–244. Concentration upon the significance of reason here in the Phenomenology rather than the rationality of the Idea as the culmination of the Logic, might, therefore, help to raise the general standard of Hegel interpretation. It would certainly give rise to a clearer understanding of the relationship between the structure and content of the Encyclopaedia, especially in such a crucial field as the systematic treatment of natural sciences (§§ 245–376).

99, 29
Cf. note 99, 12.

99, 30
Intelligence or 'theoretical spirit' constitutes the first of the three major spheres of Hegel's Psychology (Enc. §§ 445–468). The general progression within it is that of degrees of inwardization. Hegel contrasts it with consciousness as follows (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.95): "Since *consciousness* is in *immediate* possession of the object, one cannot very well say that it possesses impulse. *Spirit* has to be grasped as *impulse* however, for it is essentially activity, and what is more, it is in the first instance the activity by which the apparently *alien* object receives, instead of the shape of something given, singularized and contingent, the form of something recollected, subjective, universal, necessary and rational. By undertaking this alteration with the object, spirit reacts against the onesidedness of *consciousness*, which rather than knowing objects, subjectively relates itself to them as to an *immediate being*."

99, 35
Cf. note 33, 25.

100, 22
Heid. Enc. § 361.

101, 6
If we emphasize the *objective* rationality of the world, we shall have a tendency to regard what is subjective as a source of error. We shall therefore tend not to emphasize, but to play down the inherent and potential rationality of *subjectivity* which has now been made explicit in the Phenomenology.

101, 8
The rational or Notional exposition of Nature, Anthropology and

Phenomenology is that carried out in Enc. §§ 245–439. It is the work of the *comprehending* consciousness (note 17, 21), not of the wholly abstract reason now under consideration (note 99, 12).

101, 10

Within nature as a whole, the *organism* is the Notion in that it is: "the totality of the inanimate existence of mechanical and physical nature" (Enc. § 337; Phil. Nat. III.9–14). The Idea, the culmination of the Logic (Enc. §§ 213–244), is defined with reference to such clearly 'organic' categories as teleology, life and will. The organism does not *comprehend* nature however, and even the most complex of logical categories are still more *abstract* than such extreme physical abstractions as space and time (Enc. §§ 244–259). The Notion of the Logic is therefore merely an abstraction, and the Notion of nature merely is. Only the Notion of Spirit has the potentiality of taking the initiative and comprehending its *entire context*, which includes both Logic and Nature.

101, 13

Cf. note 99, 17.

101, 16

This 'certainty' is based upon the *validity of the exposition* of the subjective and objective factors involved in the levels of consciousness antecedent to reason in the systematic progression worked out in the Phenomenology.

Hegel could not have argued that the *subject-matter* of his exposition had given rise to certainty, for he had quite obviously derived it from the contingencies of the cultural and philosophical tradition within which he was working (note 41, 17). It was the outcome of a remarkably comprehensive and perceptive survey of these contingencies, it had been sorted out into its component parts with a critical acumen hardly less illuminating today that it was a century and a half ago, but one would certainly be justified in remaining sceptical of the claim that the *subject-matter itself* can give rise to certainty concerning the nature of reason.

The certainty to which Hegel is referring derives principally (cf. notes 9, 21 and 97, 8) from the *reason* he is employing in analyzing and structuring this subject matter, from the hierarchy of levels elicited from this sphere by comprehending consciousness. Since the reason *now under consideration* necessarily involves the rationality of its systematic derivation, it differs from the preceding levels of the Phenomenology in that it exhibits the *complete* correlation of subject-matter and exposition.

101, 18

It is the 'absolute substance' in that it has structured the dialectical deriva-

tion of reason from consciousness (§§ 418–423) and self-consciousness (§§ 424–437) etc. It is 'truth as knowledge' in that it sublates (note 25, 30) and has the potentiality of comprehending (note 101, 8) that from which it derives.

101, 20
Cf. notes 97, 8; 99, 17.

101, 21
Cf. note 33, 25.

101, 26
Cf. note 101, 16. It is *universal* singularity in that reason possesses me, not vice versa (note 99, 18).

101, 27
Cf. note 101, 8.

101, 30
In that it is conscious of its systematic *derivation* within the Phenomenology (Enc. §§ 413–438). Although both the Anthropology (§§ 388–412) and the Phenomenology are included within the general sphere of Spirit (§§ 377–577), it is only at this level of reason that Spirit proper is reached (note 7, 15). Reason is therefore conceived of as the *initiation* of complete freedom from natural limitations and the subject-object antithesis (cf. note 99, 30).

102, 7
Griesheim (318, 9) wrote 'kein Angst'.

102, 11
Heid. Enc. § 362.

102, 18
Heid. Enc. § 362. Griesheim omitted the full-stop after 'verhalte'.

103, 3
This is only fully applicable to the knowing and thinking of the *Idea* (note 93, 21). One again (note 17, 21), the point may be conveniently illustrated by means of the chemistry of Hegel's day. A. F. Fourcroy (1755–1809) and L. N. Vauquelin (1763–1829) for example, discovered by experiment and therefore certainly *knew* (note 9, 10) that there was more phosphate of lime in horse-dung, and more carbonate and phosphate of lime in bird-mute than could be extracted from the food consumed (Phil. Nat. III.165). They did not know,

however, that the method of analysis they were employing was suitable for chemical (Enc. § 334) but not for bio-chemical (§ 365) investigators. They had no conception of the precise difference in complexity between what is chemical and what is bio-chemical, no knowledge of the *Notion* of the scientific disciplines involved, no inkling of the overall context of the subject-matter of these disciplines within the Idea. Their knowledge and thought processes, though by no means entirely incompetent or worthless, and in fact extremely relevant to a Notional interpretation of digestion, were not, therefoe, *rational* in the Hegelian sense.

Cf. D. C. Goodman 'The Application of Chemical Criteria to biological classification in the eighteenth century' ('Medical History' vol. 15 pp. 23–44, 1971).

103, 6

These are all levels of the succeeding sphere of Intelligence or theoretical spirit (Enc. §§ 445–468; Phil. Sub. Sp. III.79–229), cf. note 99, 30.

103, 10

The primary and basic attitude of thought to objectivity is, therefore, that of being convinced that when we reproduce the content of our sensations and intuitions in thought, we are conceiving of things as they really are. This, as Hegel notes (Enc. § 26), is the attitude of: "philosophy in its earliest stages, all the sciences, and even the daily action and movement of consciousness." On the empirical and philosophical attitudes also included within "the standpoint of spirit", see Enc. §§ 37–39 and 79–82; note 17, 21.

103, 11

Heid. Enc. § 362 was combined with § 361 to form § 439 of the second (1827) and third (1830) editions of the Encyclopaedia. The §§ dealing with Reason were also *revised* in both these later editions of the Encyclopaedia, but it is difficult to pinpoint any significantly new conception of the sphere.

There is a fairly close correspondence between Enc. §§ 438–439 and Jena Phen. §§ 231–239, although §§ 240–437 of this early work are also placed under the general heading of 'reason'. After 1808 the sphere was defined very much as it is in the Berlin Phen.

In Bew. (1808/9) §§ 33–34, reason is said to be the cognition of truth in that truth is the Notion's corresponding to determinate being. The difference between consciousness and the general object is said to be resolved in reason in that rational determinations are not only thoughts but also determinations of the essence of things. This provides Hegel with the transition to Logic. The Philosophy of Spirit (Enc. §§ 440–577), corresponding to Jena Phen. §§ 240–808, is completely omitted from this work.

In Bew. (1809) §§ 40–42, the general conception of reason is the same

(§ 40), but it is also taken to include a content which involves the essence of general objects, objective reality, and not simply that which we fabricate for ourselves through our presentation or thoughts (§ 41). This would seem to imply that at this stage at least, Hegel conceived of the rationality of consciousness as superior to the subject-matter of psychology, – a conception corrected through the exposition of thought in the mature Encyclopaedia (Heid. Enc. §§ 384–387; Enc. §§ 465–468).

Since Hegel evidently paid careful attention to reason in his earlier lectures on the Heid. Enc. (§§ 360–362; Sub. Sp. notes 50–51), it is not at all clear why Boumann should have failed to provide this crucial section of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit with any additional material (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.77).

103, 13

Cf. note 101, 18. The eliciting of the *form* of reason is the work of comprehending consciousness, the provision of the *content* of reason is the work of everyday and empirical consciousness (notes 17, 21 and 103, 10).

103, 16

See the treatment of the ego and its general object (§§ 418–423), and of self-consciousness and its object (§§ 424–437). These distinctions and levels are all structured within the 'substance' of reason, which only comes under consideration itself at this level (note 101, 16).

103, 18

Cf. note 101, 30. Fourcroy and Vauquelin (note 103, 3) were certainly capable of spiritual activity – they attended (§ 448) to their work, they recollected (§§ 452–454) what they had intuited (§§ 446–450), they associated (§ 456) recollections, expressed their findings in language (§ 459), and undoubtedly remembered (§§ 461–464) what they had accomplished etc. etc. They were not, however, fully aware of the reason *implicit* in all this spiritual activity.

103, 22

Cf. notes 97, 8; 99, 17.

103, 25

In Enc. § 140 Hegel treats this attitude as arising out of a confused conception of the categories 'inner' and 'outer'. He attacks it eloquently at the beginning of the Philosophy of Nature (§§ 245–246; Phil. Nat. I.195–205), at some length in the foreword to the second edition of the Encyclopaedia (1827), and returns to it in the opening §§ of the Psychology (Phil. Sub. Sp. III.83): "To assert, as people do, that one is unable to recognize truth is the height of blasphemy. Those who do this know not what they say, and if they

knew they would deserve to be deprived of truth. The modern despair of recognizing truth is alien to all speculative philosophy, as it is to all genuine religiousness."

He was probably incited into reacting in this somewhat exaggerated manner by the persistence with which the Kantians dogmatized about the postulated inaccessibility of the 'thing-in-itself'. Cf. notes 9, 10; 11, 33; 13, 32; 67, 3; 67, 13.

103, 29

Cf. notes 99, 30; 103, 10.

103, 32

§§ 418–437.

103, 38

In Enc. § 140 and Phil. Nat. I.203 (note 103, 25), Hegel endorses Goethe's criticism of the famous lines in 'Die Falschheit menschlicher Tugenden' (1730), by Albrecht von Haller (1708–1777):

> "Into nature's inwardness no created spirits steal,
> The sweet of mortal blessedness is to taste the outer peel."

He concludes his lectures on the Philosophy of Nature with the observation (III.213) that their aim: "is to convey an image of nature, in order to subdue this Proteus: to find in this externality only the mirror of ourselves, to see in nature a free reflection of spirit: to understand God, not in the contemplation of spirit, but in this His immediate existence." Spirit (Enc. §§ 377–577) is related to Nature (§§ 245–376) in the same way as reason (§§ 438–439) is to consciousness (§§ 413–437).

105, 2

§§ 418–419; §§ 422–423.

105, 5

Cf. note 101, 16.

105, 7

Comprehending consciousness supersedes the standpoint of *ordinary* consciousness (note 17, 21).

105, 10

Cf. notes 93, 21; 99, 18; 101, 16.

105, 13

§§ 418–423; §§ 424–437.

105, 15

That is to say, the 'other' of consciousness (note 13, 32), and the soul as both the general object and the presupposition of the ego (note 5, 14). The systematic exposition of this presupposition is carried out in the Anthropology (Enc. §§ 388–412).

105, 18

Cf. notes 5, 14; 67, 27; 73, 17; 93, 21.

105, 21

Cf. note 101, 16.

105, 23

John XVI v. 13: "Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come. he will guide you into all truth." Cf. John VIII v. 32: "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

Considering the context, Kehler's addition seems plausible. Hegel probably quoted from memory and confused the two passages. Griesheim may have checked the reference while writing out his final version. Cf. notes 87, 11; 103, 25.

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